Book Symposium
David W. Johnson, *Watsuji on Nature*

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KEYWORDS: Watsuji Tetsurō—nature—Martin Heidegger—fūdo—
climate—environment—normativity—aidagara—mesology

In the remarks that follow I begin with a short summary of the book’s central thesis. After this I set out what I take the main contributions of this study to be, and then conclude with an excerpt taken from the introduction, which summarizes the major questions that inform the book.

Watsuji on Nature reconstructs Watsuji Tetsuro’s astonishing philosophy of nature, situating it in relation both to his reception of the thought of Heidegger and to his renewal of core ontological positions in classical Confucian and Buddhist philosophy. I show that for Watsuji we have our being in the lived experience of nature, one in which nature and culture compose a tightly interwoven texture called fūdo 風土. By unfolding Watsuji’s novel and radical claim that this is a setting that is neither fully external to human subjectivity nor merely a product of it, this book also sets out what still remains unthought in this concept, as well as in the relational structure that underwrites it. I argue that what remains unarticulated is nothing less than the recovery of a reenchanted conception of nature and an elucidation of the wide-ranging implications of a relational conception of the self for questions about the disclosive character of experience, the distinction between fact and value, and the possibility of a place-based ecological ethics.

In taking up what is unthought in Watsuji’s retrieval of the concept of fūdo, this study attempts to move beyond the scholarly analysis and interpretive reconstruction of Watsuji’s work to win a new and even radical understanding of this term through a series of engagements with Heidegger, Herder, and others. These exchanges bring Watsuji’s views into an intercultural philosophical conversation, and lay the groundwork for a philosophy of nature that can transcend particular worldviews and cultural perspectives. By showing in this way what Watsuji’s work has to offer to a global philosophical conversation this book also aims to expand the English-language
reception and appreciation of Watsuji’s philosophy, which remains relatively unknown in the West. The following is excerpted from the Introduction.¹

Excerpt

The Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsurō (1889–1960) was a thinker whose work extended across a remarkable range of topics in cultural theory, intellectual history, religion, the arts, and, above all, philosophy. Watsuji’s overall philosophical project can be understood as an attempt to reconceive the relations between selfhood, ethical life, and the natural world by reinterpreting and interweaving philosophical concepts found in Confucianism and Buddhism with ideas drawn from Western philosophy, especially hermeneutics, phenomenology, and the philosophy of Hegel. This is a way of approaching the human and natural worlds that opens genuinely original themes and questions, while also offering a creative array of responses to these issues.

This study focuses on Watsuji’s philosophy of nature. At the heart of his thinking about nature is the novel and radical claim that nature as it is experienced and lived through is part of the very structure of human existence, such that the self is immersed in, and continuous with, this dimension of nature. This means that the human being can be what it is only through its living in, incorporating, and giving cultural expression to a region of nature, and, furthermore, that a particular region of nature can fully be what it is only through its being part of and disclosed through the world of human culture. Watsuji calls this geocultural environment, which we both open up and belong to, a fūdo 風土.

This concept is built upon an ordinary Japanese word whose usage and history are connected to texts, practices, and ways of thinking that link self with place, and nature with culture, and whose constituent sinographs extend the semantic range and depth of these associations. Watsuji draws on this background and these connotations to express the way nature and subjectivity are ontologically interwoven with rather than exterior to one another. While he sets out this philosophical interpretation of fūdo primar-

¹. I thank Northwestern University Press for permission to reprint this excerpt from Watsuji on Nature: Japanese Philosophy in the Wake of Heidegger. Copyright © 2019 by Northwestern University Press. Published 2019. All rights reserved.
ily in response to related problems and themes he encounters in the work of Herder and, above all, Heidegger, the importance of this idea for philosophical inquiry extends well beyond these concerns.

**The Relational Self**

The central claim of this study is that the concept of *fūdo* has significant implications for two important issues in contemporary philosophy. The first question concerns how we understand the self; the second, how we understand our experience of nature. In the former case, the claim that the lived experience of nature is part of the very structure of subjectivity challenges the problematic modern understanding of the self as a self-contained, individuated center, completely encased in a biological profile that fully divides it from the world. Instead the notion of *fūdo* enables us to uncover the way in which the self, in, for instance, its sensibility, preferences, imagination, has its being in the places and spaces of the natural world. This mode of being also makes possible an essential form of self-understanding, one that varies across regions of nature.

Thus rather than an individual subject decoupled and sealed off from that which surrounds it such that it remains the same in all places and in any set of circumstances, we find that the self is continuous with its environment in and through a space that is constitutive of its being rather than external to it. Because this relational space is also an intersubjective one, we discover that we have our being in others, too. The self is present to, overlaps with, extends into, and is continuous with others who help to compose it. In uncovering this dimension of the basic space and place in and through which the self is able to be continuous with the human and natural worlds, Watsuji advances a new conception of the self as a relational structure open to that which is constitutive for it. This understanding of the self allows us to circumvent central aspects of ontological dualism and, by doing so, to dispense with some of the philosophical difficulties and problems that this dichotomy entails.

**Fūdo and the Reenchantment of Nature**

The concept of *fūdo* also has significant consequences for the pressing question of the appropriate relation between what has been called the “manifest” image of nature, or nature as it appears to us, with its characteristic qualities,
meanings, and values, and the scientific image of nature, or the qualitatively bald and value-free world of nature as described by science. When these images collide, the dominant approach to resolving this conflict has been to fold the manifest image into the scientific one. The consequences of this move are immense and manifold; numbered among them is the abolition of a large expanse of the world of meaningful human experience. Yet this approach has also become entangled in serious philosophical difficulties, such as in the various problems posed by the attempt to account for mental states from the external or third-person standpoint of physicalism, or in the controversies generated by naturalistically reductive accounts of ethical and aesthetic experience. As many have argued, the attempt to reduce lived experience to purely objective elements has led to incoherence, to the loss of insight, and even to the loss of the phenomenon that was to be explained.

I argue that Watsuji’s work contains an account of the appearances of nature that avoids these difficulties by showing that the essential reality of nature in this dimension is neither merely phenomenal and subjective, nor is it “really” an objective domain of bare entities, independent, self-contained, and complete in themselves. Rather nature as it appears in the lifeworld possesses a nascent intelligibility that is completed only in the experience of those who encounter and perceive it. This experience is not, however, an encounter with a “pristine” nature standing outside of all mediation. Watsuji’s work can be situated within a hermeneutical tradition that includes Herder, Humboldt, Heidegger, and Gadamer, one that, as John Maraldo has observed, has now become international. For Watsuji and other thinkers in this tradition, the intelligibility of nature, like the whole content of human experience, is disclosed and so mediated through our language, practices, and culture, and brought in this way to a kind of expressive articulation. And because the intelligibility of nature is completed in culture, it can be said that nature has a history—as many histories as there are cultures.

So disclosure as expressive articulation is not simply the articulation of something already known and fully formed; in this process there is a complex interaction of making and showing, discovery and creation. Yet insofar

as the disclosive activity of the self and the being of nature unfold together in fūdo, nature as it appears in the lifeworld is not an “objective” entity onto which we project “subjective” meanings; rather it is an always already meaningful setting in which subjective and objective elements form a unity.

In this regard, the concept of fūdo returns us to a richer, premodern conception of experience, one that, by restoring the “weight” of the things, holds out the promise of a partial reenchantment of nature. Although the philosophical implications of the concept of fūdo are novel, wide-ranging, and dramatic, the idea that the appearances of nature are “saved” in the event of disclosure is only incipient but never fully realized in Watsuji’s thought. This study shows that this aspect of Watsuji’s philosophy of nature can be more fully developed through a richer account of the disclosive capacity of actions, practices, language, and emotions.

This book thus offers a critical interpretation of Watsuji’s thought, but it does not aim to present an assessment of his oeuvre as a whole, or even to provide an interpretive reconstruction of the entirety of Climate and Culture (Fūdo), which is his main text on the theme of nature. To fully grasp Watsuji’s theory of fūdo, Climate and Culture must be read together with the third volume of Ethics (倫理学). There Watsuji supplies many more of the ingredients needed to fill out the highly compressed philosophical insights that were presented in the preface, first chapter, and last chapter of Climate and Culture. Nevertheless, my primary interest is less in the granular details of Watsuji’s texts themselves than it is in what I see as fundamental and original philosophical insights which emerge from them concerning the relation between fact and value, the nature of the self, the structure and status of experience, and, at the end of this study, the implications of the concept of fūdo for problems in phenomenology, for questions in environmental ethics, and for the recent turn to place and space in contemporary philosophy. In this regard this book belongs among recent works that seek, as James Heisig observes, “to put the ideas of the Kyoto School to use in rephrasing a range of traditional philosophical questions. This, in turn, has led to a creative rethinking of some of their core ideas in order to accommodate them to new modes of thought and problems specific to our own times.”

Among Western academics concerned with Kyoto School philosophy in these early decades of the 21st century, there is a renewed interest in Watsuji Tetsurō (1889–1960), a philosopher obviously related to Nishida philosophy, although he cannot be considered to be part of the school, *stricto sensu*. And among recent publications on his work (translations, books, articles, ...), one of the most outstanding is the study by David W. Johnson, *Watsuji on Nature: Japanese Philosophy in the Wake of Heidegger*. Although the book focuses on Watsuji’s philosophy of nature, centered around the notion of 風土 *fūdo* (often mistranslated as “climate”), it presents more globally the thought of the Japanese philosopher in its attempt to reinterpret the relations between selfhood (主体性), ethics (倫理学), history (歴史) and nature (自然), in the light of both Asian notions (mainly Confucianist and Mahāyāna Buddhist) and European concepts (drawn mostly from Hegelian dialectics, Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian hermeneutics). The author shows remarkably how Watsuji’s work is clearly situated within a hermeneutical tradition that includes Herder and Heidegger—to name just the two philosophers that have influenced him the most. “For Watsuji and other thinkers in this tradition, the intelligibility of nature, like the whole content of human experience, is disclosed and so mediated through our language, practices, and culture, and brought in this way to a kind of expressive articulation.” (p. 5). For these thinkers, in order to fully understand a phenomenon, it must be put in relation to the things that surround it, while these, in turn, need to be situated in a still larger contextual field. All this is done through a usage of language as disclosive, rather than designative, and it operates at the point where separate domains of intelligibility intersect. This includes methods that enrich the phenomenological descriptions of intentionality with the hermeneutic usage of etymology and philology.

Watsuji elaborates here on the word *fūdo* through a reappropriation of *Being and Time*’s notion of “being-in-the-world” (*in-der-Welt-sein*), unveiling the spatial dimension belonging to it that Heidegger’s stress on temporality had neglected. At the two poles of this phenomenological
structure, (1) the individual ek-sistent Dasein becomes a social human being (人間存在 ningen sonzai) constituted by its relations to others, it’s “practical interconnection of acts” (実践的行為的連関), while (2) the world (Welt) incorporates nature (風土性 fūdosei rather than 自然 shizen), as it is experienced and lived through by the self. Fūdo is a “moment” (契機) in the structure of human life.

Nature is not just an objective reality facing a subjective cogito: it is part of the very structure of human existence. The human being cannot exist without being part of nature and nature cannot be what it is without being disclosed by the world of human culture. This ontological interweaving is precisely what is expressed by the word 風土 fūdo, an ordinary Japanese term from which Watsuji derives very rich philosophical significance. In sum: we have our self not just in an individual and bodily subjectivity, but also “outside” of us: in our other fellow humans and in our surroundings, which are altogether natural and cultural. A human (人間 ningen: person+relation) is ontologically a relational structure (間柄 aidagara: relation+quality). So the isolated individual is an abstraction from this more primordial relational human reality: a negation of it. The full human being is formed by the dialectic unity of the person and the group, giving an identity to both the individual and the whole, which otherwise are both “empty” (空 kara). And the group cannot be understood in its very identity apart from its integration in its surroundings—which is discovered through the combination of a practical disposition, an affective orientation and a linguistically disclosive comportment.

Watsuji’s reinterpretation of all the above-mentioned expressions is enriched by Asian reflections on self and other (自他), such as the Confucian description of human relations (aidagara), or the Buddhist metaphysics of non-dualism (不二) and of conditioned co-production (因縁).

The most notable effort of David W. Johnson in this context lies in his endeavour to not just repeat and summarize Watsuji’s philosophy but to also show all the implications of his thinking, developing what remains unthought and finally proposing a speculative reconstruction of that which lies beyond what Watsuji actually said. So, for example, the “disen-chanted” dualistic objectivism of modern scientific thought is dissected in order to obtain a better view of how hermeneutic phenomenology (from Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger to Watsuji and Berque) manages to over-
come it; the hybrid nature of the self (individual and social) is illustrated by a number of concrete descriptions that make the point undisputable; and the same thing happens when this social space of the self is enlarged to its cultural, “atmospheric” and natural dimensions (where a clear limit between the natural and the artificial cannot always be drawn). The author also shows how the profound logic of Watsuji’s thought is not compatible with the geographic determinism nor with the “national environmentalism” some critics have seen in occasionally ambiguous aspects of his writings.

After having developed and illustrated the rich consequences of Watsuji’s hermeneutics of fūdo and having tried to make explicit what often remains unsaid in his philosophy of nature by giving both more weight and clarity to an often elliptical style, David W. Johnson shows us how the disclosive capacity of expressing the interweaving between man and nature, in all their liveliness, opens the horizon of a “reenchantment” of nature. Beyond new developments in phenomenology, this includes new horizons in environmental ethics which should help us address some of the specific ecological problems of our time. All this effort can contribute to “the promise of a reconciliation with the world” (209), and to the hope of finding ourselves at home in nature once again.

Notwithstanding the remarkable quality of this book, the reader might want to ask a couple of questions.

The first question: At a certain point, during his discussion of the interaction between person and group, Watsuji tends towards a dialectic of mutual negation between the individual and the totality which obviously merges with Nishididian metaphysics. To what extent is this metaphysical dimension an essential point in his argument? Could it not just be a stylistic subtlety to show his proximity with Kyoto School philosophy?

The second question: Watsuji’s reinterpretation of the notion of fūdo obviously offers a better understanding of how man is rooted in nature, but in what way does it really help us address the specific environmental problems of our time?
I would like to begin by thanking Professors Stevens, Berque, Mine, and Liederbach for their close and careful attention to this book and for so generously taking the time to respond in such thought-provoking ways to it.

The first question that Prof. Stevens poses is, “At a certain point, during his discussion of the interaction between person and group, Watsuji tends towards a dialectic of mutual negation between the individual and the totality which obviously merges with Nishidian metaphysics. To what extent is this metaphysical dimension an essential point in his argument? Could it not just be a stylistic subtlety to show his proximity with Kyoto School philosophy?” This certainly seems to be the view of commentators such as William LaFleur, who claims, as I have noted, that this dialectic is “never integrated well into the architecture of his philosophy.” I show that one reason for this is Watsuji’s confusing attempt to identify the movement of the self between individuation and community with the metaphysical structure of the nondual whole of human existence as such. As Thomas Kasulis observes, Watsuji sometimes fails to distinguish between

the betweenness of emptiness that logically precedes and makes possible the differentiation and logical tension between nin and gen (also called the originary totality) vs. the betweenness inherent in the collective pole, the gen of the ningen. That is, ningen is one kind of betweenness, namely, one that exists in the tension between the individual and the collective. The other kind of betweenness is that of collective itself (gen); as a collective, it is a totality between or among people.¹

The metaphysical dimension of the dialectic of mutual negation between the individual and the totality which Stevens alludes to refers in my view to the betweenness that is that of “the totality between or among people.” In short, Watsuji’s notion of mutual negation is another way of expressing the nondual character of the “collective itself (gen).” And while the vocabulary

that Watsuji deploys to articulate the nonduality of human existence may be clumsy (as well as needlessly technical), what emerges is something much more than a metaphysical construction that signals his affinity with the Kyoto School. As I show in Sec. iv of Chapter 5, the nondual structure of human existence necessitates that self and other also be distinct and differentiated entities in order for them to be situated in a relation of dependence on one another. And this means that there must be a certain kind of separation between the two. Because the relation between self and other is also a relation between physical entities, this separation is a physical separation—in space—between them. Space is what makes this mode of relational unity possible; it holds together and separates at the same time since there must be a distinction in and through space between one thing and another that separates the things related. Hence the nondual structure of human existence—in which one self exists in relational continuity with another—entails a space that both subtends the relation between practical subjects (inasmuch as space connects selves to one another) and links them to a world, and ultimately, to the lifeworldly dimension of nature that is disclosed through this world, namely, a fūdo.

In his second question, Stevens asks: “in what way does [the notion of fūdo] really help us address the specific environmental problems of our time?” In my study I tried to show that an understanding of the natural world in terms of fūdo entails an at least partially reenchanted concept of nature, namely, a nature characterized by qualities and values (such as beauty and sublimity) that we are entitled to take at face value, that is, to take as features of the natural world itself rather than as projections of the human mind. One of the ideas I drew on to support this claim was John McDowell’s argument that secondary qualities can be understood as subject-dependent entities that nevertheless count as real. I will not repeat the way that his argument establishes this claim; instead I would like to pursue more fully the way in which McDowell extends this argument to moral and aesthetic experience.

McDowell argues that the entities that populate the ethical and aesthetic domains are like secondary qualities in the relevant respects. In the same way that our everyday experience gives us secondary qualities as if they were features of things, our moral and aesthetic experience presents itself as an encounter with a value or disvalue residing in an object, and so suggests to us
that normative facts are “part of the fabric of the world.”  

More specifically, the ethical and aesthetic component of our evaluative thought presents itself as a sensitivity to normative facts, i.e., as properties residing in objects in the manner of a secondary quality, and the phenomenology of this experience allows one to make an analogy between the awareness of moral and aesthetic value in evaluative thinking and the perception of secondary qualities.

If we have found McDowell’s argument for the reality of secondary qualities persuasive, there does not seem to be any obstacle to accepting in addition at face value the appearances in evaluative thinking. But McDowell does not want to press the analogy too far, and notes that whereas secondary qualities may be said to elicit responses, values can be said to merit them, and that the presence of values are contentious, whereas that of secondary qualities is not. I suggest, loosely following J. L. Mackie, that what is philosophically contentious about values understood as properties of entities is that, on the one hand, they are supposed to exist independently of human beliefs or attitudes (like McDowell’s secondary qualities) and so can be understood as facts of the matter, while on the other, they are (unlike secondary qualities) intrinsically motivating and action-guiding.

To say that such properties are intrinsically motivating and action-guiding is to say that there would be something about the facts *themselves* that appealed to the agent or was felt to be compelling such that they either merit responses (such as particular attitudes or states of will) or give us good reasons for acting. In the former case, these properties demand an affective attitude such as being enchanted by (e.g., the beauty of a waterfall), being overwhelmed by (e.g., the sublimity of a canyon view), or simply appreciating what we are confronted with. This is a kind of awareness that is similar to an aesthetic response to an object. In the latter case, such properties are a feature of the world that seems to make a demand on us, that seems to require us to act—and this give us a good reason or motive to act that is independent of our own interests, desires, and goals (e.g., such as protecting a primeval forest landscape from developers who want to build a resort on the same site).

