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Clarifying the Meaning of the Logic of Species

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Translators' Introduction

The “logic of Species” is the philosophical framework that has become synonymous with Tanabe Hajime. Inaugurated in “The Logic of Social-Being” (1934–1935), it would come to comprise part of the groundwork of the Kyoto School along with Nishida Kitarō’s “logic of place,”¹ against which it was developed as a response. “Clarifying the Meaning of the Logic of Species,” translated here for the first time in full,² is the fourth major article of the “logic of Species” but also completes Tanabe’s articulation of the relationship between Genus, Species, and Individual, the basic conceptual apparatus that would serve him up to his last work, *Mallarmé Memorandum* (1961). Consequently, it would not be an overstatement to say that, for understanding the issues that motivate Tanabe’s thought, this article is the most significant work in his over five-decade long career.

With its distinctive reappropriations of vocabulary from throughout the history of Western philosophy, its demand for acquaintance with central issues of modern thought, and its continuation of an intense debate that, with the passage of time, has become unfamiliar (or perhaps uncannily familiar), this article poses a fairly high barrier to entry. There is no space to provide a systematic initiation to those issues here.³ In this introduction, we

1. HEISIG 2011, 670.

2. Two of the seven sections of this article have been previously translated into English (TANABE 2018).

3. For Tanabe’s own, relatively accessible, introduction to these issues, see Tanabe 2022, the Translator’s Introduction for which offers background on the relationship of the logic of Species to Nishida’s thought. For an overview of the logic of Species as social ontology, as well as the relationship between social ontology and “statal ontology,” a notion that appears in the present article (THZ 6: 454); see URAI 2022.

instead focus on what seems to be the most advantageous point of entry into the logic of Species: Tanabe's confrontation with Hegel.

TANABE AND THE *DOPPELSATZ*

Perhaps paradoxical,⁴ it is helpful to understand Tanabe's appreciation of Hegel from the angle of his "Platonism,"⁵ a self-ascription that became prominent in the 1930s and would continue until his last work. Things become a little clearer when we note that significant for Tanabe is, not the textbook Plato's realm of supersensible entities, but that his "method is dialectic and the motive of his philosophy throughout lies in the political praxis of building a rational state."⁶ In clarifying, or "radicalizing," this methodological guide, Tanabe locates the significance of Hegel, attributing his own "fundamental ideas" to Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (hereafter, PR), what Tanabe translates as the "Philosophy of Law."⁷ In his words, "the present logic of social ontology follows the precedent of Hegel's Philosophy of Law."⁸

Referencing the Preface to PR,⁹ Tanabe states:

When he [Hegel] declares in the preface of the *Elements* that it is not the task of the philosophy of law to ideate a state that does not actually exist but only ought to exist, and that its task lies in grasping reason within the actual and to be the rational comprehension of the actual state, therein lies what guides the attempt that follows from my practical motivation, to analyze the state and try to understand its ontological structure logically.¹⁰

4. "Paradoxical," that is, granting that it is the Hegel-*Aristotle* constellation that, via Wilfrid Sellars, has most captured the imagination of the recent anglophone Hegel renaissance (cf. BRANDOM 1994; PINKARD 1994, 356, n. 12; MCDOWELL 2000, 5; notably, McDowell speaks of a "naturalized platonism," *ibid.*, 91). For some historical reference points on Plato in the Kantian aftermath, see Beiser 2002, 354–5; and for an introduction to Hegel's study of Plato, see SURBER 2019.

5. THZ 6: 454.

6. THZ 6: 463. For a window into the political significance of reading Plato in the early years of German Idealism, see Baum 2000.

7. THZ 6: 399.

8. THZ 6: 459

9. "This treatise, therefore, in so far as it deals with political science, shall be nothing other than an attempt to comprehend and portray the state as an inherently rational entity." (PR, 21)

10. THZ 6: 459.

Tanabe's purpose in the "logic of Species," in other words, was to grasp the Idea of the state, not in terms of a utopia dreamed up by philosophers, but within the state as it actually exists. On this point, Tanabe takes himself to be in company with Hegel. As he puts it:

[W]hen I first resolved to understand Hegel's philosophy, I believed I could find the key to that understanding in the practical union of the actual and the rational that appears in the preface of the *Elements of the Philosophy of Law*.¹¹

Tanabe is referring here to the famous *Doppelsatz*: what is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational. Tanabe had already drawn attention to the *Doppelsatz* in the articles "The Coincidence of the Rational and the Actual in Hegel" (1930) and "Hegelian Philosophy and Absolute Dialectic" (1931), both collected in *Hegelian Philosophy and Dialectic* (1932). Yet going beyond Hegel interpretation, Tanabe develops his logic of Species as part of the inquiry into this coincidence in historical society. Such a historical coincidence is "rational actuality," or, more concretely, the "humane State."¹² What it means to build a humane State as a rational actuality is a core problem (the "practical motivation") of the logic of Species.

UNDERSTANDING HEGEL BY OVERCOMING HEGEL

To speak of a coincidence between the rational and the actual is not to suggest that the two are directly integrated in the historical world. But neither are they to be conceived as coinciding merely in essence. As Tanabe explains in "The Logic of Species and the World Scheme" (1935):

The watchword of Hegel's philosophy is "what is rational is actual; what is actual is rational"; however, if the claimed mutual accordance of the actual and rational is taken to mean, not the unification of oppositional, negative moments in praxis, but the contemplative identity of the two in essence, then this mutual accordance would no longer be capable of being rational precisely on account of its collapse into rationalism.¹³

11. THZ 6: 458.

12. THZ 6: 507.

13. THZ 6: 177.

When Tanabe then claims that it is from the logic of Species that Hegel is both “understood” and “overcome,”¹⁴ we can see that he understands Hegel as taking the mutual accordance of the *Doppelsatz* to be but an identity in contemplation, a position to be overcome by reconsidering it in terms of praxis. For Tanabe, then, unification in praxis is the meaning of humane state-building.

We can get clearer on Tanabe’s understanding of his disagreement with Hegel by examining his motivations more closely. In the first instance, to “overcome” Hegel means to further radicalize dialectic. For Tanabe, what is missing in a dialectic of contemplative identity is the participation of individuals in the mutual accordance of the rational and the actual. In this vein, Tanabe says that “acting dialectic” is “the true dialectic,”¹⁵ the method capable of explaining how “action, while that of the Individual, is the self-actualization of the Whole.”¹⁶ The basic point is that something is missing from our understanding of how truly humane States come into being (our “social” and “statal ontology”), if it is possible for them to arise for reasons that their members do not recognize. “Reason,” Tanabe says, “must be something that is free and always so on the basis of a self-awareness of reasons.”¹⁷

In this light, the distinction between the “contemplative” and the “practical,” and so Tanabe’s conception of how his dialectic “overcomes” Hegel, turns on the explicandum of dialectic, what sense-making dialectic is making sense of. Of great relevance to this point is Tanabe’s claim in “Hegel’s Philosophy and Absolute Idealism” (1931) that “to understand Hegel properly is to revive and radicalize Kant’s ‘priority of practical reason.’”¹⁸ If properly understanding Hegel means overcoming him, then, as Tanabe states in “Ethics and Logic” (1940), “the recovery of the Kantian moment in Hegel”¹⁹ is the task of understanding the Kantian motivations driving Hegel (the priority of practical reason), while ensuring that those motivations are not frustrated in Hegel’s own execution (which Tanabe takes to end in “con-

14. THZ 6: 460.

15. Ibid.

16. THZ 6: 492.

17. THZ 6: 488.

18. THZ 3, 134.

19. THZ 7, 184.

templation”). The explicandum of dialectic, properly radicalized, is a conception of freedom based on practical reason, a “self-awareness of reasons.”²⁰

That “Kantian moment” (a conception of freedom based on practical reason) is what Kant called autonomy. As Tanabe explains:

For the rational, individual person, if compulsion from the outside does not unite with the autonomy within the self, then it has no moral binding power. To me, who cannot help but believe in the rationality of the actual, even the compulsion of state society must, through reason, turn into autonomy. It must have rational grounds that are not exhausted by mere force.²¹

Still, practical reason is not to be “exhausted by some faculty of formal lawfulness,” and “the unconditioned universality of reason... must be a concrete wholeness” that “subjectively satisfies the self.”²² The humane State (“concrete wholeness”) *subjectively* satisfies individuals because its own reasons for being are *their* reasons as autonomous subjects. Therefore, if our focus is only on reasons accessible through abstraction from “actual, practical life,”²³ then such reasons belong to contemplative identity and not an actual unification in history. And if we take contemplative reasons to be the meaning of human history, then that history is not a history of human freedom as autonomy.²⁴ At least, that is the case Tanabe makes as he clarifies the meaning of his logic of Species.

Above, we have tried to provide a window into Tanabe’s attempt to clarify the meaning of his logic of Species. While we hope that this affords a view on why Tanabe took this project to be significant, we should also acknowledge that not everything can be seen from this vantage point. In addition to the ontological themes and Hegelian variations discussed above, the logic of Species plays out in a sprawling landscape. Tanabe is just as comfortable grappling with the most advanced mathematics and physics of his time as he is with treating issues in Buddhism (especially Dōgen and Zen), to say

20. THZ 6: 488.

21. THZ 6: 450.

22. THZ 6: 450–1.

23. THZ 6: 520.

24. Although Tanabe’s guide is Plato, the thrust of his project hits a modernist beat in the “Kant to Hegel” branch of contemporary Hegel scholarship (see PIPPIN 1999, especially Ch. 3; and PINKARD 2017).

nothing of his ongoing dialogue with Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Schelling, Kierkegaard, Nishida, Heidegger, Jaspers, and others. At each of these points of engagement, Tanabe invites us to make some sense of these developments, but he also leaves us with the warning that, as we try to do so, we must not lose sight of ourselves.

NOTE ON TRANSLATION

A word regarding our translation of terms that present particular difficulties.²⁵

Capitalization is generally, but not always, implemented to emphasize the categorical status of several single character terms. In this regard, 類・種・個 (Genus/Species/Individual) are capitalized when Tanabe uses the terms as nouns, but lowercase is used in their adjectival forms, as in “individual subject,” “species society,” and “genus Whole.” “Whole” is capitalized when referring to 全 and in lowercase when referring to 全体. While Tanabe tends to use the terms interchangeably, we implement different cases in this situation to facilitate a close reading of the text. “Being” and “Nothingness” are capitalized when translating 有 and 無, as well as 非有 (“non-Being”) and 絶対無 (“absolute Nothingness”). Lowercase “being” is 存在. (Incidentally, “existence” is 実存.) Finally, “Idea” appears in capitalization as a translation of 理念. Where 觀念 (lower-case “idea”) implies something merely subjective, the “Idea” belongs to actuality.

We have introduced a distinction in Tanabe’s usage of 統一 in order to make more transparent his different senses of the term, senses that are clearer in the original grammar but harder to pick up on in English. Where “unity” is the merely in-itself mode of integration, “unification” is for-itself. We have tried our best to be consistent in our reading of context; but for a

25. The present translation agrees with the basic principles for translating Tanabe stated in the Translators’ Introduction to TANABE 2022. The most significant point to rehearse here is our disagreement with an earlier principle of translation formulated in the early years of Kyoto School study: “Part of the problem is that very few philosophers today will tolerate the hyperboles of German Idealism and, if it is possible to write or translate in a style that is not Hegelian, that would be preferred” (KASULIS 1982, 143). Besides a concern for blurring the line between commentary and translation, we contest this principle because Tanabe himself is trying to make a case for why philosophers today ought to reconsider “the hyperboles of German Idealism.”

close reading, please be aware that both “unity” and “unification” translate the same term.

“Humane State” translates 人類的国家 (alternatively, 人類国家). As the goal of rational state-building, the humane State is the concrete form of a “generified Species” (“State” is here capitalized to distinguish the political institution from “state” as “condition”; in most cases, context clarifies ambiguity, but “humane State” presents special challenges.) The English “humane” has an ethical resonance that is not necessarily present in the Japanese 人類. We should note that, where this idea might be expressed in English as *humankind* or *homo sapiens*, which focus on the species level, in Japanese, the term is constructed with the sinograph for genus (類). This point was certainly not lost on Tanabe. In “The Logic of Social-being” Tanabe identifies the humane State with “the actual mode of the Genus,” which “corresponds with the Idea of the state,” in particular, the Idea of “harmony and peace within and without.”²⁶ Social-ontologically, the humane State is a mode of the Genus; practically, it is guided by the Idea of foreign and domestic accord based on rational intercourse.

Given the prominent role of “mediation” (媒介) in Tanabe’s logic of Species, we note that 無媒介 and its variants are translated as “unmediated” or “without mediation,” while 直接的, which does not contain the same sinographs as used in “mediation,” is translated as “immediate.”

The terms that could be translated as “object” have been handled as follows. 客觀 and its variants are translated as “object” (“objective,” etc.). 客体 is specified in translation as “object (*simpliciter*).” This distinction can be clarified with reference to Hegel’s PR: “If we consider ethical life from the objective point of view, we may say that ethical man is unconscious of himself.”²⁷ Something “objective” (客觀的) can be taken for granted through its, often implicit, relationship to the subject (so, in Hegel’s example, “ethical man” is not aware of his role in the objectivity of laws). Yet, when the individual person is alienated from the object, it appears as an object (*simpliciter*) (客体). In this sense, Tanabe writes, “The anti-subjectivity of the Species is recognized as the objective (*simpliciter*) being of the Species, which, in

26. THZ 6: 146.

27. PR, 189.

the acting dialectic, is none other than the self-alienation of unification.”²⁸ Finally, 対象, which corresponds with the German *Gegenstand*, has been translated as “referent.” We do not intend to draw on Frege’s distinction between “sense” and “reference.” Instead, the referent is the object of an activity, what stands against it as its correlate. To use Aristotelian locutions, the referent of thinking is the thinkable, the referent of sensation sensibles.

Finally, both 主観 and 主体 have been translated as “subject.” Especially in this article, the subject as 主観, which is marked by a footnote to the Japanese, is used to indicate the subject of consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The subject as 主体 indicates the subject of action.²⁹ Footnotes are used to distinguish 主語 (the subject in a judgment) from the subject of action (主体).

28. THZ 6: 506.

29. See THZ 6: 459.

Tanabe Hajime

Clarifying the Meaning of the Logic of Species

Translated by Urai Satoshi and Sova P. K. Cerda

I

[449] Over the past few years, I have problematized the logic of social being and devised this logic of Species. Overall, there are two sorts of reasons that led me to its conception: the practical and the logical. With regard to the first, I have come to think that the quality of unity within various nations, unities that have recently sprang up in their respective countries, as well as the state's power of control, possess something that ultimately cannot be understood from a standpoint that tries to conceive of society merely as the mutual interrelations of individual people. For my part, it seems that this power to compel, which belongs to the nation-state, cannot be exhaustively understood by means of, not only the categories of mutual interrelation belonging to traditional "formal sociology,"¹ but also the phenomenon of human interrelation found in recent hermeneutical phenomenology. For that reason, it seems one must go beyond that which is shared in these, namely, the psychic or phenomenological state of affairs within the individual person's consciousness, and acknowledge a state of affairs that is not merely "ontological," but simultaneously ontico-ontological. That is to say, one must take there to be in the ground of state and society, what the French school of sociology calls, the *chose*, or *res*.² It was my belief that society is not exhausted by the relationships established merely after or at the same time as the individual person; that if society did not possess a substratum that is unaffected by the transience of individual people, and if, to that extent, society was not prior to the individual person, then it would be unable to unify individual people compellingly. I held that this substratum of society, which

1. Georg Simmel, taking a cue from Kant, investigates the *a priori* forms of socialization, the procedure of formal sociology identified with his name (see HELLE 2009, 6).

2. Tanabe uses the Japanese *mono* もの. Compare the expression, *la chose publique* (as in *res publica*).

pertains to the “species”³ from out of which individual people are born and within which they are embraced, thereby ought to be called the species substratum.

Next, taking the totem tribe to represent a model of society in which this kind of species substratum appeared most forcefully and with relative purity, I tried to understand the relationship between society and the individual person therein by relying on Lévy-Bruhl’s law of participation. Of course, I did not think that, with the primitive totem tribe’s structure at hand, I could adequately understand, in all their complexity, the common societies of contemporary nations. Yet, where Bergson’s *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion*, 1932, which at the time of its publication was, at least to me, quite stimulating [450], makes a distinction between “closed” and “open” societies, I believed that it would not be completely inappropriate to find a model of what I call species society by conceiving the totem society to be representative of the former model (i.e., the closed society); further, I believed that it would not be entirely impermissible to think that totemism does not appear once in primitive society only to vanish without a trace following society’s advance but instead persists within society today as well; nor would it be impermissible following a point acknowledged by folklorists, to take the totem society as a relatively pure model of species society, and thereby conceive of it as representing that substratal aspect of national societies. I came to this way of thinking, because the complex issue of the nation is not easy for me to treat, having insufficient specialized knowledge of sociology and being unrefined in its particular methods, but also because an aspect of it, the aspect serving as my problem, was the side of it that compels the individual person. Seeing that the religious legends and myths of primitive society have come to secure an important place in recent, nationalistic⁴ cultural studies and that there are plans for their rehabilitation through prescriptions on thought, even now I cannot help but continue to believe that my amateurish intuitions were not entirely mistaken. That being said, I must state definitively that my intention was not to ignore the spe-

3. 種族的なるもの。The term here is that used to signify taxonomic species. According to Kōyama Iwao, Tanabe brings to the notion of Species resonances from Darwin’s *On the Origin of Species* (KŌYAMA 1964, 158).

4. 国民主義的。

cialized research of sociology and claim to the effect that an understanding of the nation could be exhausted by means of some concept like the species substratum. At any rate, it was in the above sense that I conceived of the species substratum as an indispensable moment of society.

Nevertheless, even if the power to compel the individual person in society comes from this species substratum, it is inconceivable for an individual person's moral duty to be exhausted by any submission to this natural compulsion. For the rational,⁵ individual person, if compulsion from the outside does not unite with the autonomy within the self, then it has no moral binding power. To me, who cannot help but believe in the rationality⁶ of the actual, even the compulsion of state society must, through reason, turn into autonomy. It must have rational⁷ grounds that are not exhausted by mere force. Yet, if reason is to be exhausted by some faculty of formal lawfulness, through which an actual individual person sheds every condition that determines her being, a lawfulness that assigns to her, merely from within herself, a universal law as the standard for the maxims of her will, this is not what I conceive to be reason. [451] The unconditioned universality of reason is no mere abstract universality, but must be a concrete wholeness. Concrete wholeness means that, through the self returning to Nothingness—which is the result of the self's ultimate determination as objective being falling into contradictory antinomy—actuality itself serves as the whole that subjectively satisfies the self, and unconditioned universality is established as *self-sive-actuality*. To put it in a Kantian way, through the contradiction of antinomy, the theoretically rational, objective determination of the phenomenal self returns to Nothingness, and this ultimate self-negation, is, at the same time, none other than absolute negation as the subjective self-affirmation of practical reason; it is the absolute-negative turnover of pure reason, which dies theoretically and lives practically. Hence, without first considering the opposition of the self of the individual person toward the compulsion of the social substratum that it confronts, the rationality of the actual cannot be attained. The common society (species society) and the

5. 理性的なる.

6. 合理性.

7. 理性的.

“contract society,” as a stakeholder society⁸ centered on the self-interests of individual people, oppose each other and thus form a model corresponding to what Tönnies calls *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. Thinking in this way, I defined the egoity⁹ of the individual person by drawing on the concept of the will to power,¹⁰ a will that tries to arrogate to the self the power of the whole to compel. Of course, by so referring to the egoity¹¹ of the individual person in opposition with the species society’s will to life,¹² I made provisional use of Nietzsche’s concepts; however with respect to content, the point is completely different: for what I had in mind was an immediate egoity, a self-attachment that contained no overcoming of negation, as to be found in Nietzsche. At the time, I anguished at the strength of self-attachment, at the fierceness of the greed for power and lust for honor, matters entirely opposed to the ideas held dear by our men of learning, who understood and taught of the wretchedness of human self-attachment and especially the nobility of selflessness. And as I was vexed by the fact that the ground of that anguish lied first and foremost within my own intractable self-attachment, I was accounting for the egoity of the individual person and discussing its negative oppositionality toward the social substratum. Thus my thinking with regard to the Individual was limited to the egoity of the immediate self of the individual person, which, as not yet dialectically developed, must be negated dialectically: for the true self must be recovered through losing the self, which is to say that the true self achieves existence only by means of absolute negation. Certainly, this could not avoid the onesidedness shared by one who conceives of society only from the side of its compulsion of the individual person. [452] Thus afterwards I added the amendment that for the Individual to be truly Individual it must be negated-*sive*-affirmed by means of absolute negation, that the true Individual first becomes Individual within the whole and when mediated by the universal. It goes without saying that the Species is negated thereby as well through this absolute negation and becomes a whole society. In dialectical thinking overall, it is necessary

8. 利益社会; a common translation of *Gesellschaft*; lit. a society based on mutual self-interest.

9. 自我性.

10. 權力.

11. 我性.

12. 生存.

that all concepts have a dual significance as both negative and affirmative; yet on the basis of the motivations of my problematic, the perspective I took in my point of departure was, for a large part, unavoidably partial toward observing the immediate aspect, the aspect to be negated.

