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On “Consciousness in General”

Tanabe Hajime 田辺 元

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Translators' Introduction

Tanabe's essay on consciousness in general presents the translator with a number of difficulties. As Japanese philosophical vocabulary was coming of age in the 1910s, frequent adjustments were needed. For instance, three years prior to the publication of this text, Tanabe still spoke of 不許不, whereas here he prefers to translate *Sollen* as 当為. The term for *Vorstellung* changes around the same time from 写像 to 表象. Some words thus fall out of use, while others—more problematically—remain in use to this day, their meaning having however undergone changes in nuance that are not insignificant to the interpretation of the text. To make matters worse, Tanabe makes extensive use of such terms as それ, これ, 前者, 後者 (that, this, the former, the latter) without any clear referent. A direct passage from Japanese to English would therefore force us, as Ortega y Gasset puts it in a different context, to leave a large part of the author's luggage behind in customs. Tanabe himself has however provided us with means for a safer passage through German territory: seeking to ponder in Japanese problems that he encounters with Kant, Rickert, Husserl and many other Germans and Austrians in their native tongue, Tanabe often translates or paraphrases these thinkers in his texts. This often gives us a clear indication of the German terms hiding behind the kanji compounds used by Tanabe and can thus help bring his vocabulary into focus, allowing us, as with an old photo, to revive the colors of the text with some accuracy. This is why we have extensively quoted the German texts to which Tanabe refers. For instance, one might expect to find 予想 rendered as “anticipation” or “expectation,” but the word is generally to be understood rather as *Voraussetzung*, i.e., “presupposition” or “precondition”; one might expect “relation” for 關係, but as the author repeatedly translates *Zusammenhang* by this term, “connection” or “interconnection”

is in many instances a more precise option; the dictionary equivalent of 組織 is “organize,” but Tanabe uses the term more broadly, rendering for instance *aufbauen*, *zusammenfügen*, and it is thus perhaps more faithfully grasped by the term “articulation” or “to articulate.”

We have also tried to preserve the clear distinctions found in Japanese and the corresponding German terms, but are problematic in English: this is the case, for instance, with 対象 and 客観 which generally correspond, respectively, to *Gegenstand* and *Objekt*,¹ both having the single term “object” as their equivalent in English. But the distinction is by no means insignificant in Tanabe’s early work; 対象, *Gegenstand*, is, as he made clear in his very first article, the object *as it stands opposed to us*,² whereas 客観 is independent of the subject. The present text likewise distinguishes between these two terms (namely in the discussion of Rickert), and we have thus distinguished them throughout by hyphenating the former: *ob-ject*, in order to underscore the oppositional character it implies. In a like manner, we find in Tanabe two terms for *determination* or *determinate*: 規定 and 限定. The distinction is not clearly reflected in German, as both terms are used for *Bestimmung* (the former occasionally for *Formulierung*, *Determination*). Nevertheless, the latter term has the distinct connotation of *delimitation*, of positing (定) a limit (限), and we have thus, here as well, hyphenated the term by which it is generally rendered: *de-termination*, thus drawing attention to this “negative” meaning, as “term” indeed conveys the sense of an “end” or “limit.” The universal delimits itself when particularized, red in general becoming this determinate nuance of red, for instance, or consciousness in general is delimited to/de-termined as the individual consciousness.

The terms 現実 and 実在, which both mean *reality* in daily Japanese, pose a particular difficulty. They are generally taken to correspond to the German terms *Wirklichkeit* and *Realität* respectively, which likewise simply mean *reality* in daily German, and are customarily artificially distinguished in the philosophical English vocabulary as “actuality” and “reality,” or, in the adjectival forms, “actual” (for *wirklich*) and “real” (for *real*). This English distinction aims to mirror the connotation of *having an effect* (*wirken*) of the former term. Three objections however present themselves in the case

1. Tanabe does occasionally translate *Objekt* to 対象, specifically in Kant. Cf. also THZ 2: 180.

2. TANABE 2021A, 228, 230.

of Tanabe's early texts: first, Tanabe does not clearly take over this distinction but often renders *Wirklichkeit* as 実在 and *real* as 現実. For instance, in the present text, Tanabe's expression 現実意識 (rendered as "actual consciousness") corresponds, in the chapter of Rickert's main work discussed here by the Japanese thinker, to *das reale erkennende Subjekt*—an expression quoted by Tanabe himself. Second, the connotation of *act* is absent from the Japanese 現実, which rather emphasizes the *present or phenomenal character* (現) of this aspect of reality or the real (実). Third, as Tanabe argues that 実在 (reality)—and not 現実—is *will* (and thus activity), the traditional rendering of *genjitsu* as *actuality* involves some risk of confusion of the conceptual intricacies of the text. We have nevertheless stayed true to common practice, while hoping that the present explanation suffices to safeguard the reader against these confusions.

表象 corresponds to *Vorstellung*, which is sometimes rendered as *representation* in English, and other times (namely in the phenomenological literature) as *presentation*, in order to distinguish it from *Repräsentation*—a term which Tanabe, in certain texts, renders as 表現.³ As Tanabe writes in a broader context of not only Husserl's thought but also Rickert's and Kant's, and as 表象 can hardly be rendered as *presentation* without unduly introducing a connotation of presence (現) which rather pertains to 表現—表象 being distinguished by a connotation of image (象)—we have here opted for translating the term as *representation*. The frequent term 統一 corresponds to both *unity* and *unification* (in the present text, there are places where it explicitly translates *Einheit* others where it translates *Synthesis*), and it thus generally demands that the translator make a choice between the two.

As mentioned, Tanabe makes extensive use of such expressions as *sore*, *kore*, *ryōsha*, *zensha*, *kōsha*, the referents of which are often far from clear and unambiguous. We have in these instances filled in the gaps in square brackets, indicating the translators' interpretation. Tanabe rarely uses emphasis and never does so in this text; all italics are added by the translators where they may help clarify the text. Italics in German quotations in the footnotes are meant to emphasize parallels with Tanabe's text, often helping to disambiguate the sentence structure and terminology of the original.

3. Cf. for instance TANABE 2021B.

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Translated by Morten E. Jelby and Urai Satoshi

I

[299] Today, it is not necessary to explain once again that what made Kant’s Copernican revolution possible, was nothing other than the supra-individual I, which is the basis for the categorical synthesis, or what Kant himself called “consciousness in general.” He himself affirms that “the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point on which all activity of understanding, even all logic, and thus *Transzendental-Philosophie*, is suspended.”⁴ Indeed, this discovery—of this transcendental apperception, pure consciousness, universal self-consciousness (自意識), or of what, since the *Prolegomena*, Kant in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* called “consciousness in general”⁵—made it possible for him, on the one hand, to abandon the copy-theory, according to which the veracity of knowledge requires correspondence to the transcendent thing-in-itself; on the other hand, it allowed him to avoid falling into a subjective idealism or skepticism and being led to negate natural science. Undoubtedly, the core of critical philosophy is to be found in this concept. However, when it comes to the question of what this “consciousness in general” is, though it may seem clear at first glance, quite a few problems cannot be avoided. I would now like to consider, first, in the perspective of the spirit of critical philosophy, how we should understand this “consciousness in general”; guided by the results of this inquiry, I would further like to express, in brief terms, my own views relating to certain philosophical problems for which this concept

4. [Tanabe indicates: “*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Vorländers Ausgabe, 142, Anm.” Having been unable to find any edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* by Karl Vorländer, we give Tanabe’s references and indicate the corresponding reference in KANT 1990, as well as the original text in German: “Und so ist die synthetische Einheit der Apperzeption der höchste Punkt, an dem man allen Verstandesgebrauch, selbst die ganze Logik, und, nach ihr, die Transzendental-Philosophie heften muss, ja, dieses Vermögen ist der Verstand selbst.” KANT 1990, B 134. Eng. trans., 127, modified.]

5. *Prolegomena*, Reclam Ausgabe, 80. [KANT 1993, § 20 56]; *Kritik*, 149 [KANT 1990, B 143.]

is central. First, the fact that Kant himself takes “consciousness in general” to be the fundamental condition for the emergence of knowledge, can be summarily explained in the following manner. To begin with, as something combined in the ob-ject, the manifold of representations must have been combined by the subject beforehand.⁶ Whether it becomes conscious [to us] or not, it is only when there is such a subjective combination that the combination in an objective ob-ject becomes possible. What makes this subjective act of combination is none other than understanding. The categories are formal concepts that constitute the general criterion for understanding to produce such a combination. However, for the combination of understanding, the intuitive manifold to be combined needs something given that synthetically constitutes a unity. Otherwise, the combination would be entirely impossible. It is only when there is such a unity that the combination of understanding becomes possible. For this reason, this synthetic unity [300] becomes the fundamental condition for all categorial combinations of understanding, and consequently it further becomes the fundamental presupposition for all objective ob-jects to emerge. This so-called synthetic unity is precisely the transcendental unity of self-awareness (自覚). The self-awareness “I think” must necessarily be able to accompany all my representations. The identical self-awareness thus arises due to the fact that insofar as all representations become conscious to me they are synthetically unified in consciousness. Thus, presupposing this synthetic unity, understanding can also bring about their combination. The synthetic unity must therefore be a primordial unity which precedes all experience. This is what is referred to by transcendental unity of self-awareness, pure apperception, or original apperception. Taking the categories as its criteria, the manifold of representations, which is synthetically unified through this pure apperception, is further combined through the act of judgment of understanding, and thus the objective knowledge of “judgment of experience” (*Erfahrungsurteil*) arises. This consciousness of judgment in particular is what Kant called “consciousness in general.” For this reason, in the end, this is precisely the name given to the development of pure apperception in the act of judgment of understanding. “Ay, Kant himself affirms, this faculty (of transcendental unity of

6. [Cf. KANT 1990, B 130.]

apperception)⁷ is the understanding itself"⁸; from this standpoint, we interpret pure apperception and "consciousness in general" as one and the same thing, and it seems that we can take this to mean the general synthetic unity which is completed in the synthetic act of understanding.