In short, the suggestion here is that we can be motivated to refrain from

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harming or destroying the environment because the metaphysical status of such properties entails that the natural world possesses features that are intrinsically valuable, and that this sense of its value is no merely “subjective” construal. Nevertheless, one might object that it seems highly unlikely that the mere recognition of intrinsic value will necessarily motivate or provide reasons for action regardless of the interests, desires, or psychological make-up of the agent. As Chad Engelland observes, “Mind bogglingly, intrinsic values can deliberately be ignored; they can fail to move us. It is therefore not enough to iterate intrinsic values; it is also necessary to give an account of the kind of disposition one must have in order to be receptive to them.”

The notion that we may need to become a certain kind of person to engage the world in fuller and truer ways is, of course, something that is thematized in the injunction to self-cultivation in classical Asian philosophy. This is also a project that can be pursued and developed, as I have tried to show elsewhere, by bringing Nishida’s work together with elements of the phenomenological tradition.

But a conception of nature as at least partially reenchanted is not the only way that the notion of fūdo can motivate us to address the specific environmental problems of our time. As I observed in the concluding chapter of the book, the convergence of nature and culture in fūdo allows us to see that the damage we do to nature through our practices is also a form of self-harm, one whose consequences and ultimate losses are more than merely physical. Jonathan Lear’s philosophical meditation on the collapse and death of the (native American) Crow life-world at the end of the nineteenth century has shown quite clearly just what such a loss comes to. It is a loss different in


kind and substance from something as grave as defeat in war or even as cata-
sto phic as the Holocaust. In the aftermath of such occurrences the defeated or the victims have the capacity to try to make sense of what has happened to them; but while the Crow people, like others who have suffered, continue to exist, their world does not. And with the end—after their move onto a reservation—of the traditional Crow way of life as warriors, hunters, and nomads, comes the end of the social and political structure, the celebrations and religious ceremonies, the narratives and rituals, the adult roles of men and women, and the education, play, and games of children that were directly tied to this life-way. With this the higher aims and values that govern a life are lost such that actions become unmoored from all meaning.

This loss, says Lear, “is a real loss, not just one that is described from a certain point of view. It is a real loss of a point of view.” And this means that the loss of a life-way “is not itself a happening but is the breakdown of that in terms of which happenings occur.” To lose a world is to lose the ability to make sense of one’s actions, projects, and very existence. This is the frame in which Lear interprets enigmatic statement of the Crow Chief Plenty Coups to a white interlocutor at the end of his life: “when the buffalo went away the hearts of my people fell to the ground, and they could not lift them up again. After this, nothing happened.” This example enables us to see in a particularly acute manner that there is no way to adequately compensate for this kind of destruction—the kind of damage and loss here is not only environmental, but also existential.

6. Ibid. The quotations in this paragraph are from—in the order in which they appear—pages 32, 38, and 2.

The last few lines of the conclusion aptly sum up the author’s judgment:

Watsuji’s theory of fūdo thus offers a novel, wide-ranging and complex view of how the self comes to be what it is—a view that moves beyond the problematic modern understanding of human beings as individual subjectivities ontologically decoupled from the natural and social environment that surrounds them. In this vision, we find instead that the self and its consciousness are rooted in a source far greater and more profound than the awareness of a single individual: not only are we immersed in, and emerge from, the depths of the historical and social world, but our lives both shape, and flow from, the vast life of nature (214).

The Japanese word fūdo, written 風土, is composed of the two elements “wind” (風) and “earth” (土). Let us first remark that it is not a very current word. I have met young Japanese who, hearing it for the first time, confused it with フード (food), and consequently confused fūdogaku 風土学 (the study of fūdo) with dietetics. This phenomenon enabled sociologist Miura Atsushi to publish in 2004 an essay which became a bestseller, entitled Fast-fūdoka suru Nippon ファスト風土化する日本. This title was rendered in French with “Le fūdo devient Macdo,” but a more respectful English equivalent might be The fast-fūdoisation of Japan.

These puns are far from being only jocular, because what is at stake here is exactly what Watsuji’s classic, Fūdo (1935) defines in its first line: “What this book aims at is to make clear fūdosei 風土性 as the structural moment
of human existence (人間存在の構造契機 ningen sonzai no kōzō keiki).” An immediate translation of this concept, ふどせい, would be “fudoity” or “fudonn-ess”: the quality of fudo, the manifestation of fudo. Johnson for his part uses the following periphrases to render its meaning: “nature as it is experienced and lived through” (6), “a fudo as it is encountered in experience, as part of a world, ...a particular region of nature as it is disclosed through the activities, practices, affective possibilities, and language that characterize a world” (15), “the concrete character of a human fudo as it is lived through” (48), “the character and quality of fudo as it is experienced and lived through” (26), “the experience of fudo” (42), “the concrete character of a region of nature as lived through” (107).

One may first wonder why Johnson does not take advantage of Watsuji’s proper definition in order to define this watsujian concept (ふどせい is indeed a concept created by Watsuji), which might possibly have led him to propose an English translation of that concept. Yet the fact is that Johnson is reluctant to translate Watsuji’s main concepts, to begin with fudo. The first chapter is dedicated to an excellent historical presentation of that word, starting with the ふどき記 風土記 (“official eighth-century reports on the history, geography, and customs of the provinces,” p. 18), up to its emergence as a philosophical concept in Watsuji’s works, in the sense which the above quotation of Johnson’s conclusion convincingly sums up. Yet I should like to add that, although fudo is widely recognized as one of the flagships of Japanese philosophy in the twentieth century—and the existence of such a book as Watsuji on Nature precisely testifies this—the fact is that most of its Japanese readers have misunderstood its purpose and purport. On the one hand, it is often considered as a Nihonjinron (an essay on the unique uniqueness of the Japanese), which it is indeed to some degree, but it is also much more: first and foremost, as its first line declares, it is a clarification of “the structural moment of human existence.” Second, although the second sentence of the book clearly dismisses determinism (“Therefore, the question here is not how the natural environment determines human life,” many readers, typically so geographers like Suzuki Hideo or Yasuda Yoshinori, have unshakeably interpreted it as a deterministic thesis, and used it to war-

1. In the Japanese text : この書の目指すところは人間存在の構造契機としての風土性を明らかにすることである.
rant their own. More generally, Japanese readers have understood fūdo just as if they had not read its first sentence (which is hard to digest, it must be said), thus ignoring Watsuji’s definition of fūdosei and inferring the meaning of this concept from the average understanding of the word fūdo, which stresses the singularity of a certain region or country. In that sense, fūdosei might be rendered with Gegendheit in German, comarcalidad in Castilian, and contréité in French.

Then what about English? Since country derives from contrée, fūdosei might then be translated with countriness. Yet, the meaning of country has evolved since that origin; and in particular, this word has now foremost the acceptation of nation, which is totally absent from fūdo. Moreover, and, in my eyes, mainly, countriness would have not much to do with Watsuji’s definition of fūdosei.

Now, what does this definition mean? The decisive word here is keiki 契機, which in Japanese philosophy has translated the German Moment. Not der Moment (a short lapse of time), but das Moment, which is a power of moving. Of moving what? In this instance, moving the relationship between the human and nature, and acting on both; and it is this moment which produces what nature (that universal) historically becomes: a singular fūdo.

Johnson for his part does not delve into Watsuji’s definition of fūdosei, but the paraphrases through which he expresses the meaning of this concept are entirely compatible with the above interpretation. So what is the problem? To put it in the worst sense, it is that, by refusing to translate both fūdo and its derivative fūdosei, he countrifies these concepts; he reduces them to two more unique nipponese notions, though—and this is an oximoron—classically “in the wake of” something Western (Heidegger in this instance). This locks out the possibility to have these concepts, and the related term fūdogaku 風土学 (the study of fūdo), display their true potential; that is, to overcome onto/logically (that means: both ontologically and logically) the modern classical Western paradigm, which has come to a dead end—let us rather say: a deadly end, that of the Sixth Extinction of life on this planet.

Let me precise immediately that this alone would be too harsh a judgment. I shall not forget to stress the evident qualities of this book, which presents clearly, concretely and in a pleasant-to-read manner—even for an unanglo (非英) being such as I—what I do think is the essence of Watsuji’s message. Yet a problem there is, because translation, in this case, is more than
putting or not Javanese into Tagalog, or Japanese into English. The reason for that is clearly expatiated upon by Johnson himself: language discloses a certain reality. And the time being what it is (that of the Anthropocene), we have to disclose a reality other than that which leads us toward the Sixth Extinction (which, of course, will comprise our own, not only that of pangolins). For such a task, we must have at our disposal, in each of our proper mother tongues, among other concepts, the equivalent of what Watsuji defined as “the structural moment of human existence.”

This need is demonstrated by the fact that, outside of Japan, the diffusion of the ideas of Fudo has been more than hindered: blocked by its translation in English, due to Geoffrey Bownas and sponsored by the unesco.¹ One cannot but say that this translation completely misses the purport of the book, leaving only its deterministic side (that of the non-theoretical chapters II to IV, based on Watsuji’s impressions as a traveller, not on his conceptual framework), which is nothing but mundane. Later a German version² was published, a better one but still approximate about Watsuji’s essential concepts.

Fudo (1935): here we have a book written by a philosopher, and which revolves around a concept: fūdosei 風土性, enunciated and defined, as we have seen, in the first sentence of its first line. In the two above translations, this becomes respectively: “My purpose in this study is to clarify the function of climate as a factor within the structure of human existence,” and “In der vorliegenden Studie möchten wir zeigen, daß fūdosei, das Klimatische, zur Struktur des menschlichen Dasein gehört.” The two main difficulties of this sentence are the translation of the concept of fūdosei and that of its definition as ningen sonzai no kōzō keiki 人間存在の構造契機. One can see that the concept is rendered differently: “the function of climate” on the one hand, “das Klimatische” on the other hand; and its definition too: “a factor within the structure of human existence,” and “die Struktur des menschlichen Daseins.” Keiki is not translated in the German version, although, in the Japanese philosophical vocabulary, this word, as we have

seen, has rendered the German *Moment*, frequently used for example in Hegel, and of primary importance for the Japanese philosophers of Watsuji’s generation.

That two different translations render differently a difficult sentence, nothing surprising here. Yet although the entry into this book is arduous—actually, this first sentence is certainly the most recondite in the whole book—it’s rigorous coherence with the theoretical construction of the introduction and the first chapter makes it luminously clear *a posteriori*. Not only does the whole of *Fūdo* revolve around the concept of *fūdosei*, but the text displays about that same term a conceptual apparatus of no less consistency. Now the two translations, as for them, do not respect this consistency: they fluctuate from page to page. To take here only the example of the introduction, which is short and where the word *fūdosei* occurs five times, it is respectively rendered as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English version</th>
<th>German version</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the function of climate</td>
<td><em>fūdosei</em>, das Klimatische</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“human climate”</td>
<td>das klimatische Bestimmtsein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>climate</td>
<td><em>fūdo</em>, Klima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>climate</td>
<td>das Klimatische</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, for one and the same word, each of the two versions adopts three different translations. Moreover, *climate* or *Klima* translating on the other hand another word in the same book, *fūdo*, an interference occurs between the two terms *fūdo* and *fūdosei*; whereas, in Japanese, these words are no less distinct than are in English *history* and *historicity*, or *space* and *spatiality*. As Watsuji, besides *fūdosei*, also derives from *fūdo* the adjective *fūdoteki* 風土的 (relative to *fūdo*), the adverb *fūdotekini* 風土的に (relatively to *fūdo*), as well as *fūdoron* 風土論 (*fūdo*-logy) and *fūdogaku* 風土学 (the science or study of *fūdo*), one can imagine the knock-on effects of such sideslippings in the two translations.

Still, the main problem is indeed, in both cases, the defaulting translation of *fūdo* and of its deriving concept *fūdosei* (the suffix -sei 性 being the equivalent of the German –keit, the Castilian –idad, the English –ness etc.). In the German text, this concept is not rendered with an adequate term, but the general frame of the problematics is nonetheless respected. In Bownas’ text, on the other hand, it is that whole frame which remains misunder-
stood; which, in some cases, leads the translator to surrealistic digressions, for lack of a conceptual seamark as regards the meaning of the book.

There exists also a Spanish translation, a conceptually more successful, first published in 1973 but out of sale for a long time, which was republished in 2006. It is remarkable because, here, \textit{fūdosei} is effectively translated, as testifies the first sentence: “El objeto de esta obra es resaltar la importancia de la ambientalidad—clima y paisaje—como elemento estructural de la existencia humana.” Yet one can see that the idea of structural moment, which is absolutely central in Watsuji’s conception of \textit{fūdosei}, is padded out into a trite “structural element,” which straightaway occults the Watsujian conception of human existence. As for the abovesaid five occurrences of \textit{fūdosei} in the introduction, they are rendered in the following way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English version</th>
<th>Spanish version</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the function of climate</td>
<td>ambientalidad, clima y paisaje</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“human climate”</td>
<td>ambientalidad climático-paisajística</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>climate</td>
<td>ambientalidad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>climate</td>
<td>ambientalidad existencial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The distinction between \textit{fūdo} and \textit{fūdosei}, for its part, is rather well respected, the first term being rendered with \textit{clima y paisaje}; but there remain some overlappings, as in the first occurrence above, or on the following page, where the brief expression \textit{fūdo no mondai} (the question of \textit{fūdo}) is rendered with a periphrastic “[el] clima y paisaje como ambientalidad constitutiva de la vida humana.” Besides, the derivatives of \textit{fūdo} are not arrayed into a genuine conceptual apparatus, but casually rendered in various ways. To sum up—and this corroborates the fact that the definition of the concept of \textit{fūdosei} is not rendered in the first sentence—, Watsuji’s problematics does not clearly appear.

Finally, there exists of \textit{Fūdo}—among the works which I have been able to consult—a Chinese version, which should have been supposed to respect Watsuji’s conceptual apparatus, since the sinographs could have been reproduced just as they are; but in fact, Watsuji’s problematics is erased, leaving

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
only a thesis of gross environmental determinism, as the first sentence testifies straightaway, since the concept of *fūdosei* (*fēngtŭxìng* 風土性) as well as its definition—and at the same time Watsuji’s conception of *ningen* 人間 (the human as a relational being, or more accurately, the human interlink) and that of *ningen sonzai* (human existence), which are no less central than *fūdosei* in Watsuji’s conception of *fūdo*—are squeezed out into in a flat “What this book aims at is to make clear the relation between the human’s existential modes (*rén dē cúnzài fāngshì* 人的存在方式) and milieu (*fēngtŭ* 風土).” Correlatively, the distinction between *fūdo* (*fēngtŭ*) and *fūdosei* (*fēngtŭxìng*) is not respected, to the detriment of the concept of *fūdosei* (*fēngtŭxìng*). Consequently, in the introduction, the five occurrences of *fūdosei* become:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English version</th>
<th>Chinese version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the function of climate</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“human climate”</td>
<td><em>fēngtŭxìng</em> 風土性</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>climate</td>
<td><em>fēngtŭxìng</em> 風土性</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>climate</td>
<td><em>fēngtŭxìng</em> 風土性</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is to say that the central idea of the book went up in smoke.... Because, for a Chinese reader, the word *fēngtŭ* 風土 evokes nothing more than the objective environment⁵; and it is to that objective environment that the improper simplifications of the translator tend to reduce the purpose of the book.

As can be seen, the fact is that the translators of *Fūdo*—as far as I know, that is, comparing only the English, German, Spanish and Chinese versions—have most of the time not been able to translate properly, or translate at all, the concept of *fūdosei*. As one of these translators, but also as a geographer, I have argued that it should be rendered with *médiance*, a neologism which I derived from the Latin *medietas*, same root as *medius* (central, in the middle, intermediate) which, combined with *lieu* (place), gave *milieu*. *Medietas* means “half,” which is to say that the human’s Being is both inside the self and *ek-sists* outside in her/his milieu; and that is indeed what Watsuji

⁵. The *Xiandai hanyu cidian* (The Chinese equivalent of the Oxford Concise) defines this word as follows : “A general term comprising the natural environment (land, mountains and rivers, climate), productions etc., the customs and mores proper to a certain region.”
means with his definition of *fūdosei* as a “structural moment” between these two “halves” of the human’s Being: self and milieu, as Johnson makes evident though he does not delve into that definition and does not translate *fūdosei*.

This is not all; using the Latin root *med-* and its Greek equivalent *meso-* enables one to display in French the whole fan of Watsuji’s terminology: *milieu, médiance, médial (fūdoteki 風土的), mésologie (fūdogaku), mésologique (fūdogakuteki 風土学的),* and so on. This is a conceptual apparatus homologous to that of Watsuji, and it is all based on his own definition of *fūdosei*: “the structural moment of human existence.” Noblesse oblige, English has the capacity to assimilate all these words almost just as they are in French: *milieu, mediance, medial, mesology, mesological,* and so on.

By the way, the word *mesology* has been around for a long time in English, where it was “introduced by the English colour theorist and philosopher George Field (1777–1854) in a book published in 1839, *Outlines of Analogical Philosophy*” (Wikipedia). I have not read that book, but it manifestly relates with colour, a topic discussed by Johnson. *Milieu* for its part is defined by the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* (5th edition, 1964) as: “Environment, state of life, social surroundings.” Nothing here dissonant with *fūdo*. Nevertheless, Johnson dismisses *milieu* on the ground that “in English *milieu* primarily connotes a social environment, and it does not really convey the vital and all-important sense of nature as the ground of *fūdo*” (24).

As for the first point, from beginning to end, and rightly so, Johnson relates *fūdo* with *aidagara* 間柄, which he defines as “being in relation to others” (79, and *passim* about the same). I wonder why this should not be compatible with “a social environment”...

It remains to be seen whether Johnson’s second argument for not translating *fūdo* with *milieu*, viz. that in English, *milieu* “does not really convey... nature as the ground of *fūdo*” is compatible with the Oxford Concise’s definition of that word. As we have just seen, this definition begins with the word *environment*. Now, doesn’t the idea of nature linger somewhere in the connotations of that word? To be sure, φύσις δὲ κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ (Heraclitus, Fragm. 123: Nature loves to hide), but environmental philosophers do not exclude nature from their concern (nor the reverse, environment from nature). Watsuji, for one, systematically associates the two terms in the syntagm *shizen kankyō* 自然環境 (natural environment). For certain, this is pre-
cisely in order to distinguish it from the concept of milieu (fūdo), but the idea of nature is evidently present in both cases. Johnson himself, in fact, here and there in his own book, uses milieu to convey the idea of fūdo; e.g. p. 210: “...the notion of fūdo enables us to see that natural environments—and their climates and geographies above all—afford ways of being. These shape the structure of cities and schedules, buildings and interactions as well as the structure of ideas, habits and values. Given that climate change alters such a milieu....”

The problem here is not that I should have liked Johnson to adopt my own translation of fūdo with milieu. It is that, by translating neither fūdo nor fūdosei, he bars himself from the whole problematics of mesology, the cornerstone of which was laid as soon as Plato’s Timaeus with the notion of χώρα, as both the matrix and the imprint of relative being (γένεσις). This mediance was already nothing else than what Johnson shows about the reciprocal relationship of self and fūdo. Yet, as we know, Plato’s rationalism, based on the principle of identity and its correlate, the principle of contradistinction, eventually excluded the possibility to define such a relationship. For the same reason, afterwards, it took more than two millenia for Western thought to reach anew the stage of conceiving of mediance, but this time with the methods of the natural sciences, thus experimentally proving it; namely with Jakob von Uexküll’s mesology (Umweltlehre).

