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The Problem of the Subject of Knowledge

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The Problem of the Subject of Knowledge

Translated by Morten E. Jelby and Urai Satoshi

I

[327] That the significance of the originality of Kant's theory of knowledge is to be found in its having established the supra-individual I as the subject of knowledge, is today a well-known fact. Kant showed Berkeley to be mistaken in holding only the individual I to be real and the physical things of the outer world to be mere ideas of the I; he showed that instead, the individual I pertains to the phenomenal world just as the physical things do, and as the condition of these empirical objects¹, he argued for a supra-individual I, i.e., a consciousness-in-general, presupposed by the synthesis of the categories. This is what characterizes his objective idealism. In this way, he preserved the empirical reality of the physical things of the outer world, which had been negated by Berkeley's subjective idealism; and where he did not seek this so-called reality, or the veracity of knowledge in general, in the coincidence of the idea (觀念) with a transcendent thing-in-itself, but rather in the objectivity (客観性) of the synthesis, i.e., in necessity and universal validity, arose what is known as the Copernican revolution. One could say that the theory of consciousness-in-general, or of the supra-individual subject, constitutes the pivotal point of Kant's theory of knowledge. What is, then, this so-called consciousness-in-general? And how does this supra-individual I relate to the individual "I"?² According to Kant, the manifold (*das Mannigfaltige*) which we represent as something combined in the object, must be something that has [already] been combined beforehand by the subject.³ Independently of whether [this combination] becomes conscious

1. [Ob-ject: 対象, which generally corresponds to *Gegenstand* in Tanabe's vocabulary, as opposed to *Objekt* (客観). We hyphenate the former of these two terms in order to render the distinction clear.]

2. [We distinguish between 我 and 自我 by putting the latter in quotation marks (the "I"). The former can function as the personal pronoun as well as the noun, whereas the latter only functions as a noun.]

3. [Cf. KANT 1990, B 130.]

[to us] or not, the combination pertaining to the objective object becomes possible only on the basis of this subjective combination. What constitutes this subjective act of combination is nothing other than understanding. The categories are the concepts that express the forms which are the general criteria when understanding brings about this combination. But for the combination of understanding, the manifold of intuition to be combined needs something that is given as constituting a synthetic unity. Otherwise, combination would generally be impossible. Only when there is such a unity does the combination of understanding become possible too. This is why this synthetic unity is the fundamental condition of all categorial combinations of understanding, and consequently also the fundamental precondition for the emergence of all objective objects. This so-called synthetic unity is precisely the transcendental unity of self-awareness.⁴ All my representations can necessarily be accompanied by the self-awareness “I think.”⁵ [328] But this identical self-awareness comes about due to the fact that all representations are unified synthetically in consciousness insofar as they become conscious to me.⁶ Presupposing this synthetic unity, understanding too can thus bring about its combination, and experience also emerges in this way. This is the transcendental unity of self-awareness, which is also known as the transcendental apperception, the pure apperception, or the original apperception. The “I” which arises in this self-awareness thus becomes the precondition for all conceptual determinations and is thus itself yet devoid of any determinations, and as it accompanies any given representation as something formally identical, it is what Kant calls a “consciousness-in-general.” Since, just like other empirical objects, the individual “I,” too, only becomes possible on the basis of this transcendental “I,” or consciousness-in-general, these must be entirely supra-individual. But this “I” by no means exists as a substance. The combination of the category of substance too can only be constituted insofar as it presupposes this unity of the “I”; this combination needs the manifold of intuition as [its] matter. The I which is simply thought of as the [grammatical] subject of the judgment “I think,” is a purely formal concept which has no such content, and it cannot itself become an object

4. [Self-awareness: 自覚 or *Selbstbewusstsein* (self-consciousness) in the Kantian vocabulary.]

5. [Cf. KANT, B 131–2.]

6. [Cf. *ibid.*, B 133.]

of knowledge. If [it] combines the manifold of intuition, which is engendered as the determination of the inner sense, in an ob-ject, then the “I” also emerges as one such ob-ject; but this “I” is already an empirical such: it is not the transcendental, pure I. Since this “I” is simply individual and not supra-individual, it of course cannot provide a foundation for the objectivity of knowledge. It is thus clear that for this kind of empirical and individual I to come about as an ob-ject must presuppose the supra-individual I which is to be found in the transcendental unity of self-awareness. This is in fact the *sine qua non* of knowledge which makes all empirical ob-jects possible; this supra-individual I is something that cannot be known but can only be thought.

The transcendental “I” is in this manner a *form* of consciousness devoid of any kind of reality (実在性); as the fundamental condition of knowledge, it merely has the meaning of a logical presupposition. In the first edition of *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant took the standpoint of transcendental psychology in the *Deduktion* of the concepts of understanding, and dealing with *Apprehension*, *Reproduktion*, *Rekognition* as activities of spirit, he accepted that the synthesis of pure apperception is necessary as the foundation of the act of recognition which is to be found in the concepts; his understanding of this [synthesis] as being founded on the fact of the consciousness of “the identity of the act”⁷ is revised in the second edition; [329] as mentioned above, starting out from the concept of combination in general, he mainly argues that the transcendental unity of self-awareness is necessary as the logical precondition of [combination], and in this manner tries to purify his transcendental-logical standpoint. This is no doubt due to the fact that he wished to avoid making the mistake of attributing psychological matter (実質), in the form of the datum (与件) of the inner sense, to the transcendental “I,” and of thus understanding this [I] as a real ob-ject, which would lead to his theory being confounded with Berkeley’s subjective idealism. In Kant, the transcendental “I” is merely a formal condition of knowledge, devoid of any content. Today, the theory of Rickert—which can be recognized as being most purely and clearly representative of Kant’s transcendental idealism—precisely seeks to further radicalize this [insight]. As mentioned a moment ago, already in Kant’s perspective, the transcen-

7. KANT, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, first edition, 108.

dental “I,” i.e., consciousness-in-general, strictly speaking only has the logical meaning of a formal concept, understood as the general precondition of the emergence of knowledge; however, Kant could still not avoid dealing with it as something implied in the immediate facts of consciousness. There is no doubt that one of the original aims of Kant’s theory of knowledge was to give a firm ground to Newtonian physics, which he believed to be an absolute truth. For this reason, even in the *Deduktion* of categories by which he explained the transcendental unity of self-awareness, his attitude cannot avoid a tendency towards pointing to a fact which is *actually there* as the transcendental foundation of the natural sciences which to him were the only true empirical knowledge. The transcendental “I” also unavoidably refers to something that—as the undeniable foundation of natural knowledge—subsists as a fact. But if this standpoint comes to recognize that natural science is not the only empirical knowledge in the broadest sense of the term, but only empirical knowledge *as considered in a certain perspective*, then it gradually changes: what changes into the teleological (有極的) standpoint according to which there must be some transcendental foundation for natural science to emerge, as one type of empirical knowledge, is the Logos (理) of nature. It is thus undeniable that for critical philosophy, whose fundamental vocation is not to deal with problems *of fact* but with problems *of right*⁸—this teleological perspective is its true standpoint. Consequently, consciousness-in-general, which is the fundamental precondition of all knowledge, also reveals its meaning as the formal condition of [knowledge] when viewed from the radicalized standpoint. [330] This is indeed the interpretation which Windelband—who has taken upon himself to purify and develop Kant’s critical philosophy—proposed from the standpoint of this teleological idealism. He recognizes that other types of empirical knowledge than natural science are possible, and he takes the elucidation of the kinds *a priori* presupposed by these types of knowledge, to be the primary task of philosophy of knowledge (知識哲学), and he understands the veracity (真理性) of knowledge in general to lie in the “normativity of thinking.”⁹

8. [事実問題 and 権利問題, in other words, the opposition of *quaestio facti* and *quaestio juris*. 權利, which corresponds to the German *Recht*, is generally rendered as “legitimacy” in the present text.]

9. WINDELBAND 1915, 138. [“Wahrheit ist Normalität des Denkens.”]

Consciousness-in-general—the subject of knowledge—therefore becomes the normative consciousness which must be realized for the different types of knowledge to come about. The normative consciousness which the individual actual consciousness (現実の個人意識) must realize for knowledge to emerge within itself, is precisely consciousness-in-general. This is of course not an object that exists in reality (実在する) independently of individual consciousness; in no sense does it arise as a fact outside of individual consciousness. In Kant, consciousness-in-general is not an object, and yet it in more than one sense inevitably tends toward being a fact; since its normative character was not sufficiently clear, it can be argued that the relation between consciousness-in-general and actual, individual consciousness is to a certain degree lacking in clarity as well; but it has now become clear that consciousness-in-general is no fact, but rather a norm: that to actual, individual consciousness, consciousness-in-general is the ideal, i.e. the goal of its pursuit. Unfolding this thought, Rickert has proposed a detailed explanation of the subject of knowledge.

According to him, we can consider the following three types of subject-object oppositions. The first one takes all the objects of the outer world as objects; opposed to these, my body and the soul (精神) that dwells within it are taken as the subject. This is what he calls the psycho-physical subject. But my body is an object opposed to my content of consciousness, and in this respect there is nothing that distinguishes it from the other objects, and it can thus be considered as belonging among the objects; in this manner, all transcendent objects that are opposed to my content of consciousness are taken to be objects, while my consciousness and its content can be considered as the subject. This is what can be called the psychological subject of the second [type of opposition]. But given the fact that the transcendent object opposed to content of consciousness naturally loses its meaning once the copy-theory¹⁰ is rejected from the standpoint of critical philosophy, in third place appears a standpoint which takes all content of consciousness as the object, and takes consciousness itself as the subject. This [third opposition] is the subject-object opposition advocated by the true position of theory of knowledge, and the subject understood in this sense can be called

10. [Copy-theory (模写説), rendering *Abbildungstheorie*, i.e., theories that understand knowledge in terms of the inner reproduction of an external object.]

the true subject of knowledge. When we take all content of consciousness as pertaining to the object, that which can in no way [itself] become an object is the subject of knowledge. [331] Since such a subject has no contentual determination, it lacks the determination of being *my* consciousness (自己の意識), and ought thus to be called a consciousness-in-general: a limit-concept. But as the content of consciousness only becomes an object opposed to this subject once it is something known, this subject cannot be left out. This kind of consciousness-in-general, understood as a formal limit-concept, is the fundamental precondition for knowledge to arise. But as the object which opposes this kind of subject of knowledge is all the content of consciousness, its being-transcendent (超越性) cannot be anything else than the transcendence (超越) of the meaning for actual consciousness. The acknowledgement and the positing of this meaning is judgment. As long as knowledge is understood as representation, its object is inevitably a transcendent reality, and this standpoint cannot escape the copy-theory. If we wish to escape the copy-theory, we must abandon the idea that takes knowledge as representation and rather understand it as judgment. The meaning which is acknowledged and posited in judgment precisely constitutes the objectivity of knowledge. The object is content of consciousness taken as having this meaning, and the subject must be the judicative consciousness which acknowledges and posits this [meaning]. But since this judicative consciousness is what integrates (編入) all the actual content of consciousness in the object, or posits it as object, it must—as opposed to the actual consciousness—merely be an Idea (理念) which demands to be realized in this act of judgment, and which yet cannot be fully realized. For the individual consciousness which has a will to truth, consciousness-in-general is an Idea that expresses the normative consciousness (*Normalbewusstsein*) which is its ideal. When critical philosophy is radicalized, consciousness-in-general—the transcendental apperception which in Kant was considered as the fundamental precondition of the emergence of knowledge—must become normative consciousness, understood as an Idea. What appears as the transcendent ought of judgment for the individual consciousness, originally subsists as an objective meaning for consciousness-in-general. Insofar as transcendent meaning is immanently realized in the content of consciousness in accordance with this ought, and insofar as true knowledge emerges through this immanent realization, consciousness-in-general is an Idea that

is partially realized by individual consciousness; separate from the individual consciousness, consciousness-in-general is by no means anything real. As is emphasized by Rickert, the object of knowledge is not being (存在) but value; consequently, as subject of knowledge, consciousness-in-general is the subject of value; it is nothing else than an unreal subject understood as the mere formal condition presupposed by the subsistence of value. When the least reality is attributed to this consciousness-in-general, it immediately degrades into an object and loses its subjecthood. [332] Seeking to rid (脱する) [consciousness-in-general] of the ontological content that accompanies all actual acts of judgment, he in the third edition of his main work, *The Object of Knowledge*, presents what he calls *das fraglose Ja*,¹¹ which neither consists in the answer to a question nor the solution to a doubt, and which, as a judgment that affirms meaningful content in an absolute manner, pertains to consciousness-in-general.¹² He thus clearly explains that consciousness-in-general which affirms independently of doubt (疑問) is the “standard of the actual subject of knowledge” and the “norm of acts of the subject,” and that for the individual consciousness which has theoretical doubt and seeks truth, it expresses “the ideal of the subject, which has truth beyond time and beyond doubt,” and that insofar as the individual I acknowledges the transcendent ought and stops doubting, it takes part in this [ideal].¹³

II

Rickert’s idea of consciousness-in-general, with which we dealt in the previous section, is indeed a consequence of his radicalization of Kant’s critical philosophy; however, it seems that his determinations in relation to this concept are still not entirely compatible with this standpoint: that in certain respects this position is not yet purely radicalized. As can be seen from the passages quoted at the end of the last section, he on the one hand holds consciousness-in-general to be a non-actual limit-concept, the norm

11. [The questionless Yes.]