If this is what pure apperception or "consciousness in general" is, then, needless to say, this cannot be the unity of actual empirical consciousness (現実の経験的意識), founded on what he calls the inner sense. The combination of the content of this empirical consciousness is the "perceptual judgment" (*Wahrnehmungsurteil*); this only expresses a relation to the individual consciousness of representation (*Bewußtsein in einem Subjekt*),⁹ and there is no room for speaking of a "consciousness in general" here. It is clear that this cannot provide a basis for objective knowledge. It is a necessary condition for objective knowledge to come about that pure apperception or the transcendental unity of self-awareness be independent of empirical apperception or empirical consciousness. However, what is, after all, a pure apperception which exists separate from empirical consciousness? Kant says that "*Das, Ich denke, drückt den Actus aus, mein Dasein zu bestimmen,*"¹⁰ [301] the "I think" immediately expresses my existence (存在). Thus, he considers that it must be possible, empirically speaking, for this representation, "I think," to accompany any given representation that becomes conscious to any given individual; but that formally speaking, since [this "I think"] is always identical, all representations (regardless of whether they actually pertain to an empirical consciousness or not) must be unified by an identical transcendental I. However, it is clear from Kant's explanations in the *Paralogismen* that this transcendental I cannot be a substance existing in reality (実在する) outside of the empirical and individual I, that it cannot be an "absolute subject" or a "real soul" (実在精神); needless to say, the transcendental I is incompatible with the critique of this manner of metaphysical

7. [Tanabe's explanation]

8. *Kritik*, 142, note. [KANT 1990, B 134, note. Eng. trans. 127.]

9. *Prolegomena*, 85 ["Consciousness in a subject." The entire passage is as follows: "Daher sind Urteile entweder bloß subjektiv, wenn Vorstellungen auf ein Bewußtsein in einem Subjekt allein bezogen und in ihm vereinigt werden; oder sie sind objektiv, wenn sie in einem Bewußtsein überhaupt, d.i. darin notwendig vereinigt werden." 3, §22, A 88.]

10. *Kritik*, 159, note. [KANT 1990, B 157. Eng. trans. 156: "The *I think* expresses the act of determining my own existence."]

interpretations. Even if we hypothetically allow the existence (存在) of this kind of supra-individual I, understood as a real soul, we are entirely bereft of any way of legitimately (正當に) knowing how empirical knowledge is established between this transcendent *Subjekt an sich*¹¹ and the so-called thing-in-itself or *Objekt an sich*. Therefore, this kind of interpretation can be of no use when it comes to giving a basis to empirical knowledge, which is the main purpose of the Critique. Such metaphysical interpretations of “consciousness in general” are entirely incompatible with the Critique, and of course Kant himself rejected them most forcefully and strove to eliminate this misunderstanding.

If this is so, how are we to understand the “consciousness in general” or the transcendental I, which on the one hand is independent of empirical consciousness, but on the other cannot be considered as transcending this empirical consciousness and existing in reality (実在す)? The answer to this question which most easily comes to mind, is the interpretation which takes “consciousness in general” to refer to a supra-individual function (*Funktion*) or organization (*Organisation*) which, while being immanent to empirical and individual consciousness, is nevertheless independent of the differences of individual consciousnesses. I believe this to be the interpretation adopted by Windelband in his *History of Modern Philosophy*. He seeks the ground of objectivity in “the acting (活らくこと) of a general organization in the deepest ground of the individual consciousness”¹² or in “a supra-individual function which is equally the ground of all individual acts of representation.”¹³ He understands this as the “consciousness in general,” and argues that “the deepest ground for this supra-individual organization is the pure self-awareness, which Kant called transcendental apperception.”¹⁴ This interpretation

11. [I.e., “subject in itself.”]

12. Windelband 1907, Vol 2, 78. [“Deshalb kann der Grund der Objektivität nur darin gesucht werden, daß im tiefsten Grunde des individuellen Bewußtseins eine allgemeine Organisation tätig ist...”]

13. *Ibid.* [“Das Gegenständliche also in unserem Denken beruht auf einer überindividuellen Funktion, welche gleichmäßig den Untergrund aller individuellen Vorstellungstätigkeit bildet, auf dem ‘Bewußtsein überhaupt.’”]

14. *Ibid.*, 79. [“Den tiefsten Grund jener überindividuellen Organisation bildet also dieses ‘reine Selbstbewußtsein’, das Kant mit dem Namen der ‘transzendentalen Apperzeption’ bezeichnet.”]

is indeed the most intelligible, and furthermore (as we shall explain below) we cannot deny that from a certain standpoint, a deep meaning can be attributed to it. However, [302] it is highly doubtful whether, after all, on the face of it, the meaning of this interpretation is directly in accordance with the spirit of the Critique. If a common and universal organization or function—which runs through many different individual empirical consciousnesses and acts in their deepest ground—exists factually, and if we were to say that through it a basis is given to empirical knowledge, then this is clearly a circular argument. For saying that a common and universal organization/function factually exists in the deepest ground of empirical consciousness can, as a [type of] factual knowledge (一の事実の認識), only be founded through “consciousness in general.” Does not Windelband’s interpretation, according to which “consciousness in general” is an organization/function that acts as the common ground in individual consciousness, go against the spirit of critical philosophy¹⁵ insofar as the latter requires a ground that legitimizes fact (権利の根拠)? Since “I become conscious of myself in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in general, i.e., in the synthetic original apperception,”¹⁶ Kant affirms that my existence is known (知られる)¹⁷ directly. Kant, who probably did not entirely liberate himself from psychologistic tendencies, perhaps did really understand “consciousness in general” in a manner close to Windelband’s more or less psychologistic interpretation. Nevertheless, I believe that it cannot be denied that the true spirit of his Critique must reject such a standpoint. How, then, should we interpret “consciousness in general” as to radicalize the true spirit of Kant?

The understanding of “consciousness in general” as a metaphysical real soul was already strongly rejected by Kant himself. And if, as we have just

15. [批判主義, i.e., *Kritizismus*, rendered throughout as “critical philosophy.”]

16. *Kritik*, 159. [“Dagegen bin ich mir meiner selbst in der transzendentalen Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen der Vorstellungen überhaupt, mithin in der synthetischen ursprünglichen Einheit der Apperzeption, bewusst, nicht wie ich mir erscheine, noch wie ich an mir selbst bin, sondern nur *dass* ich bin.” KANT 1990, B 157.]

17. [The Japanese allows for a variety of distinctions when speaking of “knowledge”: 認識, 知識 or, as here, simply 知る. Whereas 認識 (*Erkenntnis*) is directed at an object, Tanabe often uses the term 知る when speaking of pre-objective consciousness. The term sometimes appears as the translation of *kennen* (to be acquainted with) or simply *bewusstsein* (to be conscious of).]

mentioned, the interpretation according to which it would be a universal organization/function factually working as the common ground in empirical, individual consciousness, is, as a psychologism, contrary to the spirit of the Critique, then the only adequate meaning of “consciousness in general” (in accordance with the spirit of the Critique), does not express anything factually existing, whether immanently in actual consciousness or transcending actual consciousness. [On the contrary], as the norm of actual consciousness, it must express the form [of consciousness] that is to be realized (実現せらるべき). “Consciousness in general” or the supra-individual I is not a factually existing foundation of objective knowledge; as the fundamental condition for objective knowledge to come about, “consciousness in general” is a form that must be postulated (*postuliert*) and realized through actual consciousness insofar as objective knowledge emerges. What exists in actuality is only the empirical apperception of empirical consciousness; the pure apperception of transcendental consciousness is the criterium to which the empirical consciousness is to conform, if it is to be the subject of objective knowledge, [303] and is the general form that it must take. “Consciousness in general” does not exist as a psychological or metaphysical fact; as the fundamental condition or postulate (*Postulat*) for objective knowledge to arise, “consciousness in general” must logically speaking be the normative form of actual consciousness. Considered in the perspective of the true spirit of the Critique, this is the only interpretation that can be recognized as justified, and although Kant himself maintains a more or less psychologistic tendency, evidence that he understood pure apperception, or “consciousness in general,” in this manner, can be found in various places. Already in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he writes “this *Einheit der Regel* determines all the manifold, and limits it to conditions which render the unity of apperception possible”¹⁸; thus, he clearly states that the unity of this apperception is the *transzendente Bedingung*¹⁹ of the necessary combination of representations,²⁰ and in the *Prolegomena* he affirms that

18. *Kritik*, 708–9 [“Unity of the rule.” The original passage quoted reads as follows: “Diese *Einheit der Regel* bestimmt nun alles Mannigfaltige, und schränkt es auf Bedingungen ein, welche die Einheit der Apperception möglich machen....” KANT 1990, A 105; Eng. trans. 136.]

19. [I.e., transcendental condition.]

20. *Kritik*, 709 [KANT 1990, A 106; Eng. trans. 137–8.]

the judgment of experience “combines empirical consciousness of the intuitions (i.e. the materials of perceptual judgment)²¹ in the ‘consciousness in general’²²; and he points out that “consciousness in general” is merely the form of empirical consciousness. Furthermore, in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, this “consciousness in general” or pure apperception is more clearly shown to be the unity of the criteria to which the empirical consciousness must conform, and of the principles which it follows. Kant here clearly states that the unity of apperception is “the supreme *Grundsatz* of all human knowledge,”²³ and by saying that “the unification (統一) of apperception is intellectual and contained in the category entirely *a priori*,”²⁴ he expresses the fact that this principle arises in the unification of the categorial act of combination of understanding. He further indicates that “consciousness in general” “is not a representation distinguishing a particular object, but rather, insofar as representation is to be called knowledge, it is its *Form überhaupt*.”²⁵ What Schopenhauer calls “*muss-können*” is a *problematisch-apodiktische Enunziation*, and in the assertion that *Das Ich denke, muss alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können*²⁶ – of which he admitted that it gives with one hand and takes with the other²⁷ – only fully

21. [Tanabe’s explanation.]