Now then, where the conflict between the negatively opposed species substratum and Individual turns, in the extremity of their mutual negation, into the affirmation of the absolute-negative subject, the result is the mutual accordance of the individual person and the state as a subjective whole. In this, the turnover of substratum-*sive*-subject takes place, and the organizational structure of whole-*sive*-individual arises. Only by means of this principle of mediation and synthesis does the state comprise a whole greater than any contract between individual people and is therefore necessarily compelling to them; at the same time, this compulsion must directly turn into freedom, and, in this, the individual person must be negated but also affirmed; in this, we have the organizational structure of self-sacrifice-*sive*-self-realization. Something like this is the concrete structure of social being as rational¹³ actuality. This concrete structure is realized on the standpoint of praxis (which, overall, establishes the negative union of the rational and the actual) and is the embodiment of the dialectic of the acting subject. It follows that this must necessarily be logical as well: for being, logic, and action comprise a triune unification. This is to dialectically raise Jellinek's Two-Sides Theory of the state by appreciating the essence of the state as the mediating mode that practically mediates the social and legal sides. If one were to accept that standpoint, then I believe that my own view, which at first sight looks like nothing more than an extreme statism, could be seen to intend, certainly not the irrational totalitarianism of a merely immediate nationalism, but state-building as the subjective realization of the whole, a realization that depends on the spontaneous cooperation of each member and consists of self-sacrifice-*sive*-self-realization and control-*sive*-freedom. And when I called this state "the humane State," this was not to meant to comprise a single state that consolidates all of humankind, but was due to my thought that each nation-state, mediated by the rational¹⁴ individuality of its people as members, could remain national while at the same time,

13. 理性的.

14. 理性的.

through the individual person with which it is in mutual accordance, [453] have a humane universality. This means neither doing away with the species condition of the nation (this is impossible), nor fusing nation-states in the manner of a “League of Nations,” but that a state obtains humanity mediately,¹⁵ that is, through being mediated¹⁶ through its entrance into open society, in Bergson’s sense, an entrance that is in virtue of the absolute negativity of individual people, taken to be members of a nation-state. I believe that the thinking of Hegel’s philosophy of law,¹⁷ which possesses a guiding significance for my inquiry, thus made its impact on this case as well, through the idea that world spirit (contrasted with national spirits) is indeed born by individual people. In Hegel’s case, those individual people who bear world spirit are heroes, which, in present day nationalist states, would be “commanders”; however, what I call “rational¹⁸ individual people,” each being a bearer of world spirit, must serve as a partial representative of God, who, from the standpoint of “world history as world judgment,”¹⁹ is world judge, and they must engage themselves in the building of states that could sustain the judgment of world history. History stands midway between objective spirit and absolute spirit. On the one hand, it is the political history of a nation-state; on the other, it is the cultural history of humankind. So while the art, religion, philosophy, and so forth that belong to the latter go beyond the conditions of the nation and take up the universal standpoint, the policies and laws that belong to the former do not go beyond the bounds of a particular nation. Accordingly, in history the universal and the particular do not completely coincide, but rather history is characterized by the movement between unity and disruption. On this basis, history could be taken to be an inconclusive dynamism and the junction between eternity and time. And precisely for this reason, history is thought to be simultaneously the unity and disruption of the dyads of “rationality” and “irrationality,”²⁰ “necessity” and “contingency.” Yet, history

15. 間接に。

16. 媒介。

17. 法哲学; viz., *Rechtsphilosophie*.

18. 理性的。

19. “Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht”: an idea announced in Friedrich Schiller’s poem, *Resignation*, and cited by Hegel (PR, 371; §340). See AHLERS 2000.

20. 合理性と非合理性。

so taken is that seen from the standpoint of interpretation; when seen practically, history must always signify that the actions of individual people actualize the unification of the dyad. On that standpoint, political and cultural history are, not separate, but to be negatively unified, and the individual person's praxis must be conducted such that the state and humankind are both different and the same. The motivation of my inquiry lied in seeking a guiding principle for praxis, the result of which, I forthrightly acknowledge, was that I could not avoid the appearance of, even with regard to the state, merely emphasizing one-sidedly its rational²¹ humanity separated from its historical actuality. It was a limitation springing from the motivation of my inquiry that, biased towards the cross-section of social being as it is in the limit situations of praxis, I overlooked its historical actuality. [454] Yet in spite of this, I cannot accept the criticism that I merely expounded an *ought* that ignores the actual. For me, whose philosophical path is Platonism, the *eidōs* that serves as the purpose of praxis is at the same time the principle of the formation of the actual; it is not a mere *ought*, and certainly not an idle fantasy. Historical actuality does not merely *become* in separation from action, but history is first established by the unification of absolute negation, wherein becoming is mediated by action and action is mediated by becoming. It would be for this reason that one must think that history is connected to God in each of its stages. Unity and disruption mutually accord dialectically as front and back: there is no unity without disruption on its reverse side and no disruption that does not presuppose unity as its other half. To, from such a standpoint, conceive of the state as the humane State does not appear to me as an error, even if it was one-sided. For even if I could not avoid an abstraction that detaches from actual history and the dynamism of its disruptions, the purpose of praxis must still be, albeit mediated by this historicity, the absoluteness of unification. The dyadic disruptiveness of history is the estranged side of absolute unification, and the individual person's actions must take, at every stage, the sublation of this disruption to be its end. In that sense, my statal ontology was, for me, necessary. Indeed, it could even be said that precisely because the actual state does not correspond with the *eidōs* of statal being and is entangled with the his-

21. 理性的.

tory of irrationality,²² practical reason's rationalizing acts must aim at the realization of this *eidōs*. If, dialectically speaking, affirmation is always achieved in negation and unity is always attended by estrangement, then it seems evident that the side of dyadic disruption in historical actuality is to be understood as, in the way I conceived of it, the estranged side of unification. Even so, I must clearly acknowledge this point: the fact that this side was not given adequate emphasis was not merely the result of my inquiry's motivations, but has a significant cause in the fact that, from the beginning, my inquiry was ahistorically inclined. This was due simply to a lack in my historical sensitivities, something for which I am privately ashamed. Now, since my aims primarily sought the rational principles that immediately face and rejoin state control, which hold great sway domestically, the central issue was always the relationship between the state and the individual person, and not international relations between nation-states [455]; I must acknowledge that this too was a great failure to times like the present, when domestic relations and international relations are so tightly interrelated. Yet, while an exhaustive discussion of the problems bearing on state and history is well beyond my present abilities, since the problem lies in social ontology, I have to believe that even today those failures do not serve as direct reasons to deny the logic of Species.

Accordingly, the practical motivation of my social ontology was, first, to make the species substratum of communal society, which is the principle of state compulsion, appreciable in terms of *res*; and, second, to put on firm footing the mediateness of absolute negativity, which, in turning this compulsion directly into freedom, negatively carries out the turnover of substratum-*sive*-subject and does so in the actions of building the state's organizational structure, characterized by self-sacrifice-*sive*-self-realization and control-*sive*-spontaneous cooperation. To thus go beyond the standpoint of interpretation to the standpoint of praxis necessarily demands more than phenomenology,²³ but also a science of logic. As stated above, being, action, and logic stand in a triune relationship. It goes without saying that this "logic" is not identity logic, which expresses being merely in ideas, but must

22. 非合理性.

23. Consider the connection between *res* (*mono*), *chōse*, and phenomenology. Husserl's famous injunction in French is, "Retour aux *choses* mêmes."

be the dialectic of the absolute-negative unification of negation and affirmation. Since the unity of this dialectic is the negative unification of being and logic in action, the logic's concept is the *eidōs* that serves as the principle of the formation of actuality by action. The concept is simultaneously the *eidōs* of being, because "being" is the being of acting actuality. Neither a substance detached and unrelated to action, nor an expressive existence unmediated by a relationship to the substratal being of the substance, but only the acting being of the substratum-*sive*-subject can be concrete being, can be, as it is said, substance and at the same time subject.²⁴ Mere substance demands to be objectively real, but likewise, since it is unrelated to the subject, it lapses into a merely assumed idea and no longer signifies "being." This is none other than the standpoint of concept-hypostatization, the standpoint of the old metaphysics and ontology, or "noumenalism."²⁵ Reality must be what negatively opposes the subject, as well as the subject's mediating substratum. Likewise, if the subject's "existence," as it is called, were to lose the mediation of the substratum, then it would simply lapse into the mere possible being of an interpreted expression, atrophying into the subject of interpretive action, which is just contentless self-decision. This is none other than fundamental ontology and hermeneutic phenomenology, which are today's new metaphysics. [456] Where the old ontology took up a standpoint of the noumenalist identity of logic and substance, a standpoint oblivious to the mediation of action, the new ontology takes up a standpoint of the unity of, on the one hand, the formal action of self-decision, which becomes contentless through the loss of the substratum, and, on the other, linguistic logic as the interpretation of substratumless expressions. What is there called "being" is in fact none other than the subject's interpreted being, being as possibly self-aware. Thus, in this "fundamental ontology," all being remains merely possible being, interpreted on the basis of possible self-awareness. Here, there is no necessary *eidōs*, which, as the purpose of an action, is to be carried out until its ideal limit. In the latter case, since the mediation of action unifies affirmation and negation, the concepts of logic can serve as

24. Compare with the famous line in the Preface of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*: "In my view, which must be justified by the exposition of the system itself, everything hangs on grasping and expressing the true not just as substance but just as much as subject" (HEGEL 2018, 12).

25. 本体論; *hontairon*. The doctrine of that lying in the ground of phenomena.

the formative principles of being; however, in the former case, there is only the possible shifting of interpretation. In this case, then, even logic remains merely an interpretation of linguistic expression and logic's mediating character is not truly reached. While the new ontology is called a doctrine of existence, the fact that it is but an interpretation of possible being, which does not reach true being, is something it holds in common with being as it was considered by the old ontology. True ontology must be a social ontology of the absolute-negative co-mediation of substratum and subject. This is what I have previously called the third stage of ontology.²⁶ This is the logic of the dialectical unification of being and action. To believe that there is, prior to logic, expressive being to be interpreted is to have a completely non-dialectical way of thinking. This is the result of thinking that the actual has being merely as the referent of interpretation independent of and prior to the formation of action. Yet, of whatever actuality we may speak, there is none that has being unrelated to the formation of action. Thinking this way is the dogmatism of the old metaphysics; there, the actual becomes mere objective reality and possesses no subjectivity. Of course, such a thing could hardly be identified with living actuality. For just that reason, the new metaphysics had tried to retain the significance of interpreting actuality by taking up "existentialism" and preserving the subject of action, despite its atrophying into the formalness of self-decision. The actual is unified with action oppositionally, and the negative turnover of substratum and subject must be what establishes this unification. Now, since action is the oppositional unification of being and concept—which are absolute-negatively mediated just as where the necessity of the actual is the freedom of the self—this all necessarily implies the realization of dialectical logic. [457] Dialectical logic is not one that expresses being in identity, but one that opposes being even as it is unified with being through absolute negation. That is to say, it is a logic that attains true affirmation in negation and whose negation is, at the same time, always the mediation of affirmation. Since this turnover of negation and affirmation is performed by action, the being of actuality that action forms become the realization of logic. In this sense, logic is the principle of acting being. For transcendental idealism, it is impermissible for

26. Tanabe's idea of the "third stage of ontology" appeared in his article of the same name (THZ 6: 267–98). For the English translation, see Tanabe 2022.

any being to be prior to logic. Still, since in transcendental logic, the ground upon which this idealism stands, the turnover of negation-*sive*-affirmation is not recognized, and the invariant principle of identity holds sway, being, as established by this logic, remains simply a phenomenon of consciousness and cannot be the thing in itself that negatively opposes the subject's volitional action. It is the logic of dialectic that, through the absolute-negative turnover of action, turns this into a logic concerned with the being that transcends as the thing in itself. Due to this, it can be the logic of being. Moreover, in this case, being is precisely that formed by action, actual being that is subjectivized. Dialectic is the logic of the actual. Indeed logic, as the logic of acting actuality, is at the same time the ethics of praxis. Accordingly, actual history, logic, and ethics negatively mediate one another.

II

Hegel's *Phenomenology* follows the experience of consciousness, describes the evolvment of phenomena, and finally reaches its climax in Absolute Knowing. It is thus said to be the preparation for the *Science of Logic* and the introduction to the system. Nevertheless, the observing consciousness (contrasted with the consciousness observed), as the subject²⁷ of philosophy, is in fact something that has already attained Absolute Knowing, and, mediated by the self-negation of stepping down from its heights in Absolute Knowing and lowering itself into the depths of sensuous consciousness, it unfolds its content recollectively. So this evolvment of the experience of consciousness is performed dialectically, and the unfolding of phenomena is understood to be Absolute Knowing's descending self-negative-*sive*-self-affirmative self-return. Therefore, this is ascent-*sive*-descent, *ōsō-sive-gensō*.²⁸ This twofold structure is necessitated by dialectic. [458]

27. 主観.

28. Tánluán (曇鸞; Jp. *Donran*) discusses the ascent to (往相, Jp. *ōsō*) and return from (還相, *gensō*) the Pure Land in his main work, the *Commentary* on Vasubandhu's (世親) *Treatise of the Pure Land*, which itself is a commentary on the *Longer Sukhāvativyūha Sūtra*. This was a key text for the Tendai (天台) monk Shinran (親鸞), the founder of what would be the Shin Buddhism or *Jōdo Shinshū* (浄土真宗) sect of Japanese Buddhism. Tanabe often draws attention to the way that Shinran interconnects the ascent to Pure Land from this world (*ōsō*) and the return from the Pure Land to aid those in this world (*gensō*).

From this, it is understood that the evolvement of the *Phenomenology* depends in-itself on the *Science of Logic*, and that since the former is the preparatory stage of the latter, it is the negative mediator of the latter's for-itself self-awareness. Since both are originally in dialectically negative opposition, it cannot be said that they are merely identical. Yet, in negative co-opposition, they correspond to one another. In this sense we must say that they together comprise a negative unification. We cannot simply proclaim that the *Phenomenology's* conscious being precedes the *Science of Logic*. Such would be impermissible by the logic of dialectic, which always accords with negation. It demands that whatever is prior is at the same time later. In that sense we must say that they are in negative, mutual accord. We can say that being, as made conscious in the *Phenomenology*, has its principle in the Absolute Being of the *Science of Logic*, and that what appears²⁹ in the absolute ontology of the latter comprises the contents of the former. Nevertheless, with only the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic*, the unification of the two has not yet become self-aware: for, as stated above, what mediates the negative unification of phenomenal being and logic is action, but this belongs to neither the *Phenomenology* nor the *Science of Logic*. The *Encyclopedia* system assigns phenomenology to the part dealing with the philosophy of spirit; however, this is the science of consciousness viewed from the standpoint of Absolute Knowing and is not something within the negative twofoldness, as was the initial *Phenomenology*, which signified the in-itself evolvement of the phenomena of Absolute Knowing as such. The science of action, which, through the *Science of Logic*, mediates the *Phenomenology* that possesses this negative duality, is none other than the *Elements of the Philosophy of Law*. We can understand the *Philosophy of Law*, which involves the philosophy of history, as precisely what constitutes the mediator of the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic* and as what concretely unifies Hegel's philosophy. When, from this perspective, I first resolved to understand Hegel's philosophy, I believed I could find the key to that understanding in the practical union of the actual and the rational that appears in the preface of the *Elements of the Philosophy of Law*. Even now, this belief has not budged. I believe that only the above perspective makes comprehension of dialectic possible, and that this perspective necessarily makes its logic

29. 現象する, viz. *erscheinen*.

the sole path of philosophy. The belief granted to me at the same time as the above perspective is that, insofar as philosophy seeks the self-awareness of the Absolute, it has no place to stand besides the self-awareness of the acting unification of being and the self. Going hand in hand, this standpoint and method opened up for me the path to philosophy. [459] For me there is a necessary reason for why the present logic of social ontology follows the precedent of Hegel's philosophy of law. When he declares in the preface of the *Elements* that it is not the task of the philosophy of law to ideate a state that does not actually exist but only ought to exist, and that its task lies in grasping reason within the actual and to be the rational comprehension of the actual state, therein lies what guides the attempt that follows from my practical motivation: to analyze the state and try to understand its ontological structure logically. On the standpoint of action, it is evident that the understanding of actuality is performed only by means of the comprehension of *eide* and Ideas.

That being said, I have no intention of claiming that Hegel himself abandoned the *Encyclopedia* system and, thinking of the *Philosophy of Law* as the mediator of the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic*, thereby tried to erect a new system. It goes without saying that in the *Encyclopedia*, the philosophy of law was already developed as the philosophy of objective spirit. In that way, one could say that by objective spirit standing in between subjective spirit and absolute spirit, in a sense, reason is given to put the *Philosophy of Law* between the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic*. Yet, this correspondence, as it were, ought to be compared to the correspondence mentioned earlier that exists between the stages of the *Phenomenology* and the system of categories of the *Science of Logic*, and the order of the system derives from its negative union with the order of actuality. Just as the standpoint of the *Philosophy of Law*, which understands actuality, is not the same as the systematic standpoint of objective spirit, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is not the same as the phenomenology in the system. Both have the difference that while one is immediately the standpoint of action or consciousness, the other is the standpoint of these viewed in Absolute Knowing. I thus lay special emphasis on the fact that, while the *Phenomenology of Spirit* merely possesses the passageway of consciousness, the *Philosophy of Law* is connected with actuality through the passageway of action and takes up the

standpoint of acting actuality, which mediates subjective,³⁰ conscious being through the transcendent logic of reason. Since the system Hegel himself erected belongs only to the contents of Absolute Knowing and lacks a side negative to it, his system cannot avoid the tendency of lapsing into so-called emanationism, and considering that this would thereby betray true dialectical thinking, he is unable to open up a passageway to the turnover of affirmation and negation, not merely by identifying this negative side with the passageway of consciousness in the *Phenomenology*, but also through the standpoint of action of the *Philosophy of Law*. [460] This is how Hegel is understood from my standpoint and, at the same time, how he is overcome. I think that we can get to the heart of Hegel's philosophical system by understanding that its evolution is demarcated by a first period, which represents the progression from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to the *Greater Logic*, a second period, which is composed of the *Encyclopedia System*, and, in contrast to these, a third period, the standpoint of the rationalization³¹ of the actual in the *Elements of the Philosophy of Law*, which unifies the two standpoints of the first period, gives shape to a negative, mediating side of the system of the second period, and completes the passageway between the system and the actual. It is impossible to bring the co-mediation of the *Phenomenology*, the *Science of Logic*, and the *Philosophy of Law* directly into formal correspondence with the co-mediation of being, logic, and action, but with adequate interpretation, it could be inferred that, in its core, the former can be made to correspond with the latter's triunity with regard to content. Further, it is also to be directly acknowledged that there is something that corresponds to logic, history, and ethics. As with the relationship between theory, history, and policy in the human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) according to Dilthey, this co-mediation remains within these bounds. The completion of the system makes static the negative dynamism belonging to this concrete dialectic of mediation and interrupts the acting passageway to the actual. It follows that, if my standpoint can be called the negative, mediating side of the system, and if precisely this is the realization of concrete dialectic, then the system is, in turn, the abstract side and can be called the dialectic's projection of identity. Yet this must clearly overcome and revise

30. 主観的.

31. 合理化.

Hegel. I think that this is the path that philosophy must take and that acting dialectic, as its method, is the true dialectic. In a sense, this is at the same time none other than a reversal of Hegel's standpoint. In virtue of this, my standpoint could synthesize Hegel's with the dialectic that emerged second in history and championed just such a reversal: for the concept of matter, which comprises the core of this second dialectic, belongs among the structural moments that shapes, what I call, the substratum of society, and what first concretely establishes praxis, a point emphasized on the standpoint that opposes Hegel, is the absolute-negative turn over and mediation of the substratum and the acting subject. Yet the "materialist dialectic" does not adequately recognize this absolute-negative turn over, and there is the tendency where what it calls matter only becomes a moment of dialectical movement once it is mediated with the subject through a concept of reason, and, therefore, a tendency to ignore the fact that matter itself belongs to the substratum of species society. [461] That the concept of, what it takes to be, praxis is abstract is just another result of this. I hold that the turnover of substratum-*sive*-subject can be the third dialectic, the dialectic through which the prior two are first synthesized. Even Hegel's *Philosophy of Law* is ruled by the systematic perspective and does not fully reach the standpoint of praxis. For this reason he is taken to go no further than a conservative contemplation that maintains the status quo. I believe there is an undeniable necessity to reverse this perspective and furnish a practical philosophy of state-building. On the standpoint of such a reversal, system no longer takes praxis to be its negative side and passageway, but instead system must serve as the negative side of the practical dialectic and as the latter's projection of identity. System cannot emanate praxis out of itself. Supposing that system embraces praxis, praxis would no longer be praxis and would go no further than the contemplated concept of praxis. Instead, one would have to think that, in the instant when praxis is performed, and being and reason are negatively brought into union, the logical order of rational being forms the contents of the system: for in that, actuality is at once rational, and the science of logic is at once ontology. Yet since such a system is the order of being at the level where praxis is completed, and therefore serves as the aim for praxis, it is also evident that it is the order of the ideal principles³² of the formation of

32. 理想的原理.

actuality and a system of *eide*. As what already sublates opposition, it reduces dialectic into an internalized and Idealized unity of identity. For this reason it is referred to as an “idealist dialectic.” Of course, even if system is, in this sense, the abstract side and negation of concrete dialectic, since it still signifies dialectical negation, it certainly does not mean that system is emanated from the concrete dialectic. Instead, as the negative moment of concrete dialectic, system is established with its very own content and opposes acting dialectic. Dialectic simply negates-*sive*-affirms system. Conversely, since the unification of dialectic is negative, this idealistic dialectic’s systematic completion, which is characterized by identity, must necessarily negate itself. There is sufficient reason to be found in the tradition of philosophy for conceiving this negative moment, which lies in the substratum that opposes and prompts the praxis of the subject, as *hyle*, which is the negative moment that opposes the unity in *eide* and ideas, and so for calling it matter. [462] It is clear that concrete dialectic must define the subjectification of the substratum in action and be what comprises the negative unification of idea and matter, *eidos* and *hyle*. System is precisely what unfolds this unification of the present in the logical order of *eide*. Therefore, it is relative to the present of unification and must be updated ceaselessly. Of course, since it is a system, it necessarily has completion. An “open system,” when understood literally, cannot evade contradiction. Even if it is closed to the outside while open³³ to the inside (although I myself have made use of this metaphor), this cannot be said to be adequately dialectical insofar as it cannot shed the emanationist tendency of evolving new moments merely inwardly. When dialectic is radicalized, system must become a moment of negation, be negated along with its completion, and be newly organized; thus “open system” or “being inwardly open” do not, in fact, make adequate sense. Yet, a system that is renewed by dialectical negation preserves, in its negative-*sive*-affirmative side of synthesis, the old system through sublation, and in this way the unification that dialectically comprises the system is none other than the turn over and mediation of absolute negation: thus, insofar as the system of every stage finds ultimate unification in the unification of absolute negation, regardless of existing³⁴ content, the system that is ceaselessly updated main-

33. 解放.