12. RICKERT 1915, 346–7.

13. Ibid., 349. For an interpretation of the Kantian consciousness-in-general as discussed in this section, cf. my article “On Consciousness-in-general.” [For an English translation of this text from 1919, see TANABE 2022.]

or ideal for the actual consciousness of the individual; on the other hand, he takes this consciousness-in-general to constitute the “consciousness that acknowledges the transcendent ought”¹⁴; however, he considers this acknowledgement or affirmation as something that completely eliminates the elements of the actual consciousness which answers questions. But, if it is something that completely eliminates the elements of actual consciousness, can consciousness-in-general then truly be said to affirm the transcendent ought? One may wonder if transcendence, ought, or this acknowledgement and affirmation, do not only have a meaning for an actual consciousness, and if it makes sense to say that an entirely non-actual consciousness-in-general acknowledges the transcendent ought. What does it mean for a non-actual consciousness to acknowledge an ought that transcends it? [333] If we merely consider consciousness-in-general as the ideal or the norm for actual consciousness, then it is partially realized to the extent that the actual consciousness acquires value of truth through the acknowledgement and affirmation of its transcendent ought; however, since it cannot be exhaustively realized, consciousness-in-general must, as the subject of all meaning and value, be nothing more than a formally thought Idea. The acknowledgement and affirmation of the transcendent ought pertain to actual consciousness, and it seems nonsensical to say that consciousness-in-general affirms the transcendent ought. Consequently, the value of knowledge is realized by means of actual consciousness; but this is something that is originally valid independently of the acknowledgement and affirmation of the subject: it is not something that only comes to subsist through the acknowledgement and affirmation of consciousness-in-general; consciousness-in-general can only be thought as a formal *Korrelat* of this subsistence. Since, as Rickert explained, transcendent meaning is, as configuration of value (価値形象), originally something that has validity, its value presupposes, as corresponding to it, a subject that must be valid (妥当すべき主観). This [subject] acknowledges the meanings individually and is thus realized in the actual consciousness that knows the truths corresponding to them; but regarding the totality of meaning, or regarding the totality of logical value, we cannot seek a subject that must be valid, in actual consciousness. We must consider consciousness-in-general—taken as an ideal which is

14. *Ibid.*, 346.

gradually partially realized insofar as actual consciousness judges in accordance with the ought, and which is yet never perfectly exhaustively realized—as corresponding to this [total meaning and value]. This is why consciousness-in-general is the ideal and normative consciousness which, to actual consciousness, is the goal of realization. For this reason, this [consciousness-in-general] is not something that relies on an act of judgment in order to come about; just like the total subsistence of objective meaning or theoretic value, [consciousness-in-general] can, as a valid subject, only be thought as an Idea. But the fact that Rickert, as mentioned above, understands consciousness-in-general as what acknowledges and affirms the transcendent ought, is no doubt due to the fact that setting out, originally, from an analysis of judicative consciousness, he reached the idea of the object of knowledge not as a transcendent reality, but as a transcendent ought, and the subject is thus, in knowledge, a concept inseparable from the object; but as the subject of judgment that posits the objective world (客観界), even consciousness-in-general (the subject of knowledge) must be something that acknowledges and affirms the ought. In fact, the subject is a concept that cannot be separated from the object; when from the standpoint of transcendental idealism we understand meaning and value as the ground on which the object stands, it is thus beyond doubt that these must presuppose a subject that must be valid; [334] however, as just mentioned, only in the case of actual consciousness do what we call the transcendent ought, as well as the acknowledgement and affirmation of the ought, have meaning; hence, we cannot say that consciousness-in-general (taken as the subject) acknowledges and affirms the transcendent ought; as the norm or ideal for the judicative act of actual consciousness, it can only be thought as a pure Idea (純理念的に思惟せられる) as the correlate of the total subsistence of value. If we take this as the subject, then what correlates to it as the object of knowledge, is not what Rickert calls the transcendent ought; it must be transcendent value. It may be said that this fact is already implied, to a certain degree, in his own thought. In his 1909 article, “The two paths of theory of knowledge,” [he argues that] the type of transcendental-psychological method that he adopted in his main work, *The Object of Knowledge*, tries to reach the object of knowledge by means of an analysis of judicative consciousness, but that the feeling of self-evidence which accompanies judgment leads us into a world of transcendent objects (対象界) from the immanent thought-

processes, and as the ob-ject of judgment, he posits (立する) an ought that is valid independently of its acknowledgement; however, since the feeling of self-evidence in fact always remains a [mere] content of consciousness, it cannot serve as proof of the transcendent ob-ject to which it points; from the start, this ob-ject must be something hypothetical. This is nothing but a *petitio principii*. This is why he argued that as a method of theory of knowledge, [this approach] is not complete [in itself] and that in order to seek an ob-ject of knowledge that truly transcends any act of knowledge, we ought to give priority to the method of transcendental logic which sets out from the meaning of sentences, which is independent of the act of knowledge. But even if *the ob-ject* of knowledge can only be grasped by means of the objective path [of theory of knowledge], *the knowledge* of the ob-ject cannot be elucidated in this way. Theory of knowledge thus does not allow us to dispense with this second path either; since [the knowledge of the ob-ject] can only be grasped by means of the subjective path of transcendental psychology, in the third edition of *The Object of Knowledge* (1915), which came out after the aforementioned article, Rickert espouses the method of transcendental psychology largely in the same manner as he had done in the previous editions, while on the other hand taking into account the objective method of transcendental logic; rather than taking his starting point—in the manner of transcendental psychology—in an analysis of the act of knowledge, he seeks the ob-ject of knowledge by starting out from the meaning of the judgment (the sentence) containing a true affirmation which is independent of the act; considered in the light of the ambiguity (二種性) of its negation, [335] it is clear that the transcendent meaning cannot but pertain to value configuration (*Wertgebilde*)¹⁵; he thus shows that the form of this value constitutes the ob-jectivity of knowledge, and concludes that we must ultimately, in the same way as when we rely on the subjective

15. Ibid., 265–72. [Rickert here argues that negation relates to the concept of being in a univocal (*eindeutig*) manner while relating to the concept of value in an ambiguous (*zweideutig*) manner. Whereas the negation of being leaves us with nothing (*Nicht-Etwas*) or nothingness (*Nichts*), “the negation of valid value (*des geltenden Wertes*) can either mean nothingness or a something (*Etwas*), namely the *negative value* or the *invalid* (das *Ungültige*), and just as value becomes the ought (*Sollen*) or the imperative if we place it in relation to an acknowledging I, in the same way negative value becomes the ought-not (*Nicht-Sollen*) or a *prohibition* (*Verbot*) for the position-taking act of the subject.” (ibid., 265.)]

method—indeed, even a step further than the subjective method which stops short at the transcendent ought—take transcendent value as the object of knowledge.¹⁶ But in that case, given that we reach transcendent value understood as an object entirely independent of the consciousness of the judicative act, the ought—which can be called a facet of transcendent value touching the subject—cannot appear.¹⁷ What according to the objective method is to be accepted as the object of knowledge, is not, as in the subjective method, the transcendent ought, but rather transcendent value (or theoretical [such]). Since the ought still cannot escape the meaning of an imperative or a demand addressed to (対する) the subject, it cannot be taken as identical with pure value; we cannot truly say that it is transcendentally and absolutely valid. Consequently, he points out that the advantage of the objective method with regard to the subjective such, is that it leads us to discover the absolutely valid transcendent value, independent of [the subject], as the object of knowledge.¹⁸ If this is indeed so, is it not natural that consciousness-in-general, i.e., the subject of knowledge, also becomes entirely free from such actual content of acts as the acknowledgment of an ought, and is it not natural to take it as a purely formal Idea, and to understand it as meaning the correlate of the totality of transcendent value (超越の価値全体), i.e., the mere norm or ideal of actual consciousness? I believe that, considered from the new standpoint preferred by Rickert himself, this understanding of consciousness-in-general is a natural consequence. If, taken as the subject of knowledge, consciousness-in-general becomes—as is recognized by Rickert himself—the norm or ideal of actual consciousness, then it must be the correlate of the totality of all transcendent value; hence, it is an Idea that is only partially realized in actual consciousness, while it is clear that it is a mistake (不当) to liken it to the acknowledgement of the ought which is presupposed by actual consciousness for this realization. According to him, it is only possible to explain knowledge of the object—which does not [itself] become an object of knowledge—by means of the subjective method of transcendental psychology, and he was right to explain the acknowledgement of the ought from the [point of view of an] analysis of

16. *Ibid.*, 277.

17. *Ibid.*, 277, 279.

18. *Ibid.*, 279.

judicative consciousness; but I do not believe that this [analysis] can be extended to [include] consciousness-in-general, the ideal of actual consciousness. It seems to me, for these reasons, that Rickert's thought relating to consciousness-in-general in certain respects remains impure, as it still immixes facts of consciousness.

[336] Rickert recognizes that considering that "content that has been given a form exists as *etwas für sich bestehendes* without having been acknowledged as existing,"¹⁹ goes counter to the spirit of critical philosophy, and he asserts that since the object of knowledge is a product of logical constitution whose emergence presupposes the subject, the attempt to exclude the acknowledgement and affirmation of the subject of judgment from this [theory of objectivity] falls into a "dogmatic" realism.²⁰ This is also why he opposes Lask's idea of an original union (合一) of content and form, and affirms that their combination can only come about through judgment.²¹ Lask distinguished two types of opposite values of judgment: (1) truth and truth-contrariness (*Wahrheit (Wahrheitsgemäßigkeit) und Wahrheitswidrigkeit*); (2) correctness and falsehood (*Richtigkeit und Falschheit*). Correctness is the value of judgment-decision (*Urteilsentscheidung*) which affirms true meaning-structures (*Sinnstruktur*) and negates truth-contrary meaning-structures, while falsehood on the other hand is the value of judgment-decision that negates true meaning-structures and affirms truth-contrary meaning-structures. In other words, these opposites are nothing but values relying on the propriety (当否) of judgment-decisions. But since this type of correctness/falsehood [distinction] is a value-opposition which relies on the propriety of judgment-decisions, this necessarily requires as its precondition that the meaning-structure of judgment *itself* possess the value-opposi-

19. Ibid., 288. [*Etwas für sich bestehendes*: something that subsists in itself. The passage reads as follows: "Wollten wir für das Zusammen von Form und Inhalt im Gegenstande Worte brauchen, wie die, daß der Inhalt in der Form 'steht', oder daß es sich dabei um ein 'schlichtes Ineinander' handelt, und hierin die allein berechnete Formulierung finden, die mehr ist als eine bewußt einseitige Ausdrucksweise, so käme das darauf hinaus, daß der geformte Inhalt als etwas für sich Bestehendes *existiert*, auch ohne daß er als existierend *erkannt* ist."]

20. Ibid., 289. [The bracketed interpolation is in line with the passage to which Tanabe is referring: "...die Ausschaltung *jedes* Subjektbegriffes aus den letzten Fundamenten der Objektivitätslehre bedeutet einen Rückfall in 'dogmatischen' Ontologismen und macht das Erkennen des Gegenstandes überhaupt unverständlich."]