22. *Prolegomena*, 80 [“Die gegebene Anschauung muss unter einem Begriff subsumiert werden, der die Form des Urteilens überhaupt in Ansehung der Anschauung bestimmt, *das empirische Bewußtsein der letzteren in einem Bewußtsein überhaupt verknüpft*, und dadurch den empirischen Urteilen Allgemeingültigkeit verschafft....” KANT 1993, § 20, A 82.]

23. [Kritik] 143 [Cf. KANT 1990, B 134–5: “Verbindung liegt aber nicht in den Gegenständen, und kann von ihnen nicht etwa durch Wahrnehmung entlehnt und in den Verstand dadurch allererst aufgenommen werden, sondern ist allein eine Verrichtung des Verstandes, der selbst nichts weiter ist, als das Vermögen, *a priori* zu verbinden, und das Mannigfaltige gegebener Vorstellungen unter Einheit der Apperzeption zu bringen, welcher Grundsatz der oberste im ganzen menschlichen Erkenntnis ist.” Eng. trans. 128.]

24. *Ibid.*, 165, note [KANT 1990, B 162, note: “... dass die Synthesis der Apprehension, welche empirisch ist, der *Synthesis der Apperzeption, welche intellektuell und gänzlich a priori in der Kategorie enthalten ist*, notwendig gemäss sein muss.” Eng. trans. 162 (modified).]

25. *Kritik*, 341 [KANT 1990, B 404: “... weil das Bewußtsein an sich nicht sowohl eine Vorstellung ist, die ein besonderes Objekt unterscheidet, sondern eine Form derselben überhaupt, sofern sie Erkenntnis genannt werden soll.” Eng. trans. 319 (modified).]

26. *Kritik*, 140 [KANT 1990, B131]

27. Schopenhauer, *Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Appendix: Kritik der Kantischen Philosophie, Reclams Ausgabe, 567.

reveals its true meaning when what is here called “I” (我) is, as “consciousness in general,” understood as the condition for objective knowledge to arise and as the form that must be realized by empirical consciousness. In this perspective, [304] we must say that Cohen’s insistence on the fact that pure apperception or “consciousness in general” is a necessary means to the purpose of objective knowledge,²⁸ fits well with the spirit of Criticism. [The same can be said for his assertion]²⁹ that rather than having the meaning of an absolute subject, the unity of apperception is to be found in the unity of acts as the highest principle of knowledge,³⁰ and for his interpretation of so-called *Selbstbewußtsein* as *Gesetz*.³¹ This is also what Professor Kuwaki points to when, in his lectures on Kant, he interprets “consciousness in general” as a general and common rule,³² and it can be considered as the most adequate expression of the spirit of the Critique. Furthermore, about a year after the publication of his above mentioned *History of modern philosophy* (1880), in his lecture “Immanuel Kant,” commemorating the centennial of the first edition of the *Critique* (1881), Windelband focused on the critical thought of the so-called teleological view (目的観批判的思想).³³ In his interpretation of “consciousness in general,” he entirely distanced himself from the above-mentioned psychologistic tendency, which was probably inherited from Lange, Liebmann and others, and he most clearly explained its normative character (規範性). He here takes the core of the *Deduktion* to consist in the concept of *Regel*,³⁴ understands thinking (思惟), which demands to be objective knowledge, as containing a combination of representations that wants to be not only the product of individual associations, but a *Regel* for all those who seek truth. And we cannot know whether this

28. COHEN 1907, 55. [“Das Ziel bildet also nicht sowohl das Selbstbewußtsein selbst, sondern der Gegenstand, für den jenes das unumgängliche Mittel ist.”]

29. [We have here cut the excessively long sentence in two for better readability. Hence the insertion.]

30. *Ibid.*, 56, 66 [56: “Es wird so außer Zweifel gestellt, daß die Einheit des Bewußtseins lediglich als Grundsatz aufgestellt wird, und nicht etwa als ein absolutes Subjekt.”]

31. *Ibid.*, 67. [*Selbstbewußtsein* as *Gesetz*: self-awareness as law.]

32. KUWAKI 1917, 121.

33. [“Immanuel Kant. Zur Säkularfeier seiner Philosophie. (Ein Vortrag 1881),” in Windelband 1915, 112–146.]

34. [I.e., rule.]

Regel pertains to the absolute “I” or not; we only know that in our own empirical consciousness, certain combinations of representations already take place in accordance with ideal criteria³⁵; this *Normalität*³⁶ is the foundation for universal validity, and truth is nothing else than the normativity of thinking.³⁷ The fact that, in his last book, *Introduction to philosophy*, he understood “consciousness in general” as a *Normalbewußtsein* which can relate to *Wert-an-sich*, no doubt expresses the same idea.³⁸ What Kant called the transcendental I or “consciousness in general” does therefore not refer to something that exists in actuality as a psychological or metaphysical fact; it must refer to the criterion which is to be recognized as a logical condition—or a postulate—for the emergence of objective knowledge, the unity of normative form to be realized through actual consciousness. This was established as the only justified interpretation from the point of view of the spirit of the Critique. Hegel too [305] regards the *Ich*—understood as *das*

35. [Ideal criteria: 当にあるべき規準.]

36. [*Normalität* is what Tanabe renders as 規範性, i.e., normative character or normativity, rather than what is “normal” (普通). This applies to *Normalbewusstsein* further down, too, which could be rendered as “norm-consciousness.”]

37. Windelband 1915, 134–138. [Cf. in particular 135: “Jedes Individuum ist imstande, die Elemente der Vorstellungstätigkeit in seiner Weise zu verbinden: aber nur Eine Anordnung derselben ist im einzelnen Fall richtig, d.h., nur eine hat den Wert, daß sie für alle Vorstellenden gelten sollte. Alles Denken, welches den Anspruch erhebt, Erkenntnis zu sein, enthält eine Vorstellungsverbindung, die nicht nur das Produkt individueller Assoziation, sondern eine Regel für alle diejenigen sein will, denen es um Wahrheit ihres Denken zu tun ist. Was also nach der gewöhnlichen Voraussetzung ein ‚Gegenstand‘ ist, der im Denken abgebildet werden soll, das ist in voraussetzungsloser Betrachtung eine Regel der Vorstellungsverknüpfung.]

38. Windelband, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 254. [WINDELBAND 1920, 255: “Wenn es unumgänglich erforderlich ist, von der Relativität in den individuellen Wertungen und in den Sitten der Völker zum Ergreifen absoluter Werte aufzusteigen, so scheint es nötig zu sein, über die historischen Formen des menschlichen Gesamtbewußtseins hinaus ein *Normalbewußtsein* zu denken, für welches diese Werte eben die Werte sind. Darin steckt ganz dieselbe Nötigung, der wir in der Erkenntnistheorie begegnen. Da es Gegenstände nur für ein vorstellendes und erkennendes Bewußtsein gibt, so wies der Gegenstand, der die Norm der Wahrheit bilden sollte, auf ein „Bewußtsein überhaupt“ als auf dasjenige hin, für das er Gegenstand sein sollte. Genau wie beim Ding-an-sich steht es bei dem Wert-an-sich. Wir müssen ihn suchen, um aus der Relativität des tatsächlichen Wertens herauszukommen, und da es Wert nur in Beziehung auf ein wertendes Bewußtsein gibt, so deutet auch der Wert-an-sich auf dasselbe Normalbewußtsein hin, das der Erkenntnistheorie als Korrelat zu dem Gegenstand-an-sich vorschwebt. In beiden Fällen aber ist diese Hindeutung höchstens ein *Postulat*, aber keine metaphysische Erkenntnis.”]

Denken als Subjekt—as a category,³⁹ but I believe that “consciousness in general” can be understood as the most universal and fundamental *a priori*—i.e., *das Apriori*—, which is the unifying root of all categories.

II

In the previous section, I arrived at the following conclusion: considered in the perspective of the spirit of Kant’s critical philosophy, “consciousness in general” must, as the general *Apriori* which is the fundamental condition for objective knowledge to come about, be a general normative form as opposed to actual consciousness. I believe that the true significance of Rickert’s theory of the subject of knowledge, which he set forth in his book *The Object of Knowledge*, also comes to light when considered in this perspective. As is generally known, he distinguished the following three types of opposition of subject and object. The first opposition takes all objects in the external world, except for my body, as objects, and takes my body and the soul (精神) that dwells within it as the subject. This is the so-called psycho-physical subject. However, since my body is no different from other objects in that it is an object opposed to my content of consciousness, it can be considered to belong among the objects; while all transcendent objects that oppose the content of my consciousness are thus considered as objects, my consciousness and its content can be considered as the subject. This is the second opposition, and this subject can be called a psychological such. However, since the [notion of a] transcendent object opposing the content of consciousness naturally becomes meaningless when the copy-theory⁴⁰ is rejected from the standpoint of critical philosophy, in the third place a standpoint arises where all content of consciousness is taken as object and where consciousness itself, in contrast, is taken as subject. This is the subject-object opposition that is to be adopted from the standpoint of idealism, and the subject understood in this manner is what can truly be called the subject of knowledge. In other words, what remains after all con-

39. HEGEL 1905, § 20, 56.

40. [The *Abbildtheorie* (模写説) is a general term for the epistemological approaches that take knowledge to consist in the correspondence between a subjective reproduction or copy and an external object.]