34. 存在する.

tains identity in Nothingness. This is why, from outside the system, it gives the outward semblance of something unmoved, completed and closed. In every instant of the present, the system is something new, and between each it is discontinuous. There exists no mediator of Being to ground continuity between the systems. Yet, by maintaining identity in the subjectivity of Nothingness, it comprises a so-called “continuity of discontinuity.” But seen from the standpoint of the system itself, the content of the system comprises a unity of ideal order and involves no negation that cannot be idealized and that would, so to speak, break the unity of the ideas: it therefore comprises a continuous evolverment that possesses the mediator of Being. This is precisely the order of evolverment whereby potentiality is actualized. Since, from the standpoint of acting, concrete dialectic, discontinuous unity is just the unification of absolute negation, it depends on the mediation of Nothingness and is therefore called a continuity of discontinuity; however, seen from the standpoint where this unification is established, system comprises the continuous evolverment whereby potentiality is actualized and shapes a unity that depends on the mediator of Being. [463] In other words, the system of the discontinuous and saltatory unification of dialectic, or, the system that can be conceived simultaneously as aim and retrospection, comprises a continuous unity within itself. If, in this way, system is the negative moment of dialectic, then the discontinuous unification of the former contains the continuous unity of the latter as a moment and takes this as its own abstract projection. Viewed from the above perspective, criticizing the interpretation that usually takes dialectic to be the actualization of potentiality, and emphasizing the unification of discontinuity, must be taken to be valid; but at the same time it must be noticed that if one does not recognize why this establishes continuous evolverment, then one cannot avoid falling into the opposite abstraction. From Hegel’s standpoint of idealistic dialectic, there seems to be a reason for his using metaphors like that of a plant’s becoming from a seed. The moment of becoming and evolverment, which is to be understood as the actualization of potentiality, is necessarily contained in dialectic. In the same way, the identity of the understanding must be contained in the dialectic of reason as a moment of negation. Yet of course, to think that the unification of dialectic is thereby exhausted is precisely the abstract view of idealistic dialectic. Along with the fixity of system, continuity transforms into discontinuity. Instead, it must be that dialectic breaks

through discontinuity and comprises the unification of discontinuity in absolute negation. To view this discontinuous unification of dialectic retrospectively and take its contents to be the continuous evolvement of Being is none other than the standpoint of the system's actualization of potentiality. And this is precisely the dialectic's projection of identity. Hegel did not completely shed this standpoint. It would be for this reason that what he calls the category of Becoming can hardly be identified completely with the manifestation of acting Nothingness, and that it does not shed the significance of a continuous, potential, and therefore differential Becoming. Dialectic must completely shed this and, without merely abandoning it, instead preserve it as a negative moment. True continuity is to be understood as the negative mediation of this continuity of identity and the discontinuous unification of dialectic.

I believe that it does not require restating that this interpretation necessarily leads us to the opposition between the dialectic of Plato and the demonstration of Aristotle. I declared earlier that the way of philosophy lies in Platonism. It must be obvious that what guides my inquiry is that Plato's method is dialectic and the motive of his philosophy throughout lies in the political praxis of building a rational state. [464] Yet as is well known, Hegel is more Aristotelian than he is Platonic. His dialectic, as "idealist dialectic," cannot but be less the acting dialectic of absolute negation, more its projection of identity. His dialectic took up the standpoint of a system close to that of teleological evolvement in Aristotle. That at the end of the *Encyclopedia*, God's contemplation in Aristotle's metaphysics, the thinking of thinking, is raised as an example of the highest being, absolute spirit's pure activity of self-awareness, makes clear that his dialectic is reason's identity logic, which thinks the unity of being. Yet, Hegel, who learned the self-contradictoriness of identity logic from Kant's Transcendental Dialectic, could not think that the demonstrations of thinking, based on the laws of identity and contradiction, can unify the unconditioned whole of being, like Aristotle who simply presupposed the identity of thinking and being. He thus tried to find a way to change the negative results of Kant's transcendental³⁵ dialectic into an affirmative unification by means of Platonic dialectic. With this, the contradictions of the antinomies become the absolute-negative unification of affir-

35. 先験.

mation and negation, and the negative opposition of the one and the many becomes the synthetic unification whereby the one and the many mutually accord. One can say that it is due to the mediation of Plato and Kant that Hegel could elevate Aristotle's logic of essence to the logic of the Concept. That being, which takes essence as its principle, is able to shape the teleological unification that is not destroyed by the contradictions of the antinomies is due to the fact that the "non-Being" of matter—the cause of contradiction—is taken to be a mediator of Being that mutually accords with Being; that the *eidōs* of the Good—which, through action, forms being as the unification of both Being and non-Being—becomes the highest principle of being; and due to the fact that its essence is none other than the principle of the formation of the *eidōs*, of the realization of the Good. The teleological unification of being comes from spirit's dialectical activity, which forms being by means of the principle of the Good. Aristotle's ontology stands in virtue of Plato's dialectic of world formation. The former's teleology is grounded in the latter's ethical cosmology. Therefore, the Analytic, the logic of demonstration that expresses Aristotle's teleological order of being in identity, can be understood as an abstraction of the affirmative side of the unity and harmony of Plato's dialectic. Indeed, as noted above, viewed from the standpoint of dialectic where affirmation and negation mutually accord, even the affirmative side is mediated by negation [465] and involves the cognition of the understanding pertaining to the Analytic, which possesses its own contents that oppose it negatively; and so, it goes without saying, insofar as there can be a standpoint of dialectical synthesis that *negatesive*-affirms this, dialectic certainly does not emanate the analytic identity logic; instead, the former presupposes the latter as a negative moment. Yet if we trace back the origins of this structure, the identity of the analytic logic must be understood to unfold only the affirmative contents of the instant that dialectical unification is established into the so-called "relationship of Genus and Species" that is the order of identity. *Hyle*, as the principle of non-Being in dialectic, there no longer signifies negative opposition and becomes mere lack; it is merely given the character of *dynamis* opposed to the Being of *eidōs* and *energeia*. The character of this substratum is such that it remains merely the basis of becoming, possessing no negative meaning. To

the extent that Aristotle aims for the universal, inferential³⁶ order of scientific cognition, we can say that he was valid to reject the method of dialectic for the method of demonstration; nevertheless, this is not enough to take up philosophy's absolute standpoint. Without the Platonic dialectic that he rejected, his standpoint must lose the grounds on which it stands. But if it is asked whether there is still a way to transform dialectic into a logic of identity, this must be denied. This is why Plotinus, who sought not the negative unification of dialectic but the Absolute One, had to take this One to be beyond thinking. It is there that philosophy has its limit. To the extent that philosophy is not Knowledge but the Love of Knowledge, dialectic must be its necessary path. Of course this does not mean that philosophy is a mere process that only ever possesses relativity and can have no absolute significance. That would be none other than the rejection³⁷ of philosophy itself. It is simply that the Absolute is not something that can be contemplated in systematic cognition, but is made absolute-negatively self-aware in ceaseless subjective action. Dialectic must always be the self-awareness of the ceaselessly renewed unification of action correlative with actuality. Since self-awareness is always mediated by negating the actuality that opposes it, it is impossible for it to eradicate negation and unify actuality as a whole, for it to attain some absolute identity whereby self-awareness is in immediate union with being. The self-awareness of spirit necessarily takes the negativity of matter as mediator, and the subject is mediated absolute-negatively in action with the substratum. The systematic self-awareness of spirit remains the projection of identity of dialectic's acting unification. [466] Through self-estrangement, system always transforms into something opposed to self-awareness. This is none other than the negativity of the material substratum. Only by arousing new action and being negatively subjectivized does it restore the unification of the system. The logic of Species, by concretely grasping the mediation of the negative opposition belonging to acting dialectic—the opposition between the substratum that opposes the subject and the *hyle* that opposes the unity of *eide*—intended to be a logic of philosophy that satisfies the practical demand. This, initially born completely out of the demand for a practical logic of social being, has nevertheless gradually come

36. 推論的.

37. 否定.

to achieve a principle significance for philosophy, due to reflections such as those traced above. The result of this came to serve the radicalization of logic, the second of my inquiry's motivations.

III

At the beginning of this article, I stated that my motivation for proposing the logic of Species could be summarized in two ways. The first of these is based on the practical demand to seek the grounds and reasons for statal society's control over individual people and to rationally uphold our attitude toward this control. I have discussed this in the previous two sections and attempted to clarify the meaning of the logic of Species from this side. As a result, this logic came to have an overall significance for even the method of philosophy itself, which goes beyond a mere practical significance tied to the actual situation. Now, this purely logical motivation for my inquiry has been, from the beginning, precisely the second reason I was driven to conceive of the logic of Species. I must now turn towards clarifying the content of this second motivation.

Insofar as dialectical logic centers on the unification of contradiction, it is evident that there is no Being that mediates this unification. Thus, we can say that this unification is unmediated and immediate. There is originally nothing that unifies Being and Nothingness, affirmation and negation. Yet, considered from the other side, even if it is said that Being and Nothingness are unified immediately, they are originally absolutely opposed to each other and are separated from one another by the uncrossable abyss of negation. They are by no means unmediated and immediately continuous. [467] If that were the case, then—because Being is not Nothingness, and Nothingness is not Being—the unification of the two would be impossible, unless some mediator allows us to go beyond this abyss of negation. Thus, there is a reason why the absence of a mediator must simultaneously mean the presence of a mediator; that is, the mediator that connects Being and Nothingness must itself be something characterized by Nothingness and Being. Since it negates even Nothingness to the extent that it is characterized by Nothingness and Being, it is evident that it is none other than what should be called Absolute Nothingness. Thus, what mediates dialectical logic is Absolute Nothingness, and the world of dialectic is established upon

and validated by Absolute Nothingness. If one were to think of Absolute Nothingness as the place that embraces the world, it is none other than the so-called place of Nothingness. When we come to think this way, it must be said that Absolute Nothingness is at first glance extremely evident, that there can be no doubt about its presence, and the reason why we should conceive of it as the place of Nothingness is quite clear as well. I believe that it can go without saying that the Nishida philosophy—recognized as the most recondite philosophy of Japan today—is grounded on this concept, and that the thinkers influenced by this philosophy uniformly advocate this meaning of Nothingness.

For me, however, it is in no way possible to interpret Absolute Nothingness in this manner. At present, ten years have already passed since Professor Nishida first advocated the place of Nothingness. In these years, while constructing his magnificent system, his inquiry has added greater profundity and precision. Yet, from the beginning until today, I still cannot help but have doubts about the foundation of his admirable system. My doubt is that as long as Absolute Nothingness is posited immediately as the foundation of the system, as the so-called place of Nothingness, it is already Being and so not Nothingness. Absolute Nothingness must be that which is throughout Nothingness, that which may not be Being. Yet, if one takes it to be Absolute Nothingness, to be the bottom or behind of the dialectical world, and to be the place in which self-negating being is contained, then one immediately fixes it as something that is. Thus, in truth, it loses the significance of being something that is simultaneously not. Accordingly, all other beings are negatively mediated dialectically in the manner of negation-*sive*-affirmation, becoming what is in Nothingness; however, the place of Nothingness itself, as the mediator that makes all else something that is in Nothingness, is instead immediately affirmed non-dialectically. [468] Absolute Nothingness cannot help but lose its meaning as both Being and Nothingness and thereby become immediate Being. This means precisely that dialectic itself is immediately affirmed and asserted non-dialectically. I cannot help but consider this to be an insufficient radicalization of dialectic. In other words, Absolute Nothingness must also and at the same time be negatively mediated. Now, what does it mean for Absolute Nothingness to be negatively mediated? Since Absolute Nothingness is Nothingness through and through, that which negatively opposes it must be Being. Where in dialecti-

cal thinking, affirmation is, all in all, mediated by negation, and Being is mediated by Nothingness, in this case, to the contrary, Nothingness needs to be mediated by Being, and negation needs to be mediated by affirmation. Absolute Nothingness is Absolute Nothingness only in the acts by which it takes Being to be its own mediator and negates it. Only in affirming its Nothingness by negating its negation (Being), can Absolute Nothingness be a negation mediated by a negation, can it be absolute negation. In other words, Absolute Nothingness must have its self-negation (Being) as its mediate side. Based on this, Absolute Nothingness, insofar as it is not immediately posited but is throughout, as mediated by self-negation, an act of negation, it can be, not immediate Being, but something negatively mediated. In this sense, we must say that Absolute Nothingness is nothing besides the act of absolute negation. Absolute Nothingness, when posited and presupposed as the prior ground of negative activity, comes to be immediately affirmed or asserted non-dialectically, even while it serves to ground the rule of dialectic over all being that is other than itself. When established on such a ground, a system can attain the unity necessary for it to stand; however, as a unity without self-negativity, it, at the same time, must fall into a non-dialectical, ideal identity. For even Absolute Nothingness, the ground of the system, is non-dialectical. As we saw earlier, system is none other than the negative moment of dialectic. Accordingly, it must be evident that Absolute Nothingness, as the ground of this system, is, in fact, the non-dialectical identity of Being. The place of Nothingness is precisely this: for it negates all contained within it, or, more specifically, by turning Being into Nothingness, it makes it possible for generation to be corruption and corruption to be generation, [469] while it itself is the sole permanent thing unaffected by such generation and corruption. This would be what is called “eternal Nothingness.” In the main, this is the ground of the philosophies of Nothingness, and it is only on this eternal and permanent Nothingness that the philosophical system of Nothingness can stand. This is none other than a non-dialectical affirmation and assertion of dialectic. This is what I regard as insufficient radicalization. If we take dialectic as the necessary and sufficient method of philosophy, then we must radicalize it. If we instead exclude dialectic from dialectical thinking itself, then it will be clearly contradictory and inconsistent. If on the contrary, however, we try to escape from this inconsistency and to radicalize dialectic, we must resolve ourselves to the

fact that the philosophies of Nothingness can no longer stand as systems grounded on Absolute Nothingness. If we radicalize dialectic, then the being of the system must mutually accord with its non-being. Hence, a system based on dialectic becomes contradictory in the ordinary sense and falls into meaninglessness. System would only be conceivable in the sense described in the previous section. It refers to the logical order of unification at the instant of acting unification; at the same time, it is to be negated as the alienation of dialectic and is subject to ceaseless amendment. A system cannot be established as an eternally still, completed unity that embraces actions. If one intends such a system to embrace dialectic, then one must suppose something beyond dialectic as its foundation, something that is Absolute Being and not Absolute Nothingness. Such Absolute Being, however, is a unity that already goes beyond logic and thinking, as in the case of Plotinus's One mentioned at the end of the previous section. It is none other than the content of mystical intuition. The system that embraces dialectic is only possible on such an ostensibly supra-dialectical standpoint. Yet insofar as such a supra-dialectical thing is posited in an unmediated way and as a restriction on dialectic, it should be clear that dialectic must have already been degraded as something secondary within the methods of philosophy. This is why Plato's dialectic changed its significance in Plotinus. Dialectic must begin and end on the standpoint of acting mediation and abandon the eternal system that synthesizes the whole. In most cases, however, the philosophies of Nothingness ignore such concerns and fallaciously assume a system can be immediately erected on the dialectical standpoint. [470] But if Absolute Nothingness is intuited, then it is thereby intuited as Being on the supra-dialectical standpoint and certainly not thought dialectically. In dialectic, Nothingness must always be the Nothingness of Being, the Nothingness of what is³⁸. It cannot be viewed immediately apart from acts of negation. What is intuited is always Being. It is a matter of course that Bergson rejected nothingness³⁹ from the standpoint of intuition. To view Nothingness must be to awake⁴⁰ to it. However, an awakening to Nothingness is a self-awareness of working as Nothingness and not an intuition of

38. 存在.

39. 虚無.

40. 悟る.

Nothingness. Apart from the self becoming Nothingness and acting as actuality-*sive*-self, it is impossible to awake to Nothingness and to, in that sense, view it. Properly speaking, Nothingness is not something to be viewed but something to be done. This Absolute Nothingness of action is by no means what is, in the original sense, intuited on the basis of the nature of action itself. Because action goes beyond intuition, it is action. Since it goes beyond intuition and breaks through intuited Being, action in Nothingness can take place. In this sense, action and intuition are negatively opposed. The content of intuition is Being, which is, as mentioned earlier, the negative mediator of Absolute Nothingness. Just as Absolute Nothingness is no longer Nothingness if it is immediately hypostatized, action can no longer be called action, if it is intuited. Insofar as action is the unification of Nothingness, that unification cannot be intuited. Action first arises where intuition is negated. As long as intuition continues, there is no room for action. In this sense, “acting intuition” seems to me to be a contradictory concept. In fact, this could only be said once one shifts from the standpoint of action, which performs dialectic, to the standpoint that interprets the results of action as expressions. The adjective “acting,” properly speaking, indicates only that intuition is active⁴¹ or creative rather than merely passive. Even the turnover from “what is created” to “what creates,” insofar as it is merely expressive or poietic, remains on the standpoint that views things and cannot be the self-awareness of the negative turnover between things and the self. Even if this amounted to artistic poiesis, it is not ethical action. The Absolute that is touched by the former is absolute life⁴² and so not Nothingness but Being. Nothingness is only performed in action and in the manner of absolute negation. Its mediator must then be Being. The place of Nothingness cannot provide this with its basic principle. In that instance, to say, negating action is possible because Nothingness is, would amount to an interpretation of action, not the self-awareness of action. [471] To merely see the things that are to be negated is not only not truly viewing Nothingness, but also, properly speaking, has nothing even to do with action. That which pertains to action, and therefore the negative, contradicts intuition. Yet, the philosophies of Nothingness are based on such a contradictory con-

41. 能動的.

42. 生命.

cept and apply dialectic non-dialectically, thereby erecting their systems. Just as if the practical standpoint of Zen, which is to begin and end with the Sudden Enlightenment of Nothingness, were nevertheless fastened to the contemplative system of the *Prajñāpāramitā* doctrine of emptiness, the philosophies of Nothingness, hypostatizing Nothingness as the content of mystical intuition with no self-awareness of this turn toward a supra-dialectic, think as though dialectic could itself erect a system and boldly commit a contradiction in the edifice of their dialectical systems. This is precisely the reason for my objection.

The negative unification of being and action is actuality, but insofar as actuality thus takes action as a moment, it cannot change into being. An “ontology of actuality” is impossible. If one were to view actuality only from the side of the content that is being formed through action and, excluding the Nothingness of action that serves as a moment, take actuality exclusively as Being, thereby changing it into being, then, as so-called “expressive being,” actuality would come to serve as a referent of interpretation. The reverse side, which is backed by Absolute Nothingness (the mediator of action), supports the system by immediately presupposing Nothingness. This is none other than the overall structure of the system of the philosophies of Nothingness. But since such Nothingness is already Being, it cannot allow action to take place. They only consider action in terms of the expressive content resulting from action. It is evident that action cannot enter within the chambers of their systems. In the ontology of expression interpretation, action has no room to itself. For action takes place where it negates such expressive being. Herein would also lie the reason for why Nothingness in existential philosophy is interpreted Nothingness, and action stops at the possibility of decision. If one were to go beyond this, immediately unifying action and being, and, by the hypostatization of Nothingness as place, forcibly put acting intuition into the ground of the system, then the result would no longer be a philosophy that adheres to the standpoint of logic but no more than a myth that is the product of the imagination. Plato always employs myths when explaining the origin of actuality and the unfolding of its supra-logical structure, thereby clearly distinguishing them from the standpoint of dialectical logic. We must say that this indicates an extreme lucidity on the part of reason’s self-awareness. Yet, oblivious to this distinction, the philosophies of Nothingness immediately combine logic with

myth and think as though this could be possible by means of dialectic. [472] The reasons for for my opposition to such artistry is that, on the one hand, they make the logical relations of concepts unclear by appealing to the mysteries of intuition and thus run the risk of backsliding into the fantasies of so-called “intellectual intuition”; at the same time, on the other hand, they render praxis, which is the core of dialectical logic, unnecessary and, without turning the irrationality of actuality over into rationality through the mediation of action, they immediately rationalize the irrational just as it is, entrusting its unity to the contemplation of Absolute Nothingness, as if such unity depended on the turnover of absolute negation. This is not an acting appropriation of actuality, a negative abiding by actuality, but no more than actuality’s immediate affirmation. The “acting” of acting intuition merely signifies the immediate, artistic creation of culture and does not reach the political praxis of reforming that which lies at its base, namely, the state. It is ultimately nothing besides a non-practical resignation to present conditions. In this way, compared to one who, with self-awareness, takes up the standpoint of supra-dialectical intuition, makes all being into the symbol of the Absolute, contemplates this as symbolic being—so-called “plants, trees, and lands all can become Buddha”—and tries to solve such a mystery, this philosophy would appear to be not only unaware of the inconsistency of its standpoint, as stated above, but also to have a greater tendency to immediately render praxis useless for actual, practical life⁴³. This is because they do not, like the former, admit to praxis its own standpoint and bring it to symbolization, but by fallaciously thinking that contemplation itself is immediately practice, they make intuition and interpretation the surrogates of praxis. Overall, the logical inconsistencies of the system do not end there: for it necessarily has a practical effect. Therein lies my reason for having to oppose the philosophical system of Nothingness.