It is not clear whether Watsuji, during his stay in Germany, or back to Japan, had or had not heard of Uexküll’s mesology, but the fact remains that his own mesology (fūdogaku) relies on the two same pillars which Uexküll had established: 1. the subjecthood (Subjektitāt, shutaisei 主体性) of the concerned being (in Uexküll’s case the animal, or the living in general, and in Watsuji’s case the human); 2. correlative, the necessity to distinguish the objective environment (Umgebung, kankyō, under the gaze-from-nowhere of modern science) from the milieu (Umwelt, fūdo) of such situated subjects (Subjekten, shutai 主体), living this milieu through their own flesh.

It may be that Heidegger’s thought was the medium between Watsuji (1889–1960) and Uexküll (1864–1944), because Uexküll profoundly influenced Heidegger (1889–1976), who even dedicated half of his seminar of 1929–1930 to Uexküll’s ideas, making them heideggerian. Indirectly and unconsciously though it may be, Johnson propagates this influence when he writes for example the following: “perception is never the simple mir-
roring of what is present; it always includes and involves meaning, and so the understanding of something ‘as’ something” (196). This “something as something” is word for word that which in Heidegger was expressed as “etwas als etwas,” and which, in the above seminar, was construed in the following way: “[Aristotle] wants to say what we call the structure of ‘as’ (die »als<-Struktur). That is what he wants to say, without really advancing expressly into the dimension of that problem. The structure of ‘as’, the prece-dingly unifying perception (vorgängige einheitbildende Vernehmen) of something as something (etwas als etwas), is the condition of possibility of the truth or of the falseness of the λόγος.”

Now, if Heidegger was able to write the above, it is because he knew about Uexküll’s findings, which have experimentally proved that an object never exists as such for an animal, but necessarily in a certain “tone” (Ton), which depends on this animal’s species. For example, a same tuft of grass will exist as food (Esston) for a cow, as an obstacle (Hinderniston) for an ant, as a shelter (Schutzton) for a beetle, etc. Later, Heidegger developed the same idea in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, in which the famous “dispute” (Streit) between “earth” (die Erde) and “world” (die Welt) is manifestly derived from the enactment (ἐνέργεια, as Aristotle would have put it) of the Umgebung “as” a certain Umwelt; in other words, the historical incarnation of nature’s universal virtuality “as” the singularity of a concrete milieu.

The developments of post-uexküllian and post-watsujiian mesology have founded anew the problematics of the nature/culture relation. Yet it must be stressed that this relation, being concretely nothing else than the relation of Humankind with the Earth, has been questioned for more than two millennia by geography. No surprise that Johnson, in the last pages of his book, uses repeatedly such words as geography or geocultural, though he did not notice (or does not mention) that Watsuji himself, in his 1948 codicil to the


second edition of *Fūdo* (287 in the 1979 *bunko* edition, Iwanami), explicitly refers to Vidal de la Blache’s *Principes de géographie humaine*, which he regrets not having read before writing his own essay (as a matter of fact, Vidal’s book, published posthumously in 1922, translated by Iizuka Kōji, was published in Japanese only in 1940). Why that? Because Vidal’s *géographie humaine*, reacting against the determinism prevailing at the time in German and Anglo-Saxon geographies, had shown that, even in comparable natural environments, human societies can historically develop completely different *genres de vie* (a concept which Iizuka rendered with *seikatsu yōshiki* 生活様式). This idea—which Lucien Febvre later qualified as “possibilisme”—was indeed consonant with Watsuiji’s opposition to determinism. Yet he adds, rightly so, that even if he had known of Vidal’s theory before, that would not have changed his basic point of view. He does not say why, but we know the answer: whereas Vidal’s standpoint was classically that of positive geography, and therefore does not distinguish environment from milieu, Watsuiji’s standpoint, as we have seen, is truly mesological.

Let me conclude in stressing, once again, that Johnson’s book gives us an excellent presentation of Watsuiji’s problematics of *fūdo*, while adding the wish that he may some day, why not, *de-countrify* it and delve further into that of mesology as such.
Prof. Berque’s essay approaches my book through the erudite rehearsal of an argument he has long made—one which, however, I have not taken up or made my own. This is the claim that the term *fūdosei* 風土性 should be translated with the word *médiance*, which is a neologism Berque derives from the Latin *medietas* (center; half; intermediate state; amidst). He wants to use this term to capture the way the human being for Watsuji is not a self-contained silo, a being closed up on itself, but one that exists only in and through its natural milieu. Berque points out that this “is indeed what Watsuji means with his definition of *fūdosei* as a “structural moment” between these two “halves” of the human’s Being: self and milieu…. This is not all; using the Latin root *med-* and its Greek equivalent *meso-* enables one to display in French the whole fan of Watsuji’s terminology: *milieu*, *médiance*, *médial* (*fūdoteki* 風土的), *mésologie* (*fūdogaku*), *mésologique* (*fūdogakuteki* 風土学的), and so on.” He observes that his conceptual apparatus maps onto Watsuji’s own, and contends that “English has the capacity to assimilate all these words almost just as they are in French: *milieu*, *mediance*, *medial*, *mesology*, *mesological*, and so on.”

These claims and the impressive evidence assembled to support them (etymological investigations, comparative analyses of translations of the term *fūdosei* across different languages, and so on) have appeared in multiple places; they are repeated in his essay first, in order to highlight where the basic outlines of our respective interpretations of Watsuji overlap and second, in order to show why there is a substantive complaint to be lodged against my decision to leave *fūdosei* untranslated. With respect to the former, Berque acknowledges that my study does make the mediating and mediated character of *fūdosei* evident. Regarding the latter point, the difficulty for Berque appears to be that I do not “delve into that definition [of *médiance*].”

Although in the book I do not explicitly address why I do not make use of and expound on the term *médiance* in particular (as well as the closely connected *medial* and *mesology*), the reason for this should be clear from two
of the central claims that I defend and substantiate there. The first problem with making use of the word *médiance* is that it only covers one dimension of the sense in which the human being “stands outside” of itself (*ex-sistere*), namely the self as it exists outside of itself and has its being in the natural world (recall that for Berque *médiance* = *fūdosei*), yet the terms *médiance*/*medial* at once connote something far broader and more general than this, namely, the self as mediating and mediated *in toto*. Despite this connotation, Berque’s narrower definition of *médiance* means that in his hands it does not capture the other essential sense in which the self is mediating and mediated for Watsuji, namely, the way that the self stands outside of itself and has its being in others (*aidagara* 間柄). Others are also a key dimension of the self’s transcendence, one which is inseparably interwoven with *fūdosei*—as I show in extensive discussions in the book of phenomena such as “shared intentionality” (*kyōdōshikō* 共同志向), and the historicity of nature. The use of the term *médiance* to convey *fūdosei* alone causes confusion, unfortunately, because its etymology suggests something much wider; this has the consequence of obscuring what must be opened up, namely, the totality of the mediating and mediated structure of the self; this is a unified structure whose central dimensions are nevertheless analytically distinguishable. To express this, both in this study and elsewhere, I have instead mapped out a topology of the self through the planes of nature and sociality.

The second reason that I do not employ the term *médiance* is that I espouse and defend a conception of language as fundamentally disclosive and expressive rather than designative and referential. Although Berque indicates that he is aware of this rationale he does not engage with this standpoint or its philosophical consequences, which are considerable. I will not repeat here what I have already laid out in a series of arguments in the book (see “Translating *Fūdo*,” 21–6, as well as 173–6, 238–41) except to note the most prominent landmarks. The first of these is that Watsuji’s work can be situated within an international hermeneutical tradition that includes Herder, Humboldt, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur inasmuch as the conception of language as a holistic and disclosive medium that emerges from this tradition has deep intellectual and historical affinities and overlaps with Watsuji’s own philosophical stance (see Chapter 7, 155–80, as well as 281–6). This conception of language and linguistic meaning poses serious obstacles to the adequate translation of terms such as *fūdo* and *fūdosei*. This is because
what is disclosed by terms like these depends upon an adequate grasp of the rich semantic, cultural, and historical background in which they are situated. Without this context, a loss in translation occurs insofar as the original language can disclose something which cannot be made manifest in another language. In short, my claim is that different languages can disclose different things, and no single language is able to say or show everything.

Moreover, because these terms have been appropriated by Watsuji as philosophical concepts, that is, concepts which bring to light new realities and give us novel ways of understanding the world, translating these terms undermines (and sometimes distorts) their disclosive force as philosophical concepts, just as would be the case were we to translate Dasein with terms such as subject or consciousness, or phronēsis with prudence. Watsuji was aware of this problem, which is why he rejects the translation of ningen 人間 (which was another key philosophical concept for him) with words from Western languages such as anthropos, homo, man, or Mensch. One needs more than a “translation” of Dasein, phronēsis, or fūdo to see what these terms make manifest—one needs a translation of the philosophical account which accompanies and explains the use of these terms; Watsuji on Nature is in part an attempt to provide just such an account.

What is disclosed by fūdo and fūdosei as philosophical concepts, moreover, can be made intelligible even—and perhaps especially—if these terms are left untranslated, just as in the case of the examples from German and ancient Greek. In carrying these words over into the target language and working with them over time, we develop a fuller sense of the network of ideas, values, practices, narratives, texts, related terms, and claims that surround these terms and fill out their sense and significance. An example of this approach in our own philosophical tradition is the way in which we work with Greek or Latin terms, no longer automatically translating logos into reason or arête into virtue. The process of struggling to incorporate these terms into our already existing philosophical vocabulary, in turn, enlivens and enriches it. This kind of contact with radically other vocabularies and ways of thinking can also provide a powerful stimulant to the linguistic imagination. Through this attempt to say something in a novel way with foreign words, new meanings come into being and new
realities are brought to light. And this, in turn, can open up new ways of being and thinking.¹

It would be good to know what Prof. Berque makes of any of this—the philosophical claims and arguments about the disclosive nature of language, the attendant obstacles to translation for such a conception, the special challenges posed by philosophical concepts from another language, the examples of precedents in German and Greek, or the convergence of these points with Watsuji’s own views. But he unfortunately says nothing about any of these issues. A response of some kind, I respectfully suggest, would have given his complaint more substance.

Rather than engage with any of these questions, Berque maintains that “The problem here is not that I should have liked Johnson to adopt my own translation of fūdo with milieu. It is that, by translating neither fūdo nor fūdosei, he bars himself from the whole problematics of mesology.” This proclamation comes as something of a surprise. On page 49 I provide a translation of the key line from Watsuji that Berque places at the center of mesological thinking: “The aim of this book is to elucidate the character of fūdo as it is lived through and experienced (fūdosei 風土性) as a moment (keiki 契機) of the structure of human existence (ningen sonzai no kōzō 人間存在的構造).” I go on to state that “the full meaning of this passage will become apparent only at the end of our own study.” By the end of the study I have set out some of the main ingredients of a mesological ontology of the lived experience of nature: the return to the lifeworld that is made possible by Heidegger’s phenomenology, an extensive account of our linguistic, affective, and practical modes of disclosing nature, an analysis of the composite process of collective and historical change (Chapter 8, “Nature, History, Transcendence”) based on an analysis of structure and agents that does not give primacy to either, an exhibition of the mutually constitutive unity of self-understanding and disclosure with one another in fūdo (this demonstration of an interactional domain underlying the unity of the subjective and objective and the physical and phenomenal is at the very ground of mesological thinking, see, e.g., 196–7), and, in the final chapter, an argument advancing the idea that the

¹ I have recently set out these ideas and arguments in “The Limits of Language: Philosophical Hermeneutics and the Task of Comparative Philosophy,” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 14/3: (2020).
reality of our world is emergent rather than sheerly and objectively there, already complete in itself—that it comes most fully into being in unfolding with and through the active participation of human and animal perception. The last three items in this list are all intimately connected, moreover, to what in Berque’s mesological terminology is called trajection.

In short, rather than use the term mesology (partly for the reasons already given) I have instead shown what lies at its philosophical heart. One wishes in all sincerity that Berque had come to grips with the main themes and claims of Watsuji on Nature in relation to his own thinking about mesology. It would have been enlightening and fruitful, for instance, to compare my re-reading of philosophers such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty with what he has set out in his own system. It would have been good to know in this regard what he thinks of Merleau-Ponty’s account of perception as an opening onto a world that it simultaneously belongs to and emerges from. As I attempt to show, insofar as the capacity to perceive belongs to the things perceived, the comportments and dispositions that realize these capacities can also be said to belong to what they would disclose. This idea, in turn, underlies my claim that “in our encounter with nature as fūdo, it can be said that this experience is the disclosure of a nature which presents itself to us.” I can only wonder what Berque would have made of these points in light of his affirmation of Uexküll’s relativism about human and animal perception.

I turn now to address two final points. First, Berque maintains that the idea of the perception (Vernehmen) of something “as” something in Heidegger was made possible “because he [Heidegger] knew about Uexküll’s findings,” and suggests that the “as” structure is derived from the notion of “tone” (Ton) in Uexküll. For philosophers working in this area the connection between Heidegger and the theoretical biology of Uexküll has long been well-known. And while not wishing to downplay this link, it must be said that the precise nature and extent of Uexküll’s influence on Heidegger is unclear. In his authoritative study titled The Genesis of Being and Time, Theodore Kiesel notes only that “the young Heidegger was clearly aware of Uexküll’s then-popular notion of Umwelt.” But if, as Berque contends, there

was a direct connection between Heidegger’s notion of the “as” structure of perception and the results of Uexküll’s forays (Streifzüge) into the Umwelt of animals, the relationship was not that of model and copy. In fact, in the text which Berque draws our attention to (Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit), insofar as Heidegger examines Uexküll’s ideas, this is done in order to contrast the animal as world-poor (weltarm) with the human being as world-forming (weltbildend). The animal has access to the entities in its environment only insofar as these stimuli initiate or inhibit its drives. Since it is absorbed (benommen) or captivated within the circle of its drives, it never reaches entities in their being. Heidegger maintains that the animal is carried away (hingenommen) by what is in its environment such that its behavior (Benehmen) does not involve apprehension (Vernehmen). Since the animal cannot “apprehend something as something, something as an entity at all,” “the animal is separated from man by an abyss.” What is at stake here, then, is the chasm opened between Watsuji’s Heideggerean understanding of fūdo and Uexküll’s notion of the animal Umwelt by the transcendence of Dasein and the concomitant phenomenon of the ontological difference. If we truly want to understand the origins and development of Heidegger’s notion of the hermeneutic as, we must set this as side by side with the apophantic as in his thought and begin to excavate and work through the many thinkers that had a decisive influence on the development both of these concepts, a list that would include Aristotle, Herder, Humboldt, Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Scheler, and Husserl.

Finally, I would like to offer a minor correction to Berque’s last point in which he states that

[...] Johnson, in the last pages of his book, uses repeatedly such words as geography or geocultural, though he did not notice (or does not mention) that Watsuji himself, in his 1948 codicil to the second edition of Fūdo (p. 287 in the 1979 bunko edition, Iwanami), explicitly refers to Vidal de la Blache’s Principes de géographie humaine, which he regrets not having read before writing his own essay (as a matter of fact, Vidal’s book, published posthu-

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mously in 1922, translated by Iizuka Kōji, was published in Japanese only in 1940). Why that? Because Vidal’s *géographie humaine*, reacting against the determinism prevailing at the time in German and Anglo-Saxon geographies, had shown that, even in comparable natural environments, human societies can historically develop completely different *genres de vie* (a concept which Iizuka rendered with *seikatsu yōshiki* 生活様式). This idea—which Lucien Febvre later qualified as “possibilisme” – was indeed consonant with Watsuji’s opposition to determinism. Yet he adds, rightly so, that even if he had known of Vidal’s theory before, that would not have changed his basic point of view. He does not say why, but we know the answer: whereas Vidal’s standpoint was classically that of positive geography, and therefore does not distinguish environment from milieu, Watsuji’s standpoint, as we have seen, is truly mesological.

But in note 13 of the eighth chapter I observe that

Jeff Malpas reminds us that the same kind of integrated spatiotemporal analysis is especially prominent within twentieth-century historiography, which has explicitly thematized the interplay of climactic, geological, and topographical factors and human action, society and culture. He observes that Paul Vidal de la Blache and Lucien Febvre played a foundational role in the rise of this kind of geographically oriented history. See *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place*, 138–40. Watsuji read de la Blache and Febvre, but their influence on him was limited since, as he notes in the postface added to *Fūdo* in 1948, he read both of them after writing this text. Moreover, while he approves of de la Blache and Febvre’s criticism of Friedrich Ratzel’s approach as a form of environmental determinism, he decided against making any major revisions to the manuscript of *Fūdo* because his study of *fūdo* (*fūdogaku* 風土学) is not to be simply identified with the human geography of these two scholars.