21. Ibid., 282; 286–91.

tion of truth and truth-contrariness, independently of this judgment-decision. This is precisely the first type of opposition mentioned above. Insofar as this opposition precedes the judgment-decision of affirmation or negation, as its precondition and its criterion, it must be something characteristic to the meaning-structure of judgment, i.e., something characteristic to the very combinations and connections between the elements of these [meaning-structures]. In other words, this is precisely a value-opposition which depends on whether the category and the category-material (*Kategorienmaterial*) conform (適応) to each other or not. However, saying that the opposition of truth and truth-contrariness is in this manner engendered depending on whether the category and category-material conform to each other or not, must furthermore presuppose that the primordial mutual belonging (原始的相属) of category and category-material, which is the criterion for this value-opposition, subsists (*besteht*) as an absolutely valid value beyond (絶する) [this] opposition. This is what he calls supra-judicative objects (*urteilsjenseitige Gegenstände*), i.e., objects of knowledge.²² The characteristics of [such objects of knowledge] reside in the fact that the elements of category and category-material are abstracted and separated, and that they are bound together in flexible relations; as a result [these characteristics] are to be found in [337] *ein schlichtes durch keinerlei Antastung hindurchgegangenes Stehen der Inhalte in ihren Relationen*,²³ which leaves no room for the value-distinction of conformity and non-conformity; i.e., they reside in *das schlichte Stehen des Kategorienmaterials in den Kategorien*.²⁴ When we separate these elements from the unitary (融一的) primordial object-region

22. LASK 1912, 53. [In the passage in question, Lask writes that by taking the objects to be permeated by the logical and the theoretical, Kant made it possible to understand their composition (*Gliederung*) as pertaining to the logical, rather than to the meta-logical or metaphysical, in such a way that “the meaning-structure of the judgment-region can legitimately be tied to the supra-judicative object-structure, without nevertheless abandoning the dominion (*Herrschaftsbereich*) of the logical. Only thus are the preconditions given for a meta-grammatical and yet still intra-logical theory orientated towards the supra-judicative objects.”]

23. Ibid., 96–7. [“an untouched, simple standing of the content in its relations.”]

24. Ibid., 98. [“the simple standing of category-material in the categories.” The passage reads as follows: “...so lässt sich die gegenständliche Urstruktur sprachlich weniger umständlich, allerdings nur in abgekürzter Redeweise, auch als das schlichte Stehen des Kategorienmaterials in den Kategorien aussprechen.”]

(*gegenständliche Urregion*)²⁵ which lies beyond (彼岸) judgment, and combine the category with the category-material, a judgment is produced which *prädiziert* a predicate to a [grammatical] subject, and thus appears the distinction between truth and truth-contrariness (i.e., the aforementioned first value-opposition) in accordance with the conformity or non-conformity of these elements. This is a result of the fact that the artificial (人為技巧) separation of the elements of the primordial ob-ject-region has already been added; this alone is separate from the primordial region. Judgment merely creates (隔てる) this distance (*Abstand*) and reflects (映像する)²⁶ the primordial ob-ject. The immediate ob-ject of judgment does thus not pertain to the primordial ob-ject-region; in this region, the primordial unity of a yet undistinguished oneness of interpenetration (融合), elements are separated through human effort, and it is nothing more than a reflection (映像) taken as the product of a will to subjectively capture and dominate these elements by means of such artificiality. This is the meaning of judgment (*Urteilsinn*). Its structure is only an artificial product which does not belong to the primordial region. Contrariwise, given that within the simple meaning-structure, the decision (*Entscheidung*), the second constitutive element (成素) of judgment, is not yet explicitly separated, and that while separating the relations that make up the structure (the so-called meaning-fragment (*Sinnfragment*)²⁷ and its value-quality (*Wertqualität*)) it affirms or negates their combinations and connections, judgment as a result furthermore goes through a second stage of artificiality, and thus comes to have a twofold distance with regard to the primordial region. Since the act of judgment is in fact something that reflects the ob-ject by going through this kind of double artificiality, it does not take part in the constitution of the ob-ject at all; it is only a means for the subject to take control of (*sich bemächtigen*) the world of ob-jects. The judgment-region (*Urteilsregion*) is only the product of a subjectivity (*Subjektivität*) that has been isolated by means of the superimposition of the primordial ob-ject-region and artificial structures. For this

25. [Tanabe writes 源始の対象領域, which literally translates to *primordial ob-ject-region* rather than *ob-jective primordial-region* or *archi-region*, as indicated by the German expression. Below, the author speaks of 対象の原始領域 (cf. page 340 of the original text).]

26. [映像, “reflection” in the sense not of the act of consciousness but of a mirror image.]

27. LASK 1912, 177.

reason, formal logic which deals with judgments, and thus with concepts and inference (推論), cannot go beyond the non-ob-jective, subjective region. Since the categories on the contrary *do* take part in the ob-ject-constitution of the primordial region, we must say that the transcendental logic which elucidates the ob-ject-constitution of categories, is an objective, material logic (*materiale Logik*) which does not encroach on subjectivity. *Das Logische* in general is divided into *das Formallogische* and [338] *das Materiallogische*,²⁸ which relate to each other as two distinct regions, separated by a trench that cannot be crossed. From this standpoint, Lask recognizes Kant's "consciousness-in-general" as the *Repräsentant des gegensatzlosen Stehens der Inhaltlichkeit in der transzendentalen Form*,²⁹ and considering it as unrelated to the act of judgment, he asserts a *Primat des Konstitutiv-Logischen*³⁰ against the *Primat der Urteilslehre* which constitutes the basic theme of Rickert's theory.³¹ In response, Rickert emphasized that in terms of theory of knowledge, this [i.e., Lask's] position (説) approaches realism or Platonic value-metaphysics, and that after all, the concept of the subject of knowledge cannot be eliminated from critical philosophy.³² There is no doubt, however, that his argument (論) commits—as became clear in the above—the mistake of extending to the non-actual consciousness-in-general that which is only valid for our actual knowledge. As he says, when dealing with actual knowledge (現実の認識), the standpoint of transcendental logic, which can only account for the ob-ject of knowledge, is insufficient, and we must no doubt recognize the validity of (正常なる) the region of transcendental psychology, which proceeds from an analysis of actual consciousness³³; however, what he calls the "legitimacy of transcendental psychology"³⁴ must necessarily—in terms of methodology as considered by

28. Ibid., 111.

29. Ibid., 149. ["Representative of the oppositionless standing of contentuality in the transcendental form."]

30. Ibid., 6. ["Primacy of the constitutive-logical"; and in the following: "primacy of the doctrine of judgment."]

31. Ibid., 153.

32. RICKERT 1915, 288.

33. Ibid., 292.

34. ["*Das Recht der Transzendentalpsychologie*" is the heading of section VII of Chapter four ("*Die Begründung der Objektivität*") of the third edition of Rickert's *Der Gegenstand der Er-*

Rickert himself—be restricted to the field of actual consciousness. [Transcendental psychology] cannot be extended to [include] consciousness-in-general, a non-actual Idea. Just like it generally is not possible to extend the relations which, in mathematics, come about in finite stages, to the limits that can only be reached at the stage of the infinite, so the extension of the acknowledgement of the transcendent ought—necessary for the knowledge of actual consciousness—to the limit-concept of the consciousness-in-general, is proscribed by the true nature of this limit-concept. He explains that the ought-affirmation of consciousness-in-general fully does away with the quality of answering a question, which we find in the case of actual, individual consciousness, but it does not seem sufficiently clear how this [elimination] becomes possible. One may wonder if this is not because this is, in fact, an essentially (本来) impossible requirement. An affirmation of an ought is necessarily prompted by a question and is inevitably a psychological fact which appears in opposition to a negation. It would seem that the so-called *fraglose Ja* separate from a question does not in fact arise by means of an affirmation, [339] but is [instead] nothing other than the absolute validity of value, presupposed by the affirmation of individual consciousness. Rather than being brought to validity through judgment, it must be something that, preceding judgment, is valid as the precondition of [judgment]. We must say that Lask was quite perceptive in realizing this, and in thus dealing with an ob-ject-region beyond the reach of judgment (判断の彼岸にある), which he understands as an absolute subsistence of non-oppositional value. Consciousness-in-general is the subject that is the correlate of this [absolute subsistence]. But since this is not a subject that effectuates an act of judgment in actuality in accordance with an ought, there is no risk—as dreaded by Lask—that subjectivity might encroach on the primordial ob-ject. But [this subject] must consistently be thought as the mere formal Idea that must be necessarily presupposed as the *Korrelat* of the concept of value or of validity. But by accepting the consciousness-in-general, understood as this Ideal subject, the Platonic value-metaphysics can no doubt be satisfactorily avoided, as Rickert wished to do. But this does not—as he believes—lead to the validity of value by means of the acknowledgement of the ought; it is rather the non-actual Idea which is thought as the formal condition for the

kenntnis. RICKERT 1915, 294–305.]

subsistence of the absolutely valid value; it must be something that expresses the ideal that is only partially realized by means of the acknowledgement of the ought of the actual judicative consciousness, and which cannot be fully and exhaustively realized. In other words, this subject is a limit (極限) which gives a norm to actual judgment (現実の判断), by means of which it seeks to be realized; it does not itself judge. In terms of the true nature of consciousness-in-general, a limit-concept, it is not possible for the transcendent value facing it to appear through the transcendent ought, in the way that the transcendent value facing the individual consciousness appears through the transcendent ought. As the Idea that correlates to the totality of transcendent objects, the subject, understood as consciousness-in-general, must itself be considered as non-actual, as something that can only partially be realized by means of the ought-acknowledgement of actual consciousness. Only in this way can we account for the subject, as required by Rickert, without contradiction, while at the same time accepting transcendent value as the ultimate object of knowledge. One may wonder if the fact that he consistently considers the subject (taken as consciousness-in-general) as acknowledging and affirming the transcendent ought, is not in contradiction with his own perspective which takes consciousness-in-general as a non-actual limit-concept, an ideal for actual consciousness. The subject taken as consciousness-in-general is not the correlate of a transcendent ought; it must be the correlate of the transcendent value which Rickert recognizes as a more fundamental object of knowledge, [340] the correlate of what Lask calls the objective primordial region. However, saying that the subject, taken as consciousness-in-general, is in this manner the correlate of transcendent value, does not mean that it, in terms of the true nature of consciousness-in-general as we have dealt with it until now, i.e., as a limit-concept or as an Idea, damages the absolute validity of the transcendent value; one may wonder if this does not rather ultimately preserve the subject of knowledge as Rickert tried to do, and bring about the accomplishment (貫徹) of the standpoint according to which value only has meaning for a subject of value (価値主観). But since he persistently considered consciousness-in-general (the subject of knowledge) as what affirms the transcendent ought, he encountered various difficulties regarding this point; he is furthermore forced to accept—as the correlate of negation rather than affirmation—a transcendent prohibition, or a negative ought, and thus a

transcendent negative ob-ject (a negative value); however, when we read this text attentively, we cannot help but sense that he struggled to avoid making any conclusions on this point.³⁵ This is no doubt a result of his trying to extend the condition of the affirmation of the ought to include consciousness-in-general. On this point, Lask's opposing theory of the absolute subsistence of the supra-oppositional, supra-judicative value is undeniably more consistent. I find it difficult to agree with the perspective of Lask—or, to go further back: of Windelband,³⁶ whose thought he inherits—according to which formal and transcendental logic are to be rigorously distinguished, only the latter contributing to the constitution of the ob-ject, while the former is merely the artificial means by which the subject captures and controls the thus established world of objective ob-jects. Since “identity” (自同)—which, according to Lask, is not strictly speaking a category but the most fundamental form pertaining to formal logic—and “equality” (相等)—a mathematical form which according to Windelband is not a constitutive category but the basis for reflective categories—are the categories that constitute the ob-jects of the world of logic and the ob-jects of the world of mathematics respectively; and since the world of “experience” in particular—which can be considered as the world of objective ob-jects—but also the natural and cultural worlds, presuppose these [categories] and can only be constituted as a result of proceeding to concrete determinations by adding sequentially ordered and original (順次独特なる) moments on this basis; and since furthermore the primordial envelopment of content (原始的内容

35. Cf. *ibid.*, 344–5, 347. [Rickert here writes: “Perhaps the entirely supra-oppositional (*das vollkommene Uebergegensätzliche*) is also the pre- or supratheoretical, and the negative ought or the negation-worthiness (*Verneinungswürdigkeit*) is just as original as the positive ought or the affirmation-worthiness (*Bejahungswürdigkeit*); perhaps the validity (*Geltung*) of the negative ought can nevertheless somehow be reduced (*zurückführen*) to the validity of the positive ought.... Then the assumption of a supra-oppositional mutual belonging (*Zusammengehören*) would be just as justified as the assumption of a supra-oppositional value, and the supra-oppositional mutual belonging of form and content would (...) give the *ultimate* standard of measure (*Maßstab*) both for the validity (*Gültigkeit*) of the true judgments and for the invalidity (*Ungültigkeit*) of the untrue judgments. We could then let the objective invalidity (*Ungeltung*) of the untruths subsist next to the validity (*Geltung*) of the truths without nevertheless having to assume any ‘negative ob-ject’ of knowledge; rather, the ob-ject would then, in the supra-oppositionality of its mutual belonging of form and content, be the ultimate *common* standard of measure for both the valid or true and the invalid or untrue judgments....”]