For the reasons explained in detail above, in order to thoroughly pursue dialectical logic, I intended to affirm this logic, throughout in a dialectical manner, taking, indeed, that which negatively opposes it as mediator, and to understand these negating acts of absolute negation as the true meaning of Absolute Nothingness. In order for even Absolute Nothingness to be thought dialectically, it must have the opposition of Being as

43. 实践的生活.

the negative mediator of its Nothingness. Otherwise, on account of its immediacy, it is not Nothingness but rather turns into Being. The gist of the above is that Nothingness, as Nothingness throughout, is an activity of negation and thus requires the Being it is to negate. Now, since Being, as such a negative mediator of Nothingness, is the mediator of Nothingness, it must itself be unmediated, immediate Being. [473] For insofar as it is presupposed as the mediator of Nothingness, it itself is none other than unmediated Being. Nevertheless, considered from the other side, in dialectical thinking, any affirmation of Being should have been mediated by negation. If Being is required in order to negatively mediate Nothingness, then at the same time Nothingness must be required in order to negatively mediate Being. Otherwise, inconsistency would still be unavoidable. Moreover, viewed from the outset of the problem we have been considering, Nothingness, which now takes Being as its mediator, is Absolute Nothingness. Accordingly, we cannot separately conceive of Nothingness besides this. From this it follows that, besides in Absolute Nothingness, there is no way to seek the Nothingness that mediates Being. Moreover, Absolute Nothingness takes Being as its own mediator. If so, then Absolute Nothingness itself mediates Being, the mediator of itself, and so does not have the mediator of itself outside of itself. If the spirit of dialectic, which takes all Being to be mediated by Nothingness, is none other than the fact that even Being is impossible outside of Absolute Nothingness, then the above follows as a matter of course. Absolute Nothingness thus signifies that which mediates itself absolutely. Absolute Nothingness refers to the activity that negatively mediates itself absolutely. This is why I said that the true meaning of absolute Nothingness lies in absolute negation. Now, based on what we have just examined, absolute negation is none other than absolute mediation. If so, then it is a matter of course that the activity of absolute negation is none other than the activity of absolute mediation.

So then, what sort of thing is absolute mediation? It must mean, as seen above, that even mediation itself is so mediated and that there is no giving or presupposing of anything merely immediately. Concretely speaking, it means that the immediate Being to be supposed by negative mediation—even if this Being is immediate to the extent that it is viewed in accordance with Being and against absolute negation—must, at the same time, itself

be something mediated by absolute negation. That is to say, absolute negation mediates itself negatively. It is clear, however, that in order for the self to mediate itself, there must be an unmediated self. This is what is called “immediate Being.” Yet, since it is still the self, and since the self refers to that which mediates the self, the unmediated self must refer to that which is and is not the self. [474] That which is and is not the self is that which betrays and is apart from the self; that which has lost sight of the self and has been alienated from the self. That which is self-alienated, as it is called, is that which is and is not the self. As the negative moment of absolute negation, this is none other than what is called “immediate being.” Since it is something mediated by absolute negation, while also being the oblivion and abandonment of that mediation, it can be the negation of absolute negation. Thus, self-alienation is nothing more than in-itself self-negation. To at the same time become self-aware of self-negation for-itself, is no longer self-negation or self-contradiction but rather a turn back toward the self. Now, since the turn back toward the self is the negation of self-alienation, it must be precisely absolute negation. Absolute negation comprises the turn back toward the self through the mediation of self-negation as self-alienation. This is none other than residing-at-home (*Beisichsein*). Residing-at-home does not mean that one never goes out of the home, but rather, since going out and turning back are simultaneous, it means to go from home, stop at home, and reside at home. “To be on the way without leaving home”⁴⁴ would be something that speaks to this. Yet this mutually accords, as front and back, with “to leave home without being on the way.”⁴⁵ Thus, residing-at-home must even be called “residing-away-from-home.” It is in this sense that absolute mediation should be called self-negation-*sive*-absolute negation. Yet of course, since this “*sive*” is a signification of negative mediation and return-to-one, it signifies something that is realized only in action, precisely that self-negation serves as the mediator of absolute negation. Indeed, self-negation, in the sense of self-alienation, negatively opposes absolute negation. Literally, it must betray the self and go out, leave home and be on the way. Moreover, it is an absolute mediation because, conversely, it means not leaving home and remaining in the self, leaving and returning simulta-

44. A reference to *The Record of Linji* (see KIRCHNER 2009, 6; translation modified).

45. *Ibid.*

neously. This residing-at-home, in the sense of “leaving-*sive*-returning,” so to speak, is my absolute mediation. No matter how much one leaves home and betrays oneself, one never leaves home; thus, to be awake to why the unification of absolute negation seeks realization in action, and to be self-aware that the negation of the self is none other than the return to the Absolute, is “seeing one’s true nature⁴⁶,” as it is called. It is based on faith, not intuition. Action and faith mutually depend on and support each other, enabling one to evidence the dialectic of absolute mediation in oneself⁴⁷. Negation is not what can be intuited. Only faith⁴⁸ and practice⁴⁹ evidence this. [475]

Therefore, absolute mediation in this sense is by no means identical to the so-called “self-determination of Absolute Nothingness.” Absolute Nothingness, as discussed in detail above, is, instead, Being insofar as it is viewed immediately. This self-determination is the self-negation of Being and never the absolute negation that is mediated by Being as self-negation. Since that which is intuited is necessarily immediate, we cannot consider it to be identical with absolute negation as that which is mediated by self-negation. Accordingly, this self-determination is not mediated by self-negation as self-alienation but is no more than an immediate self-negation. No matter how forcefully one may expound acting intuition, that is not the same as elaborating, from the standpoint of absolute mediation, absolute negation as mediated by self-alienation. The former is, after all, no more than an interpretation of the world as the self-determination (stated otherwise, as the emanation) of the content of intuition, a content that is called “Absolute Nothingness” but is none other than Being. But how can immediate, Absolute Nothingness, which is directionless, determine the direction of temporal, historical actuality? Only absolute negation, which unifies self-alienation and recovery-of-self, as residing-at-home, can mediate and unify the dynamism of actuality and the static oneness of the Absolute. To interpret the world as the self-determination of Absolute Nothingness is, in fact, to burden dialectic with a standpoint that transcends dialectic. In no way does it legiti-

46. 見性.

47. 自証.

48. 信.

49. 行.

mately begin and end on the standpoint of dialectic or radicalize that standpoint. As mentioned above, I oppose this with extreme force. The only way to escape from such insufficiency and inconsistency is to explicitly uphold self-alienation as an indispensable moment of absolute mediation. We can say that, in fact, the core of dialectic lies in such self-alienation. In Plato, since the philosophy of history had yet to be developed, he stopped at merely explaining the dialectic of non-being in relation to the origin of the world and the soul's corporeal bondage, and did not reach a manner of thinking that takes the alienation of *hyle* to be what mediates historical transition and, thus, historical practice. This is the core of the dialectic born of Hegel's distinctive philosophy of history. To characterize dialectic in terms of self-negativity has been, for all, something that has long gone without controversy, and must be a matter of course. However, it is rare by comparison to radicalize residing-at-home all the way to absolute mediation, where residing-at-home is the leaving-*sive*-return in which self-negation is self-alienation, and the self returns to itself, recovers itself, through the mediation of self-alienation. [476] Such rarity is due, not to keeping dialectic purely as the logic of action, but to wanting to make dialectic the principle for constructing a contemplative system by smuggling in intuition. It is a matter of course that this results in emanationism. In emanationism, self-alienation is none other than the self-determination of Absolute Being. That is the mediation of emanation, not the mediation of return. Thus, self-negation becomes the principle of emanation as the self-determination of the absolute and can never have a meaning that is negatively opposed to the absolute. Accordingly, nature and matter are no more than the potential *hyle* of spirit, and the absolute is, not something thoroughly mediated by the negation and alienation of the former, but just spirit that always maintains immediate unity. This is why the self-determination of Absolute Nothingness is still a system of the philosophy of spirit. As repeated above, this is none other than the denial of dialectic. On the standpoint of a truly radicalized dialectic, action is not embraced by system; it must be, rather, that system is action's side of negative unification. In this respect, it is, more so than Hegel, Plato who purely retained dialectic, as stated above. Could we not say that it is the synthesis of Plato and Hegel that radicalizes dialectic? In any case, in order to carry dialectic all the

way through to absolute mediation, I have forthrightly raised the moment of self-alienation and taken it to be the species substratum. I explained in the previous section that the species substratum corresponds, not to potentiality, but to *hyle* as non-Being. If we call this matter, then matter is no less than the self-alienation of the absolute. Its self-returning side is spirit. Thus, matter is not the self-alienation or self-externalization of spirit, as Hegel thought, but self-alienation as the negative moment of the absolute. Accordingly, spirit is not directly the Absolute. Instead, it is none other than the self-returning side, which takes the self-alienation of matter as a moment. The absolute is absolute mediation, which, mediated by matter's self-alienness, unifies this through action into the self-return of spirit. It is not directly spirit, just as it is not matter. Spirit and matter are both but moments of absolute mediation. This is why we can say that absolute mediation is absolute dialectic, that it goes beyond the opposition of idealistic and materialistic dialectic, negatively synthesizing both. By contrast, it is clear that the standpoint of the intuition of Absolute Nothingness, while it may carry the name of absolute dialectic, is, in fact, no more than an idealist dialectic, as we have just seen. [477] There can be no absolute dialectic without the dialectic of absolute mediation, which forthrightly acknowledges the moment of matter, which is self-alienation, and makes this self-negativity the negative mediator of absolute negation. It is only in this that matter, the moment of self-negation, is in mutual accord with spirit, the affirmative side of absolute negation, and realizes, through action, its being self-negation-*sive*-absolute-negation. Yet, self-negation, as always ever self-alienation, as matter, must negatively oppose the self-awareness of spirit. That which mediates self-negation with absolute negation, that which is the *sive*, is precisely absolute negation itself. Action establishes spirit as matter's for-itself self-awareness, so to speak. It is never the case that matter is embraced by spirit, or that the former comes out of the latter. Self-alienation is the principle that negatively opposes spirit in matter. That which I call the species substratum is none other than this. In materialistic dialectic, matter is defined as the productive force of social production, and social relations are conceived in correspondence with this, on which basis, the state too is solely thought to be a class state. In light of this abstraction, I considered the substratum of social relations to

be, not only productive forces, the causes of class division, but also a unifying moment that opposes and correlates with this, namely, an immediate, species unity bound to blood and soil—this is what I call the species substratum. The species substratum satisfies the duty of mediation to the aforementioned purely logical demand of radicalizing dialectic and serves as the principle of self-alienation, which is the negative moment of absolute dialectic as absolute mediation. To say that its doing so logically guarantees its significance would be no exaggeration. The Species is of central significance, not only for satisfying practical demands as the substratum of the logic of social being, but also as self-alienation, the principle of negation in the logic of absolute mediation, which is dialectic's radicalization. Absolute dialectic is none other than the logic of Species. Since a dialectic of Nothingness that is not mediated by the logic of Species indiscriminately identifies self-negation with absolute negation, it can only be an undirected emanationism that is not mediated by history. That is why it cannot be the absolute dialectic of absolute mediation. Now, it has become clear that my two motivations for conceiving of the logic of Species are not separate but have a necessary, internal relation. The evolvement of my thought took place in the unfolding of this relationship. It must be obvious that practice and logic are bound through the mediation of actuality. [478] It is precisely in this way that the logic of Species came to be.

IV

In the last three sections, I have discussed the motivations that led me to conceive of the logic of Species from both practical and logical sides and explained that these two motivations are not separate but have a necessary relation; I have made clear that the species substratum is the moment of self-negation, as well as the principle of self-alienation, of dialectic as the logic of absolute mediation and, as such, is the negative mediator of absolute negation. I believe that the logical significance of the Species has thereby been made known in broad strokes. Still, how the Species is thus situated within the logic of absolute mediation, its charge therein, is, necessarily, not to be left without defining the content or structure of the Species. At first, I problematized the logic of social being, mainly in terms of the practi-

cal demand, and found the concept of the species substratum to be the key to resolving this problem. There, I defined this concept only from the side of social being's logical structure and did not, at the same time, achieve an overall awareness of this logic's ground, its absolute-dialectical universal. Such broad reflection is obviously always done later, after attaining some broad prospect of the contents. It was after writing "The Logic of Social Being,"⁵⁰ and only in "The Logic of Species and World Scheme,"⁵¹ that I came to develop the standpoint of absolute mediation. Yet, having reached this standpoint, my reflections on the logic of Species in accord with its principles led my initial concept of Species to undergo significant revision. The results of this are described by my third paper on social ontology, "The Social-ontological Structure of Logic."⁵² This is because the Species had initially been conceived as the negative moment of social being, as the substratum, immediate unity opposing the Individual's subjectivity, but now, as the negative moment of absolute mediation, the Species must become the principle of self-alienation. In this way, the species substratum, which at first was considered relatively simplistically, is given the structure appropriate to the principle of self-alienation, and that which could not be defined in sufficient detail at the beginning, by degree came to logically unfold its structure. This, I must summarize next. [479] On this basis, the concept of Species—which initially had a chaotic and indefinite content that permits only metaphorical depiction, as in Schelling's interpretation of the *hyle* of Plato's *Timaeus* in his essay, *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom*—gradually turned into something possessing logical definition. Following Plato's precedent, I analyzed this concept mathematically and physically, and, drawing analogies to the theory of relativity and the continuum theory of intuitionism in recent foundational theories of mathematics, I finally tried to bring the concept into contact with the dialectic of quantum mechanics. My discussion of such issues has been evaluated as a sort of dallying with respect to the study of social ontology, something caused by my predilection for mathematics and physics. I myself would not purport to deny this altogether. My interests in those directions have

50. 「社会存在の論理」(1934-1935, THZ 6: 53-167).

51. 「種の論理と世界図式」(1935, THZ 6: 171-264).

52. 「論理の社会存在論的構造」(1936, THZ 6: 301-96).

led me to indulge in such dalliance. Yet, if one considers these studies to be mere dallying, completely unrelated to the logic of social being, then I cannot agree without qualification. If we admit the unified structure of being, the dialectical development of its stages, and their, so to speak, spiraling and cyclical relationship of advance and concretization, then it should be evident that mathematical and physical ontologies comprise a kind of correspondence with social ontology. If we call this correspondence “analogy,” it cannot remain something rarefied as similarity. Indeed, if we follow the identity method of demonstration, which serves as the logic of the object, then analogy would be nothing more than an incomplete demonstration, in which the middle term, as mediator of the deduction, is not shown. Yet, as the logic of the subject, the analogy, which lacks what is common overall, turns out to be a concrete configuration, to the extent that it takes the absolute negative structure of the subject’s acting unification as its common mediator. Analogy, which lacks the middle term of Being, in fact has the middle term of Nothingness and is the logic of mediation. The identity-deductive syllogism of Being can be understood as the negative mode of the analogical syllogism of Nothingness. Of course, since “negative” here must mean dialectical negation, it does not mean that if one adds immediate determination to analogy and then negates and restricts this, then a deduction is thereby carried out. Instead, although deduction must, as the logic of the object, have its own standpoint, just as the understanding, as reason’s negative moment, has its own principles; at the same time—and in the sense that reason, contrasted with the understanding, as the unification of subjective Nothingness, takes for its negative mode the understanding’s unity of objective Being—we should be able to say that analogy is concrete syllogism that takes for its negative mode deduction based on common genera. [480] Because even the ontologies of mathematics and physics stand in a relationship analogous, in the above sense, to social ontology, there is no doubt that analogy facilitates a subjective understanding of structure. In this sense, even today, Pythagoreanism has not at all lost its grounds. Even the thinking of the Vienna Circle, in a sense, proves this, while of course, I am not one to fully support—but am rather in opposition to—the group’s unified science and what is asserted from its standpoint, such as Neurath’s mathematical economics and sociology. To the extent that it is responsive to the spirit of Platonism, Pythagoreanism has valid grounds. By, in this sense, connecting

my scientific interest in math and physics to philosophy, and doing so without hesitation, I have attempted to adjust my logic in light of these, apply them analogically to social ontology, and, conversely, correct the former on the basis of its compatibility to the latter. What my Platonism demanded was not merely to consider social structure on the basis of an analogy with math and physics but, conversely, to develop the logics of math and physics on the basis of the logic of social structure. Hence, the species substratum came to undergo logical modification from such a perspective.

If that was the case, then where is the major point of modification? At first, the Species was conceived to be merely the substratum opposed to the subject as Individual, to be merely an immediate unifying power; however, on the basis of the logic of self-alienation mentioned above, the Species was then interpreted as a mode of self-negation. Now, as we have seen in the previous section, self-negation is none other than to forget that the self is established upon unification and, losing sight of that unification, to generate opposition and arouse disruption within the self. It follows that, the mode of self-negation, whereby the self is alien to itself, must be the opposition between the disruption and unity of the self, and, at the same time, the opposition between the moments so disrupted. That is to say, the opposition is twofold. The fundamental structure of the species substratum is precisely this twofoldness of opposition. Self-negation as self-alienation arises from this twofold oppositionality. Where a unity is unable to concretely unify an opposition, but simply opposes it as an alienated unity, this is an unmediated, immediate unity and so is, at the same time, itself nothing other than an opposition. Such is the essence of the Species, which we have now clarified.

What is thus especially important in this case is that the unity that opposes the very disruption of the moments that, in turn, oppose one another, is certainly not something that works as a unity or is self-aware as the whole. [481] This is clear from what I have mentioned earlier about the structure of self-alienation; if one forgets this and understands unity itself to have being for opposition, then it no longer remains self-negation and, accordingly, cannot be non-Being in Plato's sense, but instead, turns out to be Being and affirmation. Such unity is no longer mere *hyle* but already includes *eidōs*; it is no longer the self-alienation of matter but the self-return of spirit. So then, insofar as the species substratum is not Being, but non-Being, not self-affir-

mation, but self-negation, it shall not be something that is self-aware of its unity. If unity becomes self-aware, and if in that sense unity has being, then this unity is no longer the Species but the Genus. The Genus, in my sense, is just that where the self-negating Species, in action, turns over into absolute negation, and self-alienation, *sive* self-return, attains the self-awareness of residing-at-home, so to speak. On this basis, the inward opposition of the Species is unified into a whole, and, if we call “Species” only the parallel moments that merely oppose one another, then, where what unifies this is called the “Genus,” there appears something that corresponds to the relation of genus and species in identity logic. Yet, since the opposition of parallel moments is originally caused by the self-alienation of unity, parallel opposition accompanies the opposition between the whole and its parts. For this reason, it is always the case that the compulsion of the whole that oppresses the part is simultaneously the compulsion of one part against another. Furthermore, allies are sought in wholes that oppose this whole, and since, on a standpoint of Species with no true unification and no absolute whole, such is necessary for the part under compulsion, inward opposition and outward opposition accompany one another. The Genus must be what has negatively unified such twofold—and conceivably threefold—opposition. Inwardly, the Genus is a whole that realizes consonance and unification among Individuals by negating and mediating opposition; at the same time, outwardly, it is unified with other wholes and, as itself a unified individual, participates in the absolute whole. This manner of inward-outward, twofold unification is the whole of a Genus, which makes itself an Individual and, at the same time, is conceived to be the unification of Individuals. Where the whole of a state serves as that in which the class divisions among a people are sublated, that in which the individual person cooperates freely, where this whole is, at the same time, established in international harmony—if this is to be the world of humankind, then it is to possess the above structure. [482] It is in this sense that a state is conceived to be a humane State that is aware of itself, and an individual person, as a member of this state, becomes, at the same time, one member of humankind. This is the concrete structure of social being. As the negative moment of this structure, the Species is originally non-Being; hence, we cannot say that it has being on its own. Even when I initially thought of species societies as being typified by totemic tribes, that certainly did not mean that the species substratum, on its own and as such

a society, had being. I did no more than call “species society” that type of society in which the immediateness of the Species is, as a structural moment of society, dominant over other moments. What is now emphasized is that even this immediate unity is, as something against opposition, indeed itself oppositional. The one side that is a tribe’s immediate unity would perhaps be accompanied by strife among tribes. Of course, disruption and opposition only take place upon unity, and, without the latter, they seem to lose their meaning. Yet, in the self-negating mode that is self-alienation, even unity is simply contained as an opponent of opposition and is not self-aware as unity; accordingly, this unity remains ever as a moment of opposition, a unity to be negated, and cannot truly unify opposition. Even if this were an in-itself unity, this would not yet realize a for-itself unification, since in-itself unmediatedness is contrary to the realization of unification. If unification is realized, then this is not self-negation but absolute negation. Although the two are mutually accordant, at the same time, they are negatively opposed, and it is through action that they are first mediated. Of course, even if this unity is said to be alienated and negated, since this signifies dialectical negation, it does not mean that the unity simply disappears immediately upon negation. Even negation is negation in affirmation; so, the unity is negated and, at the same time, has being as a moment. Indeed, it becomes the negative mediator that establishes opposition; it is, in other words, negated in affirmation. This is why Aristotle’s *hyle* remains identical as the substratum throughout the movement whereby *dynamis* changes into *energeia*. If this is inverted, restored through the mediation of negation, and affirmed in negation, then, since it is already a self-awareness of unification, it is no longer mere self-negation but precisely the acting turnover of self-negation-*sive*-absolute negation. This is the generification of Species. The fact that Aristotle denied⁵³ the substantiality of *hyle*, which he had once established, and then took *eidōs* to be the substance, must signify this turnover. [483] His doctrine of movement breaks through the framework of identity logic and demands dialectical logic. This must amount to a generification of Species, whereby *hyle* is made into *eidōs*, within an acting turnover that is more radical than with even Hegel. This cannot be understood from the standpoint of identity logic, as simply *dynamis* becoming *energeia*; it must be the

53. 否定して。

absolute-negative, unifying subjectification of the self-negating species substratum. Remaining at the self-negating substratum of the Species, unity is lost and alienated, itself unable to be more than a mere moment of opposition. In this way, we can say that the Species is an absolute disruption and opposition that takes even unity itself as a moment of opposition. The *hyle* in *Timaeus*, which Schelling compares to the turbulent waves of the sea,⁵⁴ can be an absolute opposition, because it is the two-fold oppositional, self-negating mode. The Species, initially conceived as an immediate unity for the subjectivities of Individuals, clarifies itself through its own structure as an absolute disruption and opposition that takes even such an immediate unity as a negative moment. I can now define the Species as that whereby unity itself is, at the same time, none other than opposition. This definition would indeed apply to something like a “nation” as well. This is precisely what I referred to above as the logical modification of the concept of Species. In relation to this, we can say that the Genus signifies that whereby opposition is at the same time unification; and the Individual is none other than the mediator of the turnover whereby the Species, as absolute opposition, turns into the Genus, as absolute unification.