It is difficult to think of a Western commentator who has done more than Berque to direct our attention to the important distinction to be made between human geography and Watsuji’s *fūdoron*, or to the singular character and intellectual significance Watsuji’s *fūdogaku*. By way of conclusion I would hence like to repeat, though in a somewhat different key, the admiration I expressed for Prof. Berque’s work in the acknowledgements section of *Watsuji on Nature*. It is precisely because I have benefitted in large and small ways from his scholarly and insightful examination of the concepts of *fūdo* and *fūdosei* that I regret the missed opportunity here for a genuine
encounter between our approaches to Watsuji’s work, especially given the manner in which the imaginative and theoretical power of Berque’s version of *fudogaku* has done so much to further the philosophical discussion of these topics.
嶺 秀樹 Mine Hideki

和辻はハイデガーから何を継承し、何を継承しなかったか

本書のテーマである和辻の風土論は、最近欧米でも取り上げられることが少なくないが、本書の特色は、自己と自然の関係性を間柄としての人間存在の関係性と絡み合わせて考察するところにある。自己の関係性の自然的次元（風土性）と社会的次元（間柄存在）が自己をどのような仕方で自己たらしめているかに着目し、そこから和辻の風土論の主要な論点である自己と自然の連続性、共属性を明らかにしようとしている。著者の関心は、和辻がその風土論において「言い得なかったこと」、「まだ考えられずにとどまっていること」を明確にするところにある。「事実と価値の関係、経験の構造、現象学や環境倫理学の諸問題に対して風土論の及ぼす影響」という現代哲学にとっても重要なテーマを視野に入れつつ、和辻の風土論の現代的意義を取り出そうとする著者の仕事は、日本の一哲学者の紹介をはるか超えた読みごたえのある書物となっている。具体的な事象分析をまじえて風土論の理論的核心と思われる部分に切り込んでいく手口は、和辻解釈としても説得力があり、とりわけ実践的行為、言語、情動性のもつ「開示の能力」（faculty of disclosure）に焦点を定めて、和辻の風土論がもつ哲学的可能性を追求するさまは、大変刺激的でもある。

この書評で取り上げたい論点は、和辻とハイデガーの「関係」（"Japanese Philosophy in the Wake of Heidegger"という副題にもあるように、本書の重要な視点）である。著者ジョンソン氏は、現象学や解釈学を思索の地盤とする哲学者らしく、両者の関係をバランスよく取り扱い、ハイデガーの解釈学的現象学を批判的に継承した和辻の風土論や倫理学の哲学的射程を、和辻に影響を与えた東西の思想的伝統や哲学者たちの文脈に十分留意しながら、粘り強く考察している。しかし、すべて問題が解消したわけではない。たとえば著者は、個人であると共に社会的存在である「自己」の動的弁証法的構造を風土性の問題と結びつけて理解してこそ、和辻の風土論の本来の射程が見えてくると考えている。結果的に通じられない。それはまさに和辻自身の立場から見ても正しいだろう。だが、そもそもハイデガーの解釈学的現象学が弁証法的思考と相容れないものもっていることを顧みるだけでも、和辻におけるハイデガーの継承と批判の問題は、それほど単純ではないことがわかる。

周知のように、和辻の風土論の構想は、彼がハイデガーの「存在と時間」を読み、「世界内存在」（In-der-Welt-sein）としての「現存在」（Dasein）を現象学的に分析する
手法にふれたことに始まる。しかし和辻はハイデガーの分析が時間性に偏っていること、空間性が背景に退いていることを批判し、その理由をハイデガーの「現存在」が個人的であることに求めた。空間性を重視するならば、人間存在の間柄としてのあり方が際立ってくる。その際、人間存在の根本原理とされたのが、個人性と全体性の間の弁証法的運動であり、それを貫く「絶対否定性」の「空」であった。人倫のこうした根本原理に基づいて間柄としての人間存在の独自な「倫理学」が展開されることになるのである。しかし、和辻の風土論の経験的基盤に注目してみると、「間柄としての人間存在論」と「風土論」とがいったいどのように連関しているか、やはり問題となる。『倫理学』の第四章「人間存在の歴史的風土的構造」におけるように、和辻が両者を一つの事柄として追求しようとしたことは明らかだが、事象への接近の仕方としての方法論の観点から言えば、自己の関係性の自然の次元と社会的次元の間には連続性よりもむしろ非連続性が顕著になってくる。自己の間柄としての関係性を自己と自然の関係性に絡めて考えることは、そう簡単なことではないのである。

こうした困難は、著者も言及している坂部恵の和辻評、すなわち、和辻には「個と共同体全体との関係を排他的部分とその総和という人格的ないしより正確には間人格的世界の表層でのみ妥当する論理ないし図式に従って考える傾向」がある、という指摘に関連しているように思われる。そこから、「ヨーロッパの主観性を克服しようとした和辻自身がはたしてそこから完全に自由であったかどうか」という疑問も出てくるだろう。そうした意味で、和辻におけるハイデガーの批判的継承の意味を今一度再考に載せ、方法論の観点から両者の「自己」理解の内実を検討してみることは無駄ではない。評者としては、特に「開示の出来事（an event of disclosure）」としての「風土の生きた経験」の問題に制限しつつ、次の二つの観点から著者の「自己」理解の内実を検討してみることは無駄ではない。評者としては、特に「開示の出来事（an event of disclosure）」としての「風土の生きた経験」の問題に制限しつつ、次の二つの観点から著者の「自己」理解の内実を検討してみることは無駄ではない。

（１）「実在の知覚」の「一人称的観点」（the first-person standpoint, p. 207）について。著者は、風土の開示性のありかたをより明確にするために、実在としての一人称的経験に言及している。メルロ＝ポントやマクダウェルを援用して展開される「自己と自然の連続性」、「相互帰属性」の問題は、和辻が風土論や人間の学としての倫理学を展開した際に、ハイデガーの現象学的解釈学から何を継承し、何を継承しなかったかということも関わっている。周知のように、和辻は、倫理学の体系を展開

1. 坂部恵『ペルソナの詩学』（岩波書店、1989年）、114ページ。
するに先立って、方法論としてハイデガーの現象学よりはむしろ解釈学を優先し、ハイデガーの「現象学的還元」を「人間存在への解釈学的還元」に転釈した。その意味を十分に検討してみるとよく分かかるように、和辻は一人称的観点をつねに保持していたとは言えないのである。この疑念は、和辻の風土論や倫理学の具体的な叙述に立ち入って見てみれば、一層強くなる。たしかに、ハイデガーの「現存在」（Dasein）の「現」（Da）の「開示性」（Erschlossenheit）を主観性克服の契機と捉え、自己の自己性を「開示の出来事」の視点から考えるべきだという著者の方向は正しい。「人間存在と自然の相互浸透性」（和辻の風土性やベルクの通態性）という自己の関係性を、間柄としての人間存在の二重性と重ねて考えるべきだという主張も、和辻の意図に沿うもので、十分に頷ける。しかし、和辻の風土論の枠組みを決定する思考法に、主観と客観の分離以前の原経験とも言うべき「一人称的観点」から外れるような傾向が含まれているとすれば、どうであろうか。またそれが和辻の風土論における一種の環境決定論的な傾向を生み出す機縁ともなっていたとすれば、どうであろうか。この問題は、ハイデガーの「存在と時間」の現存在分析の基本的視点である「自己性」（Jemeinigkeit）を、単に「個人性」として批判した和辻の主張に関わるだけに、慎重に考えるべき問題であろう。 (2) ハイデガーの「存在論的差異」や「超越」についての和辻の理解について。和辻はハイデガーの「現存在」を個人的なものにすぎないと批判し、現存在の時間性に基づいたハイデガーの超越概念を、間柄としての人間存在の絶対否定性の構造に転化して理解すべきだとした。和辻のこうした歩みは、ハイデガーの存在論的差異や超越の問題の発展的解消と見なすべきだろうか。それともむしろハイデガーの思索の核心を見逃し、「存在論的次元」（ontologische Dimension）を単に「人間学的存在的次元」に平板化したと見るべきではないか。著者は、和辻が存在論的差異の問題をきちんと捉えていたとし、それを風土論に含まれる「開示」（disclosure）の事柄に認めようとしている。しかし、周知のように、ハイデガーの「存在論的差異」は「超越」と一つの事柄である。そうすると、和辻がハイデガーの意味での「超越」を認めようとしていなれば、「存在論的差異」についてもハイデガーと違った理解をしていることになる。「存在論的差異」や「超越」の思想をめぐるハイデガーと和辻の違いが、和辻自身の風土論のもつ困難にもその影を落としていると思われるだけに、（1）の問題とも連関させて、和辻の風土論や倫理学の基盤を「存在論的差異」や「超越」の問題の光のもとで
再検討する必要があるのではないか。その際、一つの重要な視点として、和辻が（そして西田や田辺などの当時の他の日本の哲学者たちも同様にして）、ハイデガーの「存在論の歴史の現象学的破壊」（eine phänomenologische Destruktion der Geschichte der Ontologie）の課題を十分理解していないことに着目すべきであろう。

まず第一の問題に関して、補足しつつ質問の意図もうすこし明確にしてみよう。「一人称的観点」を説明する具体例としては、著者も言及している「寒さ」や「花の美しさ」の経験が挙げられるだろう。和辻によると、我々が寒さを感じるとき、「寒気」というような独立した物理的実在があって、それが我々に影響し、その結果、我々が寒さを感じるのではなく、我々は直接に「外気の冷たさ」を感じている。我々と寒さは、それぞれ別別に存じて関係し合うのではなく、我々ははじめから「寒さの内へ出て」いて、「寒さ自身の内に自己を見いだす」のである。寒さを感じるということと寒さそのものは一つの出来事である。この事態を、我々は寒さが現出する「場所」であり、我々において外の「寒さ」が露わになっている、と言い表すこともできる。3。「花の美しさ」についても同様のことが言える。花の美しさは、我々が「花」に投射した主観的な性質や価値ではない。また我々人間存在から引き離した花の客観的性質でもない。和辻によると、「人間は花の美しさを観ずることにおいて、花のもと出ているおのれの存在を受け取っている」。同じ事態を、我々は「花の美しさ」が露わになる「場」であると言い表してもよいだろう4。詩人や画家が描いた作品が、「花の真の生命を露わにしているように感ぜられる」のもそのためである。

このように、「一人称的観点」が物事が現出する原初的経験、いわゆる主観・客観の区別以前の出来事を言い表す言葉であるとすると、この「一人称的」な観点を他者と区別された「私」の観点とか「個人的」な観点と見なすことは、原初的な「開示性」の出来事にそぐわないことになる。「個人」とか「間柄」ということは、「原初的」で「一人称的」な観点を、つまり実在が露わになる経験の「現場」をいったん離れて、それをいわば外から反省して初めて可能になる「三人称的」規定である。ハイデガーの「現存在の実存論的分析」(die existenzielle Analytik des Daseins) の指して立つ「各自性」(Jemeinigkeit) も同じように理解すべきだろう。

以上のことが正しいとすると、和辻が「風土の基礎理論」において寒さの志向的経験を根本的には「間柄の経験であるとし、「寒さにおいて己れを見いだすのは、根源的には間柄としての我々なのである」と述べるとき、「私」の寒さの知覚的直接

3. 和辻 8:8 以下参照。
4. 和辻 11:106 参照。
経験が言語や他者との共同性に媒介されているという意味では正鵠を得ているが、
経験の構造を分析し解釈する立場としては、すでに「三人称的」観点に立っていると
いわざるをえないのではないか。ここには、一人称的現象学的開示性の経験に立脚
するということと、それを記述し、分析し、解釈するという三人称的立場との微妙な
関係が伏在しており、現象学的解釈学に共通の課題となっている。「経験において出
会われる風土性」すなわち「実践的活動性や情動や言語を通して開示される出来事」
を言い表すために、著者が「我々としての私、私としての我々」（I-as-we and we-as-I）
という言い方をするのは、間柄としての「共同的振る舞い」（shared comportment）を
言い表す表現としては適切だと思うが、一人称的な開示性としての原初的の経験の次
元には当てはまらないのではないか。
こうした指摘は、実は和辻のハイデガー批判、すなわち「彼（ハイデガー）におい
ては存在への通路はわれと物との係わり」であり、「人」ははじめから「われ」とし
て規定されているという主張の正否を検討したいがためである。ハイデガーの現存
在の「存在的内容」は「われ」としての「ひと」であり、ハイデガーの実存論は個人
の立場に立っているという和辻の主張は、間柄としての人間存在論の立場から当然
出てくることである。しかし、それがハイデガーの基本的出発点（これを括弧付きで
「一人称的立場」と呼んでも大過ないと思う）を正しく捉えているかとなると、そうで
はないと言わざるをえない。というのも、「各自性」としての「現存在」の「開示性」
の出来事、言い換えれば「現存在」の「超越」の行き先としての「存在」の「真性
（Wahrheit）＝隠れのなさ（Unverborgenheit）」は、「存在者」としての「個人」とは
次元を異にするからである。ハイデガーの「各自性」としての「自己」の次元は、本
来的実存であれ非本来的実存であれ、現存在の「真性」（および「非真性」）に根ざ
したものである。このように、ハイデガーの現存在の「自己性」が「各自性」として、
そもそも私と汝、個人と他者、我々と事物などの諸関係が露わになるところの「超越」
の「場」（これを後期のハイデガーは「存在の明け開け」（Lichtung des Seins）と呼んだ）
であるとすると、和辻のように、『存在と時間』の現象学的立場が「個人の立場」で
あると断定するのは行き過ぎであり、ハイデガーの曲解であると思ええる。和辻の「人
間の学としての倫理学」が現象学ではなく、むしろディルタイ的な生、表現・解の
連関に立脚した解釈学の道を辿ろうとするのも、こうした誤解に端を発しているので
はなかろうか。それがもし日常性における表現とその了解を通じて人間存在の構造を
把握しようとする倫理学の必然の成り行きだとすれば、自然の根源的開示性の経験
に基づいた現象学的洞察から出発する「風土論」と、実践的行為的連関に立脚した
解釈学としての「倫理学」の絡み合った関係は、より注意深く解きほぐしていく必要
がある。そのための手がかりとして第二の超越と存在論的差異の問題に少し立ち入って考えてみたい。

ハイデガーの「超越」や「存在論的差異」を取り上げる際にまず念頭に置いておかなければならないことは、密接に関連した両概念が『存在と時間』におけるハイデガーの基礎的神論論の構想に従って理解されるべき形而上学的事柄だということである。和辻はこの両概念について形の上ではそれなりの理解を示しているが、ハイデガーの「基礎的神論論」の構想および「超越」や「存在論的差異」の真意については、きちんと把握していたとは言えない。その理由として、彼が当時読むことができたハイデガーのテキストが限られており、しかもその主たるテキストである『存在と時間』が第一部の途中で挫折しており、第二部の「存在論の歴史の現象学的破壊」が発表されずに未完にとどまったことなどが挙げられるかもしれない。周知のように、『存在と時間』の公刊された内容の大部分は、「現存在の実存論的分析」に関わるものであり、『存在と時間』は当時から「実存哲学」や「人間存在論」として受け止められる危険性があった。和辻は『人間の学としての倫理学』において、『存在と時間』公刊の後すぐに行われた1927年夏学期の講義『現象学の根本問題』に触れており、超越や存在論的差異の問題について理解を深める機会があったはずである。だが彼は「超越」の概念を、世界内存在としての現存在が時間性の構造に基づいて「外に出て行くこと」としてしか理解しておらず、現存在の形而上学的生起としての「存在論的差異」との連関において捉えることはほとんどなかった。それはとりわけ、『風土』の基礎理論における「超越」の理解からも窺うことができる。

和辻によると、超越は、第一に、人間存在の超越として、時間性と空間性の相即によって成り立っているところの、全体から個へ、個から全体へという絶対否定性の運動と重ね合わせて理解すべき事柄である。第二に、こうした意味での超越が、間柄の時間的構造として、歴史性の意義を帯びていることに注意すべきである。最後に、超越は「風土的に外に出ること」であり、風土において「自らを見いだすこと」つまり、個人の立場では「身体の自覚」になり、人間存在にとっては共同体の形成の仕方、意識の仕方、言語の作り方、生産や家屋の作り方などに現れてくるものである。和辻は、超越はこれらすべてを含まなければならないが、ハイデガーの超越概念にはそれが

5. この問題についてはかつて拙著『ハイデッガーと日本の哲学』（ミネルヴァ書房、2002年）でくわしく論じたことがある（第2章および第3章を参照）。この書評では「開示性」に焦点を当てて、少し別の観点から検討してみたい。
6. 当時日本では『現象学の根本問題』の講義録の速記に基づいたコピーが出回っていたことはよく知られている。和辻はおそらくその一部を手に入れ読んでいたのであろう。
7. 和辻 8: 18 以下参照。
ないと批判するのである。和辻のこうした指摘は、ハイデガーから見れば、基礎的存
在論の基本構想を理解することなく、哲学の人間学の ontisch な立場に由来すると思
えたことだろう。

ハイデガーにとって「現存在」の「超越」とは、基本的には、「存在者」全体を超えて、
「存在者」の「存在理解」を可能にするアプリオリ的地平を開くことであり、存在者と
存在を明確に区別することとしての「存在論的差異」を遂行することである。その意
味で「超越」は、存在者との関わりに没入し、自己の存在を世界の方から理解する
傾向にある現存在の素朴なまなざしを、存在者から存在へと向け変えること、そうし
て存在者との関わりを可能にする存在理解のアプリオリ的地平を開示することという、
ハイデガーの現象学的還元と構成の明確な遂行にほかならない。「超越」と「存在
論的差異」は、「存在理解」の可能的地平に向けた現存在的自己企図という同じ出
来事を、二つの側面から見たものだとも言えよう。

超越や存在論的差異の概念をめぐるもうひとつ重要な観点は、ハイデガーの現存
在の実存論的分析が、伝承された存在概念をその作られた源泉に返し、批判的に掘
り起こすことによって、既成の存在理解・世界理解の自明性を打ち破り、根源的な存
在理解的地平を獲得しようという「形而上学の基礎づけ」への意図を含んでいること
である。「存在論的差異」という「存在者」と「存在」の明確な区別の遂行は、存
在理解の自己企図の真正さを確かめるために、伝統的概念の批判的解体の作業を
必ず必要とする。存在概念の現象学的構成の作業は、「存在論の歴史の現象学的解
体」という課題と切り離すことができないのである。基礎的存在論をめぐるこうした
方法的課題は、ハイデガーの「存在の問い」（Seinsfrage）を導く現存在的被投性・
事実性の自覚に基づいており、伝統の掘り起こしと存在論の革新という、一見相反す
る事柄を一つに結びつけようという構想に由来している。カントやデカルト、アリスト
テレスなどの存在論の伝統の現象学的解体というある意味では非常に学的な課題を、
「不安」、「死への存在」、「先駆的覚悟性」（vorlaufende Entschlossenheit）という、
ある意味できわめて実存哲学的な経験と結びつけ、本来の実存における「存在」や
「世界」開示の根源的出来事を、歴史的伝統による存在理解の支配の問題と絡めて
展開しようとしたところに、我々はハイデガーの思索の大きな魅力を感じるのである
が、同時に安易な理解をはねつけるような困難にもぶつかるのである。

ハイデガーの思索をさらなる問いへと強制する問題構制の複雑さを、和辻がどこま
で把握し受け止めようとしていたかは定かではない。いずれにせよここで重要なこと
は、現存在的事実性・歴史性の根本経験が「超越」や「存在論的差異」の概念構
成の契機となっていたこと、存在理解の実存論的な根源的開示と存在理解の歴史的
規定性をと、どのようにすれば一つの問題連関として展開できるかというハイデガーの「存在と時間」の問いに含まれている困難を、和辻が一体として捉えた上でハイデガーを批判していたか、ということである。「世界内存在」としての「現存」に本質的に属しているとされる「超越」の出来事を、人間存在の否定性の運動と重ね合わせたり、「風土的に外へ出ること」というように人間存在と世界とのわざわざontischな関わりとして捉えるのは、ハイデガー解釈としてとてもも首肯できるものではない。「超越」というこうした転換を導く和辻の風土論の理論的構想そのものに、ある種の「欠陥」があるのではないかという疑念さえ生じるゆえんでもある。

和辻が風土論を構想するに至ったのは、自らの証言にもあるように、ドイツに留学すべくヨーロッパに渡航した際にさまざまな「風土」に直接触れたことと、ベルリンで「存在と時間」を読んで、ハイデガーにおいて時間性が「主体的存在構造」として活かされたときに、なぜ空間性も活かされないのかと疑問に思ったことに発する。これはハイデガーの「存在と時間」の構想に対する単なる批判の表明ではなく、世界内存在としての現存の時間性に向けられた解釈学的現象学の手法に対する賛辞でもあり、ハイデガーの手法を風土性の分析に応用すれば、人間存在の「主体的構造」を時間性のみならず空間性としても解明できるという見通しを得たことの告白である。

事実、和辻の『人間の学としての倫理学』や『倫理学』の言説は、ハイデガーの「実存」を前提としての「人間存在」に換骨奪胎しているとはいえ、形式的には驚くほどハイデガーの思考の枠組みをそのまま借用している。根本的に両者の違いを感じるのには、ハイデガーの事象へのまなざしと思索の歩みがつねに緊張関係を保ち、常に「問いを仕上げる」という「開かれた」あり方をしているのに対し、和辻の場合、思考そのものがかなり図式的であり、事象の経験から絶えずインパクトを受けつつ自らの思索そのものを問い直すという開かれた批判的思考が欠如していることである。和辻の風土論が、その理論的構想の部分ではそれなりの説得力をもち、人間存在と自然との「連続的相互帰属関係」についての独創的な発想となっているという印象を与える反面、いざ具体的な分析に取りかかると風土のタイプ論に終始し、一種の自然環境決定論の様相を帯びるのはいったいなぜだろうか。