tent of consciousness is made to belong among the objects, and what can by no means become an object, is the subject of knowledge. However, since such a subject is already devoid of any determination of content, it cannot be called “my consciousness”: as it is entirely free from the limitations of the individual, it should simply be called a consciousness in general, and is nothing but a limit-concept. In the opposition of subject and object, we attain this Ideal (理念的) subject at the limit of expanding the extension of the object and contracting the extension of the subject. [306] Moreover, only when it is known to this subject does the content of knowledge become an object, and this subject is therefore indispensable to the theory of knowledge. This kind of consciousness—understood as an Idea (理念) or a limit-concept—is the fundamental condition for knowledge to come about. Now, since all objects corresponding to such a subject of knowledge are content of consciousness, their being-transcendent (超越性) cannot be other than the transcendence (超越) of meaning for actual consciousness. What posits this meaning through the acknowledgment of the transcendent ought is judgment. As long as we interpret knowledge as representation, its object inevitably becomes a transcendent reality, and this standpoint cannot escape the copy-theory. If we wish to break free from this [theory], we must cease to interpret knowledge as representation and instead interpret it as judgment. The meaning posited in judgment constitutes the objectivity of knowledge. As the object is the content of consciousness which possesses this meaning, the subject must be the consciousness of judgment that posits it. However, since this kind of judicative consciousness in general, as just stated, integrates all content of actual consciousness (現實的意識内容) into the object and posits this content as an object, it must—contrary to actual consciousness—be merely a formal Idea which seeks to be realized in this act of judgment. Thus, “consciousness in general”—which Rickert conceives, as we saw a moment ago, as the *Grenzbegriff*⁴¹ simply constituting the limit of the process of extensional expansion of the object and of extensional contraction of the subject—became the criterion (標準) for the truth-seeking individual consciousness, and the Idea which is partially realized to the extent that this individual consciousness—making judgments in accordance with the transcendent ought—has true knowledge. In the end, this [conscious-

41. [I.e., limit-concept.]

ness in general] is nothing more than the formal condition presupposed by the existence of meaning understood as a value-configuration (*Wertgebilde*). The reason why, when discussing the *fraglose Ja*⁴² in the third edition of *The Object of Knowledge*, Rickert considered—rather than an answer to a question or a solution to a doubt—the judgment which absolutely affirms meaningful content as pertaining to true “consciousness in general,” is that he wanted to free this judgment from the ontological content (存在的内容) that accompanies all individual acts of judgment.⁴³ Thus, he clearly shows that the unquestioning and affirming “consciousness in general” is the *Maßstab für das reale erkennende Subjekt*,⁴⁴ (i.e., the *Norm des Subjektverhaltens*)⁴⁵ and that to the theoretically questioning individual consciousness seeking truth, this consciousness in general “is the *Ideal des Subjekts* that no longer seeks truth but possesses truth atemporally and unquestioningly.” He further explains that when the individual I acknowledges the transcendent ought and [307] stops questioning, it to some degree comes to participate in this [ideal].⁴⁶ Thus, the fact that Rickert describes this “consciousness in general” as “a general supra-individual affirmative subject that in its meaning acknowledges the transcendent ought”⁴⁷ only means that it is an Idea which

42. [I.e., unquestioning Yes. *Das fraglose Ja* is the topic of Chapter VI, section II, in RICKERT 1915.]

43. RICKERT 1915, 346–7.

44. [I.e., the standard for the real, knowing subject.]

45. [I.e., the norm of the subject-relation.]

46. *Ibid.*, 346. [The passage in question is actually on 349 of the third edition: “Schließlich wird jetzt das zu diesem Gegenstande notwendig gehörende formale Subjektkorrelat oder *das fraglos bejahende Bewußtsein* ebenfalls in einem gewissen Sinne zum “*Maßstab*” für das reale erkennende Subjekt, nämlich zur *Norm des Subjektverhaltens*, denn es ist jetzt nicht nur die allgemeine, theoretisch indifferente Form, die jedes reale Ich zum Subjekt überhaupt macht, sondern es stellt sich dem *theoretisch fragenden Ich* zugleich als ein theoretisches *Ideal des Subjekts* dar, *das die Wahrheit nicht erst sucht, sondern sie ebenso zeitlos wie fraglos bejahend besitzt, und an dem das individuelle Ich gewissermaßen “Anteil” bekommt, sobald es eine Frage beantwortend ebenfalls ein transzendentes Sollen anerkennt und zu fragen aufhört.*”]

47. *Ibid.*, 346. [Tanabe clearly refers to the following passage: “man kann ein *überindividuelles bejahendes Bewußtsein überhaupt*, welches seinem Sinn nach ein *transzendentes Sollen* anerkennt, so denken, daß die Bejahung und dementsprechend das Sollen dabei von allen Bestandteilen frei bleiben, die nur zu einem *fragenden und zweifelnden Subjekt* gehören und deshalb als Beeinträchtigung oder Antastung der echten Gegenstandsregion angesehen werden müßten.” Rickert 1915, 346. The context justifies Tanabe’s substituting “consciousness in general” with “subject.”]

is the criterion for the act of judgment of actual and individual consciousness which acknowledges and affirms the transcendent ought—not that “consciousness in general” is a judging consciousness that acknowledges and affirms the transcendent ought in actuality (現実). By its true nature, this concept [consciousness in general] does not allow for such an interpretation. In fact, “consciousness in general” cannot even be called a judging consciousness in the ordinary sense of the word; it must merely be an Idea that can be conceived purely formally, and which, while being entirely free from such psychological determinations, is the correlate of the total subsistence⁴⁸ of theoretical meaning. Kant’s “consciousness in general” is to be understood primarily as the fundamental and universal *a priori* that serves as the principle and criterion for the constitution of the object from its own side; but we could say that Rickert emphasizes its meaning, understood as ought and norm for the act of actual consciousness, from the side of the subject in particular.

From Kant to Rickert, it has become ever clearer that “consciousness in general” must in this manner be the correlate of the total subsistence of theoretical meaning, and must be a purely formal normative consciousness thought as an Idea (理念的に思惟せられた). But to start with, how does “consciousness in general,” understood as this purely formal Idea, become the ought or the norm for our empirical individual, actual consciousness? On the one hand, as the most fundamental and universal *a priori*, “consciousness in general” must be the unifying basis for all categories, and the principle and criterion for the constitution of the world of objective objects; on the other hand, it must at the same time be the ought and norm for the acts of judgment of actual consciousness. It is therefore natural, in critical philosophy—which strives to provide a foundation for the constitution of the object by means of the subjective synthesis—that as an identical concept, “consciousness in general” in this manner unifies the two aspects of the objective and the subjective; there is no doubt about this. If we now focus on the first aspect alone and construct a theory of knowledge based on this kind of “consciousness in general,” this theory will be pure transcendental logic, which must clarify the articulation of the logical connections (論理

48. [Subsistence: 存立. This is the term by which Tanabe translates *Bestand* or, in the verbal form (存立する), *bestehen* (cf. for instance THZ I: 32), which we render as “to subsist.”]

的關係) in which the categories (presupposed by the emergence of objective knowledge) are differentiated and developed from a unifying principle. Cohen's pure logic is representative of this manner of theory of knowledge. However, this standpoint only clarifies the "object of knowledge"; it cannot clarify the knowledge of the object. [308] If we seek this [clarification of the knowledge of the object], we must at the same time take into account the second aspect of "consciousness in general" and consider its relation to actual consciousness. This is indeed why Rickert—who since his article *Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie* has advocated for the primacy of the method of transcendental logic, bringing this standpoint to fruition in in the third edition of *The Object of Knowledge*—still recognizes the necessity of the method of transcendental psychology and maintains this standpoint. There is, of course, no doubt that Kant also maintained this aspect [of consciousness in general], pertaining to transcendental psychology. However, from this standpoint, the only way to conceive of the immanence of "consciousness in general" in actual consciousness as its ought and norm, is to accept the consciousness of the ought, which is contained in the judicative actual consciousness, as signifying (指示する) transcendent meaning, and to accept "consciousness in general" (thought as the correlate of the total subsistence of transcendent meaning) as demanding a partial self-realization by way of the consciousness of the ought. This is a primordial fact that cannot be further explained. As Dr. Sōda attempted to show in an original way in his article "Cultural value as a limit-concept," the relationship between being and ought can in general be expressed most fittingly by means of the mathematical limit-concept, and from the standpoint of logicism it is most likely impossible to give any other or better explanation than this. However, what constitutes what Dr. Sōda calls the "*in sich geschlossenes Wesen*"⁴⁹ as the combination of being and ought—the fundamental presupposition of this interpretation⁵⁰—can only be grasped directly in actual consciousness. Now, also in the case of "consciousness in general," we can only attest to it directly (直証) in the ought of judicative actual consciousness; we cannot further logically demonstrate (論証) that "consciousness in general" is immanent to actual consciousness as the ought. This is quite natural, since "consciousness

49. [Essence closed within itself.]

50. SŌDA 1918, 76.

in general” is the fundamental postulate of knowledge. This is the primordial fact that constitutes the limit of transcendental logic; transcendental psychology can only accept this fact and try to explain the knowledge of the object on this foundation. As transcendental psychology affirms the immanence of “consciousness in general” *as an ought* and is not concerned with its immanence *as a fact*, it must of course be distinguished from empirical psychology. Nevertheless, we must recognize that theory of knowledge here incurs an inescapable circular argument.

Furthermore, when we interpret “consciousness in general” as *das Apriori* (i.e., as the most fundamental universal *a priori*) from the standpoint of logicism [309] and consider the categories as differentiating and developing from this [*das Apriori*], we find (as I have had occasion to show in relation to various specific problems) that it is utterly impossible to deduce this differentiation and development in a purely logical manner. The question of how the *geordnete Menge*,⁵¹ as a mathematical object, develops into a spatial series, taken as a form of being (存在形式), or of how the number “1” develops from an identical “one” (一者) pertaining to logic, can by no means be deduced by logic alone; it requires in each case a ground of lived experience⁵² that makes it possible for the development of thinking to be reduced.⁵³ Nay, even the most fundamental category, *Identität*, which is the ultimate foundation of all logic, is possible only on the ground of the system of the inner development of lived experience. Therefore, we must say that in its logical structure, the determination of “consciousness in general” too—of which these categories are the differentiation and development—, presupposes the immediate lived experience of actual consciousness. Or, as is emphasized by the Austrian school, which seeks to radicalize logicism while distinguishing itself from the Kantian school, Leibniz’ eternal truths (which logically determine these categories) necessarily subsist whether they become conscious or nor; it may thus be objected, from the standpoint of logicism, that such transcendental concepts cannot be said to rely on

51. [Ordered set.]