If the species substratum is, thereby, self-negation as a twofold opposition, then this would mean that the Individual, which is subjectively opposed to it, cannot be immediately in negative opposition to the Species, as I initially thought. For insofar as the Species is absolute disruption and opposition, there can be no opposition outside of the Species; and even if we speak of a negative opposition to the Species, so long as it is in an immediate, mutual opposition with the Species, then is it no more than a relative opposition that itself is classified under the Species and establishes the Species’s absolute opposition. Since what truly is for and negates the Species is the Species’s negation of itself, the negation of the Species could not be anything besides absolute negation. Absolute negation is the negation of self-negation and, as just seen, the negation of absolute opposition. As such, it is none other than action, which realizes for-itself the unity that had served as the in-itself mediator of opposition. [484] Hence, the subjective action of the Individual is in fact the absolute-negative turnover (the Species’s self-negation) toward

54. See Schelling 2006, 30.

the Genus, and the Individual is not simply opposed to the Species, but emerges in this turnover toward the Genus, the turnover mediated by the Species's self-negation. Where the unity that is presupposed in-itself by the Species's absolute disruption and opposition is realized as the Genus, what mediates this for-itself turnover is the Individual. This is why the Individual is conceived to be that which acts as a subject. And this takes place within the in- and for-itself, whole unification of self-negation-*sive*-absolute negation. Earlier, I took the Absolute to be residing-at-home; I took its self-alienating and outbound side to be matter, its absolute-negative, homebound side to be spirit. It must be that the Individual is then precisely the spiritual subject, contrasted with the Species as a material substratum. While the latter is the side of absolute disruption and opposition, the former is the side of absolute unification and return. Since the Individual is thus mediated by the Species and is none other than the negation of the Species' self-negation, it must be considered to be, not what negates the Species immediately, but rather what emerges in the restoration and unification of the Species' self-negation. This is why, as stated in Section Two, I have changed my initial thinking, which took the Individual to be the immediate negation of the Species, and now, consider the Individual to be mediated by the Species, to be something that emerges in absolute negation and is mediated by the negation of the Species itself. It should go without saying that this modification is none other than the result of modifying the concept of the Species itself, which led me to clarify the two-fold oppositionality of the Species. Thus, the Individual emerges in the whole of the Genus, and, as a member of the whole, it bears and represents⁵⁵ the whole's subjectively unified character. In this sense, the individual is coevally the whole, and the whole is coevally the individual. The two must be in mutual accord. Since the negation of the Species is a negation of self-negation, it is the for-itself realization of the in-itself unity contained in the very absolute opposition of the Species: the negation of the Species is the restoration of the whole. The Individual is the *dynamism* of this restoration of whole unification: it is the process of return. This is why the Individual is the acting subject. While the residing-at-home, absolute negation's negative side is

55. 代表

the Species's materiality, its affirmative side is none other than the Individual's spirituality. Just as unity, considered in-itself, was included in the absolute opposition of the Species and was itself a moment of opposition, the Individual, considered immediately, is included in the Species's self-negating mode and is a Species. Spirit necessarily takes the body as its negative moment, and is mediated by matter. [485] The Individual, in my initial conception, was such an in-itself Individual, and so, as an opponent of the Species that belongs to the Species, this Individual was itself none other than a Species. That which in this way opposes the Species is ever a Species: for Species is absolute opposition. Moreover, since the Individual's emergence together with the unification of the Whole, which is the restoration and return of unification, depends on the absolute negative turnover of the Species's self-negation, it thus goes without saying that the Individual and the Whole (Genus) are both mediated by the self-negation of the Species. This is why this dialectic is necessarily the logic of Species. I entertain no doubt that the absolute mediation of dialectic could be other than the logic of Species.

By contrast, it could be thought that when it comes to absolute mediation, Genus, Species, and Individual should each be mediated by each, and so there is no reason for why the Species in particular must be thought to mediate the other two, and that, in this regard, absolute mediation and the logic of Species are incompatible. Yet, if one were to adequately understand what I have described above, then such a thought should dissolve itself. Indeed, formally speaking, the term "absolute mediation" may seem to mean that Genus, Species, and Individual mediate each other equivalently, as do UPI⁵⁶ in Hegel's logic. Yet, even in Hegel, the three mediating modes are not completely equivalent. I-P-U syllogistically develops the natural primitive structure of the judgment "I is U" as what is most natural, just as, in Aristotle's syllogisms, the first figure takes the superior position as what is most natural in comparison with the other two figures. In the natural order of generation, that the P of the Particular takes the position of mediator must be necessary. Yet, if we reflect further on the syllogistic mode generated in this way, then other forms of syllogism are possible as well. We can under-

56. Tanabe's *ABE*, which stands for *Allgemeinen* (Universal), *Besonderen* (Particular), *Einzelnen* (Individual), is translated as U, P, and I.

stand the syllogism whether it is U, P, or I that mediates the other two, and it is from this point that we can establish what is called “absolute mediation.” Even with my logic of Species, it, in the same way, regards the Species’s self-negation and self-alienation as the substratum on which dialectic depends, which is a necessary result of the fact that dialectic is the logic of self-negation; however, the twofold oppositional structure of self-negation includes the Genus (Whole) and the Individual simultaneously and obviously includes them in-themselves, as moments of absolute opposition. In that sense, since the Species is simultaneously mediated by both the Genus and the Individual, it is evident that the Species establishes absolute mediation, and it is possible for any one to mediate the other two. [486] Nay, we should be able to say not only that but even, conversely, any two mediate the other as well. The very fact that absolute mediation is established as the logic of Species belongs to the necessity of dialectic. The reason one doubts this is that one does not understand dialectic subjectively. No one would doubt that, say, time is absolutely mediated by the three modalities of past, present, and future, and that none of these could be lacking as a mediator of the other two. Standpoints are possible which understand time by emphasizing any one of the three modalities, which is why, since ancient times, each has had its own persuasive representatives. Nevertheless, we cannot deny that the present, as a mediator in the establishment of time, stands in a privileged position. This is why Augustine’s classical theory of time has profound significance. By standing in the present, the dynamism and unity of time are combined. The mediality of the present is not contradictory with absolute mediality; on the contrary, the former makes the latter possible. In a similar sense, the logic of Species is not only compatible with the logic of absolute mediation but makes it possible. It stands to say that doubting this is the consequence of not understanding the logic of absolute mediation dialectically, but instead transforming it into formal logic objectively.

What here requires notice is that when we understand dialectic as the logic of absolute mediation, how are we to understand the overall character of logic, namely, inferentiality? I have pointed out the impossibility of, when one overextends the concept of logic, purporting that what remains as the mere understanding of expressions, too, is logic, and claimed that it is necessary to precisely distinguish the logos of logic from the logos of lin-

guistic expression. I have thereby proposed inferentiality to be what characterizes the latter. This, of course, is not for me to be claiming anything like a novel view. Instead, I have only made clear the meaning of the concept of logic, the meaning of its correct use from long ago to today. Yet, suppose one were to merely follow the classical meaning and confine inferentiality to the operation of thinking that deduces conclusions from premises. Then, it would not be directly suitable to the case of dialectic. [487] The reason for this is that deducing a conclusion from a premise entails both the mediatedness of the conclusion and the unmediatedness and immediacy of the premise, and yet, dialectically speaking and in accord with the demands of absolute mediation, even the premise must be at the same time something that is mediated. This clearly implies a circular argument, which is not allowed by identity logic. In this sense, one might say that inferentiality and circularity are incompatible. Yet, in the subject's freedom within the Nothing of the referent, dialectic goes beyond the law of contradiction, which is the axiom of identity logic, and concurrently with this, even demands circularity. Accordingly, if we understand inferentiality in the usual sense, then the dialectic of absolute mediation is not inferential but circular. One could therefore go so far as to say that it is not logic.

Nevertheless, it has long been an accepted matter that, even with identity logic, where it, as the method of cognition, seeks systematic completion, the premise of deduction is the conclusion of induction—premise and conclusion being, in this way, in mutual accord— and that deduction and induction are mediated by each other to establish a circular relationship. Seen from this perspective, inferentiality turns out to be in mutual accord with circularity, and the former stands in relation to the whole of the latter as a partial moment. This is akin to precisely the relationship between dialectic and identity logic overall. One may even say that the circularity of dialectic is absolute inferentiality, which takes the inferentiality of analytic logic as its moment of negation. Still, since the moment of negation is not an immediate part, inference would not stand, if we were to take only one part of dialectical circularity, say, the one direction comprised by mediation; instead, that which negates identity inference, ever renewing it, is absolute inferentially. We may also refer to this absolute inferentiality as the subjective inferentiality that comprises the negation-*sive*-affirmation of objective inferential-

ity. From this it follows that, in the ordinary sense, it cannot be said that dialectical logic takes inference as its content. Absolute inferentiality is, rather, the powerhouse of inferentiality that affirms inference in its negation. Or we may say that, where ordinary inference has an extendedness and extensionality that proceeds by way of identity and the understanding, absolute inferentiality signifies the intensionality that negatively subjectivizes these very inferences. While the inference of identity logic is immediately affirmative, this is absolutely negative. Absolute inferentiality is inference that is aware of itself as taking place on the basis of such a mode of absolute negation. We must thus understand that the inferentiality of dialectical logic means negative mediation. [488] And this clearly belongs to the self-awareness of the acting subject.

With such considerations, it is easy to recognize that the inferentiality of dialectic, which clarifies the negative structure of the middle term at the core of ordinary inferences⁵⁷, is none other than the concretization of the copula of judgment. It has long been my contention that from either the logic of the subject⁵⁸ or that of the predicate, dialectical judgments cannot be concretely understood, and that such understanding is possible only from the logic of the copula. I do not think that this bears repeating here. If dialectic is the mutual accord of negation and affirmation, the negative mediation of substance and subject⁵⁹, and thus the acting mediation of being and concept, then it should be evident that the negative mediation of the copula is to comprise the core of judgment. That being said, in judgment, the copula is an immediate unity without content. It is the simple acting decision of negation-*sive*-affirmation. The unity of subject and predicate⁶⁰ has no mediator, and the universal of the concept implied by the latter is combined, without mediation, with the being expressed by the former. This unity lacks self-

57. In the Hegelian context, 推論 is translated as syllogism (cf. HEGEL 2010A, 588–624; 2010B, 253–68). More broadly, the Japanese term means “inference.”

58. 主語.

59. 主体.

60. 「述語と主語との統一は何等の媒介を有せず、後者の意味する概念の普遍は無媒介に、前者の表わす存在に結合せられる」。In the original, it is suggested that the *subject* implies the universal of the concept and the *predicate* expresses being, which appears to be a simple mistake in Tanabe’s usage of “former” and “latter.” In our translation, we have corrected the order.

awareness and, comparable to an action that lacks reasons, one cannot say that it is sufficiently rational. Reason must be something that is free and always so on the basis of a self-awareness of reasons. Contrary to the above, to be self-aware of the mediation of the predicate, such that freedom is established based on the turnover of actuality-*sive*-self, is precisely inferentiality. Inferentiality is a self-awareness of the species substratum, which is to be the negative mediator for the universal of the predicate, and the mediation of this into a restoration of unification within the subject⁶¹ of the Individual, expressed by the subject.⁶² In such a way, the contentless copula of judgment can avoid the state of affairs whereby immediate judgment always falls into falsehood—just as, in correlation with the merely immediate mode of negative unification, unity turns out to be a moment of opposition—and it can turn into the mode of truth, which is self-aware of its grounds. This is precisely inferentiality. The species substratum serves as a mediator to concretize the immediate unity of the copula into a unification of absolute negation. Self-awareness of this mediation of self-negation is the inferentiality of dialectic. The twofold oppositional structure of this mediation lends understanding to judgment's negative establishment, and a self-awareness of this will necessarily concretize the copula into the content of the middle term. The true content of the middle term is none other than the species substratum. The logic of Species that clarifies this would indeed be something that realizes inferentiality. Yet, I do not think it needs to be repeated that what is here being called “realization” is none other than a self-awareness of the restoration of unification in action. [489]

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The unification of the whole in the Genus, as we have seen, is the restoration of unification, a unity that was contained, in itself, as a moment within the Species' self-negating mode. It is a self-awareness that is for-itself, and the establishment of this self-awareness, insofar as it is the restoration and realization of unification, is none other than the

61. 主体.

62. 主語.

subjective action of the Individual. If this is so, then the Individual corresponds to the turning point where, in the turnover of absolute negation, the species moment, which signifies, in-itself, the unity of the Genus as the negation of self-negation, turns from the Species over into the Genus. The unification, which had itself until now been nothing but a moment of opposition, is now a unifying whole realized in- and for-itself. At the same time, the particularity, which had been a moment of the in-itself unity that comprises the Species, does not simply vanish but must be affirmed in its negation, and, in that sense, be sublated. In other words, the restoration of the unification of the whole is not performed without mediation, but rather by taking as its negative mediator this species moment that had previously, in its in-itself mode, been determined by the Species. Metaphorically speaking, the establishment of unification has an axis, a mediating point over which it turns. This axis is the negation of unity within unification and nonetheless the mediator of unification. In other words, within the negativity of the axis, the self-negativity distinctive to the Species is inherited while, by negating itself in unification, coming to serve as the negative mediator of unification. It is here that Specificity is sublated. To sublimate Specificity is to negate it by radicalizing it. The thinking of classical logic, which identifies the limit of species particularization with the Individual as the lowest species, must be turned into this manner of dialectic. Insofar as the absolute negative mode of unification always takes the Species's self-negativity to be its mediator, it preserves this negativity as a negative moment, as the point that mediates and activates its turnover. The acting point of the turnover, the so-called "*punctum saliens* of all vitality,"⁶³ is none other than the Individual. On account of the Individual, the Species is negatively turned over into the unification of the whole that comprises the Genus, and the species moment, which had, in-itself, represented unity, becomes the Genus as a whole. The whole and the individual mutually correspond, and the negative mediator of this is none other than the substratum of the Species. This substratum, which binds the whole and the individual in mutual correspondence, is, on the reverse side of both, divided and opposed through self-negation. [490] Precisely this is what I

63. HEGEL 2010B, 242.

meant when I said earlier that the absolute negative turnover of the self-negation of the species substratum is the unification of the Genus, while the homeward-boundedness of this unification's turnover and return is the Individual. One could say that the Genus signifies the movement-*sive*-stillness of residing-at-home, to be contrasted with the dynamism of the Individual, and that the for-itself mode, to be contrasted with the in-and-for-itself Genus, is the subjectivity of the Individual. It is also for this reason that the Individual is conceived to be the limit of the Species's determination, and for why we may think that the unity of the Species is negatively realized, while, at the same time, its separate independence,⁶⁴ taken to the limit, reaches the Individual. Herein lies the reason for why, since Plato, the lowest species has been taken to represent the individual. It would only be by taking the Individual to be that which negatively retains the Species within the unifying whole, and retains it as the mediator of the realization of unification, that the precise significance of the Individual may be understood. In its oppositionality to the whole, the individual inherits the special, but in the absolute negativity that sublates Specificity into the whole, the individual is instead the activating point of the whole, its point of turnover. Where mutual negation of this negative oppositionality reaches its culmination, the content of the substratum returns to nothing; at the same time, the very negative acts that had been constrained by the substratum, work themselves out as completely emancipated, free action, which turns the content of the substratum into its own subjective content. This is none other than the individual subject. Therefore, in the oppositional unification composed of I and thou, the individual subject sublates the oppositions corresponding to the negative oppositions of Species. The contents of I and thou, insofar as they comprise a unification that negates Specificity, belong to the Genus as a whole. Thus, if the Individual affirms itself not as a negative moment of the whole, but affirms itself immediately as something that opposes the whole, it lapses directly into the Species. The individual is a contradictory being, which retains its self-sovereignty⁶⁵ within the whole, but establishes the whole by negating itself. That the individual *is* in its being

64. 分立性.

65. 自主性.

nothing, that one finds oneself in losing oneself—this self-sacrificing-*sive*-self-realizing character is established in the above way.

In consideration of the above, we can say that while the Genus is the restoration and self-awareness of the unification that is presupposed by and contained, in-itself, within the Species as a moment, the Individual is the preservation and affirmation of the Species's oppositionality within the unification of the Genus. The relationship between Genus, Species, and Individual from the perspective of social ontology, as I had initially described, must be made concrete up to this point. This relationship is none other than the development of the logic of Species, which depends on the twofold-oppositional structure of the Species's self-negation. I believe that, when seen from this perspective, the Individual's twofold character too becomes apparent and inconcealable. [491] For the Individual, seen from one side, depends on the Whole that serves as the negation of the Species's oppositionality; at the same time, regarded from the other side, since the Individual is the preservation and affirmation of the Species's oppositionality, its establishment lies at the point where two orientations intersect: the ascension toward the unification of the Genus, which depends on the negation of the Species' oppositionality, and the descent toward the Species's opposition, which the unification of the Genus demands as its own mediator. And this is precisely the point of intersection of *ōsō* and *gensō*.⁶⁶ Earlier, the Individual was identified as the point at which the absolute negative unification of the Genus arises; but now, we must also consider the Individual as the point at which the unification of the Genus mediates itself through and brings itself in contact with its negative mediator, the Species's oppositionality. This unification does not bear fruit *qua* unification, unless within itself it enlivens its members and gives being to the independence of each. This must be, as I emphasized at the beginning, a state of affairs whereby the whole unification of the state gives each of its members their place⁶⁷ and brings them into participation within the whole through their spontaneous cooperation. This is precisely the *gensō* side of the Whole within the Individual. The concreteness of the universal is not possible unless it mediates itself through the particular. Yet, the universal would by no means mediate itself through

66. On *ōsō* and *gensō*, see note 29 above.

67. 所.

a particular, if this particular remained merely internal to the universal as the latter's immediate self-determination: for what mediates must oppose that which is mediated. Accordingly, the particular is not to simply remain as an immediate self-determination of the universal. It is necessary for the particular to be both within the universal and outside of it, something that both opposes it and belongs to its unification. Even so-called "self-determination" must be dialectically mediated. When speaking of self-determination-*sive*-determination-by-other, this notion must sufficiently clarify such oppositional negativity, as well as, therefore, the absolute negativity that, as the *sive*,⁶⁸ is mediated only in action. Otherwise, mutual correspondence is not negative mediation but reduces to a non-dialectical identity. Still, true unification is ever mediated by opposition. Therefore, the universal must mediate itself through the oppositions of particulars, and the whole must come down to the individuals, enliven them, and bring them, as independent members, into opposition with itself, while imbibing them into itself. Lacking this *gensō* side, the absolute unification of the universal as a whole inevitably regresses into the in-itself mode, thus degenerating into the opposition of a Species. The ascension and *ōsō* by which the Species is raised to the Genus, at the same time requires a mutual correspondence with the descension and *gensō* by which the Genus comes down to the Individual. [492] What realizes this mutual correspondence is action. Action, while that of the Individual, is the self-actualization of the Whole. While, it is by losing the self that the Individual indeed finds itself within the Whole, at the same time, the Whole is mediated by the Individual and can only become a subject through the spontaneous freedom of the Individual.