36. Windelband, *Vom System der Kategorien; Über Gleichheit und Identität*.

包含) in categories as understood by Lask, which contributes to the constitution [of these worlds], is valid as value configurations; [341]—it seems to me that, by taking into account the fact that the subsistence of all absolute value—which Rickert considered as entirely incapable of escaping the correlation to the subject—correlates to consciousness-in-general (as discussed above), it would be possible to attempt a unification of logic in a fuller sense than what was done by Lask and others. Nevertheless, I believe that the fact that Lask argued for the absolute subsistence of primordial value against Rickert, is indicative of his capacity for radical thinking (思索). Of course, he without hesitation recognizes a *Falschheit an sich*³⁷ as opposed to the *Richtigkeit an sich* in the judicative region of oppositional value,³⁸ but this is what he calls the quasi-transcendent (*quasitranszendent*) value, and not the purely transcendent primordial value. His thought is that, as opposed to Rickert's idea, the latter is to be considered as having in itself an absolute subsistence beyond any [form of] opposition. This is related to the question of the true nature of value and of the meaning of anti-value (反価値), which I will discuss in the following, and I believe the attainment of a sufficiently clear understanding of this point to be of great importance for the establishment (樹立) of an axiological world-view (価値の世界観). Like Rickert, we take the subject, understood as a consciousness-in-general, as something that affirms the transcendent ought; if we therefore take the transcendent value and the transcendent ought as necessarily relative to each other, as the objects of knowledge that have been found by means of the objective method and the subjective method, then we will have to recognize—in the

37. [Falsity-in-itself as opposed to correctness-in-itself.]

38. [LASK 1912] p. 193. [Lask here writes that “in the same way as there is an absoluteness and quasi-transcendence of the truth-conform and the truth-contrary meaning, there is an absoluteness and quasi-transcendence of correct and false meaning. The harmonies and disharmonies between meaning-fragment and value-quality subsist in a timeless eternity.... The correct and the false meaning can be absolved (*ablösbar*) from the time-fulfilling (*zeiterfüllend*) acts, and what is more: what conforms to meaning must itself be meaningful (*sinnartig*). Under no circumstances can one therefore say that error coincides with the subsistence of simply psychological lived experience (*Erlebensbestand*) without any relation to meaning, and that it does not belong in the domain of logical consideration. Incorrectness is just as meaningful (*sinnartig*) as correctness, and correctness is just as distant from the original (*urbildlich*) meaning as incorrectness is. There are indeed falsehoods-in-themselves just as there are correctnesses-in-themselves, ‘eternal untruths’ (Palagyi) just as there are ‘eternal truths.’”]

same way as there is a negative ought (understood as prohibition) opposed to the affirmative ought—what he calls the negative ob-ject, i.e., the transcendent falsehood, as something opposing the transcendent truth (understood as value). But when the aforementioned premise is negated, this conclusion does not necessarily follow, and while we like Lask posit a value-in-itself beyond oppositions, I nevertheless believe that by considering its relation to the subject we can uncover a ground that can account for the judicative opposition of affirmation and negation. Anti-value thus only has a secondary meaning with regard to value, and it can be assumed that there is no real need to affirm that they are originally opposed to each other. Rickert himself also seems, on the one hand, to lean towards this idea,³⁹ but it seems that since he on the other hand gives importance to the relation of the subject to the emergence of value and thus consistently understands the subject as effectuating the opposing acts of affirmation and negation, it became difficult for him to clearly espouse this standpoint. I believe that I will have occasion to discuss this problem further in the following, [342] but as we now purely radicalize the thought according to which the consciousness-in-general, understood as the subject of knowledge, is a formal Idea, it is no doubt worth noting the reasons why the aforementioned perspective becomes tenable.

III

In the previous section, I showed why, when critical philosophy is radicalized, consciousness-in-general understood as the subject of knowledge must be nothing more than a non-actual and formal Idea separate from all actual content of consciousness, an Idea which can be thought as the subject-correlate of the totality of transcendent value. In this way, the transcendent value to which this subject correlates, becomes an absolutely valid value-in-itself, entirely independent of actual facts of consciousness, and it forms, as argued by Lask, the supra-oppositional primordial region where form and content are originally intertwined (融一) beyond the ought. The subject (consciousness-in-general) is nothing more than what has seen objectivity in general, in which the ob-ject (this supra-oppositional primordial

39. Cf. RICKERT 1915, 341, 344.

region) is valid as a value, from the side of the norm for the act of knowledge of actual consciousness. The characteristics of critical philosophy are to be found in the fact that the gnoseological⁴⁰ subject is in this manner nothing but the objectivity itself of the object of knowledge. Objectivity arises where the transcendent theoretical value, or transcendent meaning, primordially has a form that accords with its content (material), and is the norm for the combination of the content and form of the act of knowledge of actual consciousness. Pure logic, which deals with the structure of such transcendent forms of meaning, is thus something entirely separate from the actual acts of thinking, something that can arise independently of them. This is also *grosso modo* the logical standpoint taken by Husserl who, differing in academic lineage (学統) from Lask and Rickert, pertains to the German-Austrian school influenced by Bolzano. But the standpoint of the German-Austrian school—which, taking its starting point in Bolzano’s [notion of the] proposition-in-itself, came to emphasize the object’s independent subsistence (*Bestand*) with regard to the act—only slightly differs from [that of] the proponents of the aforementioned South-West German school—who reached a teleological constructionism by radicalizing Kant’s critical philosophy; [the difference is that,] as the German-Austrian school does not satisfactorily bring the aspect of the validity of value to the foreground, it is exclusively concerned with the independence (自立) of the judgment of the proposition.⁴¹ But the fact that—having moved to a more radical position of pure logic than that of Rickert –, [343] Lask has come very close to Husserl’s logic, is no doubt highly remarkably, as it points to a logical relation between Kant’s and Bolzano’s philosophies. Pure logic is a science (学) that clarifies the meaning-forms that subsist absolutely, independently of acts of thinking. By means of this research, the systematic articulation (体系組織) of the meaning-forms must be clarified. Only through this system of meaning-forms does knowledge acquire its objectivity, and insofar as theory of knowledge is a study (学) concerned with the legitimacy of

40. [“Gnoseological” translates 認識論的, i.e., *erkenntnistheoretisch*: the pure subject as regarded in theory of knowledge.]

41. Cf. *ibid.*, 275. [“Die ‘ontologische’ Tradition ist, wo das Logische noch als ideal Seiendes behandelt wird, nicht vollständig genug aufgegeben, der Werthcharakter alles ‘Geltens’ daher nicht gewürdigt.”]

knowledge rather than its fact, and mainly with giving a fundamental basis (基礎) to knowledge, it cannot be denied that the primary problem of theory of knowledge is to be found, first and foremost, in this pure transcendental logic. There is no doubt that the spirit of critical philosophy, which aims to provide a fundamental basis of knowledge, necessarily claims pure logicism as its initial standpoint.

But the objective meaning subsisting independently of the acts, whose forms the pure logic takes as its object of study, or the transcendent theoretical value-in-itself which becomes bodily present in a particular guise (特殊の体现) in this [objective meaning] must—insofar as it is a value—presuppose the subject of actual consciousness, which is required if it is to be possible for [this value] to become immanent and to realize itself as having validity in actuality for this [subject]. If we were to take the object of knowledge as a transcendent being and to understand knowledge as something that, in some sense, copied this [transcendent being], then it goes without saying that—even if, insofar as we consider the transcendent being as an object, we must due to the subject-object correlation consider this object as what stands opposed to the subject—the transcendent being, if considered separate from knowledge, would exist devoid of any connection to the subject of actual consciousness, and it can thus by no means be said to attain being (understood as transcendent being) only for the subject of actual consciousness. (The adjective “transcendent” of course only has meaning in relation to the subject of actual consciousness, but since what it means is conversely the emancipation from any relation to actual consciousness, it does not, in order to exist positively, presuppose actual consciousness.) But when it comes to the validity of transcendent value, it differs in tenor (趣) [from that of transcendent being]. Because no matter how its transcendence should be understood, value requires—as a necessary consequence of its being a value—to be realized at some point, and it therefore has the possibility of becoming immanent, and presupposes the subject of actual consciousness which is valid in actuality. Transcendent being does in no sense necessarily presuppose its becoming immanent, but transcendent value necessarily implies the possibility of becoming immanent and of being realized. [344] Otherwise it could not be called value. If, while being an object of knowledge, it rejected all possibility of immanence, then—even if it had value—it would have to be a “valuable being” rather than simple “value.”

This is what Rickert calls Platonic value-metaphysics, which inevitably ends up leading to dogmatic realism. If we wish to avoid this relapse, we must consider transcendent value as capable of becoming immanent in the subject of actual consciousness and of thus being realized. As the goal of this realization, the norm or the ideal for the act of knowledge of the subject of actual consciousness is consciousness-in-general understood as the Idea that is the correlate of the total validity of this value. When we take this as the true gnoseological subject, actual consciousness is something that always partially realizes this [subject], and we must also consider the transcendent value of absolute validity as something that is to become immanent by means of this [realization]. I believe this is the only way for Lask's theory to avoid falling into the Platonic value-metaphysics against which Rickert warns. I also believe this to be what led Rickert to commit the inconsistency of dealing with the consciousness-in-general—a limit-concept—as *das fraglos bejahende Bewußtsein überhaupt*,⁴² something that acknowledges the transcendent ought, and thus as endowed with content—content which only *actual* consciousness allows for. As I argued in the previous section, insofar as consciousness-in-general is a purely formal Idea, it cannot have the actual content of affirming and acknowledging the ought. It is only the Idea that correlates to the total validity of transcendent theoretical value. If transcendent value can be realized, this is only through the mediation of consciousness-in-general's correlation to the total subsistence of this transcendent value, which, *as* value, is immanent to the actual subject and is valid for it; this aspect can by no means be ignored from the standpoint of critical philosophy. After all, if consciousness-in-general (understood as the gnoseological subject) is the correlate of the total subsistence of transcendent value, this cannot mean that a relation akin to the opposition between the subject of actual consciousness and transcendent value—where the latter transcends the former while nevertheless being valid for it—can be found between consciousness-in-general and transcendent value. It only means that the fact that transcendent value subsists (存する) as an intertwined combination (融一的結合) of content (what Lask calls 'category-material') within the form (the category), in other words, as what Lask calls

42. RICKERT 1915, 347. [The consciousness-in-general that affirms without question.]

schlichtes Stehen,⁴³ [345] is (as the condition of this value) abstractly separated into form and content, and that the combination of [content] to [form] is taken as the limit (極限) of the subject from the side of the ideal or norm that the subject of actual consciousness is to realize. In other words, as we said a moment ago, the gnoseological subject, taken as the consciousness-in-general, is nothing else than what sees the objectivity of the object—taken as transcendent value—from the side of the norm of the subject of actual consciousness. It is also in this sense that Lask's consciousness-in-general—with which we dealt in the previous section—can be said to be a *Repräsentant des gegensatzlosen Stehens der Inhaltlichkeit in der transzendenten Form*.⁴⁴ In summary, for critical philosophy, the subject of knowledge, taken as consciousness-in-general, is something that sees the objectivity of the objective object from the side of the norm of actual consciousness. This is the necessary conclusion of the standpoint in which critical philosophy gives a foundation to the object by means of the subject, and this is also what gives rise to the so-called Copernican revolution. This brings about the objectivity of the objective object, and at the same time it is nothing but the norm of actual consciousness. To say that consciousness-in-general is the correlate of the total subsistence of transcendent logical value, means considering consciousness-in-general as the ground of the value-character (価値性) of [this total subsistence]. But since, as mentioned in the above, value necessarily presupposes an actual consciousness in which it can be realized, and must become immanent in it, consciousness-in-general is the limit-concept of an ideal act that may be partially realized in the act of knowledge of actual consciousness, but cannot be completely and exhaustively realized. If we understand the transcendent object as the immediate interpenetration of what Lask calls the category-material within the category, and if it has no relation whatsoever to the subject of actual consciousness, then it actually loses its meaning as value, and at the same time there will no longer be any room for considering the mutual belonging (相属) of content and form—which is the ground of its objectivity—as pertaining to consciousness-in-general, taken as the subject. But if we put the transcendent object and

43. [A mere standing.]