52. [We render 体験, corresponding to *Erlebnis*, as “lived experience,” in order to clearly distinguish this term from 経験, which we render as “experience.”]

53. [As the expression in the Japanese text is grammatically problematic, we reproduce it here: 思惟の発展が還元なることを可能ならしむる体験の基.]

lived experience. However, since eternal truths necessarily subsist whether they become conscious or not, to say that they do not presuppose the lived experience of actual consciousness only means that they do not presuppose *a certain particular*, contentually de-terminate⁵⁴ lived experience; it cannot mean that they do not presuppose any lived experience at all. All eternal truths express connections of hypothetical necessity.⁵⁵ For example, even the law of identity “A is A,” only asserts that *when* we think A, it must be thought as an A which, in any given case, possesses an identical meaning; since it does not require that A itself *be thought*, it is clear that this law does not presuppose any particular lived experience. However, the relational concepts or categories that make up the core of each eternal truth (such as this *Identität*, for instance), are only possible when they correspond to the [act of] thinking a given object; separate from the inner unity of lived experience on which this thinking is based, they cannot but become null words. In other words, [these eternal truths] do not need an actual consciousness *with a specific content*, but they *do* need the consciousness of the inner connections (内面的関係) which arise in any given content. [310] If we broadly call the latter “pure intuition” in the sense of formal intuition (extending Kant’s use of the term), then we must say that all categories presuppose pure intuition. Therefore, it is also undeniable that in its logical determination, “consciousness in general,” understood as the unifying fundamental basis of categories, presupposes intuition and lived experience (直観体験). As we have seen in the above, “consciousness in general” must not only be lived through (体験せられる) in its logical determination as the ought and norm of actual consciousness; even in its logical structure does it presuppose the ground of lived experience. Only in actual consciousness can we—through pure intuition of the inner connections of the content of this consciousness and through the lived experience of the connections that determine the con-

54. [Contentually de-terminate: 内容的に限定せられた. An *Erlebnis* that is determined in terms of its content. The hyphenation of the term *de-termination* (限定) allows us to draw attention to its nuance of *delimitation*, the setting (定) of a *terminus*, an end, a limit (限), which sets it apart from 規定, rendered simply as *determination*. As Tanabe often uses the term *content* (内容) adjectivally (内容的) and, as here, adverbially (内容的に), as opposed to *form*, *formal*, *formally* (形式的に), the neologism *contentual* (i.e., as relates to content) must be allowed.]

55. See the third section of my article “The significance of the philosophy of Leibniz.” [Article published 1918, included in THZ I: 255–84.]

tent of the ought of acts of judgment—come into contact with “consciousness in general.”

III

If we consider “consciousness in general” to be only that which (as just mentioned) can be grasped in intuition and lived experience of actual consciousness, then what is the so-called actual consciousness? The various categories are the differentiating development of “consciousness in general,” and as I mentioned a moment ago, these categories presuppose what we have called pure intuition; but actual consciousness does not arise on the ground of this pure intuition alone. Rather than a *formal* intuition, actual consciousness presupposes what we can call “*material* intuition”; the lived experience of actual consciousness emerges through the mutual dependence of formal intuition and material intuition. This material intuition is sensation. Actual consciousness can by no means arise without sensation. But what is sensation? Kant considered sensation as something that is engendered where sensibility is stimulated by the thing-in-itself, something that is merely given to us; but according to Rickert, when we say that something is *given*, this must mean that it is already thought by means of the *Kategorie der Gegebenheit*.⁵⁶ Furthermore, Cohen understands *being given* as being given *as a task*,⁵⁷ and on the basis of the concept of the differential (微分概念) taken as the principle of transcendentalization of sensation (感覺先驗化), he radicalizes (深化) the principle of intensive quantity (内包量), eliminating the remains of dogmatism contained in Kant’s transcendental aesthetics. Insofar as this philosophy (思想) establishes (確立) the transcendental logical foundation for mathematical natural sciences in particular, we must recognize its insightfulness. However, even if given as a task, [311] it cannot be denied that as that which gives a goal to the constitution of thinking, sensation must possess objectivity, understood as the task of this constitution. Otherwise, no matter how transcendental the principle of constitution, the solution of its task cannot be said to be objective, nor can objective experi-

56. [I.e., the category of givenness.]

57. [Tanabe often quotes Cohen’s expression that *Gegebenheit* is *Aufgegebenheit*. See for instance THZ 1: 361; 2: 516.]

ence (the knowledge pertaining to natural science) be said to emerge as a result. Consequently, there must, also in sensation, be something universal and necessary which—in another sense than the transcendental forms of the categories—is the ground of objectivity. This is precisely what Husserl calls the essence (*Wesen*) of sensation (感覚に対する). Regardless of whether sensations become present to consciousness or not, we are aware of (知る) different relations which emerge in a universal and necessary manner. These cannot be fully expressed through the concepts of thinking (like the relations of the sensations of color (色覚) that can be expressed by the color cone); but the universal and necessary transcendental relations pertaining to Leibniz' so-called eternal truths, do not differ at all from the transcendental principles relating to the categories. These are the eidetic relations (本質的關係) of sensations. Since Kant, research into the *form* of knowledge has become ever deeper and ever more detailed, but the essence of sensation, the *material* of knowledge, has been disregarded by the Neo-Kantian schools. The fact that the scholars of the Austrian school—which, having its source in Leibniz' idea of eternal truths and passing through Bolzano's theory of the representation-in-itself and proposition-in-itself, reached the idea of the essence or the object⁵⁸—recognize [the essence of sensation] is a great achievement. Sensation too possesses universal and necessary eidetic relations that can be expressed as eternal truths. Thus, to the extent that the relations expressed by the transcendental principles of the categories are internally implied in the abovementioned pure intuition, it is no doubt superfluous to explain once again that these are the eidetic relations clarified through the so-called phenomenological reduction which *ausschaltet* or *einklammert* the particular *Einstellung* of the constitution of empirical facts.⁵⁹ We can thus say that actual consciousness (more precisely, the actual consciousness in which all objectivation of thinking is extinguished and reduced to primordial lived experience) is a combination of various orders⁶⁰ of eidetic relations. In particular, its core is the combinatory de-

58. [I.e., to Husserl's eidetics and to Meinong's object-theory.]

59. HUSSERL 1913, 54. [*ausschalten*, *einklammern*: to suspend, to bracket; *Einstellung*: attitude. Cf. English translation: Husserl 2014, 54. One would here expect the plural (*Einstellungen*), but since Japanese does not distinguish between singular and plural, Tanabe rarely makes such distinctions when borrowing foreign terms.]

60. [Order: 系統, which in Tanabe's vocabulary corresponds to the German *Ordnung*

termination of the three eidetic orders of sensation, time and space; other eidetic orders than these subsist as something more abstract and general on their surface. One can say that these eidetic relations of sensation, time and space subsist regardless of whether they become conscious or not, and that their becoming conscious adds nothing to them. But this is because their becoming conscious does not mean the addition of some new quality of "becoming conscious" to them individually; [312] rather, their becoming conscious precisely means their being mutually combined and each being unequivocally de-termined. Yet other eidetic relations become conscious to the extent that they emerge on the basis of these combinations to which they are bound. Thus, what was first hypothetically necessary relations (each as an eternal truth) is de-termined and comes to be the ground for so-called factual truth.⁶¹ This [de-termination] is precisely how actual consciousness comes about. If we call the activity (活動) which constitutes this fundamental eidetic combination "will," then we must say that will is the foundation of consciousness. Since content of consciousness is the combinatory de-termination of essence, and will is the activity which constitutes this combination, will does not appear as an element of consciousness. This does not mean that will is something secondary, derived from intellectual elements (知的要素); rather, it is indicative of the fact that will is of a higher order than knowing (知識). (I add that on these points, I am mainly indebted to Professor Nishida's thought).

If the above is correct, we have until now only considered "consciousness in general" from the side of the formal categories of knowledge, according to the thought of Kant and of the Neo-Kantian schools; but we must now furthermore take the essence of sensation, the material of knowledge, into account, and thus determine "consciousness in general." As I just mentioned, actual consciousness generally has at its core the three eidetic orders of sensation, time and space; it is something where various orders of essences are combined. But if we consider this from the side of eidetic formal relations (the foundation of categories, which can be understood as the differentiating development (分化発展) of "consciousness in general"), then actual con-

(THZ I: 16). In the rare instances where "order" translates 秩序, we include the *kanji* in parenthesis.]