ジョンソン氏はこうした和辻の風土論のもつ危険に対して、自然を開示する我々の能力が時代により、あるいは文化間で様々であることを具体的に示すことで応えようとしている。氏は、「自然として現れるものを媒介する開示の文化的様式が強調されすぎると、我々の自然経験を我々の文化形式に還元してしまう危険がある。そして自然を開示するのが我々であることになると、ある種の主観主義ないし相対主義になる」という風土論一般の危険を回避すべく、仏教哲学や現象学の「非二元論」を引き合
いに出すことで、和辻の風土概念の豊かさを明らかにしようとしている。そうするためにも、しかし、著者は和辻の風土論の危険が一体どこに由来するのかを、その思考のあり方の現場に立ち返ってもう少し問題にしてもよかったのではないか。

和辻の風土論が、たとえ彼一流の優れた洞察の論文であるという印象を我々に与えるのは偶然ではない。和辻の風土論のように現象学的解釈学的な事象分析を遂行するためには、現象の開示の場となる一人称的な直接的経験に基づくことはまず必要なことである。しかし、それだけでは不十分で、例えば旅行中に自らがその場に置かれた風土の具体相を解釈するに当たって、自らの「一人称的直接的経験」を支える「解釈学的状況」（hermeneutische Situation）、すなわち、自らの「先理解」（Vorverständnis）の枠組み的地平についてあらかじめ反省する必要がある。言語的、情動的、文化的に媒介された自然との関わりの中で、その具体的連関を露わにできるのは、まずは一人称的直接的経験であるが、その体験において露わになった事象を解釈するために、体験を自覚化し反省する三人称的立場に立つ必要がある。旅行者の場合のように、この一人称的体験がその風土のもとにある生活世界に根ざしていない場合、直接的体験は知らず知らずのうちに外部的枠組みをかぶせることによって歪んだ解釈に導きやすい。和辻自身、風土理解を可能にする自らの先構造についての洞察が十分にあれば、旅行中の風土体験における一人称的直接性と外からの三人称的立場との錯綜した関係について、もう少し自覚的でありえたであろうし、現象の開示の場となる一人称的直接経験と、このコンテクストを支える歴史的、文化的な規定性との絡み合いに目を向け、自らの理解の先構造についての反省を通して、自らの解釈学的地平をたえず開かれたものにしておくことができたかもしれない。そのためにも、自らの直接的経験と、他者や他文化の風土性についての自らの解釈の枠組みを行いつつ自己批判的に反省すべきであった。そうすることができれば、和辻の風土論が単なるタイプ論に終わることもなかったのではないか。異なった風土における間文化的状況の中で、自己固有のものと異他のものとの相互浸透に絶えず目配せすることによってのみ、自らの体験や理解の彼拘束性について自覚する可能性が開かれる。それは旅行者や一時外国で生活世界を体験する機会を与えられた者の特権的である。こうした人たちは、間文化的な緊張関係に置き入られることによって、間柄としての人間存在の特定の生活世界における存在者の連関を他者からの異質な生活世界における連関と対比させざるをえなくなり、自らの存在理解を拘束する自明性を異化し、解放された地平に自らを置き直す機会を与えられる。それは自己経験を深めることでもあり、自らの歴史的、文化的規定性に対して透明性を確保することでもある。
しかし、これは決して簡単なことではない。本来的実存や人間存在の本来の面目が問われる理由でもある。しかし、ハイデガーの不安や「死への存在」を契機とする「先駆的覚悟性」としての本来的実存にせよ、和辻の「自他不二」的な人間存在の絶対否定性としての「本来の面目」にせよ、その否定的動性の内に「自己の閉鎖性」を解き放つ機能を含んでいるとはいえ、歴史的伝統に支配された自文化の拘束性から自己を一挙に自由にするものではなかった。むしろ、そうした最終的に自己を解放する根拠を求めようとしたことこそ、自己の歴史的文化的規定性を排除することにつながりかねない。

『存在と時間』の時期における基礎的実存論の構想そのものに「根拠づけへの意志」が働いていたことは、ハイデガー自身が後に反省することになる。和辻がこうした基本的洞察に導かることなく、ハイデガーの「超越」や「存在論的差異」を誤解したこと、否、両概念の掟って立つ現存在の基盤に亀裂が存するに十分目配りできなかったこと、そこにおそらく、風土論の様々な困難の一つの理由があるのではないか。歴史的伝承の拘束性や存在論の形而上学的基礎づけの間に、橋渡しすることができない亀裂が存していることは、存在論的差異を現存在の超越の方からのみ考えることを許さない事態であり、ハイデガーを「基礎的実存論」から「存在史的思索」へと転回せしめる動機となったことはよく知られている。こうしたハイデガーの「存在の思索」の困難と途上性格こそ、直接体験の歴史的文化的拘束性に対してより敏感に反応し、歴史的環境的拘束性と自由の弁証法的関係についても、より注意深く考える道が開かれたであろう。少なくとも風土論のもつ環境決定論的な一面性に対して、和辻は自己批判的姿勢を維持できたのではないか。その意味で、超越や存在論的差異の思想は、換骨奪胎して利用すべきものではなく、それらが掟って立つ「解釈学的状況」の問い直しを通して、風土論の事象分析を遂行する和辻自身の「解釈学的状況」を自覚化するきっかけとすべきものであった。和辻がハイデガーの思想を継承する際に主に注目したのは、思索の主題や方法、そこから帰結する人間存在の基礎的構造であった。しかし我々がハイデガーから学びうるのは、むしろハイデガーの思索の課題の困難であり、彼がこの困難を自覚しつつ思索の不安定な動性を耐え抜き、まさに自らの「存在の問い」を問い続けたことである。彼の思索のこうした徹底した努力が広い意味での「解釈学的空間」を開かれたものとしていたことを思えば、和辻はハイデガーからやはり大事なことを学び損ねたのである。
Prof. Mine rightly observes that *Watsuji on Nature* attempts to uncover the theoretical core and philosophical potential of *fūdoron* through concrete event analysis and an investigation into the disclosive capacity of practical action, language, and emotions. His review approaches this core by focusing on the relationship between Watsuji and Heidegger, noting that the subtitle of the book is “Japanese Philosophy in the Wake of Heidegger.” He restricts the scope of his inquiry to two aspects of the question of what I have called “the lived experience of *fūdo* as an event of disclosure.” The first involves methodological and philosophical issues in the first-person standpoint of disclosedness, and the second reconsiders Watsuji’s understanding of Heidegger’s concepts of the ontological difference and transcendence. Mine notes that he presents these issues in the hope that reflection on them will serve as an opportunity for clarifying my intentions in interpreting Watsuji.

Because these matters are interrelated in ways that are difficult to pry apart, in what follows I take up the most salient points more or less in the order in which they appear in the original essay. Mine begins by suggesting that the deterministic drift of Watsuji’s theory of *fūdo* is linked to his tendency to misunderstand the function and significance of the first-person standpoint in phenomenology. This tendency can be seen in Watsuji’s criticism of Heidegger’s notion of *mineness* (*Jemeinigkeit*) as too individualistic. But in (illegitimately) undermining *mineness*, Watsuji also undermines the first-person point of view that is the basic starting point of Heidegger in *Being and Time*, and loses a proper understanding of the phenomena of disclosure and transcendence that belong to this standpoint. The misunderstanding of these concepts, in turn, are a source of the geographical determinism that appears in Watsuji’s *fūdoron*.

There are at least two dimensions of the first-person standpoint in Heidegger’s work that Mine thinks Watsuji has misunderstood. In discussing the first issue, he cites Watsuji’s examples of our experience of feeling cold as well as our experience of perceiving a flower as beautiful. These examples are
meant to illustrate the way that this viewpoint is that of the original experience of the appearance of things; it is the event before the bifurcation of subject and object. But if this is the case, Watsuji cannot characterize the first-person perspective of Heideggerian phenomenology as an \textit{individual} one, since this is already the stance of a (single) subject divided from the objects of experience.

Notwithstanding this point, Watsuji claims, moreover, that rather than being the standpoint of an individual, the first-person stance is actually that of \textit{aidagara} 間柄, or being-in-relation to others. Regarding this claim, Mine acknowledges that while it is true that the direct perceptual experience of the “I” is mediated by language and co-existence with others, “being-in-relation to others,” is, like “individuality,” a determination from the third-person standpoint that analyzes and interprets the structure of experience. Since I, too, follow Watsuji here in expanding on this idea with the claim that things and events are disclosed through the shared comportment practical action, emotions, and language, my account appears to face the same difficulty.

Mine maintains that the first-person standpoint is not that of \textit{aidagara} but rather that of the “mineness” of Dasein, and, as such, one that constitutes the field of appearances in which the relationship between self and other, and we and things, are disclosed in the first place, a disclosure (in the sense of \textit{Wahrheit} as \textit{Unverborgenheit}) which already belongs to the transcendence of Dasein. His further observation that we can identify this field with what Heidegger in his later period calls the \textit{Lichtung des Seins} also serves to reinforce the conclusion that the \textit{Jemeinigkeit} of Dasein is different in dimension from that of the \textit{individual} as an \textit{entity} such that these must not be conflated with one another.

Mine’s criticisms about Watsuji’s misreading of Dasein as too “individualistic” are well placed, and seem in important ways to be right. What Watsuji should perhaps have criticized more clearly was the overly subjective cast of Dasein as being “there” and being the “there.” Insofar as this original field of appearing was intended by Heidegger to subvert the subject-object dichotomy, identifying it with the mineness or \textit{Jemeinigkeit} of Dasein (namely, the “I” of direct personal involvement in something, such that it is “I” in each case who, e.g., is making a confession of his sins, or who loves his wife, or who is dying of cancer) serves to reify the subjective dimension of this field rather than pass beyond it. Mine’s allusion to the \textit{Kehre} here bolsters this
point, as it is in part precisely because the later Heidegger viewed his early iteration of Dasein as too subjective that he began to turn to a different kind of language.

But this does not really obviate the other claim at stake, namely, that the field of disclosure is constitutively linked to others. Mine is right to point out the distinction between how I experience the first-person standpoint, on the one hand, and an explicit understanding of what this standpoint is—which is something that is grasped only in the third-person standpoint of reflection. I may experience this standpoint (at times) as a form of what Nishida calls pure experience and so one in which I am fully absorbed in my activity such that there is no explicit distinction between subject and object; I may experience this standpoint at other times as an individual facing off against a world of others who do not understand me; I may also experience this standpoint as a consciousness wholly distinct from the objects which it encounters. One of the tasks that phenomenological reflection has is to distinguish in these experiences between those in which the natural attitude reads into experience what a more careful phenomenological description does not find (such as the latter notion that I experience the first-person standpoint as a consciousness sealed off from objects that it subsequently encounters, rather than as always already being determined by the objects of awareness, and so a consciousness “of” something). Such phenomenological descriptions, along with other forms of reflection in the third-person, can contribute to the development of philosophical claims about what this first-person standpoint is.

In the case of Watsuji’s claims about the nature of the first-person standpoint there is a similar gap between how we generally experience this stance and what he maintains is actually involved in it. Let’s begin with the question of how we experience the first-person stance. Even if we jettison with Watsuji the notion of Jemeinigkeit as too subjective in describing how we experience this viewpoint, it nevertheless can be said that we experience this standpoint in terms of what phenomenologists call pre-reflective self-awareness, namely the (usually unattended) background awareness I have in any activity that I am the one engaged in it. Moreover, as it is virtually impossible to be mistaken about this implicit sense that it is I rather than someone else who is having this experience (except in certain rare cases such as that of
schizophrenia, in which this feeling can be missing), I always experience this first-person stance as belonging to me.

Now, as I have tried to show, an important result of Watsuji’s own phenomenological descriptions is that it disrupts or puts into question the assumption that this stance is reducible to our experience of it in terms of the subjectivity of pre-reflective self-awareness. Watsuji shows that essential modes of consciousness, activity, and embodiment, which are indispensable for the first-person standpoint, always already depend on our being in relation to others in order to be what they are, just as in transcendental phenomenology consciousness depends on its objects to be what it is. However, it must be granted that this relation is not as robust as that between consciousness and object, since it appears to be possible to uncover moments or aspects of the first-person standpoint that escape the constitutive relation to others. Nevertheless, Watsuji’s broader aim and its rationale remain valid: to move away from Jemeinigkeit as too subjective a construal of the structure of the first-person standpoint. In short, inasmuch as the original field in and through which experience unfolds moves beyond a form of subjectivism in being an event before the distinction between subject and object, it must also move beyond subjectivism in being a standpoint before the distinction between self and other.

The challenge here is articulating just what this standpoint entails—a challenge that admittedly still has not been fully met by Watsuji. I have explored a possible further step in this direction in a recent article about Kimura Bin’s work in this area.\(^1\) Drawing on long clinical experience and observation, Kimura posits a form of impersonal subjectivity that underlies and precedes our experience of ourselves as individuated subjects. His analysis uncovers two structural features relevant to our discussion that characterize the impersonal subject. First, this subject can be identified as the subject of basic and impersonal forms of sensation and perception, and so must be understood as the source of an experience that precedes the individual self. Kimura draws in this regard on the work of Viktor von Weizsäcker, who has uncovered a form of subjectivity that underlies even pre-reflective self-awareness. Second, this impersonal subject functions as a constituent ele-

ment in the collective subjectivity of the group (as when, e.g., a group of musicians plays a piece of music together).

Kimura’s concept of the impersonal subject can in this way open up a path toward understanding the first-person stance in both a less subjective and less individualistic manner. Notwithstanding these points, Mine thinks that there is also a second important issue at stake in Watsuji’s approach to the first-person standpoint, namely, a link between his misinterpretation of the Heideggerean concept of transcendence and the geographical determinism that makes its appearance in his theory of fūdo. He suggests that Watsuji’s problems here may have their source in the (admittedly) confused and confusing relationship between the phenomenological character of his fūdoron (which thematizes the first-person standpoint of the experience of the geo-cultural environment) and the reflective standpoint of his Ethics as the Study of the Human (人間の学としての倫理学), which attempts to grasp the structure of human existence via an understanding of its expressions (objectifications of lived experience) in the manner of Dilthey’s hermeneutics, a philosophical method which, of course, does not take a phenomenological approach. Thus, rather than keeping at the center of his approach the first-person standpoint of the Heideggerean phenomenology of Being and Time and so with it the site in which beings are transcended by their being, Watsuji instead explicitly develops his ethical theory by prioritizing hermeneutics, translating Heidegger’s “phenomenological reduction” into a “hermeneutic reduction to human existence.”

One of the most important consequences of this is that Watsuji fails to grasp Heidegger’s concept of transcendence as Dasein’s openness to the horizon that enables the understanding of the being of an entity in a manner that transcends the entity. If this is the case, this will also mean that when Watsuji criticizes Heidegger’s concept of transcendence, he does so without an understanding of the ontological difference between being and beings. Mine observes that for Watsuji, transcendence (in the sense that is relevant here) has its source in the unified spatio-temporal structure of Dasein as being-in-the-world-in-relation-to-others. For this conception of human existence, fūdo is the context through which we come to see ourselves in cultural structures, processes, and products, one that both constitutes and reflects our self-understanding and mediates our experience of nature. Via this mirroring process we are able to grasp both the ways that we are deter-
mined by and the ways that we are capable of transcending our limitations in relation to the natural world in which we have our ground. Watsuji’s criticism of Heidegger in this regard is that his concept of transcendence fails to include all of these things.

Mine points out that Watsuji does not in this instance treat the concept of transcendence in the context of or in relation to the question of the ontological difference, and that he rarely does so. In addition, at the time he wrote this Watsuji did not fully understand the problem of Heidegger’s phenomenological deconstruction of the history of ontology. Mine thus contends that the relationship here between human existence and the world is grasped ontically rather than ontologically. Watsuji’s viewpoint, he suggests, has likely come from the ontical standpoint of philosophical anthropology. Hence while transcendence for Watsuji has historical significance as the temporal structure of *aidagara*, one might draw the conclusion that this is the temporality of what Heidegger calls *Historie* rather than *Geschichte*. All of these factors can help us understand why, as Mine notes, when the time comes to perform a concrete analysis of *fūdo*, Watsuji turns the typology of climate into a kind of environmental determinism of nature.

Prof. Mine wonders whether it might not have been appropriate for me to have paid somewhat more attention to the concrete conditions of Watsuji’s way of thinking here, and disentangled the phenomenology of Watsuji’s *fūdoron* from the Diltheyean thrust of his hermeneutic “study of the human” (*人間の学*). This, in turn, would have enabled me to more effectively locate the source of the determinism in Watsuji’s theory of *fūdo*. This seems to me to be a valid point. A clearer and more readily identifiable contrast between the phenomenological approach taken in 風土:人間学的考察 and Watsuji’s self-proclaimed hermeneutics of human existence as this is set out in 人間の学としての倫理学 would probably have allowed me to more effectively make two points which may not have come across as clearly as I would have liked.

The first point is that my account of Watsuji’s construal of transcendence in terms of a certain form of freedom was meant to show how important elements in Watsuji’s own thinking work against its deterministic tendencies. That is, I tried to show that on his reading of transcendence, nature has a history, and that this appears as the historicality (歴史性) of *fūdo*—historicality understood as *Geschichtlichkeit* in Heidegger’s sense (see, e.g., *WTZ* 8: 119–20). While Watsuji may have struggled to articulate a proper
understanding of Heidegger’s concept of transcendence, he appears to have had an implicit grasp of the ontological difference that is required for this understanding. For this reason, I felt justified in giving an ontological reading of his construal of the relationship between human existence and nature as it appears in and through the phenomenon of world. Perhaps I should have been more explicit about the fact that this understanding of the difference between being and beings is implicitly present, even if this difference is not something that Watsuji himself was always able to see. This, I maintain—and this is my second point—becomes evident upon close inspection of Watsuji’s hermeneutic theory. I won’t rehearse here the evidence I lay out in Chapter 7, noting only that it ranges from a consideration of Watsuji’s ultimate intentions and aim in turning to a hermeneutic of human existence (158–9), to an overview of the overlaps and parallels between Heidegger’s and Watsuji’s conceptions of the ontological relationship between “having” and “being,” one that forces a reconsideration of the true meaning and significance of the term expression (表現; see, e.g., WtZ 9: 176–7) as it is used in Watsuji’s hermeneutics, to the implicitly disclosive character of linguistic, affective, and practical comportments as these are treated in Watsuji’s work. What I did not say, but probably should have, is that as confused as Watsuji himself might have been, all of this goes to show that his hermeneutic procedure was far closer to a thinker such as Gadamer than to Dilthey, and so was an approach that can be reconciled—however unintentionally—with the phenomenological path Watsuji pursued in his theory of fūdo.