44. [A representative for the oppositionless standing of contentuality in the transcendental form.]

consciousness-in-general in relation with the content of actual consciousness, we can take the former as absolutely valid value, and the latter as the ground of its value-character; and we must thus take consciousness-in-general as the limit-concept or Idea of actual consciousness, and consider the transcendent value as also having the possibility of becoming immanent in [actual consciousness], and as something that can in this manner be realized. Insofar as the actual consciousness realizes the ideal of consciousness-in-general (i.e., the subject of knowledge), it grasps the transcendent object (i.e., the object), realizing and acquiring the value which is valid to it. Consciousness-in-general is the Idea or the limit-concept for the transcendent object to attract to itself the actual consciousness that it necessarily presupposes in its true nature, [346] while at the same time being the mediator (媒介者) that allows the transcendent object to be realized as a value by means of actual consciousness. As the reverse-side of the study of the formal structure which exists (有する) as this value-in-itself, the transcendent value, understood as this object of knowledge, therefore requires a study of the process by which, mediated by the Idea of consciousness-in-general (which is the ground of objectivity), this [transcendent value] comes into contact with actual consciousness. Although Rickert has gradually come to take a standpoint of pure logic akin to that of Lask, he still considers that while theory of knowledge on the one hand has the vocation of clarifying the “object of knowledge,” it at the same time on the other hand has the vocation of clarifying the “knowledge of the object”; this is also why he affirms the legitimacy of transcendental psychology, without [however] taking it as immediately identical to transcendental logic, and I believe that we must admit this affirmation [of the legitimacy of transcendental psychology] as justified. Even if the various systems of the transcendent forms of meaning are valid regardless of whether they become conscious [to us] or not, and their structures can be elucidated without actual consciousness being taken into account, meaning yet only comes to fruition as meaning once it has the possibility of being immanent in actual consciousness, and value presupposes the subject of actual consciousness which can actualize it (実現); only thus is it [truly] value; consequently, a study is needed which takes consciousness-in-general—understood as the Ideal subject that is the correlate of this [meaning or value]—as the limit or the ideal of the subject of actual consciousness, and which elucidates how the transcendent object, through

this [consciousness-in-general] relates to the subject of actual consciousness. It is incumbent upon us to clarify how the transcendent object becomes immanent in actual consciousness, and how consciousness-in-general is thus realized by means of actual consciousness. Unless the objective object—understood as transcendent value—and the subject—understood as consciousness-in-general—are in some way intertwined (相交渉) with actual consciousness, they in fact lose their respective gnoseological meanings as object and subject. The fact that Rickert consistently gives importance to this aspect of theory of knowledge and that he affirms the legitimacy of transcendental psychology apart from transcendental logic, can perhaps be criticized as lacking in radicality from the point of view of the proponents of pure logicism; but insofar as he does not arbitrarily delimit the problem of theory of knowledge, we must recognize that in the broad perspective of critical philosophy, his standpoint has a justified foundation. The shortcoming of his theory is only to be found in the fact that having failed to distinguish transcendental logic and transcendental psychology in a sufficiently consequent manner, and thus to radicalize the purely formal Ideality of consciousness-in-general by admitting the former standpoint [i.e., transcendental logic] in its purity, he immixed the standpoint of transcendental psychology; [347] it is not in itself impossible to affirm the legitimacy of transcendental psychology as opposed to transcendental logic within theory of knowledge.

How then does transcendent value come to be immanent in actual consciousness? Just as the question of how all that is transcendent becomes immanent is the ultimate *Mysterium* that philosophical knowledge cannot answer, this problem [of the immanence of transcendent value] constitutes, in my view, a limit to the answers that can be provided by theory of knowledge, taken as theoretical philosophy; the only path open to us no doubt consists in acknowledging this fact *as a fact*. Rickert on the one hand argues that from the standpoint of transcendental logic, all judgments (propositions) that claim objectivity have, besides their *immanent* meaning (i.e., the *Urteilssinn*), an *Urteilsgehalt*⁴⁵ which is correlative of the [*Urteilssinn*] but nevertheless entirely transcends judicative consciousness, in other words, a *transcendent* meaning, and that their form endows the judgment with

45. [*Urteilssinn*: meaning of judgment; *Urteilsgehalt*: content of judgment.]

objectivity; thus, while showing that this meaning must pertain to value-configurations by considering the character of its negation, he on the other hand, by way of an analysis of judicative consciousness in the perspective of transcendental psychology, uncovers the transcendent ought as the object of the acknowledgment or affirmation, which he understands as that side of the aforementioned transcendent meaning, which comes into contact with judicative consciousness; in this manner, he meant to combine the two sides of theory of knowledge. Against Lask, he then argues that the union (合一) of form (category) and content (category-material) that we find in transcendent meaning, is not originally a mere *Zusammen*, but must always be a *Zusammengehörigkeit*⁴⁶ that only arises by means of the subject's acknowledgement⁴⁷—this means that, as we have seen, the subject, understood as consciousness-in-general, formally means objectivity in general for actual consciousness, from the side of the norm, and that insofar as it is a non-actual Idea, it is without meaning. Like Lask, we must thus recognize an original union of content and form in transcendent meaning. But insofar as the problem of theory of knowledge is not only concerned with the relation between content and form—as Lask would have it—but also with the relation between subject and object, the point of view according to which the transcendent object appears, within the side that comes into contact with

46. [*Zusammen*: together, rendered by Tanabe as 融合, i.e., “interpenetration”; *Zusammengehörigkeit*: belonging together, rendered by Tanabe as 相属 and translated here as “mutual belonging.”]

47. RICKERT 1915, 286. [On this page, Rickert argues that while one may abstract from the ought when dealing with value as such, this does not apply when our point of concern is the object, in which case a consciousness that establishes the relationship of the form with regard to its content, and for whom the value then becomes the ought, must be taken into account. That is to say that, insofar as the object is an object of knowledge, the “interpenetration” (*Zusammen*) is rather a belonging-together (*Zusammengehörigkeit*), an ought that is only satisfied through the subject's establishing this relation: “in each object that can be grasped through affirmation, the relation or interpenetration (*Zusammen*) of form and content is necessarily present as mutual belonging (*Zusammengehörigkeit*). The concept of the transcendent ought has thus become entirely indispensable for the object region. It all depends on the transcendent validity of the mutual belonging (*Zusammengehörigkeit*) which is affirmed, for without it, the real knowing (*reale Erkennen*) would be utterly incapable of taking control (*sich bemächtigen*) of the transcendent through [an act of] judgment. The side of the object that is turned towards the subject (...) must always be understood as mutual belonging of form and content, and once we deal with the knowledge of the object, this “side” remains the essential such.”]

actual consciousness, as the ought to the judicative act of this consciousness, must be admitted as justified. But to combine transcendental logic and transcendental psychology, [348] and to understand the transcendent ought—which transcendental psychology uncovers as the object of knowledge—as the side of the transcendent meaning or absolute theoretical value—taken as the object of knowledge in transcendental logic—which comes into contact with judicative consciousness, is a primordial fact that allows for no explanation; we have always presupposed that within judgment, an indication of something transcendent is implied, and we have understood this as the transcendent value which appears as the ought. As Rickert has clearly argued, the transcendent and the immanent are conceptually incompatible, and the question of how these two regions can be unified can never be solved—and yet we must accept their unity as a fact. We must simply take it as a primordial fact that the transcendent meaning essentially (本来) becomes immanent in actual consciousness, and we must accept this [fact] as the starting point of theory of knowledge. Even if transcendental logic can separate transcendent meaning from its immanence in consciousness and clarify its formal articulations entirely independently of this [consciousness], such a meaning-form can only bring about meaning once it is immanent in consciousness, and we must thus take the fact of this immanence in consciousness as the fundamental presupposition of theory of knowledge. Here we find a limit that cannot by any means be overcome by this science (学). We must simply accept this fundamental fact, and interpret, with this presupposition, how facts of consciousness relate to meaning. What we can clarify by means of transcendental psychology is not *what* founds the immanence of transcendent value or meaning in actual consciousness, but only *how* this immanence takes place.

How then does transcendent meaning or the theoretical value of absolute validity attain immanence in actual consciousness by way of the ought? [This question] constitutes an insurmountable limit to theory of knowledge. We must simply accept this [immanence] as a primordial fact. But the fact that forms possessed of meaning (意味の有する形式) (i.e., transcendent value-configurations) come into contact with actual consciousness by way of the ought, and are realized by means of the affirmation and acknowledgment of this [actual consciousness], *is not to say* that there on the one hand is content of actual consciousness that contains no forms of meaning, while

on the other hand there subsist transcendent forms of meaning, and that they are first united (相会合) by way of the ought in a manner that we cannot come to know. This point of view puts the cart before the horse: as a result of abstraction, it takes that which appears as something that originally exists in an independent manner (独立自存). As long as we take this standpoint, we cannot comprehend how the meaning-forms and the content of consciousness can correspond to each other (相適応). [349] We must then simply presuppose their pre-established harmony. But regardless of whether meaning-forms are originally immanent in content of consciousness or not, they are something valid; but it can only be determined *what* these meaning-forms are once they conform to (即する) their respective content. If we for instance consider the meaning-form or category of causality (因果), there is no doubt that, as what Kant called a concept of pure understanding, it is indeed a universal concept, but as a meaning-form that brings about actual objects of knowledge, it must rely on its respective content and express relations of causality. But since we leave the respective content suspended (不定) and disregard (不問) the particularities of the relations relying on them as general concepts [the meaning-forms] can be accepted as universal relational forms (關係形式). But when they are combined with actual content, they must be particularized by according with the particularity of the content. The form can be likened to a mathematical function that in a universal manner expresses—in relation to the independent variable—the dependent variable which takes a particular value by means of the particular value of the independent variable. This must be a concept of function that expresses not only an abstract universal concept, but rather concrete universal relations. The meaning-forms only truly emerge as such once they conform to content of actual consciousness. If they are entirely separate from content of consciousness, even meaning-forms are incapable of giving rise to meaning. To say that transcendent meaning attains immanence in consciousness by way of the ought does not mean that this meaning subsists entirely independently of consciousness, and that they are subsequently combined by the mediation of the ought; in reality, there is first primordial content of consciousness which internally implies meaning-form in particular differences of species, and for reasons unknown to us, this [primordial unity] splits, rendering the meaning-form manifest; it is distinguished from this content of consciousness that has been separated, and their explicit

union becomes transcendent with regard to the disunified and split consciousness, and the demand of the combination of what has in this manner been split manifests itself as an ought. The original union of category-material and of the category—which, following Lask, was taken as the object of knowledge—is an entirely transcendent Idea for the stage of knowledge, where the meaning-form (the category) and the content of consciousness (category-material) have already split; but for their correspondence and harmony to become possible, their inner combination must conversely be a primordial fact at the stage preceding knowledge. If we take the object of knowledge to be—as argued by Rickert—a transcendent value or ought, then, as an Idea, this value/ought is the only *absolute and theoretical* such; [350] but if we apply this to the individual [instances of] knowledge, [the object] must be something that appears as a particular meaning or value-configuration in accordance with the individual character of each [instance of] knowledge. If this is so, then these meanings are also, concretely speaking, formed into particular relations and forms in accordance with the individual character (個性) of the content, and insofar as transcendental logic only suspends the individual character of [content], this [content] can also be recognized as a universal that has the individual meaning-forms as its particularizations, and [transcendental logic] can thus take this as an object in general. The standpoint of transcendental psychology, on the other hand, takes the universal meaning-forms that have been abstracted from this content, as originally entirely transcendent with regard to consciousness, and does not clarify how they come to be combined with content of actual consciousness (as mentioned, this is a wholly impossible undertaking); it conversely must return to what precedes this abstraction, and analyze and describe how meaning-forms are internally combined with the content of actual consciousness. In short, [transcendental psychology] must seek the absolute intertwining of category and category-material, which Lask takes as the object of knowledge, not *beyond* the reach of (彼岸) actual consciousness, but in its deepest ground, to analyze and describe it. *An sich*, our immediate consciousness is supra-individual and within it the original union of category and category-material are implied in a state of primordial indistinction. What splits them apart pertains to the content of a judgment that takes place in our actual consciousness, and [the state] where the union of [category and category-material] can be considered as a transcendent ob-

ject for this [actual consciousness] is indeed the stage of *für sich*. When we acquire the true union—as knowledge—of category-material and category by means of a correct judgment founded on the ought, this is nothing other than a return to the origin (本) at the stage of *an und für sich*. Knowledge is in this manner a circular process; transcendental logic carries out the abstract study of the categorial forms at the stage of *für sich*; by means of reduction transcendental psychology retrospects (回顧) the original source (本源) from the stage of *an und für sich* to that of *an sich*, and studies the circular process of knowledge which returns form and content to their oneness (帰一をなす). But as long as we take the standpoint of theoretical philosophy, the guarantee of the validity of knowledge must be sought in the absolutely independent subsistence of categorial forms, the object [of study] of transcendental logic; transcendental psychology can only presuppose these [categorial forms] and study their immanence by means of reduction. Transcendental psychology cannot itself provide a ground of legitimacy to the validity of knowledge. Hence, transcendental psychology too must, in accordance with the viewpoint of transcendental logic, pay attention to the general structures of meaning-form and examine only the universal relations of form and content by leaving the individual character of the meaning-content in suspense (不定に放任). [351] Here the primacy of transcendental logic with regard to transcendental psychology once again comes to the fore. However, by retrospecting the primordial consciousness where the inner relations of form are indistinctly intertwined with content, transcendental psychology aims to know the circular process by which actual consciousness acquires, as its object of knowledge, the combination of the forms of meaning (the object [of study] of transcendental logic) with their corresponding universal content; even if the individual character of content, and thus the individual character of meaning that is combined with it, are beyond the scope of [transcendental psychology], there is nevertheless no doubt that, as something that has been combined with the universal content that corresponds to a universal form, we must consider the general union of form and content. In summary, in its immediate and primordial state, consciousness is something where the inner meaning-form is indistinctly intertwined with content. This is what characterizes the standpoint of transcendental psychology.