61. Cf. section three of "The Significance of Leibniz' philosophy."

consciousness is precisely the determination of content of these forms through this combination, and the de-termination of the X (項) of formal relations through the essence of sensation. For this reason, the essence of sensation de-termines the various formal essences which are the foundation of the categories (which can be understood as the differentiating development of “consciousness in general”), and we must say that [the essence of sensation] is a means by which “consciousness in general”—whose immanence in actual consciousness it makes possible—actualizes itself. Taken as a principle or criterion, “consciousness in general” is only immanent to actual consciousness by means of the formal principles of categories, which are its differentiating development; it cannot reveal the quality which is the ought and norm of actual acts of judgment (現実判断作用). But insofar as the various formal essences, which are the foundation of categories, are combined with the essence of sensation and become pure intuition, “consciousness in general” becomes immanent to actual consciousness and becomes its ought. [313] Only then does what Kant called pure apperception arise. Insofar as [consciousness in general] is in this way de-termined through the essence of sensation and combined with this eidetic order, various formal eidetic orders (not only those of time and space) are objectified in categories and acquire, within the lived experience of actual consciousness, the foundations for the logical characteristics which are thus expressed. The demand that “consciousness in general” in its logical structure have a foundation of lived experience is also satisfied in this manner. In this way, “consciousness in general” actualizes (現実化) itself in lived experience by combining and de-termining the various formal eidetic orders (the ground (基) of categories which are the differentiation of its objective aspect) with the eidetic order of sensation; but since actual consciousness comes about through the combinations of all these same eidetic orders, their differences in terms of content must be considered to arise through the differences in the modes (仕方) of their combination and de-termination. Thus, as the manifestations of the different types of modes of combination and de-termination of what are ultimately the same eidetic orders, the various actual consciousnesses (taking place in each instant of each individual) can be understood as differentiated particular facets of an identical universal (普遍者) (combination and de-termination in general of the eidetic orders). This universal is precisely “consciousness in general.” Now, “consciousness in general” is not merely an

abstract formal Idea (理念); as a concrete universal, it is immanent to the particular actual consciousnesses, and is what unifies them. This is precisely why, in the first section, I said that it is also possible, from a certain standpoint, to ascribe a deep meaning to Windelband’s early interpretation of “consciousness in general.” As long as one simply considers sensations as the manifold of the given, fails to note its universality taken as an essence (the so-called *Wesensallgemeinheit*⁶²), and overlooks the fact that it constitutes an order containing the universal and necessary eidetic relations which can be expressed in transcendental, eternal truths, it is difficult to understand the relation between “consciousness in general” and actual consciousness as we have done in the above. But by recognizing the eidetic order of sensation and interpreting its de-termining combination of the orders of categorial and formal eidetic relations as actual consciousness, it is established (確立) that the actual consciousnesses are partial and particular facets of “consciousness in general,” taken as an identical and concrete universal. “Consciousness in general” is the possible totality⁶³ of combination and de-termination of the formal eidetic orders (corresponding to categories), through the eidetic order of sensation. This is how [consciousness in general] is the formal Idea which is conceived as the correlate of the possible totality of value configuration, at the same time as it is partially immanent to actual consciousness as the ought and norm. Thus, since time and space (which are the most fundamental formal eidetic orders, indispensable to actual consciousness), are infinite systems (無限の体系), [314] the modes of combining and de-termining these through the eidetic order of sensation are infinite in number; therefore, it is of course clear that actual consciousnesses of differing content are infinitely possible. It is natural, for this reason, that although “consciousness in general” is always partially immanent to actual consciousness, its whole exceeds actual consciousness, and that it can only be thought as a mere Idea. However, given the fact that this Idea refers to the totality of something which is partially immanent to actual consciousness, it does not—despite its being an Idea—merely express an

62. HUSSERL 1913, 9. [Universality of essence or essential universality; cf. English translation: HUSSERL 2014, 11.]

63. [可能的全体, possible totality or, more freely, totality of possibilities.]

empty form; it must express something real.⁶⁴ Or, we might say that from the standpoint of logicism, “consciousness in general” is merely the general criterion or principle which is the unifying foundation of categories; to interpret this as something real is a substantialist dogmatism, and perhaps it could be objected that this is a revival of the psychological interpretation which we had rejected together with the metaphysical one. But as we have been saying since section two, for knowledge to become possible, this general criterion or principle must necessarily be immanent in actual consciousness as its ought. As its differentiation, the category is not merely a formal concept, but must be an *a priori* which acts (活か) as a living force. Unless we recognize this, we will not be able to comprehend the knowledge of the object, even if we may understand (知る) the object of knowledge. However, as Husserl emphasizes following Brentano, the actual consciousness, which we immediately live through (体験), is essentially (本来) what he calls *intentionales Erlebnis*, and regardless of whether it is presently conscious or not, it implies an immanent object with a valid meaning. What we call “ought” is nothing but what makes this immanent object, as something where a certain essence has been combined and determined with other eidetic orders, surpass of itself this determination and affirm its own universal necessity, and what opposes the so-called demand for self-objectivation to this determination. The actual consciousness which is in this way immediately lived through essentially (本来) contains the ought; here, ought and being (存在) are not yet distinguished, but are intertwined (融合) as one. This is due to the fact that actual consciousness is a particular part of “consciousness in general,” and the ought is nothing other than the demand posed by “consciousness in general” as a whole with regard to the determination of actual consciousness. The reason why, when we *ausschalten* and *einklammern* all thinking, the lived experience of actual consciousness neither possesses the distinction between self and other, between I and non-I, the reason why it is no longer differentiated into past, present and future, and why, as something that envelops and intertwines (融一) these [elements], it always contains an indication (指向) exceeding both [the distinction] self/other and time, [315] is also due to the fact that lived experience is the particularization or the determination of “consciousness in general.”

64. [On the terms *reality* (実在) and *actuality* (現実), see the Translators’ Introduction above.]

While the whole of “consciousness in general,” which manifests itself partially in this lived experience of actual consciousness, is itself an immediate true fact (真実), it is also something that, as the totality of something that cannot be denied, must truly be called reality. If we were to take it as something that, as an object, existed as a fact, we would, as pointed out by logicism, fall into substantialist dogmatism or psychologistic circular reasoning. However, on the other hand, in the immediate lived experience which constitutes the ground (基) of the possibility for the actuality of objective knowledge, which is affirmed by logicism, this [reality], to which we instantly attest (直下に自証), cannot be denied. To say that this is something real is in no way a revival of the metaphysical or psychological interpretation rejected in the above. “Consciousness in general” acts within actual consciousness, a total reality which manifests itself as an ought for actual consciousness. In this perspective, Lipps was right to understand the ought as an imperative or a demand posed to actual consciousness by total reality,⁶⁵ and Rickert’s criticism of this point⁶⁶ seems to miss the mark. As a concrete universal which particularizes and determines itself within actual consciousness, “consciousness in general” can be said to be the reality which is the possible totality of immediate actuality. Since “consciousness in general” is, as mentioned above, the activity of will which through determination combines the different eidetic orders (the foundation of categories) with the eidetic order of sensation, reality can consequently be said to be will, and as Professor Nishida has argued, it is—to the different *a priori* of categories—the *a priori* of the *a priori*. When I said in the above that “consciousness in general” is the universal and fundamental *das Apriori* for the particular *a priori*, it should be understood in this way. “Consciousness in general” is reality which is will understood as the *a priori* of *a priori*. Leibniz argued that in factual truth—which can be understood as the combination and intersection of eternal truths—each state of representation merely represents the corresponding monad or identical universe, “according to its own point of view”; but when we understand the theory of this infinitesimal representation in a logicist perspective, and take this “universe” as the possible totality of the combinations and intersections of eternal truths, it realigns

65. LIPPS 1907, chaps. VIII, IX [91–133].

66. RICKERT, *op. cit.*, 219.

with the aforementioned standpoint according to which the different types of actual consciousness are the combinations and de-terminations of the same eidetic orders, while their differences merely rely on the differences of the modes of combination. But since Leibniz always tries to remain consistent with Christian theism, he argues that as the Creator of the universe, God is the highest monad which transcends the universe and exists in an absolute manner; but [316] if we do away with this affirmation and pantheistically call “God” the volitional reality—understood as the totality of the possible combinations of eternal truths –, then “consciousness in general” is precisely God in this sense, and from the standpoint which we have developed in the above, the monadology comes to present a new significance.⁶⁷ We can thus adopt an empiricist pluralism as the one which James claimed against absolute monism, while at the same time unifying this pluralism through an immanent monism without incurring the risk of absolute monism. I wonder if this is not, in comparison, the most satisfying interpretation of “plurality” and “oneness.” As just mentioned, insofar as any immediate lived experience of actual consciousness is itself devoid of individual and temporal limitations (制限), we can say that all actual consciousness in its *an sich* already internally implies the meaning of being “consciousness in general,” but it at the same time cannot avoid proceeding to the stage of *für sich*, and being particularized and limited as the individual consciousness of a certain instant, opposed to general consciousness⁶⁸; furthermore, as something which through the realization (実現) of the ought and the emergence of objective knowledge becomes universal *an und für sich*, “consciousness in general” is the Ideal totality of an infinite process which is always being partially realized. The fact that “consciousness in general” is the ultimate goal of actual consciousness corresponds to the fact that God is not merely the noumenon⁶⁹ which is the ontological foundation (存在基礎) of actuality, but is furthermore the subject (主体) of the axiomatic totality (価値全体) which is

67. Cf. my “The Significance of the Philosophy of Leibniz.”

68. [General consciousness: Tanabe here deviates from his habit of writing “consciousness in general” (「意識一般」) and instead writes 一般意識 without quotation marks.]