If we thus think of the action of the Individual as something that takes place at the intersection of *ōsō* and *gensō*, amid the turnover of the two sides comprised by the self-negation of the Species and the absolute negation of the Genus, and if we consider the negative, mutual correspondence between the Individual and the Genus (the Whole), while taking the Species to be the negative mediator, we are to find results of great importance, both practically and logically. For instance, seen from the practical standpoint, are we not granted some insight into the relationship between religion and ethics by considering the Individual's twofoldness and capacity for nega-

68. 即.

tive turnover? It has been widely stressed, especially in recent times, that religion negates all finite being, sweeps away the human perspective, and must begin and end within the determinations set by the standpoint of the Absolute. As a reaction to the human perspective, the so-called “idealistic”⁶⁹ theories of religion, which place the religious standpoint at the limit of human perfection and completion, are of enough significance to demand our respect. Yet, it results in a bias, where by overemphasizing the negative opposition between the Absolute and the relative, between God and man, there is the tendency to reject any absolute-negative turnover between the two, accepting a turnover only within the intermediator⁷⁰ (Christ) that is the self-negation of God and, when it comes to faith in the relation to the Absolute, limiting this to a faith in the event⁷¹ of intermediation. This is due to the non-dialectical character of this tendency, where God is not absolute negation but absolute being and God’s unmediated, immediate self-negation is the creation of the relative. This is but one instance of the inconsistency where the being of the Absolute itself is non-dialectical. Yet, even if one, contrary to this, were nevertheless to affirm the union of the absolute and the relative in a sense of identity that is not sufficiently negative, one could still not escape abstraction. This is because, on this standpoint, one regards only the beingness of the Absolute to be non-dialectical and immediate, and, entrusting this to so-called “intuition,” does not carry negative mediation all the way through. As a result, this standpoint professes a union of “sacred and secular law,”⁷² collapsing into a non-practical contemplation that sings the praises of actuality. This is not peculiar to the standpoint of contemplation and resignation, but even the standpoint that champions the Practice of Buddhahood,⁷³ by necessity, cannot escape this result, insofar as the absolute negative turnover that it professes is unmediated and lacks the mediation of the Species’s self-alienation. [493] Although the latter emphasizes the Individual’s *gensō* determination, as the beneficiary of deliverance

69. 理想主義.

70. 仲介者.

71. 生起.

72. 仏法世間法.

73. 行仏.

and salvation,⁷⁴ since it does not sufficiently acknowledge the self-negation of the Species as a mediator, it ignores why social, ethical praxis is to comprise the concrete content of action. Of course, when what is relative is seen from the standpoint of the Absolute, it would seem to be a matter of course that they are indiscriminately leveled off, since they are all so many negative mediators, whose content is not to be positively⁷⁵ affirmed. Yet, the turnover of absolute negation does not simply negate and discard the relative in an immediate fashion. Through absolute negation, the relative is simultaneously negated and affirmed. Thus, while within the Absolute itself, the distinctions among what is relative are in no way to be regarded, just as they are, as differences in the positivity⁷⁶ of their value, still, from the standpoint of the relative's rightly possessed independence,⁷⁷ one must acknowledge a difference in the abstractness and concreteness they have as negative mediators. If concretely considering the being of human beings within social being and grasping action within the ethicality of the political praxis of state-building is taken to be what is most concrete, then we should not be able to deny that, in turn, being and action, so considered, are, as negative mediators, what is most concrete. This is why Hegel too explains that ethics is necessary as a mediator of religion. This must be a necessary result of recognizing the self-negating mode of the Species to be the social substratum of human being. To the extent that the Species's mediality is based on its twofold oppositional structure, it is to be acknowledged that ethics, which is the most concrete realization of this structure, is the most concrete negative mediator of absolute negation. The fact that the action of absolute negation mediates the relativity of ethics with the absoluteness of religion, and at the same time, makes the latter find its most concrete negative mediator in the former, belongs to the necessity of dialectic. Of course, this does not mean that, by the very nature of the negative mediation of dialectic, religion is erected on the basis of ethics as its postulate or that ethics is deduced from religion. Rather, it means that ethics and religion each retain the independence⁷⁸ of

74. 解脱救済の機.

75. 積極的に.

76. 積極性.

77. 自立性.

78. 自主性.

their own standpoints while being negatively mediated and unified oppositionally. To this day, I have explained the interrelation of ethics and religion with reference to this sort of relationship of negative mediation. This has not been to say either that religion's mediation through ethics is necessary in the sense of identity logic, or that ethics leads to religion at its limit in the manner of identity. To critique me for, in the above sense, regarding ethics to be the necessary and sufficient condition for religion is a result of not understanding the meaning of dialectical, negative mediation. [494] If one has not escaped the standpoint of identity intuition, then one is bound to interpret my argument non-dialectically and in the manner of identity. On the contrary, since my ethics of state-building refers to the realization of whole unification that depends on the Species's self-negation turning into the Genus' absolute negation, it, by necessity, requires the two sides of ascending *ōsō* and descending *gensō*, while presupposing the self-negating mediation of the Absolute. Religion is not the perfection or limit of ethics but the absolute negative affirmation of ethics. Consequently, on the *gensō* side of the Absolute, whereby it descends into the relative as its self-negating mediator, religion necessarily demands ethics as its most concrete negative mediator. Needless to say, this does not mean that, in the manner of identity, that which is absolute of religion negates itself without mediation and descends into the relative, thus mediating itself through ethics as an imperfect stage of religion. These misunderstandings all stem from a non-understanding of dialectic. It is not simply that faith is not an intuition of Being, but that it cannot amount to an intuition of Nothingness either. Since Nothingness is realized only through the absolute negative mediation that is action, and since action occupies the standpoint of negation that goes beyond intuition, we practice Nothingness in the sense that we believe in what cannot be seen and are negatively turned over and mediated with it. Faith⁷⁹ is, on the one hand, self-awareness of the relationship that action, in the practice of Nothingness, has to the Absolute and, on the other hand, consciousness of the turnover and mutual accordance of *ōsō* and *gensō*. Nothingness is not to be seen but to be practiced, and consciousness that practices this Nothingness

79. 信.

is none other than faith. If we equate this with seeing,⁸⁰ then religion loses its ethical character and degenerates into artistic taste.

As the intersection of *ōsō* and *gensō*, the Individual is the self-negating subject of action, which is, in turn, the achievement of the negative mutual accordance of these two directions. This fact is not only of practical importance, as described above, but also brings about an important consequence for logic. This pertains to the absolute negative twofold character of the concept of limit. There is no need to repeat that the concept of limit being used in such propositions as, “Religion stands at the limit of ethics”—a proposition I have just denied—implies a referent to be unidirectionally approximated. This concept derives from mathematical analysis and then, becoming known as the “method of limit,” came to serve philosophical logic as a central methodological concept. [495] Nevertheless, it is easy to notice that, where the limit is the goal to be approached and approximated, the generation of the series elements that correspond to each stage of the progression must depend on the power of the principle symbolized by the limit, and the differential and continuous work of the limit, as the act of production, must depend on the principle of the series elements’ generation. This is why it is thought that the production of a series, as a so-called extensive quantity, originates from the differential that is the principle of intensive quantities. Accordingly, philosophically speaking, the method of limit is none other than the infinitesimal method. Now, since the differential is a unit of continuous quantity, it is also clear that there is no room for negation in the continuous production of intensive quantity whose principle is the differential. Of course, one might say that to approach the differential by dividing the intensive quantity just is to apply negation and restriction to the whole. Still, this amounts to a decrease of quantity and not a negation of quality. The concept of the differential emerged, that is, based on a demand to reduce the opposition of qualitative negation to a quantitative decrease. The concept thereby serves the prosaic ends of analytic mathematics to quantify the change of motion. The negation that takes place between the qualitative opposition of Being and Nothingness is here no longer possible, since negation or Nothingness is replaced by the differential as the infinitesimal. The differential is nothing besides Being that heads toward Noth-

ingness. The concept of the differential aims to preserve identity against the change of motion by eliminating Nothingness and changing everything into Being. We can say that it is an extension of Aristotle's logic of being into the mathematical method of modern science. That there is no negation to be found is but a matter of course. Accordingly, if the concept of the differential is to be an affirmation in negation, it is not Being in Nothingness, but merely Being that intends and heads toward Nothingness. Moreover, just by saying that "the concept intends Nothingness," we are, in fact, implicitly presupposing Nothingness. But this is impossible without dialectic. Thus, the differential aims to replace Nothingness with infinitesimal Being. Accordingly, we should say that this concept is, instead, Being intent on concealing Nothingness. There is no room to acknowledge the concepts peculiar to dialectic, such as unification based on Nothingness or the mediation of negation. Dialectic and the infinitesimal method are fundamentally different in character and by no means compatible. I cannot even imagine what it would mean to draw on the infinitesimal method for the purpose of carrying through dialectic. The critiques that try to find such traces in my recent dialectical thought are, I believe, uniformly the result of the fact that the critics' own understanding of dialectic has not yet entirely shed itself of the identity belonging to non-dialectical intuition.

[496] On the contrary, as I have been making clear, if we acknowledge the Individual's twofoldness, as well as the Species' twofold opposition, on which the former is based, then, not only is it no longer in any way possible to have a differential interpretation of dialectic, but it is also evident that the one-sided mediality of the limit concept based on the differential must be turned into a twofold mediality. It is plain that, with the conventional differential method of limit,⁸¹ even if approaching the limit entails a productivity of the limit, this merely replaces the descending *gensō* of the limit with the ascending *ōsō* towards the limit and does not think either the simultaneous coexistence of these mutually and negatively opposing sides or the absolute negative unification that depends on their co-mediation. For these can only be thought from the standpoint of the negative mediation of dialectic, which fundamentally differs in character from the infinitesimal method. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the limit can only be

81. 微分の極限法.

posited through such a negative unification of twofoldness, and this is due precisely to the following. On the one hand, the fact that the limit is the goal toward which the series approaches and is the principle of the production of the series' elements means that the individual element is established squarely as the unification of *ōsō* and *gensō*; and, on the other hand, the fact that the limit is posited as the goal toward which a series of these elements approaches signifies that the Genus (Whole), as the whole unity of the Individual, is the principle of the Individual's production and, at the same time, also the completion of that unification. Yet, since, by the demands of identity logic, the whole can only be conceived of as a set of elements, and since, in analytic logic, the whole cannot be conceived of as the principle of the production of elements, the whole is changed into a limit that is the goal of the series' completion. This is just to propose to change the negative, mutual correspondence of the Individual and the Whole into identity logic. If one were to purely take up the standpoint of analytic logic, then it would have to be impossible to think, by way of an Idea,⁸² a whole that does not complete its elements: for this Idea is itself Nothingness and, indeed, the origin of Being. In fact, to do so would be just to make a dialectical state of affairs one of identity. The limit is what presupposes the contradictory unification of dialectic while changing it into identity. Moreover, the limit includes a contradiction that cannot be thought by way of the merely finite identity logic, namely, the contradiction that is the mutual correspondence of the whole and the elements. In the self-projection that is characteristic of infinite systems, that is, in their character whereby the whole equalizes density in a one-to-one correspondence with its parts, this issue appears as a patent contradiction. [497] This would be no more than to state analytically and extensively what is, seen dialectically, the mutual correspondence between the Whole and the Individual. Hence, it could be said that with the infinite system, identity meets its initial failure. Yet going forward, where this contradiction is not problematized and is instead made to be the definition of infinity, one can see its initial concession to dialectic. Nevertheless, this initial concession in no way ends with this first step, for the so-called "paradoxes of infinity" appear snapping at one's heels.

If, from the extensive, analytical standpoint, the definition of infinity

82. 理念的に.

states the mutual correspondence of the Whole and the Individual, then it is clear that the Whole does not remain the limit of a series or set of Individuals as a whole, but that each Individual must itself become a limit that serves as a representative of the Whole. That is to say, infinity does not establish a contradictory state of affairs merely one time and by a single fold, but should do so infinite times and by infinites folds. This is the first step in turning infinity into continuity. It is, in other words, none other than the second step of dialectic's incursion into analysis and identity logic. With this, the intensive originariness of the Whole appears by breaking through the frame of extensive, analytic logic. There, the limit element can be thought of unidirectionally as in Cantor's fundamental sequence,⁸³ but it can also be given a twofold definition as in Dedekind's cut. In the latter case, we must say that the twofold unification of the Individual is made manifest. Yet, if the continuity were to stop here, then, as still an analytic system in which Zermelo's theorem is valid, there should have been a way to solve the antinomy. Perhaps the crisis in the foundations of mathematics could have been avoided in this way. Yet, the Individual's twofoldness is based on the intersection of *ōsō* and *gensō*, and its unification was only to take place by absolute negation. As I often say, the Individual *is* in its being nothing, in the sense that it finds itself in losing itself. Now, there is no hiding that the limit is the being of Nothingness. That the limit is, in the first instance, the goal towards which the series approaches and the Idea at which it must arrive, is because, in fact, the limit contains within itself not Being, but Nothingness. Otherwise, there should be no reason for disallowing a composition of Being from arriving at its destination. No matter how much Being is lowered into the origin of the differential, there is no reaching Nothingness. [498] When we avoid Nothingness and replace it with infinitesimal Being, the limit that contains Nothingness is fixed as something destined to be unattainable. Now that precisely the Individual, and not the whole of the elements, has become the limit, we are no longer able to hide its negative character. That the limit of the Individual is Being in Nothingness, and that this unity is the unification of contradiction, makes the contradictory nature of continuity quite impossible to escape. And this is nothing but the absolute negative unification that can only be thought dialectically.

83. 基本系列.

With this, Nothingness as the negative origin of Being—the subjectively negative mutual correspondence of Whole and Individual that makes possible the infinite and continuous set as an objective referent—became an insurmountable difficulty for set theory, and the so-called “foundational crisis” became unavoidable. It is in this sense that I had previously attributed the cause of the foundational crisis mainly to difficulties in continuity theory. Reaching this point, there is no more way for the contradiction contained in the definition of infinity to be covered up. This is certainly not to say that it is possible to sever the infinite from the continuous and liberate it from paradox. On the contrary, this is none other than the first step toward the triumph of dialectic. Yet, at the same time, it is not being denied that a difference of stages, such as that seen above, persists between the infinite and the continuous. Now, in the self-negating substratum of continuity, we move on to the third stage, and the contradictory structure of continuity is made explicit. I believe that the intuitionist theory of continuity that emerged with the foundational crisis can be understood as corresponding to this third stage. As just mentioned, the limit element, or cut, as an element of continuity is, in fact, a unification of Being and Nothingness, which includes negation and takes absolute Nothingness to be its origin. Consequently, its contradictoriness cannot be covered up, and its series can never be an ordered set: for the limit element’s self-negativity freely negates its own positing, and the possibility of freely developing one series that contradicts another series is necessarily included in the establishment of the Individual as a free indeterminacy. Yet, this self-negativity of the Individual is, as mentioned above, the preservation of the self-negativity of the Species and its affirmation through the Species’s negation within the whole as the Genus. Accordingly, for the generation of the Individual (the limit element) to require the origin of Nothingness certainly does not mean that the infinitesimal is taken to be the origin of Being, as with the differential principle, [499] nor can it be a production that depends on a self-determination of intuitive Nothingness that is claimed under the guise of dialectic. As a mysticist “*oppositorum coincidentia*,” such Nothingness is, rightfully speaking, a supra-dialectical absolute Being, and one might conceive of the so-called “continuity of discontinuity” as its self-determination. Even Nothingness, as something intuited, is Being and, therefore, as the mediator of continuity, dissolves and unifies the self-contradictoriness of continuity within the

“*oppositorum coincidentia*.” Yet, that such a self-determination of Nothingness is none other than emanationism is just as has been mentioned before. This standpoint’s explanation that to speak even of Nothingness does not entail vacuity would seem to betray that its Nothingness is Being, is an absolute Being beyond Being and Nothingness. A Nothingness that is neither believed nor practiced, but contemplated, is in the end none other than this. This is due to its lack of a self-negating Species that would serve as its negative mediator. And it is just this absolute oppositionality of the species substratum that is the substratum of continuity: for it is on this that the self-contradictoriness of continuity must be based. This absolute opposition, in which even the very unity that is contained in-itself negates itself as a moment of opposition, is none other than the substratum of continuity. This is evident by considering that this substratum is, as the negative moment to all absolute negative mediation, the immediate mode of the unmediated, the self-estrangement of the negative mediator. Since, if there is any positing of Being, then it must, by the demands of dialectic, necessarily be mediated by Nothingness, the Nothingness of self-negation must be unmediated. Insofar as unification is, concretely speaking, already mediated, the unmediated is precisely an absolute opposition with no unification. Moreover, exactly because an absence of unification is a dialectical negation of unification, even unity, as something negated—which is to say, as something estranged and, in turn, fallen into a moment of opposition—is included within the the in-itself, immediate mode under the shape of the latter’s unity. What is called an intuition of continuity is none other than an intuition of this self-negating unification. This is why I previously compared continuity, as the opposition between unity and opposition, to the stress of forces, and why I tried to consider its structure by relying on the tensor. My interpretation of *hyle* in the *Timaeus* to be the straying cause thereby also implied self-negation as such self-estrangement. Of course, the impossibility of intuiting such a self-negating thing on its own is a matter in common with the fact that the substratum of the Species does not, on its own, achieve social being. [500] Yet, that which is self-negating can be intuited as a negative moment, as what backs the structure of Being on its reverse side. As the negative mediator of dialectical thinking, it is intuited without mediation; however, as something that has lost its mediation due to self-estrangement, it is still mediated. Hence, it may be thought to be without mediation but

negatively mediated as the loss of mediation. From the explication of self-estrangement's twofoldness as the core of absolute mediation, we must acknowledge that intuition is included in dialectic as without mediation, but, in the above sense, negatively mediated. This is a different claim from that of the philosophy of Nothingness, which takes an entirely immediate intuition of Nothingness, or intuition of negation, as the grounds of its system. The intuition of continuity is established as an intuition within the self-negating mode. Its content is an absolute opposition that is both unity and the negation of unity. Accordingly, it is not impossible to say that the continuity is, at the same time, discontinuous. This is why, in the main, infinite divisibility has been considered to be the definition of continuity since ancient times. It should bear no repetition that this "infinite divisibility" does not mean that we can partition continuity as many times as we want. Infinite partition⁸⁴ is possible precisely because continuity itself is an infinite disruption,⁸⁵ because any part, as a continuity, has wholeness, and unity infinitely overlaps as an element everywhere. This is none other than something based on the absolute disruption of the Species. Yet, as just mentioned, the intuition, whose content is the continuity of this substratum, remains as a negative moment. We can conceive of continuity concretely only when such an intuition is further negated and turned into a unification of absolute negation, whose result is none other than the negative mutual correspondence between the whole and Individual. Accordingly, we must say that continuity, as this negative unification, is the genus Whole—the negative mutual correspondence between individual discontinuity, on the one hand, and species continuity as individual discontinuity's negative mediator, on the other. In light of the nature⁸⁶ of dialectical negative mediation, it should be evident that concrete continuity, as the negative mutual correspondence of continuity and discontinuity, is the synthesis of both. This is clearly not what is called the continuity of discontinuity. As I have frequently mentioned, since the continuity of discontinuity does not acknowledge the species substratum, it lacks the self-negating mediator under discussion and does not allow us to validly understand in what sense we can

84. Viz. *Teilung*, 分割, a sharing division.

85. Viz. *Zerrissenheit*, 分裂. Compare HEGEL 2018, 21; and THZ 5: 471.

86. 本性上.

speak of continuity. Since, this standpoint takes Nothingness to be the content of intuition, and thereby regards it as higher-order Being, one could speak of continuity by taking this Nothingness to be the mediator. [501] Yet, as I have repeatedly indicated, this is inconsistent and non-dialectical. Nevertheless, even the standpoint of what is called “continuity of continuity”—which explicitly takes such higher-order Being to be the grounds of continuity, expressing this with the concept of “Many in One”—cannot think continuity concretely. This standpoint, which is also called the view of universal continuity, takes even discontinuity to be a discontinuity in continuity and explains that all series, speaking immediately, have continuity in their ground, and that they are realized as the “Many in One” within each stage of the series. Yet, how could mere continuity contain discontinuity within itself? If one begins and ends on the standpoint of continuity, how could one think of discontinuity as the negation of continuity? When it comes to the Many of the “Many in One,” on what principle is it that they depend? That the principle of differential does not reach negation is as was stated before; but furthermore, this principle, by presupposing negation, reifies⁸⁷ negation in the manner of identity. If we begin by accepting negation to be in mutual correspondence with affirmation, discontinuity does become possible; however, since doing so would already mean taking up the dialectical standpoint, a continuity opposed to discontinuity would take discontinuity to be a negative mediator, and so we would be unable to think of discontinuity simply and one-sidedly as a restriction of and limitation on continuity. As something negatively mediated by discontinuity, continuity itself cannot be thought merely immediately, but must be something that possesses dialectical twofoldness. By contrast, immediate continuity, which serves, together with discontinuity, as a moment of sublation, would, as something intuitive in the sense mentioned above, have to be the substratum of the self-negating Species. If we do not acknowledge this and explain continuity without mediation, then—just as the in-itself unity that opposes opposition is itself an opposition, and concrete unification must be negatively mediated with opposition—the immediate continuity that merely opposes discontinuity and lacks self-awareness of its own dialectical mediality in relation to discontinuity is, in fact, none other than discontinuity,

87. 有化.

which is like what we saw with regard to the infinite divisibility of continuity. This is because, when one thinks only from the single side of *ōsō* and lacks the *gensō* side, even the concrete Idea becomes, in fact, abstract. When the Idea of “Many in One” signifies, merely in the manner of *ōsō*, a unity within the One of Many, it cannot express the dynamic mode of continuity and motion. [502] When the One, at the same time, mediates itself in the Many as its negation, when there is the *gensō* direction that descends to the Many and these two opposite directions are negatively unified, only then could the “Many in One” signify a concrete, dynamic mode of continuity. This is already a dialectical, negative unification of continuity and discontinuity. As I have already pointed out, Cohen’s differential continuity must, in fact, presuppose the negation on its other side. Still, even Bergson’s view of continuity cannot make the continuity of intuition manifest for-itself without taking the discontinuity of intelligence⁸⁸—which, belonging to the standpoint of behavior, is conceived as though it were an abstract restriction on continuity—to be intuition’s negative mediator, which is a fact that is easily recognizable as a particular instance of dialectical criticism against his intuitionism overall. Since the continuity of non-dialectical intuition cannot mediate discontinuity toward itself, the former, by negatively opposing the latter, cannot avoid breaking its own continuity. The continuity of intuition, in other words, does not go beyond what I mean by the continuous substratum, which is, indeed, none other than absolute disruption. It is precisely for this reason that we can consider continuity to have infinite divisibility. Where this intuitive continuity is negatively affirmed and mediated with the series of Individuals who are thought to be discontinuous, we have true continuity: the genus whole. Within this whole, the continuity of intuition is turned into discontinuity, the discontinuity of the series, at the same time, is turned into continuity by its absolute negative subjectivation, and continuity and discontinuity are negatively mediated and unified. Due to the content of all of these concepts’ possession of a negative twofoldness, it is between them that a mutual turnover and mediation is conducted. When a series is objectively fixed, it becomes a discontinuity. Continuity is established for-itself only in a self-contradictory series’s subjective act of generation, a series incessantly renewed through the mediation of the substratum’s

88. 知性.

self-negation. It would seem that the continuum theory of intuitionism intends to axiomatize this dialectical state of affairs. The foundations of mathematics are still under construction today and predicting what form they will take is ultimately not something in my capacity. Still, I believe that the key to understanding concrete continuity is to think of the self-negativity of intuitive continuity in terms of its twofold oppositionality and to take this as the mediator of the negative mutual correspondence between the Individual and the Whole.