IV

So far we have considered transcendental logic as the precondition for transcendental psychology to come about, and as something entirely complete in itself and self-sufficient which does not call for [transcendental psychology]; but can transcendental logic really in this self-sufficient manner arise entirely independently of transcendental psychology? I believe that we in one sense must answer this question in the affirmative, and in another sense must answer it in the negative. It seems to me, in particular, that if one wishes to work out a logic which is not merely transcendental but also contains *formal* logic, in such a manner that, as a pure logic or a system of “eternal truths,” it is entirely independent of facts of consciousness, then one can take one’s cues from pure mathematics; but if mathematics takes its most fundamental concepts as undefinable and admits that its relations are determined by means of axioms that cannot be proved (postulates), then logic too would—just like this construction of systems of hypothetical demonstrations on the basis of these *unbeweisbare Axiome (Postulate)* containing *undefinierbare Grundbegriffe*⁴⁸—merely offer axioms that cannot be proved and which contain undefinable fundamental concepts and would be limited to articulating logical relations that can be derived from these [axioms]; [352] if that were the case, logic would indeed, as a pure logic, arise entirely independent of facts of consciousness. But as we have said in the above, it is not only impossible for meaning-forms—which are the object [of study] of this type of logic—to have (insofar as they are truly meaning-forms) the significance of being that which gives rise to the value configurations that become norm and ideal for actual consciousness; furthermore, since the axioms that are the foundation of this system of demonstrations, and the fundamental concepts that it implies, just remain suppositional (設定的), logic must [in this case] lose the qualification of being a branch of philosophy, which always seeks *Gründlichkeit*.⁴⁹ Additionally, since this logic is founded on these fundamental concepts or axioms, this already clearly means that they cannot be derived from anything else, nor proven by any other means. On the contrary, the only path that is open to us con-

48. [Unprovable axioms (postulates) containing undefinable fundamental concepts.]

49. [“Thoroughness,” or, more literally, a “fundamental character,” being well-founded.]

sists in elucidating the reasons why they arise, from the standpoint of the *Apriori*. But the only viable method for conceiving the *Apriori* [of these axioms], is to take immediate and primordial consciousness as something that originally and internally implies connections of meaning, and, from the ultimate fundamental concepts of logic and its principles to retro-spectively seek the inner connections on which, in the immediate facts of consciousness, they are founded. We can thus say that transcendental logic requires, on its flip-side, to be supplemented by transcendental psychology, and only in this manner can it take its place as a branch of philosophy. This transcendental psychology does not merely ask—as in the case of Rickert—what the act of knowledge is, identify it with the act of judgment, and uncover the transcendent ought as its object, by means of an analysis of judicative consciousness, and understand this [transcendent ought] as pointing to transcendent meaning; it must furthermore seek the foundations of this judicative act and of its object by entering into the most fundamental stratus and clarifying how transcendent meaning can originally be immanent in consciousness, and how meaning-form and content are originally combined. From what we have seen until now, it should already be clear that the method adopted in this case by [transcendental psychology] does not take its point of departure in immediate consciousness and strive to render manifest the transcendent meaning immanent within it, and to provide a foundation to the constitution of the objective object on the basis of this [immanence]; instead, by returning to the origin from the constitution of the objective object, founded on transcendental logic, transcendental psychology must strive to generally reconstruct the immediate consciousness that renders immanent the transcendent meaning, which is the foundation of this [constitution]. It seems to me that we here find the imperishable significance of Natorp's theory of reconstruction and subjectivation.

[353] Opinions differ as to whether the Natorpian method of *Rekonstruktion* and *Subjektivierung* is truly the only justified method in psychology. As I encounter a number of difficulties concerning a sufficient comprehension of his theory, I do not believe that I can answer this question by a simple yes or no; I cannot help but doubt whether this method is truly capable of giving a complete foundation to psychology as a study of actual consciousness. We may wonder, however, if it is not undeniable, in the perspective of transcendental psychology as we have understood it until now, that this disci-

pline—which does not only aim at a study of the content of actual consciousness, but takes the independent meaning-forms (clarified by transcendental logic) as intertwined with the content in general that correlates to them, and elucidates how these [meaning-forms] become immanent in actual consciousness—must rely on this method. It goes without saying that in this case as well, perfect subjectivation is, as Natorp points out,⁵⁰ a mere ideal; insofar as this [psychology] is, as knowledge, already conceptually determined, it must at least have undergone this [degree of] objectivation. But this is a constraint of knowledge as such; taking this [perfect subjectivation] as its ideal or as its guiding Idea, transcendental psychology must nevertheless be something that takes this direction. Given that [transcendental psychology] strives, through reduction and subjectivation, to reconstruct the manner in which the meaning-forms, understood as the ground of the objectivity of knowledge, are—as intertwined with content in general which corresponds to them—immanent to actual consciousness, we can say that it is, to this extent, the psychology of consciousness-in-general *an sich*.⁵¹ This is what constitutes its significance of being something that—as transcendental psychology—supplements transcendental logic. One may wonder if Husserl's phenomenology must not be something akin to such [transcendental psychology]. He understands phenomenology, taken as a science of essences (*Wesenswissenschaft*), as a study which—by bracketing and suspending (*einklammern, ausschalten*) all standpoints of constitution of the world of objective objects, by means of what he calls the phenomenological reduction (*phänomenologische Reduktion*)—clarifies the essences (*Wesen*) that are immanent to consciousness; following the example of Brentano, he distinguishes within the essence of consciousness that which pertains to the side of the intentional object and the side pertaining to the act which is its correlate (or more precisely: the act-quality (*Aktqualität*)), [354] and for him, the task of phenomenology is to elucidate the essence of these two sides. But since the separation of the intentional object (or rather: the

50. NATORP 1912, 233–40.

51. The fact that Natorp takes the *universelles Erleben, universelles schlechthin konkretes Bewusstsein*, as a leitmotif of psychology, can also be understood in this way. Cf. *ibid.*, 224–5. [The German quote reads: the universal lived experience, the universal, merely concrete consciousness.]

intentional content) and the act is, as we shall see below, already the result of a reflection, it is only due to a reflection and an abstraction that the immediate lived experience of consciousness can be said to contain these two aspects; but insofar as it leads the immanence of meaning (which constitutes the world of objective objects) in content of consciousness back, from the standpoint of this constitution, to its ground by means of reduction, and admits the immanence of this meaning in immediate consciousness, phenomenology can indeed no doubt describe these two aspects of consciousness in the perspective of the discernment of essences (*Wesenserschauung*). But we cannot be considered to be able to conduct a phenomenological description, which relies on the “discernment of essences,” simply by bracketing and suspending (*einklammern, ausschalten*) the different standpoints of the constitution of the objective world, i.e., the so-called natural attitude (*natürliche Einstellung*). On the contrary, only by tying the essences that reside in the object aspects as the ground of the different *natürliche Einstellungen*, to the unity of the essences that reside in the act-aspect, can we, in the unity of primordial consciousness, attain knowledge—through subjectivation and reconstruction—of how these essences [of the object aspects] are immanent in actual consciousness as the *a priori* of the constitution of the objective world.⁵² If we thus take the different essences not as absolutely fixed, but as something relatively determinate (定められる) in the phase of what Natorp calls *Potenz*,⁵³ then this method must increasingly rely on subjectivation and reconstruction. Natorp was in this sense right to say that Husserl’s viewpoint must coincide with (帰する) his own.⁵⁴ But for psychology—which reconstructively knows consciousness by means of subjectivation—to be a universal and valid knowledge which has objectivity, and not simply something subjective, the guarantee of this objectivity must always be sought in the transcendental meaning of objective constitution, the point of departure of its reduction; consequently, the object [of study] of this

52. [As the original sentence is tortuous and problematic, we have translated it with some degree of freedom of interpretation. The Japanese reads as follows: 「却って種々の *natürliche Einstellung* の基として種々の対象的方面に於ける本質が対象界構成のアプリオリとして現実意識に内在する仕方を作作用の方面に於ける本質の統一に関連せしめて主観化的、再構成的に原始意識の統一に於て認識するのだければなるまい。」]

53. Cf. NATORP 1912, 287–90.

54. *Ibid.*, 290.

reconstructive and subjectivizing knowledge, is the unity of the eidetic connections, insofar as they are the foundation and the background of objective constitution, and the result [of this study] must not merely be knowledge of actual consciousness, but knowledge of actual consciousness *insofar as it in its an sich is consciousness-in-general*. When Husserl says that the “*phänomenologisches Residuum*” that remains as the object [of study] of phenomenology after the “*phänomenologische ἐποχή*”—i.e., after we have put all theses (*These*) of constitution of objective objects out of action (*außer Aktion setzen*)—is pure consciousness in its own absolute being (*das reine Bewußtsein in einem absoluten Eigensein*),⁵⁵ this is perhaps indicative of the very same thing. [355] One may wonder if the Natorpian subjectivation and reconstruction is not the method that gives a foundation to psychology understood as the study of this manner of pure consciousness. I mentioned in the above that the Natorpian method of subjectivation and reconstruction is at least justified for transcendental psychology understood as a study of consciousness-in-general; but it seems that we can now see why it only has justified foundations as a method of transcendental psychology (I do not only refer to the transcendent psychology that corresponds to pure logic, but to transcendental psychology in the broadest sense, corresponding to all pure axiology). While Husserl affirms that transcendental psychology is also psychology and thus a science of facts, and that it must, to that extent, be distinguished from phenomenology, which is a science of essences, we can, by means of these considerations, agree with Rickert who on the contrary argues that phenomenology is only possible as transcendental psychology.⁵⁶ Transcendental psychology is by no means a mere science of facts. It reduces actual consciousness—considered only insofar as it realizes consciousness-in-general—to the ground of this constitution of a world of objective objects, and it thus strives to elucidate the constitution of the primordial consciousness where meaning is immanent. This is why it is clearly a science of the phenomena of consciousness that have an eidetic necessity, an eidetic universality, in the Husserlian sense. One may wonder, in other words, if

55. HUSSERL 1913B, 94. [Cf. English translation: HUSSERL 2014, 91. In these lines, Tanabe inserts the German without any translation in Japanese; for better readability, we have added the translation of these phrases where they are not necessarily immediately intelligible.]