If this is so, one can ask: how then to account for the determinism that is widely acknowledged to be present throughout much of the text of Fūdo? Here I would appeal to the publication history of Fūdo. As I point out (41), there is evidence to suggest that Watsuji only realized the philosophical significance of existential spatiality for Heidegger’s phenomenology sometime after his return to Japan, and even perhaps as late as 1933. This realization would have come after the body of the text from the second chapter forward—which was based on informal observations he made during his journey by sea from Japan to Europe in 1927, and which tends toward a kind of geographical determinism—was written. Nevertheless, it remains a mystery as to why Watsuji allowed these statements and claims to remain in the text if they were not reflective of his fully considered views or of his newfound appreciation of Heidegger.
The atmosphere of puzzlement begins to fade if we take seriously Mine’s criticism of Watsuji’s failure to establish the requisite self-critical and reflective distance in relation to his direct experience of the various geographical locales he visited. It is indeed true that Watsuji’s personal experience of the geographical regions of the world which he described was not rooted in a lived understanding of these areas, but instead reflected the more superficial experience of a traveler passing through them. And while it is not disqualifying in itself that this was the hermeneutic situation that supported Watsuji’s first-hand experience, what was required of him in this instance, as Mine points out, was a to-and-fro movement between his direct experience of other people and their geo-cultural milieu and the framework belonging to his own history and culture through which he interpreted this experience. Only this kind of alertness to the historical and cultural constraints of our own direct experience of what is alien can enable us to avoid a distorted interpretation of what we encounter. This problem demonstrates, too, that despite the overlap between Watsuji and Gadamer alluded to above, there is still an important distance and difference between their renditions of philosophical hermeneutics.

While Watsuji might be forgiven for not having read Gadamer, one wonders about the inexplicable failure later in his career to continue to engage more fully and deeply with Heidegger’s work, since Heidegger’s own philosophy at this time was developing apace. Much of my own book was intended to show what a Heideggerean philosophy of 度 could offer us had he done so. Prof. Mine is to be thanked for showing us just how difficult that task actually is.
Disclosure without Normative Background?
David Johnson’s Watsuji

Only when no longer knowing what’s what in one’s own domain, one turns to “the other” in search for advice. In this sense, the recently growing interest in non-Western, particularly Japanese philosophy bears witness to a feeling of disorientation among some philosophers in the West. This feeling harks back to the dissatisfactions with philosophical modernism, influentially articulated by Nietzsche and Heidegger. The suspicion that Western philosophy has reached an impasse motivates those philosophers to cast their eyes to the East in the hope to find solutions for problems the West has generated but is no longer capable of solving. Preparing the stage for “world philosophy” is the latest attempt in this strand of thought; changing the rules of the language game “philosophy” figures prominently on its agenda.¹

I

With his book on Watsuji Tetsurō, David Johnson has given a brilliant example for engaging Japanese philosophy in a way that does not depend on a philosophical narrative of the alleged end of Western metaphysics. Johnson’s take on “Japanese Philosophy in the Wake of Heidegger” (as the subtitle of the book reads) renders Watsuji’s thought in strictly problem-oriented (sachlich) terms. Since Johnson restricts his juxtaposition of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* and Watsuji’s writings of the 1930s (mainly *Fūdo*, *Ningen no gaku toshite no rinrigaku*, and *Rinrigaku*) to a set of philosophical issues that came to the fore with Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, his study is a creative adaption of John Maraldo’s maxim to use Japanese philosophy as “a lens on Greco-European thought.”² I call his adaption “creative,” for he further develops Maraldo’s maxim in that

2. MARALDO 2017, 21.
he provides a stereoscopic view on the problems under consideration. On one hand, Johnson’s interpretation of Watsuji opens novel perspectives on issues that are conspicuously absent in *Being and Time*: nature, space, and body, which, on Johnson’s view, are grounded in *fūdo*; on the other hand, the Heideggerian lens he applies on Watsuji puts into focus those aspects in *Being and Time* Watsuji had only insufficiently appreciated: particularly the phenomenological method. By exposing the phenomenological structure of how nature is disclosed as *fūdo*, Johnson further develops Watsuji’s often “thin and imprecise” descriptions, which, in turn, enables him to articulate the desiderata of *Being and Time*. It is its truly dialogical nature which sets Johnson’s book apart from the majority of literature on Japanese philosophy; in short, his take on Japanese philosophy is non-oedipal.

It is, therefore, conclusive that Johnson’s book goes beyond an account of Heidegger’s effective history (*Wirkungsgeschichte*) in Japan. When Watsuji in his rejoinder to Heidegger insisted on the significance concrete human spatiality as *fūdo-sei* has for a comprehensive account of being-in-the-world, he, as Johnson holds, ultimately pointed at the possibility of a “partial reenchantment of nature,” which is part of a larger project of Johnson’s, that is “overcoming subjectivism.” For making his claim, Johnson highlights the phenomenological implications of Watsuji’s theory of *fūdo* which Watsuji himself only insufficiently had spelled out. Watsuji was, in fact, highly critical towards phenomenology, particularly in a Husserlian vein, which he found ill-suited for dealing with the structure of human existence, i.e. “betweenness” (*aidagara*). Moreover, in that Johnson links the reenchant-

4. Pre-eminent in this regard is Mine 2002.
5. Johnson 2019, 49.
6. Johnson 2019, 192. In this paper, I will mainly focus on this wider aspect of Johnson’s take on Watsuji; on the problem of reenchantment I will touch only in passing.
7. On Watsuji’s view, Husserl shares with Descartes and Kant a certain kind of foundational subjectivism; moreover, as he holds, the danger of “letting the study of ethics fall victim to the study of subjective consciousness” has “to be admitted” also for phenomenological research in the line of Scheler and Heidegger; W TZ 10: 35–6; Watsuji 1996, 33; translation altered; cf. W TZ 9: 140–2; see also W TZ 10: 72; Watsuji 1996, 68: “Even in contemporary philosophy, whether it be phenomenology or fundamental ontology, the central question is, in the final analysis, the consciousness of ego”; translation altered. Similarly, in a paper on Theodor Lipps dating from 1935, Watsuji draws a line from “the Cartesian tradition” to the phenomenologi-
ment of nature to the “return to Lebenswelt” and the “reconciliation with the world,” he considerably enlarges Watsuji’s notion of fūdo, and at the same time contributes to further developing the problem of being-in-the-world as exposed in Being and Time. So the lens on Greco-European thought Johnson applies, goes well beyond the fulfilling of desiderata of both Heidegger and Watsuji; it provides the optic for a philosophical investigation in its own right. However, for all its productive novelty, in that Johnson accepts the interpretative framework that, since Tosaka Jun’s critique of Watsuji’s hermeneutical method, has proven useful for making sense of Watsuji’s theories of ningen and fūdo by contrasting them with Being and Time, he also accepts the limits inherent to this framework. As we shall see, going beyond these limits is vital for getting into sharper focus some of the long-standing problems in Watsuji’s dialectical account of ningen, which, in turn, will allow us to fully appreciate Johnson’s account of the conceptual possibilities of fūdo.

II

As is well known, Watsuji came across Being and Time during his sojourn in Berlin in 1927. This encounter was catalytic in that it provided the conceptual tools Watsuji needed for coming to grips with problems he had been engaged with prior to his departure to Germany, namely those of “Japanese culture” and “history of ethics.” That is, Being and Time allowed Watsuji to reframe these problems in their interrelatedness with the phenomenon of fūdo. In fact, after his return to Japan in 1929, Watsuji immediately began drafting “Notes on ‘Investigation into National Character’” cal method of “departing from the phenomenon of the self”; WtZ 9: 392. While Watsuji uses a much too broad brush in his characterization of phenomenology, he has a point in that his notion of aidagara is non-foundational and therefore meant to designate a form of being-in-the-world that cannot be methodically reduced to any kind of individual consciousness or individual existence, including Heidegger’s notion of Dasein. In contrast, Watsuji sets out to determine the possibility of any encounter with beings/entities as actualization of a hermeneutical activity within aidagara, he calls “formation” (keisei).

10. Cf. WtZ Bekkan 1, 369–70.
11. Cf. WtZ Bekkan 1, 378ff.
where he employed the conceptual framework of Division One of *Being and Time*, in particular the notions of “disposition” (Befindlichkeit), “involvement” (Bewandtnis), and “spatiality” (Räumlichkeit) for sketching out a theory of historical life forms in relation to their natural environment. These notes form the initial stage of Watsuji’s philosophical project that materialized in the Iwanami Kōza article *Rinrigaku* (1931), the books on *Ningen no gaku toshite no rinrigaku* (1934) and *Fūdo* (1935), and eventually his opus magnum, the three-volume *Rinrigaku* (1937–1949). In the light of the itinerary of Watsuji’s thought, the strategy of reading Watsuji through a Heideggerian lens and thus putting *Rinrigaku* and *Fūdo* into the systematical framework laid out in *Being and Time*, suggests itself.

While, in the foreword of *Fūdo*, Watsuji emphatically expressed his appreciation for Heidegger’s project, he was also explicit in maintaining that the description of Dasein was one-sided since it failed to account in full for the implications existential spatiality has for ethical life. Therefore, as Watsuji concludes, Heidegger had not been able to arrive at a notion of authentic being with others (Mitsein), which in turn was responsible for the lack of concreteness of his notion of historicity (Geschichtlichkeit). While Watsuji can be given credit for having anticipated an objection that was introduced to Heidegger scholarship by Villela-Petit more than half a century after *Fūdo*, namely that, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger had not recognized the problem of spatiality of Being-with, his own notion of ningen is far from being unproblematic. There are good reasons to believe that Watsuji’s notion of ningen is dangerously one-sided—not only, as has been often pointed out, with regard to its political implications. As has been indicated, Watsuji’s notion of authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) bears witness to his limited understanding of the ontic-ontological difference, without which the exposition of this notion wouldn’t have been possible in the first place. Along these lines, it has been maintained that the way the problem

15. Arguably the most comprehensive and judicious account of the political implications of Watsuji’s ethical thought so far is to be found in MARALDO 2019, 78–96.
of death is dealt with in Rinrigaku misses the mark, as does Watsuji’s treatment of the I-Thou-relation. On this view, Watsuji’s insufficient acknowledgment of the possible negation of ningen’s totality-aspect results from his poor understanding of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. The dialectic of absolute negation, so the story goes, was burdened with that mishap from the very start. While it was meant to reveal absolute negativity as the ontological grounds for a notion of human existence that would be free from any Cartesian residue, the dialectic lacked a standpoint of transcendence that would account for its absoluteness. Therefore, in Watsuji’s treatment, the dual structure of ningen appears as a constant, iridescent movement between ningen’s ontological and ontic dimensions, which, ultimately, is responsible for the excessive emphasis Watsuji put on the totality-aspect at the cost of the aspect of individuality. From the one-sidedness of the dialectic follows the one-sidedness of the notion of ningen. Therefore, from the point of view adopted by those who sympathize with Heidegger’s overall approach but, at the same time, are aware of the problematic implications that surface in Division Two of Being and Time, fixing the one-sidedness of ningen means abandoning Watsuji’s dialectical thinking in favor of a notion of transcendence similar to the one which had been introduced in Division Two, while avoiding Heidegger’s existentialist rigorism. There is a curious dialectical twist to this reading, since for appreciating Watsuji’s critique of Being and Time, his dialectic of aidagara has first to be sent to the purgatory of Heideggerian transcendentalism.

In that applying an Heideggerian lens on Rinrigaku proved useful to uncover certain shortcomings in Watsuji’s ethical thinking, it prepared the ground for appealing to Fūdo as some last resort for making good of Watsuji’s objections to the notion of Dasein. In this optic, with the phenomenon of fūdo figuring as the place of transcendence Watsuji would need to bring home his point about the dual nature of the notion of ningen. However, this solution comes at a price, that is the abandoning of the dialectical interconnectedness of individuality and totality and, ultimately, the dynamism Watsuji thought to be the centerpiece of the structure of ningen.

which he, after all, characterized as “practical subject” (shutai). While, on the basis of an Heideggerian reading of Watsuji’s ethical thought, the move from Rinrigaku to Fūdo could be justified with respect to the problem of transcendence, the fact that, thereby, the issues of human agency and its implicit normativity are getting out of focus cannot go unnoticed.

In any case, from a hermeneutical point of view it is perfectly legitimate to read Rinrigaku as Watsuji’s confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) with Heidegger. Watsuji, so it can be argued, is taking part in a genuine philosophical dialogue with Heidegger, and if we take the notion of dialogue seriously, in order to raise those critical objections with regard to Watsuji’s notions of ningen and honraisei, the Heideggerian lens is indispensable. However, from the point of view of the Sache (subject-matter) both are investigating, the situation is more complex. Instead of assuming that Heidegger’s existential ontology of being-in-the-World has to be the blueprint for addressing Watsuji’s shortcomings on this plane, it might be worthwhile contemplating whether Heidegger’s enterprise did not fail in a way that makes Being and Time a not so convincing candidate for amending the problematic aspects of Rinrigaku. This is not to say that, since what Watsuji pursues is an ethics and not a fundamental ontology, Rinrigaku ought to be decoupled from the fundamental issues underlying the project of Being and Time, first and foremost the problems of authenticity and existential wholeness. My point is rather that, to further develop the dialogue between Watsuji and Heidegger, the particular interpretation of Being and Time that, for so long, has informed the critical objections against Rinrigaku has to be revised. It can be doubted that, by pitting the radical transcendence of death and the “metaphysical ego-ness” (metaphysische Egoität) against the immanence of Watsuji’s account of authenticity, the deeper connections between Watsuji and Heidegger can be brought into relief. The reason for being skeptical in this regard lies in Heidegger’s failure to account for the normativity inherent in any inner-worldly practice of Dasein, its being and acting both individually and commonly within a network of involvements and purposes—a failure that can be traced back to the explications

21. This point has been made by Pippin 1997. I have drawn from Pippin’s account to discuss the relationship between Watsuji and Heidegger with regard to the normativity-issue in Lie-
in Division Two of *Being and Time*. In that Johnson mainly operates with the phenomenological toolkit laid out in Division One of *Being and Time*, his reading of Fūdo has opened a novel perspective on this dialogue and its significance for today’s philosophizing. However, in that he sidelines the problems of authenticity and existential wholeness, Johnson has trouble to articulate with sufficient clarity the normativity issue which, nevertheless, surfaces at crucial stations of his argument.

III

While the problem of normativity hardly surfaces in *Being and Time*, it figures prominently in *Rinrigaku*. After Watsuji has laid out the basic structure of the dialectic of dual negation, he explicates the normative implications of this structure as follows: “When the basic principle of ethical life (jinrin) is grasped in this way [i.e. dialectically / hpl], it also becomes clear that the basic issues of ethics (rinrigaku), such as conscience, freedom, good and evil, and so on are all included in this principle.” To grasp the basic principle of ethical life is to clarify the dialectical structure of ningen, and since this principle is nothing else than the authentic realization of the dialectically mediated interconnectedness of ningen, the normativity of ethical life as comprised in “the basic issues of ethics” is tied to the ontological structure of ningen itself. Says Watsuji: “The fundamental law of human existence is the movement of the negation of absolute negativity” and “this movement, understood as human action, signifies the sublation of individuality, the realization of ethical (jinrin-teki) unity, and the return to one’s own foundation.”

While Watsuji’s descriptions are overly schematic and abstract, it is evident that, for him, the “return to one’s own foundation” is not so much
an ontological necessity (as it might seem if the dialectical movement were reduced to only represent *ningen’s* fundamental principle) but rather depends on the continuous actualization of the structure of human existence by means of the dialectical movement of dual negation in concrete actions, which, in turn, leads to the formation of ethical unity. For it is only when this movement “comes to a standstill” that *ningen* “falls into an inauthentic mode of existence,” while, on the other hand, maintaining the continuity of the movement means to realize authenticity by fully actualizing the ontological structure of *ningen sonzai*—all of which “is closely tied to the active and practical spheres of human beings.” “An action counts as good because of its being directed to the return to its foundation.” Posed in this generality, this is a rather ambitious claim; trying to make good of it will lead us to the very heart of the normativity issue in Rinrigaku and Fūdo.

For now, to grasp the core of Watsuji’s confrontation with Heidegger, however, it suffices to confirm that, according to Watsuji, Heidegger’s notion of authenticity represents *Dasein’s* insistence on its subjective individuality; it stops short at the second aspect of *ningen’s* movement of dual negation, that is the return to totality. Put differently, on Watsuji’s view, in *Dasein’s* forerunning resoluteness, the movement of dual negation has come to a standstill. Therefore: “What Heidegger calls authenticity is, in reality, inauthenticity.” That is to say, Heidegger has painted himself into the cor-

25. As Watsuji admits, the exposition of the basic principle of human existence alone does not suffice to account for the normative concreteness of ethical life. “Within the purview of this principle, however, these issues [i.e. conscience, freedom, good and evil] cannot yet come to be dealt with concretely, for attention is paid only to the double character of individuality and totality peculiar to *ningen*, and we have not yet embarked upon a study of the structure of a totality inclusive of numerous individuals”; WTZ 10: 27; WATSUJI 1996, 23. Ultimately, without clarifying the structure of *ningen’s* agency, the concept of totality remains abstract, and only on the basis of a concrete understanding of totality, the normativity issue can be dealt with appropriately.

27. WTZ 10: 143; WATSUJI 1996, 135; translation altered.
29. WTZ 10: 141; WATSUJI 1996, 134; translation altered.
30. WTZ 10: 277; WATSUJI 1996, 225. In fact, since authenticity in *Being and Time* represents a radical break not only with the everyday practices of “the They” (*das Man*), but with any involvement in the world, Watsuji has a point in insisting on the abstractness of that notion. That only in refraining from any involvement, authenticity should be realizable is indeed, as Watsuji
ner of fundamental-ontological individualism: While *Dasein*, by negating its involvements in everyday practices, can realize its authenticity, it cannot actualize it without immediately returning to the state of falling from which the movement of forerunning resoluteness was meant to break free. Succinctly put, from what Watsuji calls Heidegger’s “individualistic” notion of authenticity necessarily follows the standstill of the dialectic movement of dual negation. And since Heidegger failed to grasp the dialectical structure of human existence, he was not prepared to give a normatively robust account of authenticity. In transcending the world in the attunement of anxiety and being-towards-death, *Dasein* is catapulted into a space that, since it is normatively void, cannot be connected to a specific place and a historical time. This is what Watsuji means when he claims that Heidegger’s insistence on the superiority of temporality over spatiality prevented him not only from grasping the concrete totality of *Dasein*, but also from spelling out a concrete notion of historicity.31 After *Being and Time*, this conceptual flaw led Heidegger to develop a notion of history that goes beyond the framework of fundamental ontology and terminates in the concept of “History of Being” (*Seinsgeschichte*). To be sure, Watsuji did not take notice of the philosophical development of Heidegger in the 1930s, also known as the Kehre. However, when he presses Heidegger on giving the spatiality of *Dasein* its proper place within the analytics of being-in-the-world, he is well aware of the limits of *Being and Time* on that plane. Therefore, with his account of *ningen*, Watsuji does not wish to balance a one-sidedness of fundamental ontology while maintaining its systematical framework. Since, in *Being and Time*, *Dasein* exists temporally and not historically,32 and since the dialectical movement of *ningen*’s dual negation always concretizes itself in a norma-

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31. “As a result, his [i.e., Heidegger’s] temporality fails to concretize itself in the form of historicity. Instead, it only plays the role of fundamentally grounding ‘beings’ as the object of an individual consciousness. That Heidegger’s main theme was concerned with ‘being and time’, but not with *ningen sonzai* and time, reflects this from the very beginning.” wtz 10: 233; Watsuji 1996, 220; translation altered.

tively structured determinate history and place, his take on the problem of being-in-the-world points beyond the exposition of the ontological structure of *Dasein* in *Being and Time*.33

Even without going any further into the details of Watsuji’s confrontation with Heidegger on the issues of authenticity and totality, it is fair to say that what both are aiming at is to articulate the horizon that makes possible *Dasein*’s and *ningen*’s everyday practices. Although they differ in determining that horizon, the common problem they are trying to come to grips with is “the very possibility of intelligibility at all.”34 When Heidegger and Watsuji touch on ontological problems like that of being and nothingness, or emptiness (*kū*), respectively, they are aiming at determining the ultimate horizon for any possible sense-making of the world and how human agency is possible within this world. What Johnson’s phenomenological reading of Watsuji deserves credit for is nothing less than having highlighted these problems as being indispensable for coming to grips with Watsuji’s theory of *fūdo*.35

IV

If one were to give a common denominator for characterizing Johnson’s multifaceted interpretative approach to Watsuji, one would most likely choose his attempt to translate the structure of the ontological difference in *Being and Time* into Watsuji’s account of *ningen sonzai*. This appears

33. Ultimately, Watsuji and Heidegger offer radically different possibilities for opening up a perspective on Being-in-the-world that articulates the difference between existence in its everydayness and its authentic mode. With regard to *Being and Time*, this is obvious, since *Dasein*’s fore-running resoluteness marks a break in the inevitable movement of falling. While Watsuji is not that explicit, he, too, determines *ningen*’s totality as “possibility” and concedes that “in its everydayness, human existence is not concerned with its authentic countenance (*honrai no menmoku*)”; WTZ 10: 196–7; WATSUJI 1996, 188; translation altered.