VI

[503] The unification of continuity is the negative mutual accordance of the Individual and the Whole, and that which negatively mediates this, the absolute opposition of the Species's self-negation, serves as the substratum. At first glance, the substratum might seem to be an immediate unity; however, since the substratum, in its immediacy, is the self-alienation and self-negation of absolute mediation, even its unity, as something merely in-itself, is not mediated with opposition and is simply an immediate unity opposed to opposition; thus, the substratum itself falls into opposition: it is, in fact, not unification but turns into absolute disruption and opposition. In order for this unification to become self-aware and be restored for-itself, the unity that is self-alienated and has fallen into precisely the oppositional mode, the unity that is not unification, but is no more than a moment of opposition, is, on the one hand, to be restored and realized as the Whole, and, at the same time, this moment that was, until now, merely that of opposition and difference toward the unity within self-alienation comes to serve as the main element and activating point of the Whole, namely, the Individual who opposes the Whole within the Whole, who is what simultaneously opposes the Whole and is within the Whole. It must be said that this negative mutual accordance of the Whole and the Individual is, as such, discontinuous, on account of its negative oppositionality. Continuity in classical set theory goes no further than this. The continuity constructed from the standpoint of identity logic, which relies on the concept of limit, is ultimately never to reach dialectical continuity. Indeed, when seen from the dialectical perspective, it is a discontinuity. No matter how one is to conceive of a series of elements that approaches *ad infinitum*, it

remains merely an approach, and does not become continuity. Between the limit and the elements, and therefore even between every element in a series wherein any element has become the limit, there is always an opposition that quantitatively approaches infinity and, at the same time, qualitatively, parted by negation, can never be overcome. This is why continuity in such classical set theory is none other than discontinuity. Alternatively, to make this continuous, one could use the concept of “Many in One,” but, insofar as this already implies the unification of the contradiction between the one and the many, this is a concept that can only be thought of dialectically. Otherwise, even if one goes further and thinks this dialectically, as long as it immediately takes Nothingness as its mediator, it merely stops at the so-called “continuity of discontinuity”; since it lacks the immediate unity of the absolute opposition, the substratum of continuity, it cannot reach true continuity. [504] True continuity must be something that takes as its substratum the immediate unity within the self-negation of this absolute opposition; and, made taught by the tension of forces in the absolute opposition between this opposition and unity, it is what absolutely negatively subjectivizes the series’ constitution as a discontinuous continuity. This is why I have said that true continuity is only established subjectively. Yet, this is none other than the subjective act of negation-*sive*-affirmation, which takes as its moment the series’ discontinuity that was thought to be continuity by classical set theory, and ceaselessly renews the mutual accord of the Whole and the Individual; thus, it goes without saying, it takes as its moment, and indeed as its mediator, the objective series’ continuity that pertains to classical set theory. This is why even the continuity theory of intuitionism in mathematics posits axiomatically what corresponds to the continuity axiom of classical set theory. In common with this is the correspondence principle of quantum theory accepting classical mechanics as a mediate branch; and these are all no more than examples of the fact that the identity logic of the understanding, as a negative moment, must serve as the mediator for the dialectic of reason. This is because the subject takes the object as its mediator, and the former is established only in the negation-*sive*-affirmation of the latter. That being said, what I call “negation-*sive*-affirmation” cannot be a heterochronous succession of affirmation and negation, as it is understood from a non-dialectical viewpoint. Such an interpretation is none other than a distortion that forcefully crams dialectic into an entirely non-dialectical

identity logic. Arguing that the turnover of dialectical negation-*sive*-affirmation is only conducted between what is heterochronous and successive is equivalent to denying dialectic completely. This is precisely the result of fitting everything into contemplative identity while entirely ignoring action. How can the concept of continuity, the “Many in One,” be established from such a standpoint? If the one and its negation, the many, are heterochronously successive, how could there be a “Many in One”? There is no fathoming how continuity and motion are to be understood by these means. Was Bergson’s description of “continuity” as “interpenetration,” “permeation,” and so forth, not meant to reject the so-called heterochronously successive relationship and instead acknowledge the unity of the contradictions that are, from the standpoint of identity logic, taken as synchronously simultaneous? The motion of walking is continuous as long as the left foot’s arrival at the ground and the right foot’s separation from the ground are synchronous. If this were to be heterochronously successive, then it would not be the continuous walking motion. For those who have themselves tried walking, this is an undoubtable fact. True continuity involves, not the synchronicity that Bergson interprets as spatiality, but true synchronicity as the mediator of successiveness, which is none other than the synchronous oppositional unification of affirmation and negation. [505] Dialectic is the logic that thinks this synchronic turnover of affirmation and negation in action. The referent is returned to Nothingness by the synchronicity of affirmation and negation; the act liberated from the binds of the referent turns freely from affirmation to negation and turns, at the same time, from negation to affirmation; and in the act of absolute negation, both are unified by freely exchanging positions—this is precisely negative turnover and mediation. If one takes this to be impossible and thinks of unity objectively (*simpliciter*), in terms of, say, a systematic Nothingness that embraces affirmation and negation, thereby taking this unity to be the statically unified substratum of continuity, then, since such a thing does not mediate between itself and the dynamic continuity of actuality, this unity could only be a noumenalistic Idea that offers no passageway for us. Being, in this case, is a hypostatization of the concept of unity that embraces contradictions. It is this noumenalistic reification of Nothingness that this identity logic calls embracement. This is the reverse side of the reification of Nothingness through mystical intuition. Needless to say, the distance of both from dialectic is great. Each is the result of a

lack of self-awareness in the lived experience⁸⁹ of action, pertaining to the self-negation of the dialectical substratum and the mutual accordance of the Whole and the Individual through that substratum's mediation.

On the contrary, from the standpoint of action, the turnover within the absolute negative unification of affirmation and negation is evident and undoubtable. Since action is unification in Nothingness, it is incompatible with contemplative identity, which does not itself partake in the work of negation. That is why, from such a standpoint, action can only be ignored or distorted. Bergson might have denied the nothing because, from the standpoint of contemplation, Nothingness is originally Being that is mediated as the consciousness of a lack of Being. On the contrary, in action, Nothingness is the subject's fundamental principle. Yet, since it is the subject's principle, Nothingness lies precisely in the work of negation. This is why I reject the intuition of absolute Nothingness from the start and take the action of absolute negation's turnover to be the foundation distinctive to dialectic. On this foundation, continuity takes place within the structure described above. For me as well, being that is most concrete must be continuity. However, as just mentioned, this is a dialectical state of affairs, one established by taking up the standpoint of thoroughgoing dialectical action, which excludes any intuitive and noumenalistic contemplating of the continuity of discontinuity and the continuity of continuity. [506] Thus, on this standpoint, there is no thinking, as in the method of limit, that individuals are limit elements that can never attain actuality. That, in the first instance, the limit remains the unattainable goal that the series approaches is because the limit signifies the Whole, which is in negative mutual accordance with the series of Individuals. Yet, with regard to action, the Individual is, rather, in mutual accordance with the Whole. Ever independent and having their own meanings, the two oppose one another; and yet, also presupposing each other, they mutually accord by each taking the other as a negative mediator. As an element of the Whole, the Individual is ever opposed to and yet still unified with it. The limit quantifies this negative unification, and while reaching the limit is the meaning of the series's development, the limit cannot be reached, and so is thought to be a goal to be infinitely approached. The meaning of the series' development contains a contradiction that, we must say, is dif-

89. 体験.

ficult to cover up. Just as the differential turned out to be a concept of Being that presupposes negation and tries to approximate this Nothingness, the limit is a concept of identity that presupposes a negative unification that it tries to approximate. Since the limit contains a contradiction, it refuses the arrival of identity. Yet, in fact, since the limit presupposes the unification of contradiction, identity is approximated as closely as possible. The contradictoriness here becomes even more evident when considering the continuous series whereby each element is considered a limit: for the series that defines the limit is not univocally fixed, but considered arbitrarily, and in order to define one limit an infinitely many different series can be taken, so that approximation loses a constant meaning; in fact, the limit is not univocally posited but has lost its fixed point and oscillates with the differences of the series that define it. As a result, there appears a negation of identity, as claimed by the intuitionist theory of continuity, and it becomes impossible to cover up the fact that the elements of continuity become a unification of contradictions. The denial of the law of excluded middle, which is the characteristic of this standpoint, is a result of this as well. The Individual, just as said before, is being that is contradictory and negative, being that finds itself in losing itself. If fixed as being, it serves, not as an Individual, but as a Species, so, in addition, it must negate itself and turn to the absolute negation of action. Moreover, this action of turnover aims at unification and posits the being of the Individual. Accordingly, the Individual is the acting subject of a turnover between Being and Nothingness; it *is* in its being nothing, and *is not* in its being. Therefore, the Genus, as its whole, likewise only has being subjectively. If it is objectified (simpliciter), it degenerates into a Species. The anti-subjectivity of the Species is recognized as the objective (simpliciter)] being of the Species, which, in the acting dialectic, is none other than the self-alienation of unification. [507] Insofar as this self-alienation is negatively mediated and subjectified, it is an object as a moment of the subject; when it is alienated from and opposed to the subject, it becomes an object simpliciter. In this sense, the Species is said to be an object (simpliciter), but as long as the unification of the Genus as the subjectification of the Species is opposed to the Individual as the subjective activating point, the Species serves an object. The unification of the Genus (the actual objective world) is subjectified in accord with the Individual's actions and objectivated in accord with the Species as object (simpliciter). This negative unification of

subject and object is the being of the Genus. Accordingly, when the Genus is subjectified by the Individual's actions it has being; at the same time, the Genus serves as an object when it is mediated by the Species as object (*simpliciter*) and opposes the Individual; if this opposition negates unification, then subjectivity is lost and both Genus and Individual degenerate into Species. Continuity is a harmony and unification made taught by tension, and when that unification is broken, it changes into a conflict of forces. This conflict, however, accords with an immediate unity, which is a continuity that is intuitive. A whole that lacks this negative mediator is nothing besides an abstract idea that is constituted by a discontinuous identity.

What carries out actions are individuals, and the Genus cannot be said to carry out actions immediately. Rather, as just shown, the Genus is the subjective actuality that is in mutual accord with the action of the Individual. The Individual is an element belonging to this unification and, at the same time, is the activating point that subjectively establishes it. Thus, the Genus cannot be established without being activated by the Individual. Furthermore, since it is through self-negation that the Individual becomes the acting subject, it unifies itself with the whole that is the Genus. The Individual is Individual only within the Whole. Moreover, what forms the Whole is precisely the Individual. The Genus would degenerate into the Species without the Individual's action of negative mediation. What mediates the Species with the Genus is none other than the action of the Individual. The wholistic being of the Genus *negates-sive-affirms* the materiality of the Species by taking it as mediator and mutually accords with the spirit of the Individual by taking the Individual's action as mediator. This basic state of affairs, whereby the absolute negative synthesis of matter and spirit is established through the mediation of action, is based on the logic described above. The Genus is the whole that contains Individuals as its members and is, in turn, established by taking the action of the Individual to be its activating moment. Thus, the Genus is typically the state and, moreover, a humane State, in the sense explained earlier. We may say that it is rational actuality, in the sense that it unites the rational and the actual. Since the state is thereby the sublation of the species particular within the universality of humankind, the state itself turns out to be an individual. [508] Inwardly, the state embraces individual people as the whole; outwardly, it is itself an individual: Genus and Individual are in a twofold mutual accor-

dance. Thus, the Genus is the actual world that is in twofold mutual accordance with Individual. In the sense just explained, it is the being of the spiritual subject that takes matter as its negative mediator. Actuality is the being of Species-*sive*-Genus and mutually accords, oppositionally, with the action of the Individual. The achievement of the acting turnover of the substratum-*sive*-subject is the actual world. The reverse side is, however, none other than the alienated object (*simpliciter*) or objective reality. This may be called the material world of Species. Incidentally, while, as just mentioned, the Individual's action mediates the turnover and mutual accordance of the Genus and Species, since the Individual has being in its non-being, as I have frequently said, it is, from the standpoint of being, on the one hand, the basis and axis of all being, just as the so-called "existential ontology" advocates itself as fundamental ontology. Yet, on the other hand, because the Individual is the activating point of subjectivity, which negates and sublates objectivity (*simpliciter*), its own being cannot be grasped objectively at all. As a result, for the standpoint of contemplation, which either neglects or avoids its own acting work, the being of the Individual is the most difficult to grasp and ultimately falls out of sight, being brought into an utterly immediate union with the whole that is the Genus. Consequently, the negative mutual accordance of Species and Genus dilutes the Individual's action, which served as negative mediator, and approaches immediacy. And that is what life⁹⁰ is. When life is thought as though it were the subjectification of the Species itself, and the Genus, as life's immediate for-itself mode, thereby takes the shape of expression, we can understand this to be ultimately due to such dilution of the Individual and abstraction of action. This holds for expressive being, as the abstract moment of the actual world; it also holds objectively for the world of living⁹¹ things, as a stage in the world of the referents of cognition. When the expressive world is considered in this way, it is an abstraction of the actual world and cannot be said to be the concrete being of the actual world. Although interpreting the actual world in this way is an extremely prevalent tendency today, doing so is just the result of ignoring or disregarding the action of the Individual. In such cases, the Individual is wholly submerged into the expressive world, and one is made to

90. 生命.

91. 生物界.

forget that the Individual is the activating core of that world's actualization. This is also why the individual person is reduced to mere being in the world. The self-awareness of the Individual in the world, its free decision, serves as the core or basis that subjectively makes the world have being, a point that even existential philosophy accepts; but, in this sense, it is thought, on the one hand, that the Individual stands out into the world, and the horizontal schema of standing outside itself establishes the world, and that, on the other, the transcendence of the world is derived from the transcendence of the self. [509] The individual person is not immediately a structural moment of the world but enters the world by negating itself within it. Being in the world and creating the world must mutually accord in and through their being simultaneously and negatively mediated. Yet, what truly serves as the grounds of transcendence is neither merely the world nor the self, but Nothingness as what negatively mediates both. Only through this acting turnover in Nothingness does the world shed the ideality of expressive being and acquire the reality of the actual world. The real subjectivity of this actual world, which is thereby simultaneously established, gives the actual world a symbolic character that cannot be established in a merely expressive world. Since expression has immediacy as its distinctive character, and does not take the action of the Individual to be a mediator, but mutually accords immediately with the for-itself, genus self-awareness of species life⁹², it does not allow for negation and interruption. This is why there is no transcendence in expression. Thus, absolute negation, the foundation of mutual accordance and turnover, is rendered immediate as Absolute Nothingness on the standpoint of expression. Moreover, because of its immediacy, it loses its absoluteness and forfeits its transcendence. When the absolute does not negatively possess mediation with the relative, and when transcendence does not negatively possess mediation with the immanent, there is nothing but for them to lose their absoluteness and transcendence. This kind of negative mediation, however, is impossible for the immediacy of expression. Only after arriving at the symbol does negative mediation become possible for-itself, and transcendence and absoluteness are brought out in full. Simply put, we should say that expression is ever the expression of life⁹³ as Being,

92. 生命.

93. 生.

and Nothingness serves, absolute negatively, as the symbol. The actual world indicates the transcending foundation of its absolute negation in its symbolic character. Even the expressive world must come to this point if it were to truly subjectify the Absolute Nothingness that is its ground. That fine art⁹⁴ is not exhausted merely in expression but must at the same time become a symbol is because fine art is not exhausted in the immediate expression of species life⁹⁵; it necessarily includes the actualization of the creative action of transcending absolute negation, which takes species life⁹⁶ as a negative mediator. It is for this reason that fine art is understood to be, not simply objective spirit, but absolute spirit. When the actual world is taken to be a merely expressive world, there is no room for the absolute negative actions of individual people. An explanation that exhausts the meaning of action in expression is a result of being ruled by the immediacy of life⁹⁷ and ignoring the negativity of action. Can the business⁹⁸ of state-building, which is the concrete configuration of action, be understood simply as an expression? [510] Such an understanding is nothing but an abstraction of Renaissance humanism, which is said to have considered even the state to be a work of fine art. The actuality of today does not permit such an interpretation. Action is a reformation of actuality that risks life and death. Accordingly, the actual world, as mediated by action, has an absoluteness that goes beyond life and death.

Where the actual world thus takes the negative mediation of action to be an indispensable moment, it necessarily takes logic to be the principle of its structure. There is no room for doubting that the structure of the actual that would unite with the rational has logic as its principle. Dialectic is the logic of actuality. Action is precisely what realizes logic in being. If one were to say, by contrast, that being goes beyond logic, and that logic is not the structural principle of being, but being is the basis of logic, then the logic meant by this could not be the logic of dialectic. It would just be identity logic. Even if this waves the banner of dialectic, as a matter of fact, it understands logic in the

94. 芸術.

95. 生命.

96. 生命.

97. 生の.

98. 業.

manner of identity and thus interprets being, not as the actual world mediated by action, but as an immediate, expressive world. The expressive world takes place as the immediate mutual correspondence of Species and Genus; consequently, it dilutes and abstracts the negative mediation of the Individual's action and does not contain, for-itself, the logical structure of such action. To that extent, the expressive world does not appear to take logic as its principle. Yet, it should be clear from what has so far been explained, that the expressive world is none other than an abstraction of acting actuality. From the standpoint of expression, actuality is not exhaustively interpreted. Expressions do not kill people; actuality does. Since the Species is immediately generified in the former, the destructive power of its absolute disruption has already lost its material force and become idealized; by contrast, this force is preserved in the latter, and so only an action that risks death can turn the Species into an absolutely negative unification. Moreover, it is on the basis of there being such actuality that expression can be performed. If no real unification of actuality takes place, then the immediate and ideal unity of expression is directly destroyed, which would be evident were one to consider the relationship between culture and war. The reason that expression does not take action, and thus logic, to be necessary is because to abstract the negative mediation of precisely these from the actuality that presupposes them both and to think by way of one-sidedly plucking out the immediate unity of Species-Genus mutual accordance, is just what expression is. [511] Accordingly, when expression is considered from the standpoint of fundamental ontology, which does not stop at merely interpreting their meaning, but pursues in them some relation that touches being, then even expression will necessarily display its logicity and, in the structure of the so-called "limit situation," make manifest its relation to negation and turnover. This is clear evidence that existential philosophy must adopt dialectic as a principle of interpretation. Still, because this dialectic does not truly take up the standpoint of acting actuality, it becomes an interpreted dialectic and a logic immanent in phenomenology. If a logic is not actualized on the standpoint of action, if it does not touch matter as objective reality, and if it is not negatively mediated, then there is no reaching dialectic as the logic of concrete actuality. By contrast, to hold the expressive world to be pre-logical being is to ignore that world's establishment and the dialectical character of logic. Such are the standpoints of phenomenology and identity logic. Although

the intention of Kant's transcendental logic to mediate being and logic bore only the negative⁹⁹ results of the antinomies, even his logic denied being that is prior to logic and does not take logic as its principle. This is the truth of the transcendental doctrine, whose abandonment is not to be permitted, but rather demands to be further radicalized. Hegel's dialectic is none other than a result of such radicalization. Since dialectic is the logic of being, it needs to go beyond the identity of transcendental logic and be the logic of negation. To think after being by way of copying it, to think being as prior to logic, is formal logic, which is not even transcendental logic, to say nothing of dialectic. It is evident that such a logic cannot be the principle of being. Yet, this cannot deny dialectical logic's principle significance for being, a fact that should be clear and require no further explanation.