56. Cf. RICKERT 1915, 304.

phenomenology, understood as a science of essences, does not coincide (帰する) with this [understanding of transcendental psychology]. But it seems to me that what here calls for particular attention is the question of whether actual consciousness, limited to its being a consciousness-in-general in its *an sich*, can truly be decomposed exhaustively into essences; or more precisely: can we say that when consciousness has simply been decomposed into essences, from the two sides of intentional content and of the act that is its correlate, then we have gained knowledge of consciousness in the perspective of a reconstructive subjectivation? Or must we admit that, in subjectivation and reconstruction, something remains that we cannot know as a mere essence and which is necessary for consciousness to arise *as consciousness*? On the contrary, given that the phenomenological discernment of essences is not a mere lived experience but something that through the *Einklammerung* and *Ausschaltung* of the so-called *natürliche Einstellung*, reflects upon the *a priori* of the constitution of a world of objective objects, as an essence, from these sides of content and act [356] this [discernment of essences] presupposes that one consider an eidetic act which immanently contains a determinate (一定) eidetic content, from the viewpoint of the fundamental unity of consciousness, that we can call *the act of the acts*; and consequently, the fundamental unity of consciousness, understood as the act of the acts, cannot be reflected as an essence. But I consider this [act of the acts] to be what brings about consciousness *as consciousness* and what makes it possible for all essences to be grasped as essences of consciousness. If we call this unity of consciousness “I” (「我」), we must say that the I is something that cannot be phenomenologically discerned as an essence, but which makes each essence an essence of consciousness. In the first edition of his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl considers that the “I” (「我」) which unifies the lived experiences “is nothing peculiar, floating above many lived experiences, but that it is simply identical with their own combined unity (結合統一),” and he affirms that the relation of this “I” (「我」) with the lived experiences does not consist in anything that can appear as an *eigentümlicher phänomenologischer Befund*⁵⁷; and it seems to me that, in this regard, Natorp was right to

57. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, first edition, II, 331. Incidentally, in the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl considers this problem “irrelevant,” and yet the fact that he still maintains it in the second edition due to the importance that he attributes to Natorp’s criticism, which

argue that the relation to the “I” (「我」), understood as *Einheitsgrund* of the unity of the content of lived experience, cannot in the end be abandoned.⁵⁸ Even if the essences pertaining to the two sides of content and act can be elucidated by means of the phenomenological reduction, there must furthermore be a ground of unity which cannot appear as a “*phänomenologischer Befund*” and which cannot be discerned as an essence, for these [essences] to give rise to a concrete consciousness. As this [ground of unity] is itself a unifying act (統一するはたらき), it is something that cannot be unified by something other, and consequently it is something which cannot be phenomenologically discerned as an essence; what can be discerned as an essence must always pertain to “what appears to consciousness,”⁵⁹ and cannot be “that which is conscious of...”⁶⁰; strictly speaking, the phenomenological investigation is only possible if among “what appears to consciousness,” there is the ground of unity which gives rise to consciousness, i.e., the foundation of consciousness [itself]. [357] What Husserl himself calls *das reine Bewußtsein*, or what he calls *das reine Ich* in the second edition of the *Logical Investigations*,⁶¹ must also in fact mean this [unitary ground of consciousness]. But one may wonder if, despite his recognizing this [pure I], he does not persist in considering it as an essence; we can however consider that no matter how we proceed, this [pure I] cannot be discerned as an essence, and that it is merely the limit of what Natorp calls

we discuss here, is a manifestation of an admirable academic spirit. [“Es ist selbstverständlich, daß das Ich nichts Eigenartiges ist, das über den mannigfaltigen Erlebnissen schwebte, sondern daß es einfach mit ihrer eigenen Verknüpfungseinheit identisch ist.” (Husserl 1901, 331) English translation: Husserl 2014, 86; translation modified. For “*eigentümlicher phänomenologischer Befund*,” the passage reads as follows: “...the relation in which [lived] experiences are thought to stand to an experiencing consciousness or psychological individual or I, point to *no peculiar phenomenological situation*.” (Husserl 2014, 85, translation modified in accordance with the first edition of *Logische Untersuchungen*, where the passage reads as follows: “...die Beziehung, in welcher wir die Erlebnisse zu einem erlebenden Bewußtsein oder psychischen Individuum oder Ich denken, auf *keinen eigentümlichen phänomenologischen Befund* zurückweist.” (331.))]

58. NATORP 1912, 33–7. [*Einheitsgrund*: a ground of unity.]

59. [What appears to consciousness: 意識せられたもの, more literally (but also more ambiguously) “what has become conscious.”]

60. [That which is conscious of... 意識するもの, more literally (and ambiguously): “what is conscious.” The difference between these two locutions—意識するもの/意識するもの—is that in the former the verb する (lit.: to do) is in the *passive*, while in the latter it is in the *active* voice.]

61. HUSSERL 1913A, II/1, 359. [The pure consciousness, the pure I.]

subjectivation. What I call consciousness-in-general is, at its *an sich* stage, only what takes this pure consciousness, this pure I, as the foundation of unity. We thus cannot say that transcendental psychology, which takes this consciousness-in-general as a guiding idea, is only a science of essences; if we in this perspective take it to be a factual science, then the “fact” with which it deals is not one that is founded on essences; it is a primordial fact which is the foundation due to which the essences are correlated as the side of intentional content and the side of the quality of the act, and which makes phenomenology (understood as a science of essences) the science of consciousness, in a certain sense. In my view, the proper role of phenomenology can thus only reveal itself by means of transcendental psychology, which strives to elucidate consciousness through subjectivation and reconstruction; and by clarifying here the limitations to Natorp’s method, supplementing the thought of Husserl, and deepening the position of Rickert, I hope to uncover a point where these three [thinkers] can be unified, and to in this manner seek a path for the study of the subject of knowledge in the perspective of transcendental psychology. We will thus need to pay much attention to the fact that at the same time that the Kantian school and the Bolzanian school enter into contact with each other by radicalizing logicism, they also, on the other hand, occasionally cross paths in the perspective of transcendental psychology.

v

I believe that in the preceding sections I have largely clarified the following points. *First*, when critical logicism is purely radicalized, consciousness-in-general (understood as the subject of knowledge) becomes the norm or the ideal for the judicative and actual consciousness of the individual; the Idea of the original and absolute interpenetration (*Zusammen*) of [the meaning-form (the category) and the content of consciousness (category-material)]—which must be presupposed as the criterion for deciding (決定) the veracity (真理性) of judgment, understood as the mutual belonging (*Zusammengehörigkeit*) of the meaning-form (the category) and the content of consciousness (the category-material),—is something considered from the side of the norm of judicative consciousness, rather than from the side of the ground of the objectivity of knowledge. [358] *Second*, the subject

of knowledge, understood as this manner of Idea, itself possesses the total unity of the meaning that fully transcends actual consciousness; but given that this [totality] demands to be the norm of actual consciousness and to be realized by [this actual consciousness] by way of the transcendent ought, it must in a certain sense be immanent in actual consciousness and intertwined (相交渉) with it. But since the fact that what is originally transcendent becomes immanent for the first time does not allow us to comprehend how the meaning-form is de-termined⁶² by means of the meaning-content and how they can accord with each other, one should not think that the category (the form) and the category-material (the content) originally subsist absolutely separately and independently of each other, that the ob-ject of knowledge is subsequently constituted through their combination, nor try to derive from it the Idea or supposition (設定) of the subject of knowledge understood as the correlate of this ob-jectivity; the original interwovenness of these two [elements] is not *beyond* (彼岸) actual consciousness; one must consider it, on the contrary, as latent (潜在) in the deepest ground of this [actual consciousness], and understand that their scission brings about the judicative content of actual consciousness, and that the unity to which they can be reduced (還元帰一) is the transcendent norm for this [consciousness], or its ob-ject. *Third*: It pertains to the standpoint of transcendental logic to try to found the ob-jectivity of knowledge by in this manner taking the category as *sine qua non* for meaning to come about, separating it from the category-material that corresponds to it (相応), and by elucidating their meaning and their relations to each other; but even if this allows us to clarify the *ob-ject* of knowledge, the *knowledge* of the ob-ject eludes us in this perspective; furthermore, it does not allow us to show the ground or the origin (由来) of these meaning-forms themselves. Relating to immediate and primordial consciousness, we must furthermore comprehend the origin (由来) from which these meaning-forms arise; we must recognize that these meaning-forms are originally intimately (不離) intertwined with the content and that their distinction, in immediate consciousness, is only a matter of reflective abstraction; the return to this origin (本元) is the very reason (所以) for knowledge of the ob-ject. This is the standpoint of transcendental psychology. The method of [transcendental psychology] does not consist in

62. [De-termined: 限定. We hyphenate this term differentiate it from 規定.]

the direct analysis of primordial consciousness and in the elucidation of its elements, and in subsequent clarification of how the knowledge of the object factually arises. Even if such a method were possible, it could not reveal what constitutes transcendental psychology as such.⁶³ On the contrary, it presupposes the standpoint of transcendental logic [359] which it takes as a guide, and through reduction it strives to comprehend the meaningful content—[content to which] meaning is given by means of the forms clarified by [transcendental logic]—from their origin of emergence (由来起原) within primordial consciousness. In short, transcendental psychology strives, by a return to the source (溯源的に), to analyze and to describe, from the side of meaning, the primordial consciousness which renders meaning immanent. This is why transcendental psychology is not merely a study (学) of actual consciousness, but the study of consciousness to the extent that, in its *Ansichsein*, it can be considered as a consciousness-in-general. It goes without saying that understood in this manner, consciousness is merely a limit. Nevertheless, transcendental psychology must take this manner of Idea as the guiding notion of its knowledge. And it is in this sense that the method of transcendental psychology consists in subjectivation and reconstruction. Only from the standpoint of such a reduction can we hope, through a transcendental psychology which analyzes and describes actual consciousness in which meaning is immanent, to reach a complete clarification of the problem of the subject of knowledge. On the basis of these ideas, I would like to push ahead in our investigations.

We must, as mentioned, consider the meaning-form and the content of consciousness to originally interpenetrate each other; we must understand that the former is originally immanent in the latter, and that the latter originally implies the former. Of course the meaning-form is a general valuable (有価値) configuration which is valid in itself, regardless of whether it is immanent or not in the content of consciousness; but for it to bring about a concrete meaning, it must undergo a de-termination due to its immanence in consciousness. It is only when a meaning-form is de-termined by the content of consciousness that it can constitute an actual meaning. Even if we think of this meaning-form as the object of pure logic, it in fact remains

63. [What constitutes transcendental psychology as such: 先驗心理学の先驗心理学たる所以.]

impossible unless we presuppose, on its flip-side, a connection to the content of consciousness. As was recognized by Lask, the moment (契機) that differentiates the form into different species (種別分化) does not lie in *das Geltende* as such, but in the material (材料) to which [*das Geltende*] relates.⁶⁴ If one considers, in the manner of Rickert, that there is content devoid of any transcendental meaning-forms, and that when this content is combined with meaning-forms, these meaning-forms attain immanence in the content, and that this gives rise to concrete meaning—then it seems entirely impossible to fully solve the problem of the immanence of meaning-form in the content of consciousness. Even if their distinction is the result of an abstraction, [it nevertheless remains that], first, meaning-form which is valid without any relation to content can be considered from the standpoint of pure logic, and [360] second, [content and meaning-form] are distinguished insofar as an identical form can be combined with different types of content; hence, this [standpoint] does not allow us to conceive of how their original interwovenness comes about. As I wonder if there is not here a main point that needs to be improved in Kant and the Kantian school, I now mean to pursue this line of inquiry in greater detail. First, as is well known, according to Kant's own theory, the manifold of sensations is given, and being received by sensibility in the intuitive forms of time and space, this gives rise to sensible intuition; but this [manifold of sensations] is originally something entirely irrational, devoid of the slightest meaning. But as its temporal determination becomes the schema of concepts of pure understanding, [the sensations]—mediated by this [schema]—are subsumed in the concepts of pure understanding, and only thus is the manifold of sensations (understood as the components (素材) of knowledge), or the “category-material,” combined with the category (the meaning-form), and thus knowledge with a concrete meaning comes about. Among contemporary Neo-Kantians—who take into account the fact that Kant's philosophy does not yet, however, abandon [all] traces of dogmatism and does thus not truly

64. LASK 1911, 57ff. [*Das Geltende*: what has validity. “Wie aber kommt es weiter zu einer Zerfällung der geltenden Form überhaupt in eine Mannigfaltigkeit von Einzelformen? Die Antwort auf diese Frage wird im folgenden durch eine Theorie gegeben, wonach das die Form differenzierende Moment nicht auf seiten des Geltenden selbst liegt, sondern auf Rechnung dessen kommt, was von der hingeltenden Form betroffen wird, worauf sie hinweist, also auf Rechnung des außerhalb Liegenden, des Materials” (57).]

radicalize critical philosophy—Rickert’s theory of knowledge maintains that in general, “to be given” means *to be judged as given*, and the givenness (所与) of the content of sensation presupposes the meaning-form of the category of givenness (所与性), and he evicts from the field of theory of knowledge all content that has not been rationalized by means of meaning-forms. It is indeed justified to affirm, in the perspective of logicism, that as long as we deal with all content as object of thinking, there is nothing that does not presuppose some meaning-form; to this, we have no reason to object. But if content is to be judged—by means of the meaning-form of the category of givenness—as given, there must first, in a content that precedes this judgment, be reasons that guarantee the possibility of being combined with this form. In other words, the meaning-form of the category of givenness must be the manifestation of something that—prior to the combination of this [category] with the content through the judgment of the content’s being given—is interpenetrating with and is immanent in this content. What the category is, that says “it is given” (「与えられてある」という範疇), cannot be comprehended by means of this category itself; it is comprehended by means of the content that is given in actuality, and which internally implies this category. Here applies Lask’s affirmation that *Was ‘Sein’ bedeutet, ist nur mit Hilfe des Sinnlichen, des Geltungs- und Bedeutungsfremden, nicht aber umgekehrt das Sinnliche durch den Seinsbegriff zu verstehen.*⁶⁵ [361] There is clearly no doubt that other meaning-forms cannot by any means be derived from this meaning-form of givenness, nor comprehended by means of it, but rely on their respective content within which they must be originally implied and immanent. The category of givenness can provide no answer to the question of how the logical meaning-forms interpenetrate and are immanent in sensible intuition. On the contrary, the very application of this category itself [to its content] requires a solution to this problem. What if we then understood, in the manner of Cohen, the givenness of sensation (normally admitted as the element of the so-called category-material) not as the givenness of matter (質料) to thinking, but as the task of the constitution of [thinking] being presented to us (課題として掲げられること)? His