34. Pippin 2005, 59. Again, with regard to *Being and Time*, this is obvious, while pinning down Watsuji’s take on this problem is more difficult. I will expand on this in the last section.

35. However, as I will try to show, carving out the intelligibility problem in *Fūdo* is possible only by taking into account the issues of wholeness and authenticity. Not that *Fūdo* is the last resort for making good of Watsuji’s dialectical ethics; it is rather the other way round: Watsuji’s theory of *fūdo* is truncated if the issues of human agency and its inherent normativity are sidestepped.
to be necessary for him to lead back Watsuji’s notion of subjective spatiality to a realistic (in Johnson’s parlance: “physical”) notion of space that would figure as the key for not only solving the problem of how Watsuji’s notoriously imprecise remarks about the unity in difference in *ningen*’s ontological structure (*jita-funi*; “self-other-not-two”) are to be made sense of, but also, and more importantly, how a realistic notion of space undergirds any possible account of being-in-the-world and the intelligibility of entities. In this regard, Johnson obviously wishes to go beyond both Heidegger (who, in *Being and Time*, did not arrive at a notion of space at all) and Watsuji (whose notion of space remains by and large hermeneutical); this makes for much of the novelty of his interpretation. For getting an idea of how Johnson’s translational approach plays itself out, we will have to look at some examples.

In his “attempt to reconstruct”36 the dialectic of *ningen*, Johnson addresses the difference between “the metaphysical structure of non-dualism and the basic movement underlying human life”37—a move which is obviously inspired by a Buddhist reading of certain concepts in *Rinrigaku*, particularly the concept of *ningen* itself. Having instigated this differentiation, Johnson goes on to maintain “that Watsuji’s confused and confusing attempt to identify the movement of the self between individuation and community with the metaphysical structure of the nondual whole of human existence *as such*”38 leads to all kind of problems.

It is not clear at all in what respect Johnson calls the non-dual structure of *ningen* metaphysical, but it is evident that, for Watsuji, it is neither a pre-critical entity like, for instance, monads or Platonic ideas,39 nor could it be a transcendental structure in a Kantian sense that would provide the condition of the possibility of human agency. After all, according to Watsuji’s self-understanding, the method of *Rinrigaku* is hermeneutics, not transcendental philosophy. In fact, Watsuji himself never maintained that difference with the clarity expressed in Johnson’s claim. Instead, he renders what he calls “the Absolute” as intelligible only in and through its actualization in a

38. Johnson 2019, 111.
finite ethical totality, such as family, company, society, and the state. Therefore, when he introduces the four areas of problems he wishes to address in *Rinrigaku*—(1) the dual structure of *ningen sonzai*, (2) the concrete analysis of this structure, (3) the problem of solidarity within ethical organizations, and (4) the climatic-historical structure of *ningen sonzai*—Watsuji exposes them as interconnected in that they are to be investigated on the same level of analysis; no methodological shift can be observed throughout the first three chapters of *Rinrigaku* that make up volume ten of Watsuji’s Collected Works. Watsuji’s critique of the absence of a notion of concrete historicity in *Being and Time* would be incomprehensible if he were to introduce an equally abstract concept of non-dualism to expound the notion of *ningen*. This would inevitably raise the question how out of that concept the historical concreteness of human existence would have to be derived. Rather, in the discussion of Nāgārjuna, which Johnson draws on, Watsuji maintains that the problem of how out of a state of non-differentiation (*kū*-*mu*-sabetsu), difference (*fū-kū*, i.e. *sabetsu*) arises, could be discussed in a meaningful way only if one understands the principle of *kū* as activity of “emptying itself”: “If one says that the essence of ‘emptying’ (*kūzuru*) means to realize itself in such an Other [i.e. *sabetsu* / HPL], then *kū* necessarily is nothing else but ‘giv-

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40. Cf. *W* 10: 129–30; WATSUBI 1996, 123: “Without the formation of ethical (*jinrin-teki*) wholes, the movement of returning to the Absolute could not occur;” translation altered. Similarly, cf. *W* 10: 126–7; WATSUBI 1996, 120: “Due to their negative structure, practical and active human beings are finite beings. The absoluteness of absolute negativity lies in its being in accordance with this finitude.” These remarks surely are not suitable to give evidence to an “effort” on Watsuji’s side “to directly correlate the processes of individuation and communion with the multiplicity of the one, that is with the nondual totality;” JOHNSON 1996, 111.


42. If the above-mentioned list were to substantiate Johnson’s claim, I suggest that (1) and (2) would equal the “metaphysical structure of non-dualism,” whereas (3) and (4) would cover the “basic movement underlying human life.” However, Watsuji neither discriminates ontologically between these four areas, nor does he discuss them as relative to some higher level of investigation. To be sure, there is a different level of analysis involved, but only as an extension of problem (4), which leads to the issue of “national morality discourse” (*kokumin dōtoku ron*). Watsuji expounds on this as follows: “This topic has two aspects: as the study of principles and of history... These two must not be confounded. Still, even the study of principle cannot be completely separated from the problem of history;” *W* 10: 30; WATSUBI 1996, 26. While this last remark is meant to characterize the proper approach to the topic of national morality, it accurately depicts also the nature of inquiry into problems (1) to (4). More on this below.

ing birth to difference.” The intricacies of Buddhist ontological discourse aside, this view is reflected in Rinrigaku. As we have seen, Watsuji claims that the “fundamental law of human existence” (that is, the return to absolute totality via the movement of dual negation) reveals itself and is realized only in and through the “context of common practices” (実践的行為的連関). However, the practices of ningen can never become identical with absolute totality, since the latter only provides the direction in which the practical movement of ningen has to be carried out. In this respect, says Watsuji, is the “self-return of the absolute... the direction of its infinite realization.”

If my understanding of Johnson is correct, by differentiating between metaphysical principle and concrete practical movement he sets the stage for applying Heidegger’s notion of ontological difference to the systematic framework of Rinrigaku. The problem raised by introducing that differentiation is how to phenomenologically describe ningen’s constant movement of individuation and return to the whole, and Johnson seeks to solve it by further differentiating four phenomenologically distinct layers of subjective space which, in their totality, are contained in the “world space.”

These sketchy remarks can impossibly do justice to the hermeneutical boldness and phenomenological richness of Johnson’s reconstruction. However, for the purpose of this paper, it is more important to note that Johnson, despite his careful reading of Watsuji’s texts, never loses sight of his own philosophical project, that is the overcoming of subjectivism. It is for this reason that he claims that Watsuji, since his concept of subjective space owes much to the notion of spatiality in Being and Time, “runs squarely into a problem that Heidegger’s account generates but never resolves.” Like Heidegger, Watsuji “has difficulty in unambiguously incorporating the spatiality of containment into his overall account of subjective space.” Only a realistic notion of space, as I read Johnson, “can function as a receptacle

44. Wtz 9: 475.
45. Wtz 10: 127; Watsuji 1996, 121; translation altered.
46. Strictly speaking, this differentiation is already prepared in Johnson’s suggestion to distinguish two different meanings of aidagara: (1) “relational contact” and (2) “direct interactional exchange;” Johnson 2019, 85. For him, (1) is more foundational than (2), since it is tied to the realistic notion of space I will refer to in the following.
47. Johnson 2019, 127.
within which we find both ourselves and the assemblages of equipment that help to compose the internal structure of the world. This space, in turn, must be rooted in a particular kind of location or place it is to be capable of surrounding and containing human beings and the objects produced by them in this way. It is this dimension of space that Watsuji appears to suppress in his account of the hierarchy of forms of space.49

Johnson’s point is that the dialectical movement of separation and unification can take place only within a space that separates and at the same time connects a multitude of individuals. Watsuji addresses this problem under the heading of “subjective spatiality.” Since this is to signify a symbolically charged space of shared meaning and understanding, it provides the hermeneutical underpinning for the dialectical movement to materialize in concrete, normatively informed actions. In that Johnson reduces this movement to a realistic notion of space, his inquiry is, sensu stricto, no longer a reconstruction of Watsuji’s intentions. That is, Johnson’s introduction of the notion of world space leads him to a reading of ningen’s practices, its involvement with entities and with others that is normatively void; he reduces Watsuji’s hermeneutically complex analysis of common practices, how they are mutually understood, and more importantly, Watsuji’s rather unusual claim that ningen “has” the entities it deals with (including herself), to the phenomenon of “disclosure.” It is at this stage of the inquiry that the truly challenging part of Johnson’s endeavor is brought front and center.

V

Making explicit the connection between dialectic and normativity in Rinrigaku has revealed that, according to Watsuji, in her everyday practices, ningen can get it right or not. Not any attempt to actualize the structure of dual negation will do; aidagara can, in fact, fail. To stress this point, Watsuji seems to have felt the need to borrow from Heidegger the notion of authenticity. It can be doubted that, with this move, he did himself a service; it can be asked whether relying on Heidegger didn’t force him to expound an ethical ideal that is difficult (if not impossible) to substantiate in ningen’s everyday practices. It is, therefore, not surprising that Watsuji

failed to show how the formal account of authenticity is linked to a normatively determined horizon of common practices within a specific place and time, i.e. a concrete context of common practices. However, there are, in fact, good reasons to argue that, for the sake of argumentative consistency in Rinrigaku, the formation of aidagara cannot but be guided by some normative yardstick; otherwise Watsuji’s discussion of authenticity and the possible wholeness of ningen would become obsolete. The question Watsuji doesn’t develop himself but which, nevertheless, makes itself unmistakably heard, is this: “How is aidagara brought into existence so that the normative orientation the dialectical movement of dual negation received from the fundamental law of ningen sonzai can be translated into a historically and climatically concrete context of common practices?”

Johnson repeatedly claims (and rightly so) that Watsuji’s explications often lack conceptual precision. This is also true for his account of the inherent normativity of aidagara; therefore, it needs to be unpacked. However, in that Johnson heavily stresses the bodily aspect of ningen sonzai and its spatial containment, he absents himself from attending to this task. This is particularly obvious in his reading of what Watsuji treats as “expressions” (hyōgen) of ningen sonzai. By carrying out a shrewd deconstruction of Watsuji’s usage of this term, Johnson aims at reducing what I would call Watsuji’s hermeneutical space of meaning and understanding to a space of atmospheres and affordances. For this purpose, he (again) introduces a differentiation that Watsuji himself did not make, but which, from Johnson’s phenomenological point of view, suggests itself.

Drawing on a linguistic ambiguity of the term ningen sonzai which could be translated as both “human being” and “human existence,” Johnson distinguishes two kinds of expressive function of inner-worldly entities, particularly artifacts and tools; according to him, they express (1) “their practical significance” for human existence, or (2) “the self-externalization of human beings [that is] forms of aidagara.”50 While for Watsuji the crucial point about expressions is that they are understood by ningen within a context of shared meaning, and therefore provide a methodological access to the hermeneutical space of ningen sonzai, Johnson maintains that expressions allow also for opening up a space of affordances that is disclosed prior to

any hermeneutical act of interpretation on the side of *ningen*. That is to say, on Johnson’s view, *ningen* (her actions and her mood) is determined by the atmospheres generated by the artifacts and tools that are part of the world space, and we understand the practical significance of these entities “in terms of what [they] afford and do not afford.”

While all this is coherent in a phenomenological sense, it leaves open how the issue of normativity, which is, as we saw, central to Watsuji’s project, can be accommodated within this account. To be sure, Johnson’s distinction of “the social, artifactual, and natural dimensions” of space is illuminating in that it helps to structure the different fields in which entities are understood. However, in that he situates understanding within “the physical spatiality of containment,” the question of how an understanding of entities is shaped by the normative demands that pervade *aidagara* gets out of focus. That, for Watsuji, there are such demands is beyond doubt. His constant reference to the forms (*kata*), “ways” (*shikata*) and “manners” (*sahō*) that determine *ningen*’s involvements with entities and others points in this direction. Therefore, I would qualify the interpretation Johnson applies to Watsuji’s example of waking up and having breakfast in a family home. The fact that this situation requires other forms of comportment than, for example, waking up and having breakfast in an inn or a boardinghouse, has nothing to do with the dining room’s furniture or the flavor of the food Johnson puts emphasis on, but with the normative horizon, the understanding of which goes along with living in these different kinds of dwellings. What is at issue here is first and foremost an understanding of these normative horizons, and not so much “a shared palate and a communal set of preferences;” and even these are accompanied by “manners of eating” which point at the emphasis Watsuji puts on the normative claims that are pervading the various kinds of comportment within *aidagara*, and which, in the example under consideration, also determine the “exchange of words and gestures within a family.”

51. Johnson 2019, 139.
52. Johnson 2019, 130.
53. Ibid.
54. Cf. *WTZ* 9, 163, where Watsuji explicitly draws these comparisons.
55. Johnson, 137.
56. *WTZ* 9, 164.
57. Ibid.
during breakfast. So, what is communal here is, of course, a shared palate and other common culinary preferences—Johnson gets this point perfectly right. But what escapes his attention is the fact that these commonalities can only be actualized and understood within a normatively determined horizon of a shared understanding of what kind of comportment is required by a specific context, be it boardinghouse or family home. It can be doubted whether Harold Garfinkel’s subjects did really enjoy their breakfast.58

So, waking up and having breakfast can go wrong. And getting it right is different from merely being solicited by affordances. If a wife serves her husband who is holding out to her his rice bowl in his usual demanding way, she is responding to what the rice bowl affords to her in a material sense; and yet, for her getting it right depends on whether she serves her husband with the appropriate sabō, that is a norm of comportment which is part of the shared understanding in a typical Japanese family of the early Shōwa period. Serving him, for instance, in a careless or defiant manner would constitute a violation of that norm. There is, in fact, a wide range of possible modifications inherent to any comportment or action within aidagara that stretches beyond what can be explained by referring to affordances or atmospheres. Getting it right implies an awareness for these possibilities. Therefore, I would hold with Watsuji that also artifacts like rice bowls give expression to ningen sonzai in both senses, and that actions and comportments within aidagara virtually “contain a limitless amount of understanding.”59 This is not to deny the importance of atmospheres created by artifacts and spaces for a comprehensive description of ningen sonzai, and Johnson deserves credit not only for making this explicit but also for disclosing the descriptive potential hidden in Watsuji’s texts. The problem is how to get from atmosphere to normativity. The fact that, in Johnson’s account, the question of how to differentiate between success and failure of such everyday comportments and actions does not surface, affects also his reading of Watsuji’s characterization of ningen’s relation to entities in terms of “having” them.

58. Cf. Garfinkel 1967. In one of Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological experiments, students who were living with their parents had to comport themselves as if they were living in a boarding house. The result was a total breakdown of the mutual understanding between the family members.

59. Wtz 9, 142.
VI

In a truly masterful interpretative tour de force, Johnson unearths behind Watsuji’s claim that entities are because ningen “has” them the structure of disclosure. One cannot but admire the philosophical rigor of Johnson’s “speculative reconstruction,”60 which sets out to transfer Heidegger’s notion of “clearance” (Lichtung) into Watsuji theory of ningen, and I am perfectly comfortable with his contention that “the larger philosophical point that Watsuji wishes to establish amounts to a claim about the human capacity to disclose the world.”61 However, everything depends upon how “disclosure” is to be interpreted in the context of Watsuji’s theory of ningen, and it is in this regard I wish to add some clarifications.

Similar to Heidegger, Johnson maintains that the clearance is the site of ningen’s disclosure of the world; and like Heidegger, he avoids the question of how the clearance is held open, which would be essential if ningen were to go on with her common practices of disclosing entities. Translated into Watsuji’s parlance, the continuous movement of dual negation within a context of common practices would have to depend on a shared understanding of the normative horizon that is carrying ningen’s common disclosure of entities. For Watsuji, only within such a horizon can entities be disclosed. Hence, he is unambiguous in maintaining that there is no entity ningen can encounter that does not belong to the structure of aidagara and, therefore, depend on the fundamental law of human existence:

Such things as the historical world, the natural world, and logic can all be discovered (mi-idasaruru) in human existence.... The subjective human existence is the basis on which all objective beings are brought into existence (nari-tatashimeru). If so, then we have to say that what obviously follows from this is that the historical world, the natural world, and so forth, all take in their respective and specific ways the fundamental law of human beings as their fundamental principle.62

This is arguably the most comprehensive of Watsuji’s various claims about

60. Johnson 2019, 170.
61. Johnson 2019, 163.
62. WTZ 10: 125–6; Watsuji 1996, 119; translation altered. Needless to say that, with these remarks, Watsuji does not espouse subjective idealism or some Neo-platonic theory of entities emanating from a supreme, metaphysical principle; cf. WTZ 10: 126.
ningen’s “having” of entities in that here, the discovering of entities is tied to the normatively determined structure of *ningen sonzai*. This is to say that, for Watsuji, the discovery of entities is something that, similar to comportments and acts in a specific *aidagara*, can fail. Now, Watsuji does not elaborate on the conditions for success or failure in this regard, but when he claims that not only entities but whole worlds (history, nature, logic) are brought into existence by *ningen*’s subjectivity, he seems to espouse the view that the conditions for any intelligibility of entities in general depends on some kind of sense-making activity.

Therefore, Johnson is right in maintaining that “the objectivity of objects is always contaminated with (and made possible by) the subjectivities of subjects.” But what he has offered here with one hand, he takes back with the other when he adds that “an entity is what it is because we are ‘there’ for and present to it; we have it in or it enters to our awareness.... This openness to being is an openness that we are rather than one that we have.” It seems as if Johnson holds (with Heidegger, from whom he quotes) that, within the context of Watsuji’s comprehensive claim, the objectivity of objects is something that simply “occurs” or “happens.” Similar to the case of affordances, Johnson wishes to reduce *ningen*’s sense-making activity to something more fundamental, in this context: “disclosure.” And the question which arises now is how to get from disclosure to the formation of normative horizons. These remarks hardly suffice for coming to grips with what is at stake here; even giving an in-depth interpretation of Watsuji’s claim and how it connects with Johnson’s contention about *ningen*’s disclosure is beyond the scope of this paper.