69. [Noumenon: 本体. Cf. THZ 3: 50. In the earliest texts, Tanabe translates this term as “substance” (cf. THZ 14: 9, 19), but from 1914, 実体 replaces 本体 as the preferred equivalent of this term (cf. THZ 1: 35; 2: 103, 314). 本体 also appears in the term 本体論, which Tanabe explicitly translates as “Ontologie” in 1924 (THZ 4: 21, 26; cf. also *ibid.*, 57).]

the ultimate aim of its progression. Considered in the perspective of this infinite process of realization, “consciousness in general” is Fichte’s absolute I. We can take the *reines Ich*, *empirisches Ich*, *absolutes Ich*⁷⁰ as corresponding to the three stages of *an sich*, *für sich* and *an und für sich*⁷¹ and thus, we can understand “consciousness in general” as the infinite dynamic reality which advances from the *reines Ich* to the *absolutes Ich*, and returns in a circle. As indicated by the fact that Fichte’s early thought incurred objections of atheism, we cannot deny that the notion of this reality is incompatible with theism; but in philosophical terms (considered in the perspective of theoretical values alone), what can appropriately be called “God” is perhaps nothing else than reality understood as this “consciousness in general.” This furthermore satisfies the true religious demand of a God which is transcendent while being immanent. I believe that “consciousness in general”—which, originating in Kant, has in today’s neo-Kantianism come to be regarded as a formal Idea, a mere limit-concept—can, as Fichte’s *Ich*, legitimately (正当) be thought as reality or God. [317] For the critical logicism purified and radicalized in neo-Kantianism, “consciousness in general” is no more than the mere general criterion or principle of knowledge, and cannot even properly speaking be the “ought” and the norm of actual consciousness. Even if this criterion or principle renders the object of knowledge possible, it does not render possible *knowledge of the object*. If we wish to render this knowledge possible, we must—in immediate, lived experience, where ought and being are yet undistinguished and are intertwined with each other—attest to the immanence of “consciousness in general” in actual consciousness, and we must accept that [consciousness in general] precedes the particularization and de-termination of [actual consciousness] as a concrete universal. The eidetic order of sensation is nothing but the principle by means of which “consciousness in general” makes itself actuality through such particularization and de-termination. This type of notion itself leads to Fichte’s thought. If this [interpretation] is now criticized as meaning the revival of metaphysics, I would like to counter that the Critique itself leads to metaphysics. To the extent that, as a metaphysics of the “I” (「我」), this metaphysics offers the foundation for the Critique, it differs in meaning from precritical meta-

70. [The pure I, the empirical I and the absolute I.]

71. [In-itself, for-itself and in-and-for-itself.]

physics. Our philosophical demand, which originally springs from a loving pursuit of true reality, cannot stop short at Critique, but naturally proceeds to a science (学) of reality, to metaphysics. The new metaphysics which appears in the wake of the Critique does not merely follow the dogmatic path of the old metaphysics dismantled by the Critique; it must be something that provides the foundation and the background of knowledge, demanded by the Critique itself. This is where the everlasting significance of Fichte's Science of Knowledge is to be found. "Consciousness in general" is the reality, or God, sought after by this metaphysics. That reality is within ourselves, that God is immanent in our soul⁷² must be the necessary conclusion of the metaphysics which proceeds from the Critique. God means nothing else than our original, true character (真面目). To truly know oneself thus becomes a way of knowing God (*Erkenne dich selbst und du hast Gott erkannt*. Augustinus.⁷³) We can say that this is the profound meaning of *gnothi seautón*.

IV

I started out by considering "consciousness in general" from the standpoint of critical logicism, as a principle and criterion; I then gradually deepened its meaning in a concrete manner from the point [of view] that "consciousness in general" must be the norm or ought immanent in actual consciousness; and I finally reached the metaphysical standpoint which considers "consciousness in general" as reality or God, i.e., an infinite process of will. [318] For the metaphysics which strives to know "consciousness in general" as reality, this approach itself defines its method. Since long ago, standpoints seeking God in the inner of one's own soul (内心), and striving to see reality in immediate lived experience, have rejected the knowledge which relies on the ordinary intellect (理知), and they have commonly depended on mystical intuition; it is a well known fact that today, Bergson, for instance, takes such an intuition as the method of metaphysics. But as is commonly pointed out to the contrary, mere intuition is not knowledge.

72. [Soul: 心, can also be rendered as "mind" or "heart." Tanabe in a later text explicitly gives this term as a translation of *Seele* (soul). Cf. THZ 4: 371.]

73. ["Know yourself and you will have come to know God."]

When we reject all intellect and conceptual articulation, how does universal and necessary knowledge come about? To simply claim intuition as the only method of metaphysics must mean giving up on metaphysics as a science. Nevertheless, even if we attest to reality by simply appealing to intuition, that is by no means in itself sufficient for us to be able to understand (知る) how reality is connected to knowledge as its foundation. This relationship cannot be clarified by intuition alone; on the one hand, it can only be clarified by adopting and radicalizing the position of critical philosophy, and by attesting, in intuition, to the inner connections that the logical structure of the transcendental principles require as their foundation or background. On the other hand, the inner connections of intuition which are the correlate of these transcendental principles of knowledge can, through the different types of transcendental concepts that express the logical structure of these transcendental principles, indirectly bring [the relation between reality and knowledge] to conceptual expression (表示). In other words, all the formal eidetic orders—the foundation of the categories—can express their articulations and interconnections through transcendental concepts, and to this extent, the articulation of actual consciousness as it is lived through (体験の現実意識) (which arises through the combination and de-termination of these [formal] eidetic orders with the eidetic order of sensation) also attains conceptual expression. Since intuition and lived experience are not initially a chaos devoid of any articulation but rather a system of internal development which, as so-called *intentionales Erlebnis*, contains these eidetic articulations within itself, it can indirectly conceptualize (概念化) these articulations by means of the transcendental concepts that objectivize (対象化する) these essences. If while calling objectivation (対象化) of essences “objectivation” (客観化), we call “subjectivation” the fact of turning from the object (the result of [objectivation]) to instead see the inner eidetic connections at the foundation of its structure and giving conceptual expression to [the inner eidetic connections] through the [object]—then by means of this method of subjectivation we can reveal the eidetic structure of lived experience. Since it is clear that mere lived experience is not knowledge, we must say that there is no doubt that the inner articulations of lived experience can only be known through this method. [319] Husserl explains

the method of the *reine Phänomenologie*,⁷⁴ of which he is the founder, in the following manner: he *suspends*⁷⁵ and *brackets* all *natural attitude*,⁷⁶ and affirms that through the suspension (the *phenomenological epoché*)⁷⁷ of the judgment which limits us (限局する) to the world of being (存在界), the *thesis* that appears in this attitude is lived through as *essence*, and what constitutes the *intuition of essences or the discernment of essences* in this *consciousness of lived experience*⁷⁸ is precisely pure phenomenology. But the lived experience that is realized through this *phänomenologische Reduktion* does not in itself immediately constitute the scientific knowledge of phenomenology. For this, we would, conversely, have to express (表現する)—by means of the concepts of thinking, which objectivizes essences—the eidetic connections of lived experience which are its foundation. This is why Natorp considered psychology as the science of the reconstruction of primordial lived experience, and why he claimed that Husserl's phenomenology is only possible in this perspective.⁷⁹ For the same reason, he followed Cohen,⁸⁰ distinguishing between *Bewußtheit* and *Bewußtsein* in the following manner: The former is *ein unreduzierbar Letztes*,⁸¹ and as a *Problemgrund* it cannot itself be a *Problem*⁸²; the problem of psychology is thus limited to the latter, which, how-

74. [Pure phenomenology.]

75. [In this sentence, Tanabe makes heavy use of German terms. For readability, we have exceptionally opted for rendering these terms directly in English, marking these instances by italics. The corresponding terms in the Japanese text are *ausschalten*, *einklammern*, *natürliche Einstellung*, *phänomenologische ἐποχή*, *Thesis*, *Wesen*, *Wesensanschauung oder Wesenserschauung*, *Erlebnisbewußtsein* (*sic.*).]

76. HUSSERL 1913, 54.

77. *Ibid.*, 56.

78. *Ibid.*, 62–3. [*Wesenserschauung* and *Wesensanschauung* are not mentioned on these pages. Perhaps Tanabe rather means to refer to 42–43; furthermore, rather than *Erlebnisbewußtsein*, Husserl speaks of *Bewußtseinserlebnis* in these pages.]

79. NATORP 1912, 191, 289.

80. COHEN 1902, 363–6. [Cohen here distinguishes between *Bewußtheit* as the mythological or merely instinctive consciousness and *Bewußtsein* as the scientific consciousness, or science (*Wissenschaft*) as such.]

81. [NATORP 1912], 27. [I.e., an irreducible ultimate instance.]

82. *Ibid.*, 33, 40. [“die reine Ichheit, desgleichen die reine Beziehung auf das Ich, ist *nicht Problem* für die Psychologie. Sie ist selbst nicht Problem, eben weil sie Grund und Voraussetzung alles psychologischen Problems ist.... So also, als *Problemgrund*, nicht selbst als Problem, hat die Psychologie die *Bewußtheit* überhaupt oder die *Ich-Beziehung* zugrunde, recht eigentlich “zum Grunde” zu legen, zu supponieren; aber einen Gegenstand der Untersuchung für die Psy-

ever, unlike *Bewußtheit*, is not merely something immediately lived through; rather, *Bewußtsein* is a goal to be realized as the result of the reconstruction of lived experience through subjectivation—a subjectivation which starts out from knowledge (or morals, art, religion, etc.) which relies on objectivation (客観化).⁸³ However, to say that the above-mentioned kind of lived experience is only known insofar as it is reconstructed by means of transcendental concepts, through the subjectivation of the result of objectivation, is to say that it is only known in the articulations of inner eidetic connections of consciousness. In other words, this precisely means that only the universal aspect of “consciousness in general” is known. What is known of actual, lived consciousness (現実体験意識) is only its universal eidetic articulations understood as “consciousness in general”; when it comes to the way in which the former is produced through de-termining particularization of the latter (as its particularization), i.e., when it comes to the particular content in itself pertaining to each actual consciousness, this cannot be determined (規定). Our spirit—a so-called windowless monad—can only become the object of universal knowledge in the common aspect of the “consciousness in general” which unifies these [actual consciousnesses]. [320] This is the necessary conclusion of the standpoint according to which subjectivation presupposes a prior objectivation and according to which knowledge of the former becomes possible only on the foundation of the latter; this is the content of psychology which must, from the position of critical philosophy, be accepted as one of the branches of philosophy. Husserl’s phenomenology can, in the end, also be reduced (帰一) to this standpoint. Thus, if—following the thoughts set forth in the last section—we do not merely stop short at critical philosophy, but take actual consciousness as the de-termining particularization of “consciousness in general” (i.e., of the concrete universal), and consider the latter [consciousness in general], as reality, understood as the possible totality of actuality, then we must say that metaphysics, which takes this reality as its object [of study] can only know the universal eidetic articulations that are the foundation of objective knowledge (or, more

chologie bildet sie fernerhin nicht” (*ibid.*, 32–3). “Für die Klärung des Problems der Psychologie ist bis dahin gewonnen... dass dieser Problemgrund selbst nicht Problem, nicht Gegenstand der Untersuchung für die Psychologie ist” (*ibid.*, 40.)]