Yet, from what I have said before about the relation between the negativity of dialectic and differential Originary-Nothingness,¹⁰⁰ it should be equally clear that when I take logic to be the principle of being, this is not, as in Cohen's logic of the origin, to abstract only the logicity of being and understand only what is demanded from the standpoint of logic as something imposed on logic and, in that sense, given. In order to reify Nothingness as the origin of Being, one qualitatively lowers Being and leads it to the limit, the result of which is the differential. [512] Through this, the logic of the origin holds that the production of Being is performed in the manner of identity and does so without having either to think the Nothingness that contradicts Being or to fear falling into a dualism of Being and Nothingness. Accordingly, there is no room in the logic of the origin for an illogical intuition, one that negatively opposes logic, to have being. It is held that even the illogical is infinitesimally and differentially logical and so does not go outside the scope of the logical. The fact that non-Being, in this sense, is necessary for the establishment of finite Being means that non-logic, as differentially logical, is the productive principle of logic leading to logic's establishment. It must thus be evident that, between the logical and the illogical, there is no negative opposition but only continuity. As already explained above, such non-Being is fundamentally different in character from dialectical negation. In dialectic, on the contrary, what it takes as its principle

99. 消極的

100. The reference appears to be to Cohen's *Ursprungs-Nichts* in Cohen 1914.

is not the radicalizing of such identity but sheer negation or Nothingness. Appreciating the fact that the mutual negation of Being and Nothingness is not something that would permit their objective union but instead takes generation and corruption together in their mutual presupposition and mutual dependence, dialectic is throwing oneself into the contradiction and conflict¹⁰¹ that comprises the opposition and unification of Being and Nothingness; by making itself into this contradiction and conflict, dialectic slays them, and in this slaying, it enlivens them. The acting subjectification of Being and Nothingness's absolute negation is precisely that standpoint. With respect to this point, we must say that the usual explanation of dialectical opposition as, not contrary opposition, but contradictory opposition is insufficient: for insofar as contradictory opposition concerns objective being to the same extent as contrary opposition, as it has been understood since Aristotle, it is not the opposition that lies in dialectic. The opposition of dialectic is the opposition of Being and Nothingness that is involved in the subjectively negative act, which is the sheer opposition of affirmation and negation. The principle concern does not lie in objective opposition, whether contrary or contradictory. What is central is that it is the opposition within the subjectively negative act. At the limit wherein the mutual negation of this negative opposition reduces the objective referent to Nothingness, the act, in being completely liberated from the referent, freely goes to work with a subjectivized content, and the positivity¹⁰² of this act is absolute negation, which enlivens the referent by slaying it. Internecion among the referents is actively¹⁰³ enlivened as the act's subjective content, and the self-awareness of this killing-*sive*-enlivening in acting¹⁰⁴ experience is the ground of dialectic. This killing-*sive*-enlivening is, first and foremost, essentially killing and enlivening simultaneously and not a heterochronic succession. [513] This simultaneous turnover is what is referred to as "action" and "act." To take this to be a heterochronous succession is to replace the acts of

101. 葛藤.

102. 積極性.

103. 能動的.

104. 行的.

action¹⁰⁵ (*Akt*) with the acts of functions or activities¹⁰⁶ (*Funktion, Tätigkeit*). To do so, broadly speaking, is to biologize¹⁰⁷ action. This standpoint amounts to a loss of dialectic's logic and its replacement with phenomenology. Likewise, since dialectic takes up the standpoint of action and enlivens negation in the above sense, it goes without saying that dialectic must be fundamentally differentiated from the standpoint of the logic of origin, which abstracts action and permits Nothingness just to the extent that it is reified. The latter is not a logic of the subject, as is the former, but only a logic of the object. Those who either themselves wave the banner of dialectic or try to criticize it offer us an interpretation in which dialectic, just like the logic of the origin, takes in the merely logicalized side of illogical intuition as a given and renders into a mediator what is imposed on it and only to the extent demanded of by logical production. It is this that prevents me from holding back my astonishment. This sort of interpretation must be the result of a complete failure to understand what dialectical negation is about. If, as is so for this interpretation, the negative mediation of dialectical logic stops at what logic demands and can assimilate, then where could there be negative opposition? What can be assimilated is not a true, negative opponent.¹⁰⁸ It is not a Nothingness for Being. Even if provisionally and on the face of it, it is Nothingness, in truth, it is Being. Such a thing could by no means perform negation. Negation is literally killing. What can be assimilated cannot kill what assimilates it. And even if it did, who would demand their own killer? Is it not evident that the negative mediation of dialectic cannot be identified with Originary-Nothingness? It is my logic of Species that carries dialectic through to its end. As is evident, this is in a direction opposite to the logic of origin. That said, I not only frankly admit that I have stood under the influence of Hermann Cohen for a long time and have not easily shed his influence, even with regard to the interpretation of dialectic, but I further confess my admiration for this man as one who radicalizes the logical spirit. However, not only does the logic of Species have no resemblance to the logic of origin, but, as I have explained frequently above, it is also dia-

105. 行為作用.

106. 活動作用.

107. 生命化.

108. 对立者.

metrically opposed in its orientation. I cannot help but think that the above interpretations and criticisms are based on a complete lack of understanding for dialectic. [514] Yet, it cannot be helped that such a lack is inevitable for those who take their stand on contemplation and interpretation, those who do not experience¹⁰⁹ the negative mediation of action for themselves. Dialectic is not the logicalization of intuition, just as it is not the interpretation of expressive being: for each goes no further than the standpoint of identity, which is no more than the negative mediator of dialectic.

VII

Dialectic is neither a logic that emanates being nor one that produces being differentially. Instead, it is the logic of negative mediation that absolutely negates identity logic, takes as mediator the self-negating being that opposes this identity logic, and unites with self-negating being in the manner of action. Yet, since such being is also the negation and alienation of the logic of absolute mediation, it is said that logic is the principle of being and that there is no being that could be presupposed without mediation and prior to logic. What could it be to cognize being, such that it precedes logic? When it is said that logic must follow the facts, what is meant by “facts”? Is not such a claim a dogmatism that carelessly betrays the truth of critical philosophy? Where transcendental phenomenology begins and ends on the standpoint of identity, it does not escape the copy theory in its non-dialectical character. To speak of dialectic from such a standpoint is meaningless, because it takes up a standpoint on which dialectic is unnecessary from the beginning. For those who intuit and interpret, but do not act, dialectic is useless. In this way, since dialectic is the logic of action, it does not reveal its true significance to those who do not themselves take dialectic to be necessary and realize it in the manner of action. A dialectic seen is not a dialectic; for those who do not practice dialectic, dialectic has no being. To the extent that one merely interprets and criticizes it, dialectic has nowhere to be. As a matter of course, dialectic seems to be unnecessary and inadequate. Even so, the putative phenomena that phenomenology purports to intuit and

describe already contain logic in-itself. There can be no phenomena to be described after entirely abstracting away logic. Phenomena are none other than logic in the in-itself mode. Neither phenomena nor logic are to be induced from or grounded in the other; rather, with the one opposing the other, they negatively mediate each other. [515] Even in Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, there is no doubt that the two mutually accord as front and back. Natorp's remarks are, to that extent, correct. Needless to say, in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, its own relationship to logic is itself dialectical, as explained earlier. That, however, phenomena contain logic in-itself and take logic to be their principle does not mean that they emanate from or are produced by logic, a fact which should no longer bear repeating. Speaking from a dialectical standpoint, logic presupposes phenomena as what, in turn, negatively opposes it. Yet, since even this stated "presupposition" means being negatively mediated, at the same time, phenomena take logic as their principle as well. The alienness of phenomena for logic is, as already seen, precisely what I mean by the Species. The logic of Species in no way absorbs phenomena into logic, but rather grounds their negativity and oppositionality toward logic. That being said, to take phenomena to be referents of interpretation in a way completely separate from logic, and to take these as expressive being, is, as mentioned earlier, something that dialectical logic does not allow. Phenomena are the in-itself mode for logic's for-itself mode and take logic to be their structural principle. Thus, interpretation is mediated by logic. The fact that phenomena cannot be interpreted completely separate from logic does not concede to the impossibility of describing them as referents of intuition. As explained above, today's hermeneutic phenomenology employs dialectic in an immanent and ideal manner, and its so-called subject of existence minimally preserves the absolute negativity of action within the character of deciding oneself¹¹⁰. What would this mean if not that interpretation is mediated by logic? In that sense, we must say that logic is the principle of expressive being. There can be no more doubt that my standpoint, which insists on the pri-

110. 自己決断.

ority¹¹¹ of logic over intuition and expression, is a necessary consequence of acting dialectic.

Yet, there is a crucial difference between the stages where intuition is considered to be what is negatively opposed to logic and where expression is already contained in-itself within logic. This difference is revealed in the contrast between transcendental phenomenology, which understands phenomena to be referents of intuition and, completely adhering to the standpoint of identity, thereby cannot shed the dogmatism of copy theory, and hermeneutic phenomenology, which is dialectical in its structure. [516] If we go further and come to the phenomenology of spirit, the relationship to logic is itself logically mediated. This is why it may be understood as the most concrete stage of phenomenology. Intuition, as the alienation of logic, is said to be entirely of the Species. Even if the synthesis and unification of intuition are those of identity logic, its own logic is antinomic and disruptive. Intuition, as the negation of logic, goes no further than containing dialectic merely negatively and fruitlessly¹¹². By contrast, expressive being contains dialectic fruitfully¹¹³. Still, it must be said that for the reason that expressive being remains merely in the in-itself mode, in a thoroughgoing sense, it cannot avoid being a denial of logic. Nevertheless, it is no longer just a Species but an immediate mutual accordance of Genus and Species. Hence, one does not speak of the referents of intuition as “being,” and, strictly speaking, such referents go no further than content and are merely in the dynamic mode; even so, with regard to expression one speaks of the “world of expression” or “expressive being.” This is precisely because expression has the for-itself mode of Genus (the Whole) in its ground. Yet, because of its immediacy, expression is not yet self-aware of its mutual accordance with logic. This is the limitation of hermeneutics. In order to become self-aware of this mutual accordance, one must oneself advance to the standpoint of dialectical action, the result of which is none other than the standpoint of the phenomenology of spirit. We may say that, compared to the immediate mutual accordance of the Genus and Species, this standpoint is

111. プリウス viz. *prius* (Latin).

112. 消極的.

113. 積極的.

one where the Individual's acting mediality in the mediation of Genus–Individual–Species is rendered contemplative by sticking fast to the Genus. Alternatively, we can say that since the immediacy of expression is in opposition to logic, it is of the Species and comes close to intuition, whereas the phenomena of the phenomenology of spirit are of the Genera and come closer to actuality.

Yet, phenomena are content belonging to consciousness. Phenomena ultimately constitute no more than the conscious side of actuality. Actuality, at the same time, has a material side that goes beyond consciousness and negatively opposes spirit. Consciousness is none other than the self-aware mediating mode of spirit, which negatively mediates matter and restores unification. This is why, in this mode, everything is internalized into unification. Contrary to this, actuality is established on the standpoint of the real subject who mediates, through action, the alienation of matter that breaks such unification. Actuality, we must say, goes beyond phenomena. This is why I have previously taken the standpoint of the philosophy of law as the final, concrete form of Hegel's system, as what mediates phenomenology and logic. Actuality is social-historical actuality. The social-historical actuality is the concrete configuration of what I call genus society. [517] As the alienation of the Genus, the Species is material, but by being generified within absolute, negative unification, the Species' character as the substratum is preserved as a moment of the subject. Just as it is generified through the mediation of the Individual's action, it also becomes the bedrock of action and the substrate for the realization of individuality. This, what should be called "spiritualized matter," becomes the rational *dynamis* of spirit, the so-called *habitus* that Aristotle distinguished from the *dynamis* of mere matter. A *habitus* is necessarily mediated by social customs. Customs signify the Species' alienated Generality and, thereby, serve as the enduring substratum in actual society. To focus only on the turnover of action, that the present, insofar as it remains a discontinuous moment, has a generational extension, and that the mere site of the Individual's whereabouts serves as an extended region, is due to the Species' temporo-spatiality, through the co-mediation of time and space, shaping an enduring and regionally extended world. The historical sociality of actuality is grounded only on the substratum that is the Species. Now as mentioned above, history has

both an acting side, which is shaped practically, and an intellectual side, which is interpreted contemplatively. While the former side clearly divulges logic as the mediator of action, the latter side is mainly concerned with the character of expressions as the referents of interpretation, which corresponds to the fact that if we abstract action, actuality becomes the expressive world that is the immediate mutual accordance of Genus and Species. This is why it would look as though cognition of the actual world is to be exclusively the interpretation of expression and not logical. Yet as I mentioned at the beginning, my studies were driven primarily by practical motivations, and it is from there that they developed into logic. A natural result of this was the inevitable neglect of that side concerned with the interpretation of expression. This is also why the theme has been social ontology, and, heretofore, I have not once espoused a philosophy of history. Consequently, I have invited the misunderstanding which takes me to believe that even the historical world can be understood by logic alone. As stated before, I am, first and foremost, a believer in the priority of logic. Yet, as explained in detail above, this does not signify an emanation or production by way of identity logic. I have not once thought or stated anything to the effect that the historical world could be deduced logically. To interpret me this way is simply the result of the interpreter's failure to grasp logic dialectically. Instead, the logic of dialectic requires the alienated side of actuality as its negative mediator, which, as already seen, corresponds to the immediate mutual accordance of Genus and Species. [518] Still, on account of my research motivations and, therefore, the limitations of my problematic that were set by such motivations, it was a matter of course that I could not treat the expressive world of history. Of course, I do not believe there to be any concealing that a powerful cause of this was the fact that the paucity of my sense of history and the intensity of my logical demands conspired, without due conscientiousness, to make my social ontology inappropriately ahistorical and schematic. This is a complete flaw of my studies. Yet, if one were to thereby disagree with me, wielding the reason that interpretation of the expressions of the historical world precedes and is unrelated to logic, I think that would be a similar one-sided bias and no more than a plain abstraction. Without the interdependence of logic and interpretation, the cognition of history cannot take place. Likewise, if logic and expres-

sive being are not mediated in action, the actual world, that is, the concrete mediating mode of Genus–Individual–Species, would not be established. The acting establishment of the historical world needs logic as a mediator, just as historical being needs the mediation of logic. That my logic of Species has not been rendered fully concrete apropos history must be clearly distinguished from the claim that the logic of Species does not need history or that it does not have sufficient utility for history. On the contrary, I cannot help but think that the clarification of history’s material substratum can only be achieved by logic and not at all by the mere interpretation of expressions. Expression is, as I have been repeating, the immediate mutual accordance of Genus and Species. Thus in expression, the moment referred to as “matter” does not have its unique meaning brought fully into play. What we have is the so-called “superstructural world,” in which everything is made into an expression and idea. For this reason it is taken to be a referent of interpretation. In that case, the Species remains only immediately generified and does not, as the alienation of the Genus, bring its own negativity fully into play. Yet, there can be no doubt that where this Species is the so-called “sub-structure,” it negatively mediates the Genus of the expressive world. With regard, in particular, to today’s period of historical change, the very fact that the elevation of spirit is so often emphasized is itself a sign indicating that the disruptiveness of the material moment is increasing its power to break the unity of spirit. This ironic truth exhibits the importance that the alienating character of the Species has for history. Since alienation belongs particularly to the species substratum, it cannot serve as an expression; instead, it is the negation of expression’s Generality. Accordingly, just as natural matter is a referent of natural science, the cognition of alienation is the lawful cognition of its referent as “social matter.” [519] It must be evident that, for this, logic is the essential method and that there is little room for the interpretation of expression to work. One cannot deny that, in this case, the logic of Species possesses a capacity beyond the reach of the interpretation of expression. I myself acknowledge that, for instance, the logic of land occupation explained in “The Social-ontological Structure of Logic”¹¹⁴ is but one part of the story, and that this too

114. 『論理の社会存在論的構造』(1936); THZ 6: 299–366.

is biased toward logic and has a weak relation to historical actuality. Nevertheless, I believe that the authority¹¹⁵ of logic must be fully admitted within the substructure of this social substratum. Setting aside the logical structure of the material substratum, the theoretical and scientific side of history cannot stand. For one to avoid being used by materialism, and to instead make use of scientific theory, is of particular necessity today. To what does this speak, if not to the vital importance of logic for both the theoretical and practical sides of history, an importance no way inferior to the interpretation of expression? The logic of Species deserves acknowledgement for upholding the thoroughgoing significance of the absolute dialectic that is self-aware of the truth and limitations of the materialistic dialectic just as much as those of the idealistic dialectic.

The negative mediality of historical actuality for the logic of Species is as has been clarified above. I am determined to pursue further studies in this direction as far as my abilities permit. Still, that does not mean that I intend to study the philosophy of history from a standpoint of the interpretation of expression that parts with logic. Instead, it signifies a historical-philosophical study of actuality that is in mutual accordance with logic. And since actuality is being that is practically mediating, the priority of logic over being in the structure of actuality cannot be denied. Mere being is none other than the alienated side of action, and the interpretation of its expression belongs to the negative side of acting mediation. This is why logic, as the principle of mediation, is said to be what defines being. Yet, the mediation and unification of this logic is neither the absolute Nothingness that emanates being nor the original Nothingness that produces being. Such absolute unity, even when it is referred to as Nothingness, finally amounts to Being. For, as is an absolute unity that embraces the dynamic mode of actuality, it is either the noumenalistic hypostatization of concepts or the immediate content of mystical intuition. To call something that is beyond mediation, and so unmediated, by the name of Nothingness is impermissible, for this name is only valid in the sense of absolute negation. Legitimately speaking, such standpoints are not to be called dialectical. [520] This is because one either noumenalistically hypostasizes identity logic and denies dia-

115. 権能.

lectic or, in mystical intuition, transcends dialectic. As a matter of fact, these two always mutually accord, as front and back. The unification of dialectic takes place through action, in mutual accord with actuality, and at each instance of the present; since to transcend dialectic is to integrally totalize and eternalize this, this absolute unity of eternity (the Transcendent) comes to be unmediated by dialectic. To that extent, this amounts to a denial of dialectic, taken to be the standpoint of absolute mediation. Since dialectic is the mediation and unification of negation and so is itself a logic of self-transcendence, to transcend dialectic ultimately results in denying dialectic. Due to its lack of mediation, what transcends dialectic (the Transcendent) is no longer entirely subjective and, though it is said to be the union of subject and object,¹¹⁶ it in fact bears objectivity (simpliciter) in its transcendence. The fact that mystical intuition is often accompanied by physical euphoria is evidence of this. Even if this is acceptable as an artistic standpoint, it is undeniable that in actual, practical life¹¹⁷, it is something close to decadence, which could in no way be regarded as normal. That such thinking appears most frequently in historical crises under the name of religion and blunts the normality of practice must be said to be a matter that demands alarm. This is what ultimately destroys the meaning of history. Dialectic, as the logic of historical actuality, should remain throughout on the standpoint of action. Legitimately speaking, no system that merely embraces dialectic ought to be. Since dialectic establishes a system negatively, the formation of a system is in mutual accord with the negation of the system, just as the Individual is in mutual accord with the Whole and yet negatively establishes the Whole. Where the Whole contains the Individual, not through negative mediation, but in an unmediated manner, the Individual vanishes, and the Whole thereby also loses its significance as the Whole. The absolute unity of a trans-dialectical embracement could be compared to such a vacuous Whole. This is why I call it a noumenalistic hypostatization of concepts, which is, after all, none other than a denial of dialectic. Contrary to this, dialectic gives testimony to the self in action. Since dialectic is the transformation of negation into affirma-

116. 主客.

117. 実践生活.

tion, it always goes beyond the self and returns to the self, is always on the way and never leaves home, and at the same time, leaves home without ever being on the way. If one tries to comprehend that which is “bright and vigorous” but “leaves no traces” within something like the “place of Nothingness,” one will never be able to avoid the situation where “the more you chase it the farther away it goes, and the more you seek it the more it turns away.”¹¹⁸ [521] Since philosophy is a relative-*sive*-absolute standpoint, it is the love of wisdom (*philosophia*). This is why its method is dialectic. To try to make philosophy into a knowing of merely the Absolute is just to deny philosophy. Philosophy must begin and end in self-awareness on the standpoint of the historical practice that forms actuality. Therefore, dialectic has both an ethical and logical significance. As mentioned earlier, logic was at the same time ethics in Platonism. The logic of actuality is none other than the ethics of praxis. Logic lies in the direction by which the mediality of the acting formation of history is made thoroughly self-aware and organized; ethics lies on the side that guides the action of mediation. Logic, history, and ethics are mutually mediated. Even Dilthey’s argument, that theory, history, and policy mutually accord within the human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*), ultimately remains within these bounds. It is easy to discern that there is a reason that, with respect to their main characteristics, these three are equivalent to the three moments of Genus, Species, and Individual. To think it is possible to argue for ethics without logic is no more than the prejudice of hermeneutics. As already explained above, not only is the standpoint of interpretation, in fact, in mutual accord with logic but also the ethical definition of the existence it treats depends on the logic of negation. How could mere existence, with neither action nor praxis, mediate into historical actuality the self-decision of its contentless being? There can legitimately be no ethics on a merely interpretive standpoint. Without logic, there is no way for history and ethics to be mediated. In this sense, the logic of Species must be the logic of historical actuality as well as the logic of ethics. It is to be plainly acknowledged that the logic of Species should satisfy, in a unified manner, both the practical and logical motivations of my research.

118. KIRCHNER 2009, 14; translation modified.

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