Therefore, my claim that Watsuji touches on a fundamental layer of *ningen*’s sense-making practices in that he maintains that the way in which *ningen* discloses entities is normatively structured by virtue of “*ningen sonzai*’s constant creation,” must remain undefended. However, in turning to *Fudo*, I will try, at least provisionally, to corroborate my claim.
“Is” ningen its openness or does ningen “have” it? Breaking down the normativity issue in Watsuji ultimately leads us to this very question. While it is not clear how, on the basis of a notion of ningen being its openness, the normative demands that are pervading aidagara can be thematized, Watsuji’s claim about ningen having its openness, although lacking conceptual underpinning, allows for addressing this problem.

All the same, the problem of normativity in Watsuji cannot be avoided; even Johnson concedes that ningen’s “shared understanding... or the lack of one, is determined largely on the basis of a shared background of values, ideas, and norms.”66 Now the philosophical interesting question is how these values, ideas, and norms come into being, how they are established, actualized, acknowledged, justified, transformed, and so forth. Johnson gets very close to this question, when he discusses the issue of “dialectic of freedom and determination”67 in Watsuji. His remark deserves to be given in full:

While the past, based in fūdo and carried into the present in the form of tradition, is experienced as determinative for us, we are able to transcend this determination to some extent, not by leaving behind our culture of fūdo—since these are part of the very setting that makes possible human life and activity—but through the production of new equipment and artifacts and the creation of new ways of thinking, and so of speaking, acting, and feeling, all of which, in turn, open up nature in novel ways and thus also furnish new modes of self-understanding.68

I am in full agreement with the overall thrust of Johnson’s contention, but I also wish to ask for an explanation of why and how all this production and creation, which, by borrowing from Watsuji, can be summarized as “development” of aidagara and its expressions,69 is carried out in the first place. Why not simply stick to one’s tradition? As Watsuji maintains, “aidagara as such moves forward into the future,” and, thereby, “forms of how communities are shaped, forms of consciousness, and, hence, ways

67. Johnson 2019, 188.
68. Johnson 2019, 189.
69. Cf. wtz 10: 38.
of creating language, furthermore, forms of production, ways of building houses, and so forth”70 are developed. Bringing into being these kinds of entities depends on “our own freedom” as well as on “phenomena of fūdo,” while at the same time, “we have appropriated the understanding that has been accumulated since the times of our ancestors,”71 which accounts for the “climatic load”72 ningen has to carry. That is, the freedom of bringing into being various entities, which, as expressions, function as the horizon for ningen’s self-understanding, depends on the interconnectedness of fūdo and history/tradition. Says Watsuji: “We saw ourselves in fūdo, and, in this self-understanding, we turned towards our own free self-formation.”73 In my rendering, ningen does not simply “encounter” her free self-formation, as Johnson translates this passage,74 but purposefully attends to it. In other words, against the backdrop of Watsuji’s comprehensive claim above, the formation (keisei) of aidagara (like the discovery of entities) is a normative enterprise; it, therefore, can fail. Moreover, this normative enterprise has a historical dimension. Therefore, to get it right, a normative yardstick beyond the sense-making activities mentioned so far is indispensable. Neither in Rinrigaku nor in Fūdo does Watsuji provide any suggestion of how to render this problem, although it makes itself heard. Only in volume three of Rinrigaku, where he ties the development of aidagara to a progressive history of human freedom, Watsuji offers a solution to this problem.75

VIII

To bring this review to a close: With his inquiry into the significance the phenomena of subjective spatiality, physical space, and natural

70. WtZ 8: 18.
71. Ibid.
72. WtZ 8: 20.
73. WtZ 8: 12.
74. Johnson 2019, 187. Besides the context of this sentence, it is the past tense of the verb mukatta that indicates that it is meant to clarify the sentence before, which ends, also in past tense, on the verb tsukuri-dashita, “created,” “produced.” So, in my reading, Watsuji writes in retrospect that, when ningen created those entities, she saw herself in fūdo and turned towards / attended to her own free self-formation.
place have for Watsuji’s concept of *ningen*, David Johnson has pushed the established interpretative paradigm “Watsuji and Heidegger” to its limits. Moreover, in doing so, he has also helped to bring into sharper relief the problems this paradigm has generated but cannot solve. Particularly the issue of normativity in Watsuji can be pursued only in going beyond the “Watsuji and Heidegger” paradigm. That is to say, overcoming subjectivism (understood as Cartesianism) not necessarily depends on a phenomenology in the line of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Dreyfus. By acknowledging the aspect of normatively determined formation in *ningen*’s self- and world-relation without relapsing into subjectivism, Watsuji has given us much to think about other, equally viable possibilities of anti-Cartesianism. What we can learn from Watsuji is that these possibilities do not exclude each other but overlap. There is, in fact, abundant textual evidence for both a phenomenological and dialectical reading of Watsuji. Johnson, by maintaining that *ningen* is the site for disclosure, has succeeded in carving out the phenomenological Watsuji, while, in my emphasis on *ningen*’s making intelligible what she encounters, insisted on taking into account the dialectical aspects of his thought. These two readings are no strict alternatives; they rather complement each other. Only a stereoscopic view that embraces both problems of space and normativity can do justice to Watsuji’s ethical and *fūdoic* thought. Having opened our eyes for this stereoscopic view, is, in my light, Johnson’s greatest achievement.

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**Abbreviations**

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>HGA</td>
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Prof. Liederbach’s rich and wide-ranging analysis offered much to reflect on and learn from. I note with special appreciation his observation that by juxtaposing Watsuji’s work and Heidegger’s, I furnish “a stereoscopic view of the problems under consideration” and provide “the optic for a philosophical investigation in its own right.” In fact, one of my central aims in bringing these thinkers together was—to borrow a felicitous phrase from Tom Kasulis’s description of his own approach to comparative studies—“to help us perceive a dimension that neither alone could fully access.”1

There is unfortunately not space enough here to address all of the issues that were opened up by Liederbach’s expert account of the relation between Watsuji’s thought and Being and Time. I will instead focus my remarks on what appears to be the central matter in question, namely, that I leave unaddressed the issue of normativity in relation to aidagara. Although the normative center of gravity of my study was located in the task of recovering a reenchanted conception of nature through the concept of fūdo, it is also true that, as Liederbach observes, “Watsuji’s theory of fūdo is truncated if the issues of human agency and its inherent normativity are sidestepped.” This point shows the difficulty of giving a full account of fūdo without also providing an account of aidagara, and vice-versa. Indeed, this book as originally conceived proposed to examine in full both of these dimensions of what I called the “topological self.” Such a project, however, turns out to be too substantial and unwieldy to be contained in a single volume.

Perhaps the first thing to be said about these issues is something that Prof. Leiderbach could not have known, namely, that rather than it being the case (as he puts it) that I overlooked or absented myself from attending to the task of presenting an account of the inherent normativity of aidagara, there was not sufficient space to do so due to restrictions the publisher placed on the length of the manuscript. It is now clear to me that I should have signaled more directly in the book itself what had been left aside for reasons of

space. And because this study was explicitly centered on the concept of fūdo, and since, as Liederbach acknowledges, Watsuji himself did not manage to address this problem in a substantive manner, my own forays into the question of the normative dimensions of aidagara remain just that, forays. But I note that this means that I did not ignore or overlook the problem of the normative aspects of being-in-relation tout court. For example, in Chapter 5, Sec. III “Between Individual and Communal: Oscillation and Dialectic” I explain why and in what sense the formation of aidagara must be understood “as nothing less than the unfolding and development of ethical life” and give a range of examples that show the sense in which “the social and individual poles that structure our existence are sites of moral danger as well as of moral self-realization.” Liederbach does not comment on this section of the text, but it may be the case that this analysis is too brief. In this regard I am happy to have the opportunity to include here some of what was cut from the original manuscript, since I think these passages offer an example of one way of responding to the pressing question which Liederbach raises of how aidagara is “brought into existence” such that its “normative orientation, the dialectical movement of dual negation” “can be translated into a historically and climactically concrete context of common practices.” Just before Sec. III, the excised passages read:

We need not only speak and act with others “as” a strict mother, or genial uncle, or concerned teacher—we can also adverbially modify our actions in ways that are not directly linked to our social roles, and conduct ourselves in a fashion which expresses a specific manner of existence.

One of the most sensitive and acute accounts of the way in which this dimension of the self emerges from our styles of interaction can be found in the work of Michael Oakeshott. I want to briefly consider Oakeshott’s view of the self in order to augment Watsuji’s pivotal—but underdeveloped—claim that one becomes an individual in relation to others. The self for Oakeshott is best understood—just as it is for Watsuji—as an activity rather than as a substance or thing. The self is never in a state of rest or passivity out of which, to use Oakeshott’s examples, activities such as perceiving, feeling, desiring, thinking, laughing, crying, dancing, and so on, emerge. We are active from the moment we are born, since not to be active is not to be alive.

Oakeshott maintains that activity is constitutive of the self insofar as the self discloses itself through goal-oriented action and through transactions with other selves. Such self-disclosure brings an identity into existence, but this identity lacks a substantial core or essence: an agent “has a ‘history’, but no ‘nature’, he is what in conduct he becomes.”

If action is the source of the self, it is also the source of much of the contingency and frustration in human life. Our actions in relation to other selves are subject to what they think and do and as such can be thwarted or foiled by them. Further, even if an actor were to achieve his or her desired aim, this creates circumstances with new problems and needs which will in due course necessitate another response, so that every achievement is at the same time a frustration. The desiring self that inhabits this world is caught up in an endless round of satisfying wants and needs, so that from this standpoint, human activity can come to seem futile.

While the self viewed as a collection of actions directed towards particular goals is subject to frustration, failure and defeat, self-disclosure is only one aspect of the self. The self consists not only of those actions related to the ends that we seek to accomplish in doing what we do, it can also be seen in terms of how we do what we do. This is “an agent’s sentiment in choosing and performing the actions he chooses and performs.” Agents or actors are able to qualify their actions adverbially, to do this or that in a particular manner. An agent may perform the same act in a different sentiment: “grudgingly, charitably, maliciously, obligingly, magnanimously, piously, spitefully, gratefully, avariciously.” The sentiments or adverbial modifications with which Oakeshott is concerned above all are those that enhance the quality of an action in a non-instrumental way. These sentiments are chosen based on who we understand ourselves to be, as well as who we are trying to become. Insofar as through these choices we cultivate specific virtues and motives in aspiring to become a particular sort of person, we enact ourselves as we wish to be and acquire a distinctive self.

This aspect of the self, moreover, is more fully sheltered from contingency than self-disclosure. Self-enactment does not seek or depend on the responses of others. Nor does the value and integrity of the self from this point of view come from the successful or unsuccessful consequences of choices. Oakeshott illustrates this point with the example of a battle. Even

4. Ibid., 71.
5. Ibid., 72.
when a battle is lost, the loyalty and fortitude of the actors is an achievement that cannot be defeated in the same way. This thought, too, lies behind his observation that “Cervantes created a character in whom the disaster of each encounter with the world was powerless to impugn it as a self-enactment.”

Like other philosophers in the twentieth century, Oakeshott worried about the triumph in our era of utility as the master value by which to measure all others. He was especially concerned with the way in which the pragmatic standpoint reduced all meaningful and worthwhile action to instrumental action, so that the significance and value of our activities depends on outcomes such as the satisfaction of our desires and the achievement of our purposes. Since for this view the value and meaning of what we undertake to do is fragile, fleeting, and finally elusive, this way of understanding human activity threatens to close off the possibility of a certain kind of autonomy and even of a certain kind of happiness. Oakeshott, who had a keen sense of the limits and risks of action, was alert to the danger. Like Aristotle, he took a tragic view of action and understood that the complexity, obscurity, and fragility of human action meant that suffering and failure are ever-present possibilities in the nature of action itself. Human finitude and human blindness mean that we can fail to see where our actions will finally lead, that we can be overwhelmed by the complexity of events, and that we are in important ways powerless in the face of contingent events and circumstances. And even where we manage in the face of all of this to attain our ends and so achieve something of value, the instrumental logic of getting and achieving tends to subvert what has been accomplished, since this attainment only results in a situation with new problems and conditions that will eventually call for a further response, leading to a never-ending pursuit of satisfactions.

Oakeshott hence ties the question of individuation to the problem of how to live in the face of the contingency and sense of futility that characterize large areas of human life and action. His view is that although neither the vulnerability of action nor what he calls the “deadliness” or endlessness of doing can ever be completely overcome—so that our basic situation is a predicament to be contended with and not a problem to be solved—this predicament can be abated, and even escaped to some extent, through a particular mode of self-fashioning. So that while for Oakeshott as for Watsuji, we disclose who we are and construct who we are becoming only in interactions with others, Oakeshott also wants to show that my transactions with others
allow me to be a certain way for them not only in terms of what my social roles prescribe, but also in terms of how I do what I do with, for, or against them. Insofar as these adverbial modifications of actions and behavior express my singular way of being in speaking, walking, acting, and so forth, they amount to the enactment of a distinctive self.

Oakeshott’s approach thus shows how a normative orientation can be established through an ideal of dialectical self-formation understood in terms of intrinsic value, and so in relation to a value that escapes the pragmatic assessments and instrumental logic that structures so much of contemporary life.

Liederbach also contends that I reduce Watsuji’s hermeneutical space of meaning and understanding to a space of atmospheres and affordances. As a result, I focus too exclusively on the dimension of practical intelligibility at the expense of the normative aspects of our activity of sense-making. But I wonder if the claims about reductivism are not somewhat overstated. I describe and investigate Watsuji’s hermeneutical space of meaning in ways that reach substantially beyond the phenomenon of practical intelligibility at various stages throughout the study, notably in Chapter 4, “The Relational Self: A New Conception” (esp. Sections i and iii), Chapter 6, Sec. ii “World Space and Social Tenor,” and Chapter 7, Sec. v, “Shared Intentionality as Disclosive Comportment.” These portions of the book are peppered with examples of the normative demands that pervade aidagara (and even of how an understanding of entities is shaped by such demands, as for instance in how a stage, kitchen, horse farm landscape, field, or seascape shows up is dependent on comportments that are inherently normative), so the complaint here must not be the lack of such descriptions, but something else.

If I have understood Liederbach correctly, this something else is that “the question of how to differentiate between success and failure of such everyday comportments and actions does not surface,” as well as that “the philosophically interesting question is how these values, ideas, and norms come into being, how they are established, actualized, acknowledged, justified, transformed, and so forth.” Each of these questions represent distinct and formidable philosophical problems in their own right; to even begin to address them would have required—at the very least—an additional chapter. Although it was not possible to include such a chapter for reasons of
space, these kinds of issues were indeed on my mind; in another now excised section I began to explore the question of how social relations can be normatively grounded beyond the sheer fact of our having established this ground—which is where Watsuji leaves these questions (see, for example, WTZ 10: 246–8, 252, 254–6). And while Watsuji does not really provide an account of how the normative demands that pervade aidagara come to be “established, actualized, acknowledged,” or address the problem of justifying norms (both their success conditions and their transformation), I indicated in Chapter 8 what a “realism” about values as properties and qualities in our lived experience of nature might look like in a way that comports well with Watsuji’s own philosophical commitments. The now excised passages extended these indications into an exploration of the form a viable moral realism might take within a hermeneutic and phenomenological framework. In what follows I provide a summary of what was set out there. I realize that these ideas are by no means uncontroversial and not without some daunting obstacles still to be overcome; I intended only to sketch what one robust response to these issues might look like. While these all too brief remarks will not address every point that was made, I hope that they will be viewed as supplementing and enlarging Liederbach’s own focus on the normative dimension of sense-making in Watsuji.

I began with an examination of the ways in which the phenomenology of our moral experience resists external, objective accounts of what happens in such experiences. My claim is that the best explanations are those that are formulated from within the experience itself. And if, as I try to show, these are the best accounts that we have, we will be justified in positing the existence of whatever is entailed by such explanations. Here this will mean the existence of moral (and aesthetic) facts as irreducible configurations in what appears that warrant our evaluative judgments, or merit a response in the form of an action or in the taking up of an affective attitude.

One of the main objections to a view such as this is that we cannot know when our responses are the right ones, and that this is reflected in the not uncommon failure to reach agreement about ethical questions. These problems, in turn, casts doubt on the truth of moral realism itself. To address the question of how it is that we can come to know that our judgments about normative facts (i.e., detectible properties or qualities of an object, action, or situation that require us to take a specific action, or that merit a particu-
lar affective attitude) are true judgments, I turn to Gadamer’s hermeneutic conception of truth. Gadamer shows how a judgment which is finite, which functions within a particular historical and cultural horizon, and which is linguistically mediated and so always made from a context of prejudices, can nevertheless make a claim to truth. In doing so, he provides us with a plausible and attractive alternative to that form of truth characterized by certainty and objectivity and reached through method that has monopolized the modern sense of truth.

In considering the problem posed by the existence of moral disagreement, especially as evinced by extreme moral variation between people and cultures, I hold that we can account for much of this by attending to the distinctions to be made between different kinds of disagreement. If we are careful about such distinctions, we will see that some moral disagreements can be traced to the phenomenon of what Isaiah Berlin calls value pluralism, other disagreements can be reduced to disagreements about the interpretation of the non-moral facts, and yet other disagreements can be attributed to the inadequate or distorted apprehension of the normative landscape by one party to the dispute. This misapprehension, in turn, can be accounted for if we are willing to accept that there are some aspects of the world that are only revealed by exercising a certain kind of sensitivity (analogous to a perceptual capacity) that is affective as well as cognitive, and that some are exemplary in their sensitivity, while others misperceive, misapprehend, or simply miss, the relevant facts.

In short, once we have accepted the existence of moral qualities and values as properties of things, persons, situations, and actions, there seems to be no reason why there could not be better and worse apprehensions of such properties, much in the same way that we acknowledge that there is better and worse in visual perception, or in textual interpretations, or skill in everything from flying airplanes to playing chess—since all of these activities involve the ability to pick out what is salient, or important, or normative in a situation. In the same manner, it may be that we can explain some disagreements over what is right as attributable to the superior perceptual capacities of a moral exemplar.

To modern ears this kind of moral realism sounds hopelessly subjective. What reasons could we have for deferring to the perceptual judgments of an exemplar, who has somehow “seen” something in the world that others
have not? A satisfactory response to this might begin with the seemingly uncontroversial point that perception is always interpretive—the same people notice different things or see the same things differently—but not every interpretation is as good as any other; some interpretations are better than others because they are richer or more penetrating, because they are more accurate or encompass a wider range of phenomena, that is, because they do justice to what is perceived. This, in turn, is a consequence of the fact that the overall orientation and sensibility of the experiencing subject can determine what appears, such that some people are able to perceive things that others miss. My suggestion is that the appearance of what is good can sometimes depend on the exercise of a sensibility that accurately deploys affectivity as a form of cognition, that is oriented by a specific set of interests, and that has been formed by experience and training.

This does not mean that an exemplar is an infallible standard for what is right in every case. Her judgments are always human judgments, that is, they are made within a community of interpreters with whom she is in dialogue and by whom she can be corrected about the matter at hand, and they are made from a particular historical and cultural perspective and so open to future revision. We may also have to acknowledge that human finitude and human limits, in the form of the inherent and intractable complexity of human experience and the multifarious character of the larger linguistic, cultural, and historical reality within which it is situated, suggest that there will always be disagreements about the meaning of experience, such that reaching the completeness of truth will always remain, to borrow Gadamer’s phrase, “an infinite task.”