83. *Ibid.*, 195–8.

broadly, of objective value configurations in general) through the method of subjectivation of psychology or phenomenology, understood as in the above. This is the only justified position of a metaphysics proceeding from critical philosophy. Fichte took the self-awareness of the I—understood as *ein Handeln auf ein Handeln selbst*⁸⁴—as intellectual intuition⁸⁵ and strove to establish his Science of Knowledge by means of this intellectual intuition; but mere intellectual intuition cannot constitute the knowledge of the Science of Knowledge. In fact, insofar as the Science of Knowledge takes its starting point in Kant’s Critique, and essentially aims to give a foundation to knowledge, it must be understood as first (starting out from objective determination) reconstructing, through subjectivation, the inner articulations of intuition and lived experience (the foundation of objective determination), and conversely as revealing the process of development of objective determination from this foundation [i.e., from the inner articulations of intuition and lived experience]. The fact that Fichte takes his point of departure in the *reine Tathandlung* when discussing the *Genesis* of knowledge, can only be accepted from this standpoint.⁸⁶ This is the sole critical method of metaphysics. As the science (学) of “consciousness in general,” metaphysics is only possible as a subjectivizing knowledge (主観化の認識) relying on the method of pure phenomenology or psychology. This is nothing else than the self-awareness of reality which takes place in *Für-sich-sein*.

However, we cannot assert that the metaphysics described above is a science of actual consciousness as it is really (実際に) given. As Natorp points out, our actual consciousness already contains from its very origin (元来) *some* thinking and brings about objectivation, so that both a “subjective” and an “objective” aspect are inherent to it; since pure lived experience entirely devoid of any thinking requires the so-called phenomenological reduction, and since it is rather a goal to be reached only in the process of subjectivation, we must thus say that it is not something given, but something to be

84. [An acting upon an acting itself.]

85. *Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre*, in FICHTE 1910, 43, 47.

86. Cf. section 2 of my article “The Problem of philosophical knowledge in German idealism.” [Published 1918, included in THZ 1: 173–226.]

sought. [321] Höningwald⁸⁷ and Driesch,⁸⁸ who in opposition to Natorp’s theory of subjectivation argue that this method is unnecessary for psychology, seem to confuse such lived experience with actual consciousness. Lived experience, which we recognize as an immediate truth and an indubitable reality, in fact refers to something which is, in this sense, ideal (理想的). To say that metaphysics is a science of lived experience does therefore not mean that it is a science of actual consciousness as it is really given. As just discussed, only by means of objectively determined concepts does such lived experience enter the scope of knowledge in a reconstructive manner, and its universal inner eidetic articulations can be known to the extent that they become the foundation of the principle of objective constitution; therefore, even if we call a metaphysics whose aim it is to know these eidetic articulations a “science of lived experience,” we must not forget that it has a special meaning. To say that such metaphysics satisfies our demand, which cannot stop short at theory of knowledge, does not mean that it provides a logical ground for the logicist theory of knowledge. Such an interpretation must reverse the relationship between these two⁸⁹. The universal eidetic articulations of lived experience which, when logicism is radicalized, are clearly required and which, while being the insurmountable limit of this standpoint, must be recognized as the foundation of the different transcendental concepts of logicism as well as the background for their interconnections—are known through this metaphysics; but this only means that as immediate truth and as knowledge of the inner articulations of an indubitable reality, it in some way satisfies our philosophical demand for true reality. The universal aspect of “consciousness in general” is the object [of study] of such metaphysics. When it comes to the primordial content of lived experience of actual consciousness, in which “consciousness in general” determines and particularizes itself, it is something which allows for no universal determination at all; this is precisely what can be called a thing in itself. In the

87. Höningwald, “Prinzipienfragen der [Denk]psychologie.” [In *Kant-Studien* 18 (1913): 205–45].

88. DRIESCH 1913.

89. [I.e., between the metaphysics of lived experience and the logical concepts pertaining to theory of knowledge. As Tanabe has argued, metaphysics cannot be purely intuitive; its access to lived experience must be mediated by concepts and objectivation, if it is to count as knowledge and maintain its claim to scientificity.]

previous section, I argued that in actual consciousness the various formal eidetic orders have been combined and de-termined with the eidetic order of sensation, and understood the differences in content as their differences in modes of combination and de-termination; however, since these modes themselves rely on the act of the will, which surpasses our intellect, we can never exhaustively determine actual consciousness in a logical manner. Only when the various essences implied in [actual consciousness] are unified into universal concepts in the direction of objectivation, are [these essences] constructed into various ob-ject-worlds (対象界) by being articulated from their respective standpoints according to various eidetic connections. If we call these “phenomena,” then we can say that the relation between the thing in itself and the phenomena in the above sense [322] is equivalent to that of the whole and the parts.⁹⁰ Or we can say that the former is concrete while the latter is abstract. In contrast, we might say, as Natorp has also claimed, that the direction of subjectivation renders the abstraction and fixation of the objective ob-ject concrete and fluid⁹¹; but since what is known as the result of this are only the universal eidetic connections on which the constitutive form (構成形式) of the ob-ject is founded, it is clear that the aforementioned thing in itself on the contrary remains a limit [to knowledge]. The metaphysics described above does not claim to know the so-called thing in itself. The thing in itself pertains to the domain of *das Irrationale*, which our intellect cannot penetrate. Metaphysics only knows the universal aspect of “consciousness in general.” However, this metaphysics, which knows the universal eidetic articulations of “consciousness in general,” clarifies the inner articulations of lived experience, which are the reality on which the constitution of the various ob-ject-worlds, as well as their mutual connections and determinations, are founded; thus, in this sense, we can say that metaphysics reveals the unifying root of the phenomenal worlds (現象界) and shows us the relational orders (秩序) that arise between the various phenomenal worlds. This is why, as the science of reality which is the root of phenomena, it can be called metaphysics. I expect that my naming this science—which shares the methods of Husserl’s phenomenology and of Natorp’s psychology—“metaphysics,” will inevitably be met with opposition

90. Cf. WINDELBAND 1920, 234.

91. [NATORP 1912] 18–82, 134, 180–92, etc.

from the standpoint of logicism. However, for the reasons stated above, I believe that we can legitimately (正当) accept this as metaphysics, as it fulfills our demand for true reality in a certain way.

So far, I have considered "consciousness in general" only in the perspective of a critique of knowledge in accordance with its historical origin. But if from the standpoint of critical philosophy we take [consciousness in general] to be an Idea which is to be conceived as the correlate of the total subsistence of value configurations, then it is already clear that "consciousness in general" is required not only for theoretical value, but also for the various absolute values of morals, art and so forth: for the total subsistence of the respective fields of value configurations. Therefore, there is also no doubt that the "consciousnesses in general" which are the correlates of the constitution, realization or "objectivation" (客観化) of these value configurations, can be known in the eidetic articulations of lived experience through subjectivation. This has been stated clearly by Natorp, among others.⁹² But if each of the "consciousnesses in general" corresponding to the various absolute values can be reduced to lived experience through subjectivation, [323] then it is quite natural that since each "consciousness in general" is unified in identical lived experience, they are further combined into mutual and fixed relationships of order (秩序) in accordance with the characteristics of these eidetic articulations. Thus, "consciousness in general" is universalized to a higher degree than it had been until now, and each of the pure subjects, that are correlates of various absolute values, comes to be understood as a particular aspect of "consciousness in general." The so-called *Kulturbewußtsein*, which Cohen accepted as the object [of study] of psychology, is precisely its logicist equivalent.⁹³ As the unifying subject of the various absolute values, this *Kulturbewußtsein*, which through differentiation into universal eidetic articulations of lived experience becomes immanent to actual consciousness and becomes the norm and goal of its realization, is true "consciousness in general." From the standpoint of metaphysics set forth in the above, this can be recognized as the ultimate reality, and from the standpoint of philosophy, it is the only thing that we can truly call God. If, like Windelband, we take the religious value, the "sacred" not to be ranked next to the values of

92. NATORP 1912, 198.

93. COHEN 1902, 15–16, 366–9.

the true, the good and the beautiful, but as rather having the meaning of their unified completion, then this “consciousness in general” is the subject of the sacred,⁹⁴ which is none other than God. We come into contact with God in consciousness of the ought, and insofar as we reintegrate “consciousness in general” in the realization of ideals and values, we become one with God. This must be our ultimate goal. “Consciousness in general” thus cannot be realized but in this actual consciousness of ours—and herein lies the great meaning (意義) of our lives (生存). The metaphysics which takes “consciousness in general” as its object [of study] must clarify it in relation to: the relationship between God and man, the distinction between reality and phenomena, the interconnections of absolute values, and the connections between the various cultural domains which are based on these values; the *a priori* interconnections of knowledge, the order (秩序) of the object-worlds which is based on these connections, as well as the significance of time, space, and sensation. It goes without saying that I cannot get into these problems now. To conclude this essay, I believe, in summary, to have shown, to some extent, that “consciousness in general” is not only a formal Idea presupposed by critical philosophy, but that it is not necessarily impossible to consider “consciousness in general” to refer to reality, taken as the object [of study] of metaphysics, and that when grasped in its true meaning, Kant’s “consciousness in general” must proceed to Fichte’s *Ich*.

– April 1919, at *Kant Abend*

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94. [The Japanese is ambiguous here: 聖の主観. Alternatively, “the sacred subject.”]

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