65. LASK 1911, 56. [“The meaning of ‘being’ can only be understood by means of the sensible, that which is alien to validity and meaning; the sensible should not conversely be understood through the concept of being.”]

great insight is indeed to have understood *gegeben* as *aufgegeben*,⁶⁶ and thus, through the concept of the differential, to have given a profound meaning to the principle of intensive quantity as a principle of transcendentalization of sensation, and to thus have accounted for the production of the object by thinking (思惟の対象生産), and we must in particular recognize that this [insight] has an important meaning for the clarification of the transcendental-logical foundations of the mathematical natural sciences. But just like the meaning-form of *Gegebenheit* cannot be comprehended, in Rickert's case, by means of this meaning-form [itself], but only by means of content that is actually (実際) given in actual consciousness, so is there in Cohen's case no doubt that the meaning of "being presented as a task" can only be comprehended by means of content that is actually presented as a task. It goes without saying that as long as we add no reflection, content cannot, prior to the solution of the task, be judged as presented as a task through a category that we can call *Aufgegebenheit*; nevertheless, it is undeniable that in the content presented as a task, a meaning preceding the solution of this task must be immanent. Even if the logical production of the object takes place by means of a meaning-form corresponding to something like the principle of intensive quantity, it thus need not be lengthily explained that this meaning-form cannot be derived from the meaning-form of *Aufgegebenheit* and that it must in fact be originally immanent in the content that is presented as a task. Therefore Cohen's theory does not provide us with any fundamental solution to the problem of how the meaning-form can be immanent in consciousness either. [362] On the other hand, there is no doubt that this theory already presupposes the solution of this problem, or at least that it requires it. But his theory contains a profound and extraordinarily fruitful (*fruchtbar*) idea (考) for the entire field of theory of knowledge; as I believe that it may be possible to find hints to the solution of our problem by going back to the premises of his theory, I wish to now pursue in greater depth the presuppositions required by this theory. To begin with, taken separately from the particular condition that in the transcendentalization of sensation we use the principle of intensive quantity, founded on the concept of the differential, the idea (思想) that being given to thinking means being presented as a task, is a perceptive insight that holds an impor-

66. [I.e., that he understood givenness as our being tasked with....]

tant significance for logical critical philosophy in general; but even if it is presented as a task, sensation must already give a criterion of constitution to thinking, and it is thus undeniable that it must imply objectivity understood as a task. Otherwise, even if the principle of constitution of thinking is somehow transcendental as an eternal truth, we cannot necessarily say that the solution of this task is objective, and that objective experience (the knowledge of the natural sciences), which can be expressed as factual truth, comes about as a result of this [solution]. It can thus be assumed that a transcendental essence which, in another sense than the logical meaning-form of thinking, becomes the foundation of objectivity, must be contained in sensation. In Kant, objectivity is always accorded to sensation insofar as the latter is given from the thing-in-itself, but in Cohen's idea of the given as being identical with the task (所与即課題), which strives to rid itself of the traces of dogmatism that remain in Kant's transcendental aesthetics, the universality, understood as essence, must be contained within the sensation presented as a task. Only under this precondition can the content or the sensation, presented as a task, avoid being merely subjective, and rather be a task of the emergence—by means of the solution—of objective knowledge; in other words, only thus can it imply the meaning of *Aufgegebenheit*. The content that presents itself as a task appears when the essence (or its system) that subsists objectively independently of whether it is presented as a task or not, becomes a task that must be solved by logical thinking, and it thus becomes capable of containing the meaning of “*Aufgegebenheit*.” *Aufgeben* must imply the meaning that the content that it presents from the start internally opposes consciousness. [363] Even if the principle that serves the solution is objective, the solution of the task in question can only have objective validity if what originally subsists becomes a task. In this regard, the standpoint of the Kantian school, which as the foremost vocation of theory of knowledge deals with the logical meaning-forms in the perspective of transcendental logic alone, perhaps cannot go beyond Cohen's theory; but if what we have just said is correct, it must be recognized that within sensation, there is a transcendental essence that can assure the objectivity of its transcendentalization. Regarding the question of whether there is, then, a transcendental essence in sensation, this is what is affirmed by the thinkers of the German-Austrian school in a perspective that differs from the one we have dealt with until now. In fact, we could say that half of what psychology usu-

ally says about sensation pertains to the essence of sensation. The reason why I use the term “half” (半ば) is that what is said of (説かる所) the distinction (識別) of sensations always belongs in fact to the psychological acts as what relates to the acts of actual consciousness; but insofar as, independently of the act of distinction, what is said of the content of sensation itself requires a meaning that subsists whether the sensations actually become conscious or not, we must say that it belongs to the essence of sensation. For instance, the distinction, in the case of color-sensation, of the three characteristics of color tone, degree of saturation, degree of lightness, and the expression of their changes as a continuous and three-dimensional series by means of the color cone, has the purpose of [clarifying] the eidetic relations that are constitutive to the respective colors as such; and in the sound-sensation, the fact that the different tones have mutual relations that express scales also relates to the essences of these respective sounds. To reduce (帰する) this to physical relations by focusing on the aspect of stimulus is the result of the objectivation of [these essences] from a particular standpoint that presupposes them; for this to be possible, there must be eidetic relations of this kind, which precede this [objectivation]. It is not something that relates to the act of distinction relying on the consciousness of sensation; the determinations that are given by the content of sensation itself must all belong to the essence of sensation. We must thus recognize that not only in the logical essences, that relate to the forms of knowledge (i.e., the essences that pertain to the meaning-forms of thinking), but also within sensation—which as given matter (質料), has been considered since Kant as entirely non-transcendental –, there must be transcendental essences. [364] One of the remarkable contributions of the German-Austrian school is that, generally based on the Leibnizian notion of eternal truths and Bolzano’s logicism, it has come to recognize the essence of non-logical sensations. What Meinong calls *Farbengeometrie* and *Tongeometrie*⁶⁷ can—as a branch of his “object theory”—be understood as the study of the transcendental structure of the eidetic orders (本質系統) of a chromatic sensation-in-itself and of an auditory sensation-in-itself, as discussed above, devoid of any relation to actual consciousness.⁶⁸ It is doubtful, of course, whether the object theory,

67. [Chromatic geometry and tonal geometry.]

68. Cf. MEINONG 1907, 10–13.

which studies the eidetic connections of the entirely irrational sensation-in-itself, truly constitutes a system of science (学) that can be compared with geometry; but it is undeniable nonetheless that outside of the logical meaning-forms, there is an essence of sensation that can be understood as what Meinong calls an “ob-ject.” It is very significant that as opposed to the object of experience, which has been objectivized by means of the logical meaning-form from the standpoint of natural knowledge of “red things,” the transcendental ob-ject (先験の対象) red-in-itself, which does not depend on actual consciousness, subsists as an essence. If sensation too, in this sense, truly has a transcendental essence, it is indubitable that like the logical essence it has so-called eidetic universality, and it goes without saying that when, taking its immanence as a task presented to actual consciousness, thinking applies the solution to [this task] by means of this transcendental principle, [sensation] consequently obtains objectivity. Cohen’s profound interpretation of the givenness of content of sensation has taught us that sensation too must have a transcendental essence, although it differs from [that of] the logical meaning-forms. Just as the logical meaning-forms are valid whether they become conscious or not, and just as nothing is added when they are combined with the content of some actual consciousness, so [the essence of sensation] forms an order that subsists independently of whether it becomes conscious or not, and nothing is added through its becoming conscious. The problem on which we have focused, that of the original immanence of meaning-form within the content of consciousness, thus comes to reveal a new facet. For sensation—which was first considered in the Kantian perspective as matter opposed to the category (i.e., the meaning-form), and was thus understood as an ultimate element of the category-materials which were in themselves considered *logisch nackt* and *bedeutungsfremd*, and in this sense: *irrational*⁶⁹—differs in type, as a transcendental essence, from meaning-forms, [365] but it has an equal claim to objectivity; therefore, it can be assumed that this is where we must at least partially find the principle of mediation which ties logical meaning-forms and content of consciousness together. Given that actual consciousness never arises without elements of sensation, and that we can say that sensa-

69. [*Logisch nackt*: logically naked; *bedeutungsfremd*: unrelated to meaning; *irrational* appears in German in the text.]

tion is in fact the *sine qua non* for actual consciousness to arise, it is indubitable that the fact that sensation has a transcendental essence is of great importance for the problem of the original immanence of logical meaning-forms in the content of consciousness. We can consider the theory of the essence of sensation in the German-Austrian school to have the vocation of complementing Kantianism on its flip-side.

But when considering it in another perspective, one recognizes that sensation is the ultimate element of the content of consciousness and that the simple sensation is an abstract product that cannot so easily become the intentional content of consciousness. If we consider the matter (質料) of sensible intuition in Kant, intuition has in its ultimate instance sensation as an element, but it must be through the combination, unified by the intuitive forms of time and space, that it becomes content of actual consciousness. As pure intuition, the intuitive forms thus have purity in common with transcendental thinking; yet, however pure they may be, there is no doubt that mere intuition is, in the perspective of logical meaning, something irrational, and that if it is to take part in knowledge, it must be rationalized. In other words, just like sensation, it must present itself as a task to thinking. Cohen has argued that time, which has anticipation as its essence, is one of the categories, and that by means of [this category] the production of content, understood as the unification of a manifold (多) which has the differential as its simple units (單位), becomes possible, and that as the completion (完成) of this unification, space is nothing but the category of the totality (全) that corresponds to the integral, and he holds geometry to be the *Methode* of natural knowledge;⁷⁰ but in the ground on which time and space arise, understood as this manner of categories, there must yet be intuitive time and intuitive space, understood as tasks. We will perhaps have occasion to discuss [these questions] in detail another day, but it seems to me that even speaking of time as a category, there must be remarkable differences in conceptual content between the historical time and the natural time; and as I said a moment ago that the differentiation of meaning-forms cannot come from the meaning-forms themselves but must rely on their content, so this difference [between historical and natural time] [366] relies in fact on the nature (如何) of the content immanent in intuitive

70. Cf. COHEN 1902, 127–70.

time. When it comes to space, there is no doubt that we can only settle the question of whether the constitutive category of empirical nature is Euclidean space or non-Euclidean space, by means of the task presented in intuitive space; as for the mistakes (無理) committed in the attempt by Natorp—who carries on Cohen’s perspective—at proving that the three-dimensional Euclidean space is logically necessary as a category constitutive of experience,⁷¹ I have commented on them elsewhere.⁷² The fact that, as it is seen today in the principle of relativity, physical space has a correlative character (双関的なること), that physical space is non-Euclidean space which has a curvature that can only be determined experimentally, etc., can only be comprehended, from the point of view of the demand of the most satisfying solution possible of the task presented to intuition; it cannot by any means be comprehended through the necessity of thinking. Cohen’s idea (説) that *gegeben* means *aufgegeben*⁷³ is not merely the rationalization of content of sensation; it must, more broadly, be extended to the totality of sensible intuition. For the logicist theory of knowledge, sensible intuition is in itself clearly separated from the logical meaning-forms, just as it was already clear in Kant. This is also why Lask generally designated *das Bedeutungsfremde, das Wert- und Geltungsfremde* as the *Sinnlich-Anschauliches*.⁷⁴ But the rigorous distinction between [the logical meaning-forms and sensible intuition] pertains to an abstract standpoint, and our current problem is—as is clear from the preceding discussions—to show how this sensible intuition concretely implies, in potency (潜在的に), the logical meaning-forms. In a sense, we can see this as the problem of the connection between intuition and understanding, which Kant strove to resolve in the central part of the *Transcendental Analytics*. Taking another road than Kant, I have argued that there is a transcendental essence in sensation too, but I have not yet accounted for the nature (何たるか) of intuitive time and space. With this in mind, I should like first, in the next section, to consider the problem of how sensible intu-

71. NATORP 1910, 303–25.

72. Cf. my article “The Logical Foundations of Geometry” [TANABE 1963, 583–661.]

73. [*Gegeben* means *aufgegeben*: *gegeben* 即 *aufgegeben*, which could also be rendered, for instance, as *gegeben-sive-aufgegeben*.]

74. [I.e., designated that which has no relation to meaning, that which has no relation to value and validity, as what can appear in sensible intuition.]

ition comes about, and then proceed to the central problem of the original immanence of the logical meaning-forms in sensible intuition within actual consciousness.

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